Theology of social justice and forgiveness in an economic context (debt) by Blount, Graham Keith
A Theology of Social Justice and Forgiveness in an Economic Context (Debt)
Graham Keith Blount
A Thesis submitted for the degree ofDoctor ofPhilosophy
at the University ofEdinburgh in 1995
This thesis has been composed by the candidate and has not been submitted for anv
previous degree. All quotations have been distinguished and the sources of
information acknowledged.
Acknowledgments
There are so many people to whom I am indebted, people who have talked, listened,
written, and generally been supportive to me in all kinds of ways during the
preparation of this thesis. I particularly want to thank
Professor Duncan Forrester and Dr J I H McDonald, my supervisors and more than
that, who have been encouraging, stimulating, helpful and understanding
throughout, and Dr Alex Robertson in the Department of Social Policy, who
stretched my competence, particularly with regard to the questionnaire and its
results:
the interviewees who willingly and openly shared their insights, expertise, and
sometimes painful experience with debt in response to my questionnaire;
the Hope Trust and Ldinburgh University Divinity Faculty Scholarships Committee,
whose financial support made it all possible;
the Kirk Session, Peace and Justice Group, and congregation of Falkirk Old and St
Modan's Parish Church, whose call to a joint ministry enabled me to begin this
project and whose forbearance, interest and support helped sustain it:
and three vers special people who have put up with a great deal over these five years
and whose forgiveness along the way has been vital - Laura and Lindsay (who have
grown up while their Dad was in the studs and helped in ways they didn't realise),
and my wife Sheila, a wonderful partner in joini ministry and much much more,
whose part in this is a lot greater than she thinks:
Thank you.
For Dad.
G Keith Blount (1924-94),
a more practical theologian
Abstract
The thesis starts front an examination of the present state of personal debt in the
UK. drawing out the issues raised in current research. These issues are further
examined through a questionnaire and interviews with creditors, debtors and
advisers, the results ofwhich are reported and analysed.
This investigation is then treated as the context for reflection, first, on the Biblical
material regarding debt, which is found to treat debt within a consideration of
justice; the reflection therefore continues by examining (particularly in the work of
Miranda and other liberation theologians) a Christian understanding of social
justice. This concept is then subjected to challenge through a critique of the assault
on social justice from the left (Marx) and right (principally Hayek).
A Christian case for and understanding of social justice having been established, the
theology of justice, justification and forgiveness is explored, building a case for
forgiveness as part of the way towards justice rather than an alternative to it. This
theological case is then translated into a social context, discussing recent work on
the politics of forgiveness.
Finally, this theoretical discussion is re-grounded in the original context of debt
problems, allowing the theological and contextual elements to interact, and inform
Christian contributions to public policy discussion.
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Introduction
"It's a vicious circle when you've not got enough, so you borrow. Then when
you get your money on a Monday you've got to pay it back, so that week you're
short. Then you borrow again and it's a vicious circle"'.
If debt is "the worst poverty", what is the good news to the poor? That, in
compressed form, is the question which this thesis seeks to answer. What insights
and resources do Christians have to contribute to current discussion of credit and
debt? In particular, does the traditional Christian language ofjustice and forgiveness
provide a useful form for such a contribution, or have assaults on the concept of
social justice made the language of justice untenable, while "no-one is interested in
forgiveness for no-one believes in sin any more"'?
In just over a decade from 1980, the average family's debt has nearly
doubled, to the equivalent of seven weeks wages, and for many the problems of the
'Vicious circle" described above are acute. Of course, neither the problem of debt,
nor Christian concern with it, is new; it is one of the areas where "Biblical God
language and economics overlap"*, and the overlap is more than verbal. Although
the typical Church of Scotland congregation praying weekly "forgive us our debts" is
unlikely to be expecting the credit card companies to respond by cancelling the
outstanding balance on their next statement, there is a long tradition of churches
taking a moral interest in matters of credit and debt. For fifteen centuries, usury was
a major concern of Christian ethics. The Kirk in Scotland, abolishing rights of
sanctuary after the Reformation, retained them for debtors, and that sanctuary was a
reality for a square mile around Holyrood well into last century. And today many
churches are actively involved in the credit union movement.
The roots of that concern, it will be argued here, are Biblical, in laws,
prophetic warnings, parables and eschatological vision, all of which address a
context in which debt was a major social problem, and address that context in terms
of justice. Yet there has also been a strong tendency to "spiritualise" that tradition,
deflecting attention from "real" to "moral" debts. We may find more concern with
poverty, pawnbrokers and debt in Dickens than in much of the Victorian church,
' "Rita", a debtor interviewed in Kempson (and others), 1994, p272
^ Shriver notes this suggestion in a conversation with an unnamed British friend, 1995, p219
3 Meeks, 1989, p31
although there have always been exceptions to such criticism (Kingsley, for
example, wrote of the "sickening weight of debt" in 18484). In one sense, then.
recover}7 or renewal of that tradition provides the starting point for this thesis, ie
how can we speak and act from that tradition to today's economic context?
If that is taken as one point of entry7 into the subject matter of this thesis,
there are at least two others. In the past fifty years, social justice has been a major,
and increasing, concern of Christian ethics and theology, notably in liberation
theology, but also in church statements on political matters. Sinful structures have
been analysed, critiques offered, policies of justice advocated and a praxis of
liberation developed. But little has been said of forgiveness in relation to these
sinful structures, especially as it is often seen as offering an escape route from the
demands of justice, cheap grace to the oppressor and a soft option for the church. Is
thai necessarily so? Can forgiveness, theologically, be an ally (or dimension) of
justice, and, if that is so, can it have a social dimension? Some thinking along these
1 inoc K'»f OAMiaf''T7Aroil •onocr ^nrl Dr» litioe D or>t" AC tKn (°Aim/'i I /~\f
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Churches in the 1980s, from discussions on the "healing of memories" in Ireland,
and in Christian responses to the Third World debt crisis. This thesis seeks to
continue that reflection, in the current economic context of personal debt in the UK.
But it is a third point of entry that is reflected most clearly m the way the
thesis is presented. Questions and concerns arise from the context itself the plight
of debtors, the underlying reasons for growing debt, and the ways in which
"society", the state and individuals deal with that all demand Christian ethical
reflection and response. Barty-King. whose book on the history of debt as "the worst
poverty"5 chronicles changing patterns and perceptions of debt through the ages,
reminds us that the basic issue is not new. But it is the present context in which we
musi respond, and that demands serious analysis, in social science terms, of credit
and debt in Britain today - not to provide ammunition for moral judgments but an
understanding of context (derived both from the expertise of social scientific
research and the perceptions of those most directly involved) in which ethical and
theological reflection can take place, and into which that thinking must reflect back
its insights.
The first two chapters therefore seek to build up that understanding. The first
reviews research on credit and debt by economists, lawyers and sociologists, b}
4 In his polemical novel Yeasi, cited by Atherton, 1992, p5
- Barty-King, 1991
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professional bodies and eharities active in this field, and by pressure groups (both
secular and Christian); it also draws on recent political debate, notably about
bankruptcy legislation. A picture is built up of the way the credit market operates, of
the causes of (or factors likely to lead to) debt, and of possible "solutions" to the
problems which emerge. The second chapter builds further on this, through original
research which drew (via questionnaire and interviews) on the perceptions and
experiences of those involved as creditors, advisers or debtors, and on the attitudes
of people in various groups connected (sometimes loosely) with churches. An
understanding of debt is therefore built up from the "inside", and, going beneath the
surface, an attempt is made to assess what values people bring to bear in this
context. At this stage, some consideration is given to matters of "justice" and
"forgiveness".
While it will be apparent from the above that Biblical or theological material
might equally have provided the starting point, the decision to present it in this way
is not arbitrary. The research method was in fact far more interactive than the final
presentation suggests, with Biblical, theological and social scientific dimensions
continually asking questions of each other. These have been presented, largely, in
separate chapters, in the interest of clarity, with the concluding chapter seeking to
express the interaction more fully.
But the description of the economic context comes first, as a conscious
reversal of a traditional method which works from theory to practice - from the
Bible to today or from theology to experienee and action. To an extent this reflects
the "praxis" method of liberation theology; it also reflects an approach to Biblical
hermeneutics which involves a fusion of horizons. This approach moves, as
McDonald says, "in a circle or spiral", in which, theoretically, one may engage at
any point on the circumference, but the crucial "entrance ticket" is self-
understanding (including social understanding). He speaks of a "many-stranded
dialectic" -
"One may make a relatively direct approach to the world of the ancient text, as
in a historical reading, and allow issues to emerge for contemporary
engagement, or one may first explore issues in the modern world and, in the
light of this contextual interest, proceed to engage with selected texts. In either
case, the circle is completed"6.
6 McDonald, 1993, p!67f
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What is most important, then, is that the circle is completed. But it is the latter of the
approaches described by McDonald that is adopted in the presentation of this thesis.
The issues are raised by the study of the context (and the interviews with those
involved help the interpretation of these to become more than private and external),
and then we proceed to examine the texts in that light.
The third chapter contains that examination. Without oversimplifying the
correspondence between Biblical motifs (such as the jubilee) and the present
context, this seeks to read the Biblical material in dynamic relation to the
(economic) context of its own time; through an understanding of both contexts, a
fusion of horizons is suggested7, allowing the authority of the text to speak into the
present context.
A key part of what emerges from this is that the Biblical material on debt
deals with it within a horizon of justice. That Biblical perspective of justice is a
crucial and distinctive one, and is explored in chapter four, building on the Biblical
studies of chapter three and on the work of Miranda and other theologians of
liberation. The understanding of justice built in this chapter is not presented as the
only possible Christian understanding (which it manifestly is not), but it is quite
explicitly a Christian understanding, intended, as the whole thesis is, as a Christian
contribution to public debate.
Whether, and how, such a contribution can be appropriate in pluralist society
requires some engagement at this (and other points in the thesis) with the work of
Maclntyre and others. Briefly, the approach taken here is to speak boldly and
explicitly out of a particular tradition, not in a spirit of Christian imperialism but as
the most authentic and valuable way in which Christians (and others) can contribute
to public debate and to dialogue with social scientists.
To some extent, that may beg questions about how that contribution relates
to formulating public policy, which are touched on in chapter five in relation to
Hayek's work. But the Christian basis of the contribution does not exempt it from
secular critique, as is apparent when churches make statements on political issues.
Those who have argued that social justice is a meaningless piece of rhetoric or a
dangerous mirage must be taken account of. The fifth chapter seeks to listen to two
major strands of the assault on social justice - Marxism and the neo-liberalism of
7 McDonald, 1993, p217 & 164
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Hayek - to offer a critique of their arguments and establish what of social justice
may survive them.
It is in chapter six that the "descent into theology" really asserts itself ! Not
as an escape from the secular realities ofMarx and Hayek, but as further reflection
on the Christian contribution to the debate on justice, this chapter considers the
theology of atonement, justification and forgiveness. While secular and ethical
theory may generally view forgiveness as an alternative to justice, Christian
theology, it is argued, sees them in a mutually creative interaction - forgiveness,
ultimately, opening up the possibility of justice, as liberation from the power of the
(sinful) past. This draws substantially on the work of Gunton and Fiddes, to build a
theological case which is central to the project.
But does that theological case have a viable social dimension? Can we talk
sensibly and helpfully of a politics, or a social reality of forgiveness which is
consistent with, or even creative of, justice? The seventh chapter explores what
meaning this may have in a variety of situations, reflecting on Shriver's contention
that the "painful study of pain-filled history is the beginning of forgiveness in
politics"8 and starting to ask whether the study of the pain of debt may open up
forgiveness in economics.
That leaves the circle still to be completed, by the concluding chapter
attempting to tie some of the strands of the thesis together (some glimpses of this
emerge at various points along the way). There Biblical and theological discussion
of justice and forgiveness is reflected back into the context of debt from which it
emerged; the impact of that contextual thinking back into the theological reflection
is also assessed.
Clearly, indebtedness is a matter with many moral implications. Some of the
changes in practice and attitudes over the past twenty years have provoked almost
moral panic in some quarters. Weyer recounts a story of the present Prime Minister's
family going through a formative period of severe hardship, having "forced
themselves into poverty in order to find the money to repay a debt", but feels that the
ground has shifted significantly since then, concluding that "repayment of debt has
gone out of fashion in modern Britain" - for everyone from Lloyd's "names" to
ordinary Liverpudlians9. Recognising that this is not entirely new, he bemoans the
fact that "throughout history (since the era of Solon in ancient Greece in fact), there
^ Shriver, 1995, p68
^ Weyer, 1994, p9
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have been pundits willing to offer social reasons why debts do not always have to be
paid", going on to cite Pope John Paul IPs declaration of the acceptability of Third
World nations "reneging" on their debts as indicative of this10. The worst of the new
commandments, he says, are those which blame "society" for the plight of the
debtor11.
Weyer's analysis is mentioned as a clear example of an individualistic
perspective, with an (implied) restricted understanding of justice as the payment of
debts. Cameron notes this as true of most of the research (both academic and
popular), in which debt is generally perceived as a problem with connotations of
blame against the debtor: whether from psychologists or economists, "the academic
literature is highly individualistic"1-. This individualism would also be true of manv
Christian perspectives which view credit as dangerous, fuelling covetousness. and of
most debt counsellors, who will concentrate on the person whose problems are
before them and are therefore reluctant to become involved in wider issues.
But there are other possibilities, which might start from how debt functions
in the economy at large, and how it relates to poverty. Weyer himself sees the
immutability and the shame of debt as pillars of capitalism11, while the Commission
on Social Justice has argued that "the neo-liberal answer to the limitations of the
194 j settlement, a return to the latssez-fatre economies of the minima! state and free
markets, has in turn produced a cycle of debt, recession and social polarisation"14.
Thus, Kempson and her colleagues challenge Mr Micawber's famous dictum on debt
and poverty - "annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen pounds
six. result happiness: annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty
pounds ought and six. result misery" - by showing thai many poor families who
succeed in making ends meet do so at great cost to their 'happiness'"11, and thereby
raising wider questions of a justice that goes beyond fulfilling contracts.
Many of these different perspectives on debt are considered in more detail in
the first two chapters of the thesis, but the point to note at this stage is their
association with different understandings of justice and of the possibilities of
forgiveness. Contrary to the perceptions of many1#, an ethical reflection on the
10 Wever, 1994, p9
11 Weyer, 1994, p 11
' ^ Cameron, 1994, p207
' ~ Weyer, 1994. p i i
1 A
1) Commission on Social Justice. 1994. p85
Kempson (and others), 1994, p279
See chapter 2 below
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"rights and wrongs" of debt situations can be more than a matter of passing
judgment on debtors, tire reflection attempted here, informed by the Biblical
material on debt, sees debt in terms of a wider perspective of justice, viewing
debtors not as isolated individuals, but persons in a network of relationships, within
a community. And that view of justice seeks a way beyond the spirals of debt, the
vicious circle described at the start: forgiveness, as liberation from the tyranny of the
past, may open up the possibility ofjustice here.
Although, as Bonhoeffer says, "the wheel of history cannot be turned back"1.
justice mat demand something quite different from binding people into the
consequences of past mistakes or misfortune. In that, the God of hope may be at
work. As Shriver puts it (of the Old Testament story of Joseph, which he sees as
illustrative of how forgiveness is the raw material for community), "it is in the
potential for the future not in the treachery of the past that God's agency in the
events can be seen"18.
It is along these lines, by making a contribution to the need which Meeks
sees for theologians and economists thinking in each others presence, that this thesis
will seek to answer the question about good news to the poor debtor by getting
alongside those caught up in the vicious circles of debt and seeking liberation.
Bonhoeffer, 1 %<1 pi 18
18 Shriver, 1995, p2S
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1. Debt - The Worst Poverty ?
Sketching The Scene
The task of this first chapter is to assess the current situation in Britain with
regard to personal credit and debt, reflecting the considerable amount of research
which has been carried out in response to recent social and economic changes and to
resulting public concerns. This research is reviewed here in order to define the
context for reflection - to look behind some popular myths and to consider some
responses to the "problems" of credit and debt; issues are raised which will be the
background for later reflection on social justice and forgiveness.
Over the past decade, a major transformation has taken place in Britain with
regard to credit and debt. "The amount ofmoney borrowed by people in Britain has
doubled in seven years; the number of mortgage repossessions rose nearly eightfold
over the same period; more than half of unemployed families with children are in
debt"1; and personal bankruptcies in Scotland are spiralling to the extent that
Scottish Office projections in 1992 suggested a trend which would have seen 10% of
the population bankrupt by the year 2000. or the whole population by 2010'. Of
course, the realities and causes of the position suggested by such statistics are
always open to dispute, but it is clear that there has been a massive expansion of the
amount, type and use of credit in recent years, and that a growing number of people
are finding themselves in severe debt difficulties - CABx are dealing with 100,000
problem debts each month, and the research suggests that those who seek such
advice are likely to be a minority of those with problems. While there are some
signs of a slowing down of the credit expansion in the mid-1990s (with the use of
credit cards, for example, being displaced by debit cards4), there is no sign of a
falling off in debt problems. Both the continuing problems and the tapering off of
some types of credit use may be products of the recession which has also seen a
resurgence of pawnbroking - a very traditional form of credit which had almost
disappeared in 1980s.
1 Berthoud, 1989, pi
"■ Institute ofCAs in Scotland position paper on the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill, 20.5.92
3 Debate on Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill 17-6-92 Hansard col940
^ Rowlingson & Kempson, 1994, pi, and The Scotsman, 2-4-94
3 Tebbutt, 1984, pl97 & Trotter, 1994, p 17
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It may seem a long time since Shakespeare advised "neither a borrower nor a
lender be" (advice recently firmly rejected by the Director General of Fair Trading6),
but debt problems are not new. The authors of the Crowther Report noted that
"lending and borrowing go back to the beginnings of human society and some of the
oldest records that have survived from the early civilisations ofMesopotamia are of
credit transactions"'; issues of credit and debt play an important part in the Biblical
narrative, and medieval theologians were greatly occupied with the question of
usury; and in "The Worst Poverty", Barty-King paints a broad historical picture of
debt problems through the ages, noting many "famous names" who had debt
problems (eg Sir Walter Scott), concerns revealed in literature (eg Shakespeare) and
legal documents (eg Magna Carta), and the role of sanctuaries for debtors such as
Holvrood Abbey untii well into last century.
While both upper and lower (though perhaps not middle) classes might hav e
found themselves in Victorian and earlier debtors' prisons, social differentials have
always been a dimension of the credit scene, Hire-purchase and "tick" were frowned
upon but the possession of an "account" especially at prestigious shops was a status
symbol (regardless of the waywardness with which it might be maintained). Barty-
King sees building societies as crucial in making debt respectable - "it was one of
the factors which transformed shameful debt into indispensable credit"*.
It is that transformation which has gathered pace over recent years. Although
a credit system may be seen as basic to capitalism, and the overturning of the
medieval ban on usury as crucial to the Protestant ethic's contribution to the spirit of
capitalism, a cautious, even suspicious, legal attitude to credit which sought to
hedge the offering of credit with considerable restrictions may have been a hangover
from the rather grudging opening of the door to usury by eg Calvin. Only relatively
recently has that given way to a "free" credit market in which the law's role is seen
as purely to ensure the effective functioning of that market. From a persona!
(consumer) point of view, possession of a credit card is seen as a sign of good
citizenship, enabling one to be a full participant in society, and the couple who had,
in the 1970s, to queue for the privilege of a loan from the building society' with
which they had been saving wouid by the 1990s be receiving competing offers from
^ Director General of Fair Trading at Money Advice Liaison Group annual conference Nov '93,
reported in "Scottish Citizen" (Scottish CAB newsletter) January/February 1994
^ Crowther Report, 1971, 2.1.1
^ Barty-King, 1991, pi66
9 Ford, 1988, pi86
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banks, building societies and others eager to lend to ihem,u (not to mention the
possibility of a "windfall" of free shares as their building society" changes its nature
and apparently rewards them merely for being in debt to the society').
At the level of national macro-economic policy, controls on credit which had
been a major instrument of economic policy in the 1970s were scrapped, leaving
only interest rates as a fairly blunt instrument of such policy. Clearly, this change
may be seen as the implementation of "free market" policies derived from Hayek
and others. Yet there are ironies in its coincidence with monetarist policies, and
with such values as "live within your means, put a nest egg by for a rainy day, and
pay your bills on time"", apparently espoused by the government.
Credit is basic to capitalism, and consumer credit is basic to the consumer
capitalism of the late twentieth century; there is therefore a real sense in which debt
is an integral part of the dynamic of capitalism - "the underlying process of
encouraging debt is a by-product of the push for high status consumption as a
foundation for trend growth in the economy"". Ford sees an important dimension of
this policy in seeking social order through indebtedness13, a theme running through
the drive towards owner-occupancy and the gradual replacement of student grants
with student loans (described by a Scottish Office minister as initiating students into
the "real world" of indebtedness14). Following Baudrillard, we may see the credit
system as a form of extended social control, in which bankruptcy is ultimately "a
support for the system of commercial credit"", and the Social Fund is an attempt at
re-integrating the "underclass" by involving them in the credit society"1. If there is no
such thing as a society of which people feel a committed part, and they do not have
a sufficient material stake to commit them to a legal system designed to protect
possessions, then credit will embed them in a network of contractual relationships
from which they might otherwise be (dangerously) excluded.
Recent Credit Expansion
The seeds of change were there long before the Thatcher government,
however. The Crowther Report of 1971, which lead to the Consumer Credit Act of
Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, p29
*' Mrs Thatcher cited by Barty-King, 1991, pi73
^ Cameron, 1994, p217/8
13 Ford, 1988, pi89
' (J M Forsyth unpublished talk to University Principals & Vice-Chancellors, 1989
'3 Scots Law Commission, 1981-82, s2.49
^ Craig in Howells etc, 1993, pi 29
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1974, may be seen as a watershed with its often quoted conclusion that "on balance,
consumer credit is beneficial since it makes a useful contribution to the living
standards and the economic and social well-being of the majority of the British
people"'". Credit may, then, be seen as moving from being viewed as dangerous to
being morally neutral (a view which often carries the implication that those who
can't "handle" credit are themselves to blame), then to being "beneficial" and thence
to warranting a status and market of its own, independent of the goods for winch the
credit is intended. Indeed there are signs that goods are now used to sell credit'*,
overturning the original impetus of the Singer Company in introducing hire-
purchase to boost sewing machine sales.
Surprisingly, there are signs that this public view of credit may not be
reflected in personal opinions, at least as revealed in the surveys. Most people agree
with the statement that "credit is too easy to obtain these days"19, and the PSI survey
found 43% who fell that credit was "never a good thing", even more being of that
opinion in 1989 than in the NCC survey of 1979; their overall conclusion was that
the popular view of credit was "at best cautious, at worst antagonistic"*. Berthoud
notes an "almost moral suggestion that credit is a Trad thing' in its own right - at
about the level of soft porn"-', and in the PSI report he and Kempson acknowledge
that "many argue that things have gone too far and that we are living well beyond
our means; they call for a curb on lendmg; others put a moral case, argumg that all
credit is usury, causes misery and should be severely curtailed if not banned
outright"". The tone at least suggests that these attitudes are perceived as outmoded
hangovers from the past, even if they are reflected in public opinion possibly more
than the approach of the PSI report which aims at moving to a "position where credit
is used beneficially"23. My own research2" suggests that attitudes by 1993 may have
"caught up" to some extent with the credit expansion, tending more to bear out the
assertion of the NCC that "in the past credit ofmost kinds was seen as a standby, to
be used when you were in need rather than for the sake of convenience, and
certainly most debt was frowned upon ... this seems to have changed"23.
17 Crowther, 1971, 3.7 1
^ Jubilee Group, 1991, p21
^ Director Genera] of Fair Trading, 1989, pi 7
20 Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, p43
71 Berthoud, 1989, p 16
22 Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, p 191
2^ Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, p206
2^ See chapter 2
25 NCC, 1990, p25
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The fact is that the average household, which owed four and a quarter weeks
of disposable income at the start of the 1980s, owed seven and a half weeks by the
end of the decade*. We may also note a shift in bank lending from companies to
individuals; between 1978 and 1986 lending to industrial companies fell from 55%
to 32% and personal lending rose from 39% to 57%27.
This expansion of personal credit is clearly linked with the ending of credit
controls noted above, although it may to some extent predate it. While the drive
towards a free credit market may be seen as characteristic of government policy in
the 1980s, its roots, as we have noted, are in the Crowther Report of 1971 - "the
correct line for policy, in its economic aspects, to follow towards consumer credit is
that of maximum freedom to develop, subject to measures designed to create the
maximum of competition"*. Alongside an ideological commitment to the free
market, financial institutions' problems with Third World Debt fuelled the supply
side of the emerging credit market, causing pressure for controls to be relaxed,
which in turn accelerated the process. From the "consumer" point of view, rising
incomes and expectations fuelled demand for credit, and inflation plus high interest
rates made credit (or even debt) "both economically sensible and respectable"29.
Thus, the Jubilee Group sees the credit boom as the result of increased supply
(which resulted from deregulation and the emergence of problems with repayment
of the loans to the Third World which were themselves the result of massive oil
revenues seeking a financially attractive home), increased willingness to hold debt
(resulting from higher incomes, changing attitudes, and inflation) and aggressive
marketing50 (the NCC notes £ 150,000m spent on advertising by the financial sector
in 1988 8931)-
Evaluating The Credit Boom
Having looked at the fact of expansion, and the causes, we must now try to
evaluate this trend. Ramsay argues that, since the credit expansion of the 1980s was
the result of deliberate policy choices, we need to "question the extent to which this
growth in consumer credit has contributed to consumer sovereignty, social welfare
^ Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, p47
^ Hartropp, 1987, p93
2^ Crowther Report, 1971, 1.3.4
29 Director General of Fair Trading, 1989, p6
3 9 Jubilee Group, 1991, p 5
31 NCC, 1990, p54
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or individual autonomy"32. On the positive side, we may note the end of "mortgage
queues" and the opening up of credit to some of those formerly excluded, not to
mention the stimulus to growth implied in increased consumer spending. The NCC
conclude that credit is "a very popular consumer product"33 (a phrase in which Marx
would have found ample confirmation of his analysis of money and alienation); its
beneficial effects, noted in the Crowther Report, have repeatedly received
endorsement, as by the Director General of Fair Trading in 1989: "in itself, the
availability of credit can undoubtedly be advantageous to the consumer; thus there is
value in having goods for use sooner rather than later, and borrowing can provide a
means of coping with money problems"34. Even if "credit has become a sticking
plaster over cuts to benefit levels and affordable housing"35, removing the plaster
while the wound has not healed will have disastrous effects, at least in the short
term. And an economist of the standing of J K Galbraith has claimed a "remarkably
egalitarian" function for credit which "allows the man with energy and no money to
participate in the economy more or less on a par with the man who has capital of his
own"34.
The other side of the argument, at macro-economic level, regrets the
diversion of resources from investment to consumption, and the inflationary effect
of credit expansion. Concern about these issues (rather than about debt problems)
led to the establishment of the Crowther Committee in the late 1960s, but their
report reassured the government of the day that "the effect of consumer credit on
inflationary pressures, on the volume of savings, and on the stability of the
industries concerned and of the economy in general is examined, but no reason is
found to view its growth with concern"3 . The argument in the Report is not always
convincing, and it is, interestingly, largely Keynesian and pre-monetarist in its
economic approach; yet it has remained the received wisdom on the subject, even
when going further in saying that "it can be argued that consumer credit contributes
to a better allocation of resources by increasing both consumer satisfaction and
economic efficiency" (without suggesting how this happens)3*. Those who believe in
the inherently supreme efficiency of the market in using available resources will, of
3^ In Howells etc, 1993, p65
33 NCC, 1990, p79
3^ Director General of Fair Trading, 1989, p2
35 NACAB, 1992, p2
3® Galbraith, 1975, p79
3^ Crowther Report, 1971, 1.3.2
3^ Crowther Report, 1971, 3.2.6
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course, poinl lo ihe dangers of such artificial intervention as restricting availability
of credit to encourage investment (although Adam Smith himself advocated a
ceiling on interest rates for precisely this reason3?). Others will want, at least, to
declare the question still open. Ison, for example, argues that "it is a matter ofmoral
value judgments and social policy to arrive at a point in the expansion of consumer
credit when it is thought to achieve the optimum good" eg in diverting income from
transitory pleasures to durables ofmore lasting benefit4®.
Paradoxically, credit may even be seen as a form of enforced saving with the
discipline imposed from outside, as Caplovitz detected41, which thereby helps to
fulfil the need of the economic system for a rapid turnover of goods Thus the credit
system is basic to modern capitalism as a cnicial area of co-ordinating production
and consumption43.
The operation of a credit market does not finally beg such questions as are
raised by the "almost moral arguments" about credit mentioned above and by the
impact of market forces in this area Parker, who is far from sympathetic to
government thinking on these issues, still says that "there is, of course, nothing
intrinsicallv 'wrong' with the use of credit unless religious or moral objections to
usury are held". But many (perhaps especially, though not exclusively, from a
Christian perspective) see the credit expansion as both cause and effect of the greed
of the consumer society: "during the 1980s a whole new culture - consumerism -
was bom out of the commercial opportunities created by the desire for instant
gratification"43. On this view, credit is temptation, the advice is "yield not", and
recovery from debt is modelled on that of an alcoholic44.
Yet there is more lo this line of argument than that caricature might suggest.
Credit expansion has undoubtedly been a part of the move towards a culture of
"consumer society individualism"45; indeed "consumer credit seems to symbolise the
contradictory images of consumerism as both liberation and oppression"4®. It is
reasonable - not only from a Christian perspective - to question or challenge the
values of consumer society and of possessive individualism, but Ramsay is right to
See further below
40 Cited in Ashley. 1983, p74
4' Cited in .Ashley, 1983, p73
I Ramsay, in Howells etc, 1993, p64
4-1 Jubilee Policy Group, 1991, pi
44 Eg in Tondeur. 1994
A ^ ~
• Hobsbawm, cited in Howells etc, 1993, p67
4^ Ramsay, in Howells etc, 1993, p67
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be cautious about "locating within consumer relations alternative values of
community and solidarity to the dominant social system or viewing them as sites lor
social transformation"'11. Any attempt to realise such values without taking account
of the context in which consumer relations operate will be both quixotic and likely
to have dangerously unforeseen consequences (this will be further discussed towards
the end of this chapter).
Credit and or Debt
Perhaps the most serious issues arise when we consider "debt". The
distinction between credit and debt is crucial to the current discussion, where credit
is generally defended as at least neutral while debt is regretted. To some extent,
definitions may depend on perspective - to a lawyer, any amount owed is a "debt",
yet few consumers feel themselves to be in "debt" at the point when their electricity-
bill arrives, so long as they can pay it promptly. The Jubilee Group may be out of
touch with popular perception in insisting that all credit is in reality debt"* (and the
possibility of credit cards being rechristened "debt cards" seems remote), but they do
speak to the public caution about credit. Most other research agrees on a distinction
whereby credit becomes debt when repayments are not being met: credit is an
opportunity, debt is a problem. This also echoes public perception, of a difference
between the up-to-date mortgage payer (owing perhaps £100,000) and the "real"
debtor with an unpaid electricity bill of £50.
A cntcial area of debate here is whether the credit expansion is to be
"blamed" for the expansion of debt during the same period. Dramatic increases in
court cases involving consumer credit and in mortgage repossessions are two of
many items of evidence for the increase in debt that has gone alongside the
expansion of credit, fuelling the case for a link. While many reports, from Crowther
onwards, have drawn attention to the fact that "the proportion of borrowers who get
into difficulty with their payments is very small and does not provide grounds for
restrictive measures"*9, the number of people experiencing debt problems is
alarming The Office of Fair Trading found that the percentage of those with credit
repayments having "heavy commitments" (defined in terms of residual income) rose
from 12.9% in 1982 to 23.3% in 1986*>, and estimates that around 4.45m people had
^ Ramsav, in Howells etc, 1993, p68
^ Hartropp (ed), 1987, p60
^ Crowther Report, 1971, 1.3.3
Director General of Fair Trading, 1989, p29
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repayment problems in a five year period5'. Adler and Sainsbury point to increases in
all measures of fuel debt in Scotland, and in repossession actions52; they also note a
rise of 13% per annum in debt collection agency licences granted by the OFT53.
Lawson notes a recognition by creditors of increasing problems - "70% of
respondents reported an increase in proportion of 'problem accounts'; 20% said this
was a 'significant increase'* - while also noting that the vast majority of customers
still meet obligations without apparent difficulties and this is the context from which
creditors work (unlike agencies such as CABx which deal almost exclusively with
problem accounts)55. In 1983, Ashley argued that "serious debt is a sign of the
breakdown of the system" with high social costs whether borne by individual
families, creditors or the state*; in the intervening years, the problem has grown, co¬
incident with a vast expansion of credit, although some forms of debt are not credit-
related (eg most rent and fuel debt). Attempts to play down the scale of the problem
in light of the vast scale of the credit market (eg the NCC report's "while the number
of people having difficulties has gone up, the rise has not matched the overall
increase in the rate of borrowing"57) seem dangerously complacent, particularly in
light of the increasing incidence ofmultiple debt and the potential of debt problems
to spiral55.
Causes ofDebt
What, then, are the causes of debt 9 Newspaper accounts of "credit binges"
may fuel the stigmatisation of debtors as at best inadequate and at worst fraudulent,
but have little if anv statistical foundation. There may be some plausibility in the
argument that even if just over 50% of unemployed claimants with children are in
debt, there are almost half who appear to be coping without running into debt. That,
however, is hardly conclusive of debt being "their own fault"; more typical, argues
Hormann from German experience, is "the structurally and socially under-privileged
debtor who has innocently fallen into a crisis"551.
Director General of Fair Trading, 1989, p39
Adler and Sainsbury, 1988, pi8 & p27
Adler and Sainsbury, 1988, p36
- ^ Lawson, 1989, p7
Lawson, 1989, p7
Ashley, 1983, p 195
57 NCC, 1990, pxiii
;8 Ashley, 1983, pl24
In Ramsay (ed), 1986, pi65
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Anecdotal evidence of rampant consumerism as the source of debt is not
borne out as significant in any of the studies,, and Ford points to other causes: "more
frequently (than credit card mania) debt results from either a sudden disruption to
income (for example as a result of unemployment or relationship breakdown or
illness) where previous commitments are difficult to sustain, or from a siower
cumulative effect of a persistently low and inadequate income (for example as a
result of living on benefit for a prolonged period), and it is these two processes that
have been so pronounced during the 1980s"60. There is some evidence of an
increased proportion of credit transaction developing problems, which seems to bear
out the argument for a link, bul the evidence is not overwhelming, nor conclusive of
such a straightforward explanation. From the creditor side, it may appear that "in a
competitive credit market, a certain level of bad debts is a necessary consequence of
a profitable exploitation of the market"61 - the implication of that being that debt
problems are inev itable as concomitants of credit expansion. As already noted, there
is certainly evidence that a characteristic of the credit expansion has been an
increase in the number of households with "heavy commitments" (defined in terms
of residual income - after meeting commitments - in relation to needs)6'. That
increase in the number of households at risk does suggest that those who follow the
Crowther Report, in deciding that the number suffering problem debts is too small
(as percentage of credit customers) to justify significant intervention in the market,
mav weii be too complacent Logically, one may well argue that credit does not
cause debt, bul one cannot dispute that more widespread credit has meant more
people being at risk of debt problems.
Many commentators cite Rock's classification of debtors into professional,
feckless or unfortunate (a classification Rock in fact derived from the perceptions of
debt collectors)6'. While that may well reflect a more general public perception
tthough with varying degrees of emphasis), characterisations of debtors and
accounts of the causes of debt may well depend on who is asked, and which types of
debt are being analysed. Fuel debt and rent arrears, for example, may well be closely
linked with poverty: credit card debt may offer more scope for explanations in terms
of financial mismanagement; and analysis of mortgage arrears and repossessions
may show a clearer link with events such as redundancy or relationship breakdown
60 hord, 1991, p.M
Ramsay, in Howells etc. 1993, p7?
^ Director General of Fair Trading 1989, p29
^' Rock, 1973, p85, cited by eg Ashley, 1983, pi 18
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There may also be useful distinctions to be drawn between long- and short-term
debt64, and similarly between primary and secondary debt as defined at the start of
the century by Rowntree6 - long-term or primary debt being linked to chronic low
income, while short-term or secondary debt is likely to be more closely related to
interruption in income
Lawson's survey of creditors' perceptions found a consensus that
unemployment was the major trigger, with marital problems playing an increasing
role, and "there was a strong feeling in some companies that another significant
cause of debt problems was the inability of certain customers to manage their affairs
properly"66. The OFT survey of debtors' perceptions of reasons for falling into debt
found unemployment and fall in earnings as the main causes, but the report is
unwilling to blame such structural factors because "it is a common experience that
people tend to give reasons which reflect less adversely on their self-esteem"67 This
caution, however, might equally be applied to creditors anu government bodies,
whose willingness to justify themselves is likely to be equally strong.
The Jubilee Group start from a hostility to the whole idea of credit, seeing
the initial act of borrowing as a primary "cause" of debt, but go on to analyse the
factors which turn manageable credit commitments into problem debts. These
factors are categorised into "personal, social, economic and credit" and they
conclude that "in the 1980s the social and credit categories have been in the
ascendancy while the early 1990s may well see the economic category as becoming
even more significant"6?.
The PSi research was probably the most broadly based, on interviews with
people drawn from (a) the arrears lists of various creditors, including one bank, a
building society, finance houses, utility and local authority housing departments (b)
households known to be at greater risk, ie non-pensioners with children,
unemployed or on low pa)', plus (c) a random sample of the population. This report
divides "moral" accounts (which stress the failure of the debtor) from "economic"
explanations (which emphasise the economic circumstances in which debt is likely
to occur>». and analyses in great detail the factors which increase the risk of debt in
64 Parker, 1990, pi7?
65 Parker, 1990, pi96
^ Lawson, 1989, plO
^ Director General of Fair Trading, 1989, p38
^ Jubilee Policy Group, 1991, pl9
f,° Berthoud & Hempson, 1992, pi30
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any given transaction. The most striking findings are arguably the variety' of risk
factors, their interaction, and the lack of detected significance in factors such as
"consumerism" and budgeting cycles. Some of the significant risk factors (eg age,
income) support the socio-economic explanation while others (eg "spur of the
moment" purchase, response to advertisement, personal priorities) tend to bolster the
"moral" argument.
It is important to distinguish between this account of circumstances in which
debt is more likely to occur and discussion of the causes of debt, which would
require further analysis of the "risk factors" and how they affect household finances.
The (statistically oriented) perception of the "objective" researcher may be more
likely to see such structural risk factors, while those involved may be more likely to
focus on "trigger" events: the researcher sees the underlying low income and high
commitments while the debtor sees a family illness as the immediate cause0. It may
also be difficult to distmguish between causes of problem debt and symptoms.
Haphazard financial management and personal isolation, for example, may be seen
as both cause and effect of debt problems71.
What is dear is that simplistic accounts are inaccurate and generally
misleading, and stereotypes of guilt or innocence (whether of debtors or of
creditors) are neither helpful nor conclusive of the issues of justice and or
forgiveness. Indeed, the prevalence of stereotypes and arguments based on them
may be the reason for a strong resistance of some of those practically involved (as
advisers or as debtors) to any kind of judging of the rights and wrongs of debt
situations whether by others or by themselves
Responses to Debt
Yet perceptions are important. "Negative attitudes, even if they are no more
than prejudices, can strengthen injustice and encourage the perpetuation of
conditions which ought to be intolerable", particularly where these take the form of
"blaming the victim'72. In this context, they are influential on how creditors treat
debtors, on how debtors view themselves (and so react to their situation), and on
how the legal system deals yvith debt problems. Thus Ramsay argues that any system
of debt recovery will always reflect assumptions about debtors and creditors73, yvhile
Parker, 1990, pi55
71 Parker, 1990, pi40 A 148
7^ Forrester & Skene, 1988, p60
' 7 Ramsay (ed), 1986, p2
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the NCH reporl shows the influence of a sense of failure and shame on debtors'
"panic" reactions to the emergence of problems 4 and their reluctance to seek advice;
31% of debtors blamed themselves for their problems, while 41% blamed "the
government" or "the system". The PSI survey showed some public acceptance that
debtors have problems not entirely of their own making75, but there is no doubt that
debtors feel a sense of failure, often confirmed in the actions of public officials such
as Social Security or court officers. Ramsay notes the "extraordinary extent to winch
debtors had internalised the prevailing view that default is associated with
incompetence"7", and this has serious consequences for the psychological impact of
debt on people, in terms of anxiety, withdrawal, and isolation77. The NCC report
recognises the "pejorative" connotations of "debt" and "debtor" and therefore prefers
to speak of "commitments", reflecting a very different set of presuppositions from
the Jubilee Group's proposal of renaming credit cards as "debt cards".
(We may also note, in passmg, an interesting aspect of Christian ethical
response to credit and debt in the Church of England's requirement that ordinands
declare themselves free of debt as a condition of ordination, a stipulation which is
posing dilemmas of definition for the Church in defining debt in an age of credit
cards, student loans, etc. While this probably originates more in the Church's
reluctance to find itself liable for its clergy's debts than in moral scruples, there is at
least a sign here that the church and the clergy are not immune from debt problems,
as witness the recently reported perception of an archdeacon experienced in dealing
with clerical debt that the key words were "foolish" and "feckless"78.)
A tendency to "blame the victim" may be reinforced by a mythology of the
spendthrift debtors who "overcommit themselves either through ignorance or a
compulsion to spend"79, while creditors are seen as neutral participants8®. Although
this "common-sense" approach is undermined by the vast bulk of the research81,
much public debate on debt revokes around it, as for example the parliamentary
debate on the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill, where pictures of the debtor varied from
"scroungers" to people on low income "pushed, egged and encouraged into debt by
74 NCH, 1992, p4&pl4
7-^ Berthoud & Hempson, 1992, p] 10
7^ I Ramsay, in Howells etc, 1993, p71
77 Doling, 1988, pi73
7" Church limes, 7-8-92
79NACAB, 1992, p37
Jubilee Policy Group, 1991, pi
^' I Ramsay, in Howells etc, 1993, p63
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what should be responsible institutions"82. From such discussions, public policy
emerges. Historically, we may note the provision of earlier bankruptcy legislation
for the court to ascertain whether the debtor was guilty of "idleness, improvidence,
gambling or intemperance"83. Even if imprisonment for debt was abandoned mainly
because it was ineffectual in aiding debt recovery, this still represents a shift from a
philosophy of punishing the debtor (with a deterrent effect on others) to a
philosophy geared to making the credit system work effectively.
Today, as Adler and Wozniak found, a view of the debtor as "unfortunate"
will have very different consequences for policy from a characterisation of the
debtor as "inadequate" or calculating". Rock, too, found two extremes of approach -
a "social control" ethic, based on the debtor as culpable, and a "social work" ethic
based on the debtor as inadequate83. Perhaps this analysis is incomplete, since there
is a third approach or "ethic" which concentrates more on structural factors and sees
the debtor as neither culpable nor inadequate but primarily as a victim of economic
forces. It is also important to note the dangers of the apparently compassionate
"social work" approach in bypassing questions of debtor's rights, a tendency of
approaches which see the courts as inappropriate loci for dealing with debt
problems".
As Cameron notes, most of the research (whether by psychologists or
economists) is highly individualistic in approach, tending to view debtors in
isolation from social trends or structural economic factors81; the same is generally
true of the approach of debt counsellors, who quite properly deal with their clients
as they find them and may view wider factors as irrelevant to dealing with the
problems of these particular people. The "privatising" of the problem (by seeing it in
terms of the failings or problems of individual debtors) may well function to deflect
structural criticism of the situations in which debt arises88 as well as minimising
public awareness of the problems: it certainly accords with the prevailing market
philosophy, as we shall see below.
The "mythology" may not be consistent. Lawson found creditors
complaining that "instead of instilling a social stigma against deliberate non-
82 Hansard, 17-6-92, cols928 & 934
82 Bankruptcy Act 1883, cited by Parker, 1990, pi 1
84 Ashley, 1983, pi93
8r" Rock, 1973, p276f
8^ See I Ramsay, in Howells etc, 1993, p73'4: see further below
82 Cameron, 1994, p207
88 R Lister in Craig, 1989, p59
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payment of debt, sensationalist press coverage labels the creditors as the wicked
capitalist exploiters and the debtors as the unsung heroes or misguided
unfortunates"89. However, the stigmatisation is real, and probably still stronger than
any sense of a "respectability" of debt as claimed by the Director General of Fair
Trading90; one aspect of it may be a condemnation of failure; "no matter how hard
this government tries to introduce business culture in Scotland, it won't work while
society condemns business failures"*', this m contrast to the different view felt to
prevail in America.
Poverty and Debt
One crucial area in terms both of perception and analysis is the question of a
link between debt and poverty . A recent NACAB report concluded that "credit has
become a sticking plaster over cuts to benefit levels and affordable housing"*2, yet
found it to be "a wholly inadequate remedy for poverty"92. As noted above, the
alarming percentage of those on benefit who have debt problems may not be seen by
defenders of the benefit system as being conclusive of poverty or inadequate
benefits as a major cause of debt; if some apparently manage to survive without
debt, those who do get into debt must be tailing m some aspect ot budgeting, or so it
is argued. Thus, Blamire denies a causal link between poverty and debt, attributing
the problems to the creation (by the media and others) of "unfullillable levels of
expectation" especially among those less well-off* The quoted phrase
("unfulfillable levels of expectation") carries some serious implications of a society
in which people know their place and have to accept limited horizons, particularly
when one realises that the debts are likely to be fuel and rent, or items like a cooker
for which people may be refused a Social Fund loan on the ground of their inability
to repay95. We may also note a link between government policy setting
"expectations" or norms through the promotion of council house sales and the
disproportionate rate at which such homes figure in repossessions especially in the
first 3-5 years of the mortgage*6.
89 Lawson, 1989, pi3
9® G Borne, in Howells etc, 1993, p53
9^ Young, 1994, pl7
92 NACAB, 1992, p2
93 NACAB, 1992, p2




Of course, middle class debt exists, even "without the mitigating
circumstances of unemployment, marital problems, etc"97, but all the research points
at least to low income as a major "risk factor" in debt, a link stronger in relation to
some debts (eg fuel) than to others (eg credit cards, often not available to those on
low income9*). "The surveys agree in showing that the use of any form of credit rose
with increasing income up to about £20,000 a year"99, but problem debts show a very
different picture. Parker, for example, concludes that "of all the relationships
uncovered in the research project, none was more striking than that between
indebtedness and low relative income"190. It is not simply that the poorest are most
vulnerable to debt, They use credit for necessities, to get by, while others, in the
same "market", are using it (in greater amounts) as a convenient way to buy
consumer desirables, to "take the waiting out of wanting". The market cannot
distinguish between the two, except by "rewarding" the greater buying power and
freedom of choice of the more affluent by cheaper credit; indeed, it can be argued
that the cost to the retailer of allowing payment by credit card is passed 011 not only
to those who are "paying with plastic" but also makes goods more expensive to those
who do not have access to a credit card.
it has long been a truism that, in credit as elsewhere, "the poor pay more";
one recent calculation suggests that "British Cs and Ds now pay APRs reaching £1
per £100 pier week, As and Bs only 60p for the same unsecured loan"101. Thus, those
who are most at risk of defaulting have the heaviest burdens placed upon them. In
the market's terms (or in the creditors' terms.) there mav be justification for this in
higher risks, higher administration costs with small loans, etc, but the impact on the
poor at least raises questions of justice. The Crowther Report concluded that this
was an "undesirable social effect" of "the deficiencies in the competitive
situation"100, but the development since then of a more competitive market seems to
have exacerbated the situation. Increasingly, the poorest have the least choice of
available credit, pay most for it, are the most vulnerable to such market swings as
interest rate changes, and face more severe penalties when default occurs, as the
Director General of Fair Trading has acknowledged103. There is thus a "debt trap"
Lawson, 1989, p2
9^ See below
99 Director General of Fair Trading, 1989, p27
100 Parker, 1990, p201
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into which fall those who lose credit-worthiness and are forced into higher-interest
loans which make the debt burden of the weak even heavier10-'.
One aspect of this is the question of access to credit (and other banking
facilities). "Banks ... are closing uneconomic accounts and we are receiving
evidence of the refusal of banking facilities in a way that was unheard of ten years
ago"ifo. The development of a greater range of financial services by the TSB has cut
them off from their traditional roots in basic banking for the poor, many banks have
closed branches, especially in poorer areas, and an increasing number of people are
being denied bank accounts on the basis of inadequate income - at a time when
access to banking is increasingly important to "normal economic participation""*
Again, the poorest have often to pay higher interest as less influential consumers: in
fact, there can be said to be two credit markets - one for those with the economic
muscle to bargain with and the relative security to offer lenders, and another for
those without access to such relatively cheap forms of credit as bank loans'". Of
course, there are serious dilemmas here, with regard to access to credit, as a right or
a privilege conditional on good behaviour or financial standing. "If the poor are
excluded from the expansion of credit, their standard of living may lag even farther
behind those with more comfortable incomes; but if they have been included in the
credil boom, there is a risk of their commitments over-reaching their means and
causing debt problems"'08. While access to credit is increasmgly access to
participation in society, debt functions as an effective termination of social as well
as economic participation for many. As we shall see this leads several commentators
tow ards the necessity for some kind of social lending mechanism, though that may
be seen as a tactic for re-integrating the underclass by involving them in the credit
society109; for now, we note that there are complex issues ofjustice and participation
raised The Glasgow pawnbroker who reported that "when people need money, they
are all one class"110 was uttering a deceptive half tnith.
A slightly different picture emerges when, instead of seeing poverty as a pari
of the background to debt, the study starts from those with the lowest incomes. The
techniques of "making ends meet" which emerge from such studies show a great
104 Movement for Christian Democracy, 1991, introduction
105 NACAB, 1992, p?7
106NACAJT 1993^ pi
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deal more realism and sophistication than those who speak of "infallible" budgeting
aids and a grasp ofAPR as the solution to debt problems allow. Kempson found two
basic approaches to poverty (1) minimising expenditure and "cutting back", the
approach which receives strong social approval, is more likely to avoid serious debt
problems; but carries a high price in terms of deprivation and social isolation and (2)
bill-juggling and borrowing, also a highly stressful approach, often ending in
financial disaster and generally frowned upon socially. Both approaches tend to try
to conceal poverty, the former by hiding it behind a closed door and the other by
keeping up appearances, accepting social pressures so as to avoid seeming
"different". Either way, there are high costs in struggling to make ends meet, of
which debt may be only one symptom.
Debtors and Creditors
Different perceptions and different needs also arise in the interaction
between debtor and creditor, ranging from different preferences in mode of
communication (debtors preferring telephone while creditors prefer to write letters)
to disparities in ability' to cope with court processes. From the start, any single
commitment is likely to be a more important part of the life of the debtor than it is
of the creditor's business: if it becomes a problem debt, the debtor's whole life will
probably be affected, while problem accounts are unlikely to be more than a small
percentage of the creditor's business (which is certainly not to say that some
creditors are not vulnerable to a growing number of bad debts, but this is more likely
to be so in the case of debts between businesses: the present study concentrates on
personal debt, although the distinction may be blurred by the growth in self-
employment). For these reasons, the customer enters the transaction weaker,
particularly the poorer customer, driven by need and with restricted choice as we
have seen
For example, there are likely to be different preferences in regard to payment
methods. Creditors are likely to seek a non-cash method with few instalments,
whereas people on low incomes require access to a frequent payment method at no
cost to themselves" i. Because the market reflects a greater cost m frequent payment
methods, it does not seem able to address the needs of poorer consumers adequately
or fairly.
111 NACAB, 1993, p29
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When things go wrong, the power differential continues. Most typically,
creditors will see communication prior to court stage being reached as a period of
negotiation while debtors may simply feel that ultimata are being issued to them
accompanied by threats. There is evidence that creditors who put most effort into
trying to understand the debtor's problems have more success than those who
demand immediate payment'Breakdowns in communication between debtor and
creditor may well be an important factor in the development from initial difficulties
to serious debt problems; they are certainly felt to be so by many of those involved.
Yet Lawson found that less than half of finance companies sought personal
interviews when problems arose113.
It may be worth considering here the impact of the increasingly impersonal
nature of many credit transactions. Ford characterises the credit system as
"continuous, regular, organised, a series of increasingly impersonal, often visible
bureaucratic transactions between individuals and institutions"114; the supermarket
accepts credit card transactions but has no scope for the informal "tick" of the corner
shop or the customer account of the high class grocer (though the "market" may still
have space for both of these in response to consumer demand). On the one hand,
credit cards may be valued as avoiding the personal interview with the bank
manager to secure a loan, but some creditors are concerned that a loss of personal
contact may have an impact on default rates11-3. Certainly, "doorstep" credit creates a
personal relationship w hich can give default a sense of letting down a friend. It is
important to remember that "in a situation where financial transactions have become
increasingly anonymous and impersonal ... a relationship is (still) being
established"116: a concept of justice which sees relationships as crucial will need to
consider this dimension, without being sentimental or nostalgic about "personal"
relationships which can be every bit as manipulative as impersonal, contractual
relationships.
Again, as we come to legal remedies, we find that, on the one hand creditors
who believe that debtors simply won't pay unless threatened by sanctions have this
picture apparently confirmed when threats produce results, yet what may be
happening is that the debtor re-prioritises multiple debts, robs Peter to pay Paul, or
^ Berthoud & Kernpson, 1992, pi64
*' ^ Lawson, 1989, p 17
114 Ford, 1988, p!3
' ^ Lawson, 1989, p2
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goes without "necessities" in order to pay up. There is also evidence that debtors
respond to pressure by making unrealistic promises of repayment117, a tendency also
to be found in court orders which take little or no account of debtors' means118. Both
of these debtor responses tend to reinforce the perception that debtors who "won't
pay" are the clear majority over those who "can't pay".
The system of legal remedies is, of course, founded on the assumption that
the debtor can pay; the system is therefore "necessarily coercive" (in the words of
the Scots Law Commission)119 and exists to ensure by sanctions the effective
fulfilment of promises made in the market: "the county court (in England) is
primarily reinforcing the normative values of the creditor debtor relationship ie if a
debt is owed it must be paid"120 and court officials may develop a culture of assisting
the creditor to get his due rather than attempting to establish fair play121. We are
dealing with a narrow (Hayekian) concept of justice here, with a reluctance to look
behind the terms of contracts properly entered into, regardless of the power
differential between those involved in concluding the bargain. Significant change
front this model, however, might well result in creditors resorting more to private
debt collection agencies rather than the courts.
Of course, this coercive model, in which courts tend to become collection
agencies for creditors, is not the only possible model; nor is it the only operational
model. Adler and Sainsbury note an increasing "privatisation"122 of debt collection
whereby creditors - who may be critical of the way courts operate121 - are inclined to
use other methods than the courts for debt recover}'. This may range from
"intimidation" (more often by stigma than violence) by bailiffs and even by
respected institutions like banks using their financially privileged position, into new.
higher interest, loans to a willingness to come to a payment plan agreement drawn
up with the aid ofmoney advisers. Ramsay draws on Rock's analysis of a move from
coercive to assimilative models of debt enforcement, and points to the dangers of
the assimilative view which seeks to integrate the debtor into the credit system and
its values - a social work model in which "treatment is aimed at changing the client
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rather than the social network in which the clieni is embedded"i:\ As has been found
in other areas, informal systems of justice can end up being more intrusive than
coercive systems which have built-in safeguards for people's rights. Thus, Adler and
Wozniak rejected a welfare model which made debtors into social workers' clients,
in favour of an arbitration model in which rights could still be defended through the
courts. The vast majority of problems will - rightly - continue to be resolved outwith
the courts, but there is a continuing need to ensure that rights are protected and that
the enforcement mechanism is not simply an extension of the market.
One area in which the Consumer Credit .Act sought to protect debtors' rights
is in the provisions aimed at nullifying "extortionate" interest rates; but these seem
to have had little practical effect. Unlike previous legislation, that Act contained 110
interest rate ceiling (not even a presumptive ceiling) but allowed courts to re-open
extortionate credit bargains "so as to do justice between the parties"125, the test of
"extortionate" being in terms of "grossly exorbitant" payments or a contravention of
"ordinary principles of fair dealing", having regard to such factors as the age,
experience and business capacity of the debtor and the fmancial pressure he was
under126. However, only four cases have been reported of credit bargains re-opened
under this provision12-. Bodies such as the NACAB and the OFT have urged changes
to the wording to induce a greater readiness to intervene, but the government
response has discouraged this128 and the underlying "root problem is the traditional
conservatism and attachment to market ideology of the British judiciary which will
prevent them from condemning as 'unjust' contracts which have been freely and
fairly entered into even though the interest rate charged is excessive"*25. Yet Adam
Smith advocated interest rate ceilings, on the ground that otherwise "the greater
portion of the money which was lent would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who
alone would be willing to give this high interest ... so it would be thrown to those
who were most likely to waste and destroy it"15". Even a presumptive ceiling - such
as operates in many Commonwealth and European countries - would be both
difficult to fix appropriately and hard to assess in terms of its impact on the market,
particularly without the adequate backing of a system of social lending151. Yet most
{2^ 1 Ramsay in Howells, etc, 1993, p71
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understandings of "justice" would balk at interest rates of well over 100% (other
than in very unusual circumstances) even if "usury" is a concept seen to belong to
another era.
Remedies such as warrant sales and poinding of goods often have little effect
in securing the amount owed for the creditor, and their only justification lies in
terms of deterrence. Disproportionate harm may be inflicted on the debtor without
any significant benefit to the creditor; "in Scotland ... the warrant sale seems
designed simply to inflict public humiliation on defaulters" with little effect in
recouping money". While the use ofwarrant sales is becoming rare (or at least was
so until rebellion against the "poll tax" brought some resurgence in their use,
perhaps with motives other than straightforward debt-recovery), their existence in
the background as threat contributes to the stigmatisation of and pressures on
debtors.
Debtor Options
Before the stage of legal remedies, the debtor may seek other means of
escape from problems. The rise in debt problems has been accompanied by a rise in
advertising of "buy-out" loans offering the attractiveness of getting pressing
creditors off one's back and postponing (at some considerable cost) the problems of
repayment; is this again something which like "loansharks" can be left to the market
to sort out or are steps called for to protect vulnerable consumers (which may be
seen as a return to nannving) ? Those who might be termed "down-market" lenders
operate with very high risks (and high interest rates)"', and even ioansharks may
have greater accessibility and flexibility of repayment than the Social Fund'". (A
factsheet accompanying a recent Channel 4 TV programme on loansharks felt it
necessary to point out that "it should be remembered that moneylenders are never a
'godsend' or perform a 'social service'. They are only interested in hooking people
into paying them at exorbitant rates""5.) Thus, the credit market has given access to
credit for some previously denied it, and a return to higher levels of regulation might
exclude them again Many of the surveys agree that a way must be found to ensure
cheaper loans for the poor (whom the market penalises by forcing them to the less
scrupulous, high interest lenders), but how to achieve this is the problem.
Berthoud, 1989, p34
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Does the Social Fund have the possibility of reform in this direction or is it
simply an institutionalising of debt ? Some of the problems with the Social Fund
have been noted above; discretion allows that possibility of discrimination (ofwhich
there is some evidence'*), people are reluctant to get into further debt that leaves
them surviving below the poverty line after repayments are deducted, and the
approach still seems predicated on the individualisation of the problem rather than
reckoning with the facts of poverty ("it is individually targeted and involves
individuals accepting responsibility for meeting payments""7). The present Prime
Minister claimed that the Social Fund was an instrument for achieving equality -
between claimants and "those on low incomes who have to borrow for large and
unforeseen expenses""'; "never has debt been more triumphantly eulogised as a
means of promoting equality" comments Phillips.
Yet the Social Fund may be seen as belonging to a tradition which goes back
to the 16th century establishment of pawnshops when "the Franciscans stepped into
the economic gap created by the expulsion of Jewish money-lenders with a chain of
'saintly pawnshops' (Montes Pietatis)">» and leads today to such as the French Credit
Municipal, providing small loans to poorer borrowers. A British version of this,
aimed at meeting the credit needs of those who have to use credit for necessities,
would have to take those needs seriously and would therefore be different from the
present Social Fund, with its limited budget (of £100m in 1991 when income
support claimants owed the state £150m), inflexibility with repayments140, and
refusal of loans on the ground of apparent inability to repay (over 27,000 applicants
refused on_ this ground in 1990141, and increasingly "Social Fund officers will refuse
loans to clients they judge unlikely to make repayments"14?). At present it seems
unlikely that Social Fund loans could be seen as a "means to secure civil and social
justice"144: rather they form "part of a strategy which is less about providing a
suitable credit facility for poor people and more about shifting the responsibility for
supporting poor people away from the state and into private obscurity"144. Any state
loan-based system seems bound to have a connotation of judging the management
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skills of those receiving loans, and will also fail to tackle the underlying low benefit
and income levels.
Credit Unions are also cited as part of the solution. "A credit union is a co¬
operative society offering its members loans out of the pool of savings built up by
the members themselves" part of its essence is a common bond uniting the
members as eg workers in the same company or members of the same church.
Balancing the idealistic objectives with the practicalities of operating in the market
has proved difficult, and there are few credit unions in the UK outside Northern
Ireland (where there is often a close link with the church). The replacement of
market criteria by the common bond and personal knowledge of character may
make credit unions too personal for some; others may feel the requirement to be a
saver before you can borrow outweighs the attractively low APR, and there is little
conclusive evidence that those who borrow from credit unions lack access to the
mainstream credit market, or that participation avoids entanglement with
moneylenders. Their role therefore seems limited, especially in areas of low
management expertise; "their operation seems to be too strongly influenced by
commercial realities' for them to perform the radical redistributive function often
assigned to them"'**. Indeed, we may see a parallel between credit unions today and
the Victorian roots of the Provident, now very much a thriving part of the credit
market with interest rates around 100% APR147, but conceived by a philanthropic
Methodist aiming to instil self-help and sobriety in the poor of his day148. The
evidence suggests that credit unions tend to be more used by those of middle
incomes, and as a convenient saving discipline which helps smooth out the peaks
and troughs of finances that are basically sound14'. Credit unions could, however,
develop a role in providing bill-paying facilities for clients which might overcome
some of the difficulties with methods of payment Though restricted, they have a
part to play - not least as a challenge to other institutions - in building the system of
social lending that is needed by those on chronic low income, including those facing
multiple debts, as is attempted in many continental countries.
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Creditor Action
Solutions which focus on the creditor tend to focus on "responsible lending",
with an assumption that expanded granting of credit without adequate checking re
ability to pay is a major cause of debt problems. Would more responsible lending
practices backed up by credit scoring etc cut debt problems or simply cut poor (and
other "high risk" people off from credit ? Certainly market pressures cut both ways
here. While the risk of bad debts operates as a limiting factor for creditors, the
competitive market makes lenders reluctant to turn down customers who might well
get credit next door, particularly if there is a gap between the credit supplier (on
commission for sales) and the ultimate creditor'*1. Computer technology opens up
many possibilities for sophisticated credit scoring and referencing to reduce risk,
which would seem to benefit both lender and, ultimately, borrower; the Jubilee
Policy Group, for example reckon that vetting to rule out high-risk debtors could cut
2% from store card interest rates.'51. But neither the selection of criteria nor the effect
of their application is straightforward'". The PSI report argues that "there can be no
doubt such credit scoring has allowed lenders to lend to a wider range of people
while keeping risks under control"'5', but that would be little consolation to the
potential borrower turned down yet desperate for a loan which a computer
programme suggests he might have problems in repaying. Credit scoring can widen
the access gap already referred to. The problems here are not just those of rough and
ready "red-lining" of whole districts15-1, but more sophisticated (and accurate)
methods raise serious issues of civil liberties'55 which have already caused concern
to the Data Protection Registrar. Not surprisingly, 73% of debtors feel that credit
blacklisting is unfair156. Even systems based on ability to repay (rather than scoring
from past performance) are limited in that major triggers of default like illness,
marital breakdown and unemployment cannot really be predicted.
It may also be argued that the provision whereby companies can offset bad
debts against tax means that they are more ready to risk these in their lending policy,
but greater harassment of debtors might well result from a change in the law. The
National Consumer Council have gone further in arguing for proper credit checking
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- "if a lender cannot prove that a careful check was made, the debt should be treated
as unenforceable"!-7. Yet creditors themselves saw the availability of more accurate
information about debtors in default and generally about borrowers at the time of
the arrangement as two of the three most important steps to improve matters (the
other being more effective measures against those who could but won't pay)>w
While responsible lending seems clearly "a good thing", and "truth in lending"
(including obligations to tell the whole truth in terms which consumers can readily
understand) is to be encouraged (or compelled by legislation), such arguments fail to
account for the high proportion of debtors whose debt arises from chronic low
income and whose resort to credit is a matter of desperation rather than free choice.
Thus concern at credit limits being increased at the creditor's instigation may
be justified, but appears to have little to do with the realities of debt problems. Such
unsolicited increases in credit limits (especially when apparently made in response
to a customer exceeding the existing credit limit) may, however, be one aspect of
the conflicting signals which defaulters on credit cards seem to receive. The briefly
typed note on the statement indicating default may be accompanied by a glossy
brochure offering extra loans or encouraging lavish spending, so that some debtors
ended up feeling that "credit card companies were more interested in persuading
people to spend than they were in encouraging them to pay their bill"159.
Creditors might also be encouraged to offer more "user-friendly" payment
methods. The PSI study shows great differences in default rates between different
payment methods, with token meters for electricity and personal collectors calling
weekly showing fewer problems than payment monthly through banks or post
offices, but creditors generally do not find these attractive, even seeing them as a
subside from rich to poor or payer to (likely) non-paver as they mav be more
expensive to operate160. Further, token meters, while apparently preventing debt and
disconnection may in fact simply conceal effective self-disconnection.
Solutions Elsewhere
The PSI survey concluded that "the problem cannot be "blamed' on
irresponsible borrowing any more than any other single cause"161. Where else, then,
can we look for solutions ? Other "solutions" focus more on the debtor and suggest
1 NCC, 1990, p86
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that the problem is a budgeting failure. Might greater provision for deductions (of
benefit or wages) at source help budgeting or simply reduce debtors' room for
manoeuvre ? Deductions of benefit at source leave people struggling to survive on
less than what is reckoned to be the bare minimum (whether they are for repayment
of Social Fund loans or other debt), reduce their ability" to budget effectively and
tend to make the social security system into a debt collection service"2.
The Office of Fair Trading, whose responsibility for monitoring the credit
market dates from the Consumer Credit Act 1974, has stressed consumer education
as crucial to the minimisation of debt, even when there has been little evidence of
ignorance as a cause of debt problems: "while it is difficult to be certain of the
reasons why people become overindebted (except for the cases due to such things as
sudden unemployment or family problems) there seems little doubt that a
contributory factor is the general iack of education and advice on the advantages and
disadvantages of credit or of particular forms of credit""'. They argue for a massive
increase in credit education "so that everyone can survive in a credit-oriented society
and benefit from it", even seeing advertising as part of that education though
admitting it sometimes "goes over the top"164.
Discussion of APR (the "annualised percentage rate" in which the total cost
of credit has had to be expressed since 1980) is crucial to this argument; "it must be
disquieting that nearly two-thirds of adults have not even a vague idea of the
pininn or rxiirtwoA of APU'1!^ Rnt tV>ic CAPtrio to rofloot o W°V of tnlfle Ifl^
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different from those struggling to make ends meet, for whom the cmcial question is
about the level of weekly payments and whose freedom of choice among different
"APRs" is minimal166. Even at a detached level, the extent to which the basic quoted
"price" and the interest rate may be mutually adjusted makes concentration on APR
alone misleading. But the fundamental problem with solutions which concentrate on
education is the implication that debt results from a lack of education and that
debtors who fail to act as rational consumers are to be blamed for their own
problems. "It is unlikely that in general working class individuals are in need of
greater education in budgeting and credit than middle class individuals""7. As
already noted, there is a great deal of sophistication in formal and informal
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budgeting and coping techniques among the poorest which would be well beyond
many who can describe APR accurately. While the Crowther Report thought that "in
general, the remedy (for debt problems) is to be found by utilising the established
techniques of social work"168, the scope for this may be limited (as certainly are the
time and abilities of social workers in dealing with such areas169) if the problem is
inadequate income.
Yet supportive consumer education is not to be discounted. The role of
various Money Advice agencies is crucial in support of those who have got into
serious debt, yet their agreement with the major credit trade associations on a
formula for rescheduling and apportioning payments can lead to their becoming
benign debt collection agencies in exercising their function of helping debtors deal
sensibly with their problems and make appropriate repayment plans (as the IMF has
been accused of being in its role in relation to international debt176). On the other
hand, creditors are not unanimous in their support for the work of advice agencies,
claiming that "those who consult agencies often display a 'sins are forgiven' attitude
to their responsibilities. Customers at times develop an offhand attitude ... believing
that the problem has now been passed to the advice agency"1 1 Although that does
not appear to be a common experience, it does hint at the conflicts of interest which
can arise for advisers between an advocacy role for clients and creditors' demands
for objectivity impartiality1711. And alongside that conflict are questions of funding -
"can local and national taxpayers be expected to meet the cost of providing debt
advice services which ultimately benefit the credit industry ?"173; but could advisers
funded by the credit industry operate in their clients' best interests ?
Whatever the value of money advice, presently available resources cannot
make more than a token impact on the problem and even an expanded service could
not be a panacea, particularly where low income is a major factor174: advice can onlv
help stabilise the problem, nol solve it, since only occasionally is the debt written
off in response to representation17*.
Crowther Report, 1971, 1 3 .66
169 Ashley, 1683, pi 86
^7® Economist, 12-10-91, p32
17* Lawson, 1989, p22
17^ Lawson, 1989, p23
' 7:1 Howells, etc, 1993, p9
174 Ashley, 1983, pi84
' 7<^ Berthoud, 1989, p3?
36
There is no one simple solution. "Tackling the problem involves preventing
debt occurring in the first place, swift and responsible debt collection and providing
practical support and help for people who have got into debt"176.
Bankruptcy
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the PSI report makes little or no mention
of bankruptcy or the English system of administration orders (which were designed
to have a similar effect) as part of the answer. Bankruptcy still carries at least some
of the social stigma which saw Joseph Fry disowned by his Quaker meeting on
becoming bankrupt177; "X went bankrupt and didn't even resign as a Kirk elder - the
nerve" reported a Scottish fanner in some indignation. Yet bankruptcies spiralled
after the 1985 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act made it a live option for debtors in deep
trouble with no realisable assets - from under 300 annually in 1985 to 12.000
annually in 1992 31«. Recognising an annual growth rate of 74% from 1986 87 to
1991 9217». and noting that this was well in advance of growth in other parts of the
UX. the government argued that this showed that economic factors were not the
major cause here, but they must be seen as playing a pari in the UK picture as a
whole, which has shown a similar, if less dramatic, trend of increase.
Stories of bankruptcies spreading street by street across Glasgow like a
disease fuelled a panic about the numbers of bankruptcies m the late 1980s. For
some, the upsurge in debtor-led bankruptcies (from 25% of the total in 1986 7 to
87% in 1991 92) indicated thai a "relatively easy wa> out"180 had been offered, to
reinforce a changed attitude to debt, causing alarm among creditors at the shift in
the balance of interests - cheap grace indeed. "We often forget - at least people who
adopt the bleeding heart approach often forget - that in the end all debts have to be
paid ... there is no such thing as a debt that is written off'181, said one supporter of
the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill in 1992. designed to "close the loophole".
The debate in Scotland had close parallels with the situation ten years earlier
in the United States, where the idea of the fresh start is said to be closely linked with
American attachment to the pioneering spirit of the risk-taker, to individualism and
the market. Certainly US bankruptcy legislation has tended to set a lesser price on
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bankruptcy by exempting a wider range of essential personal possessions from
involvement in the bankruptcy. The crucial question, traditionally, was "what a
family needed to get back on its feet"!*2: but after a concerted campaign agaiast
legislation that made bankruptcy more accessible, there was greater concern about
the possible exploitation of bankruptcy by the shrewd operator (who replaced the
honest struggling debtor as the stereotype on which policy was based)183. The new
model which has emerged on both sides of the Atlantic views bankruptcy as "a very
attractive method of improving one's financial position, so attractive that debtors
who are able to pay their debts must be prevented from using it by powerful
disincentives"184. But neither the US Consumer Bankruptcy Survey, nor UK research
supports the idea that bankruptcy has been exploited by large numbers of shrewd
financial operators; the reality is much more of people drowning in debt and
reaching out for a lifeline In that sense, some provision for release from debts is a
necessary "give" in the joints of the system w hich enables the machinery to work183.
If bankruptcy represents a hospital for the financially sick, the appropriate response
to a rapid growth in hospital cases would surely be to ask about the causes of the
disease (with a view to preventive medicine), rather than to decide that the hospital
must be too readily available.
While the writing off of debt is not generally an expectation or even serious
hope of most debtors. Ford draws attention to its scale186. In 1986. £243m was
wnnen off by finance houses to individual customers, and Britain's largest four
banks wrote off over £21bn in bad debts in a decade187. The choice is not, therefore,
between the narrow justice of "debts must be paid" and a more generous
understanding; "as the bad debt figures for last year show ... (it is) between
organised and early generosity and haphazard and reluctant generosity"188.
Furthermore, a recent analysis of international debt has shown that the "cost of
forgiveness" may not be as high as might be supposed, because of the rehabilitation
of the debtor to the system, a theory which might equally be applied to persona)
debt189.
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"Sequestration (or bankruptcy) is primarily a coercive procedure initiated by
a creditor by which the assets of a debtor who fails or refuses to pay his debts are
made available to his creditors towards the satisfaction of their debts. The debtor,
however, may petition the court for the sequestration of his own estate with the
object of obtaining in due course a general discharge of his debts, a privilege not
granted to debtors in several European legal systems unless they have paid their
debts in full"'9®. So wrote the Scots Law Commission in the report which paved the
way for the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, and their statement of objectives puts
much more of emphasis on the interests of creditors than those of debtors'". This
restatement of the traditional Scottish view lends credibility to the argument that the
dramatic increase in bankruptcies which followed the Act was not the result of any
intention to lift the burden of debt from poor debtors' shoulders; the fact that a door
was (perhaps unwittingly) left open would not have led to the numbers pouring
through but for underlying debt problems and the effects of a general economic
recession. The debts are real, and 49% of those being sequestrated are
unemployed"-; what, then, car, be done about the debts of those on chronic low
income with little reasonable prospect of paying them off 0
Through a structured "writing off', bankruptcy offers the possibility of a
fresh start for those so deeply in debt as to have no realistic hope of recovery, a
safety-valve in the financial system which can trace roots back to the Old Testament
Jubilee year'". As we shall see, it is therefore a meeting place of concerns of justice
and forgiveness. The openins up of a possibility of a fresh start makes further
investigation of the potential here vital; some attempt to break into the cycle is
needed as the NCR report and practice indicate'".
A major part of the question is the issue of who pays the cost of any such
"forgiveness". Bankruptcy legislation places this almost entirely on the creditor, for
all that the 1985 Act came to worry the government so much in terms of the costs of
administration. One effect of this may be to encourage creditors' toward more
careful monitoring of credit-granting than would take place if they were guaranteed
repayment by the state195. Yet this may only be seen as just to the extent that problem
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debts are caused by irresponsible lending; otherwise, a reluctance to grant credit to
the poorest may simply remove the "sticking-plaster" over poverty noted above. Any
attempt by the state to bear a substantial part of the cost is not only unlikely in the
present climate but would inevitably have hard-to-predict consequences throughout
the credit market. If the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1993 is achieving its objectives
of not only cutting administration costs to the government but also reducing the
embarrassing number of bankruptcies, there may well be "a seething mass of people
burdened by debts which they have no hope of paying off but from which they can
receive no relief through bankruptcy because they are not apparently insolvent""®.
In the UK at least, bankruptcy remains neither easy nor a simple "way out" of
debt problems. There are still Dickensian elements of stigma, trauma and important
legal disabilities; the impact of reading the personal stories gathered by the
Bankruptcy Association may well leave one agreeing that, in bankruptcy, "there is
no such thing as a statistic""-. It (or its threat) remains more an instrument of
diligence for creditors than an escape therefrom - even, in a credit-oriented society,
"almost the materialist version of death"19*, albeit with some prospect of eventual
resurrection. Whether a better solution lies in the direction of the protected trust
deeds encouraged by the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1993, or of the still-greater US
enthusiasm for offering a fresh start (linked with the different attitude to failure in
the US mentioned above) remains to be seen. Some way of breaking into spiralling
debt problems is needed, not only by the debtors themselves, but by a credit system
that requires that casualties do not disappear from the market in significant numbers.
At the moment, "bankruptcy is a socially-provided insurance which allows the swift
(?) rehabilitation of the debtor to the credit system"199; but it is a blunt instrument of
policy. "Uncollectable debts are going to be remitted anyway, we may be sure, but
by the clumsy destructive mechanism of bankruptcy with all its attendant misery and
unemployment. The ancient prophets may have shown us a better way. We could
depawn the old ram's horn, breathe deep and let rip one mighty debt-dissolving,
economy reviving, interest-slashing, bank-baffling blast (Then again, perhaps
it never was, nor is going to be, as simple as that.)
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Debt and the State
In Britain at least, credit and debt occur within a "market". The deregulated
credit market of the 1990s consists of an economic and legal framework within
which market rules (themselves determined by the framework) operate - "the
granting of credit ultimately rests on the promise of the state to enforce debts"™. To
speak of a credit market operating in isolated perfection is grossly misleading in
several ways. More than most "markets", the credit market is bound up with other
markets (eg for the goods the credit is intended to pay for); the "prices" of credit in
the market (ie interest rates) are largely determined by a combination of
international and macro-economic factors extrinsic to those who actually operate in
the market, the market, as previously noted, is probably better understood as at least
two markets, with "up-market" forms of credit available to those in paid
^tnnlnrmpnl _*-*■> i rt-<=>t" fr»nyi e tn enmp a4 tjiA rpcf r*f* tV\^
wiiipic iiiiwai uiiu uuv»u-iiiuiivwt iv/inio uvuiiul'iw ivy Oviiiv kj 1 uic iwoi 01 lilW
population; and freedom of choice for many consumers (and many who would like
to become consumers) is a myth™
Because the credit market does not operate in isolation, an idealistic attempt
to realise here values radically different from those at work elsewhere in society is
likely to fail like seeds planted in inhospitable soil (a point for further discussion
when Marx's contribution to the understanding of justice is considered). The legal
and economic framework in which the credit market operates is a political
construct, not something natural but a matter of continuing debate. Currently that
economic framework is one of widening inequality-™, and the market (in credit as
elsewhere) does not adequately safeguard the interests of disadvantaged consumers,
partly because it fails to take account of the different uses made of credit by rich (for
buying consumer goods) and poor (simply to make ends meet)™. A concern for
social justice which "is committed to the underlying structural imperative that 'there
should be no poor among you"1™ must be concerned that in this market an
increasing number of people are trapped in "the worst poverty". To describe such
people as the "casualties" of the credit society may be to imply that their fate is an
isolated accident; rather their problems are the foreseeable result of "market forces"
in both the credit market and the economy in general. "Debt recovery is the flip side
Sullivan and others, 1989, p3
Tebbutt, 1984, p203
Rowntree, 1995, p6 7
Berthoud, 1989, pi3
^0 s
Movement for Christian Democracy, 1991, p29
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of a society which increasingly, through plastic cards, ubiquitous payment-by-
instalment offerings from retailers and others, regards borrowing as the natural way
to pay for what you want"-™, and debt is a symptom of the inadequacy of credit as
the sticking plaster over chronic poverty. The (former) Director General of Fair
Trading lists five characteristics of an adequate credit market, as (1) ready access to
a competitive market (2) sensible borrowers (3) cautious and restrained lenders (4)
confidence in the market (5) fair and constructive arrangements to deal with
arrears-'07. Enough has been said above to show that not only is this far from being
the case as yet, but that these alone, if obtainable, would not prevent the serious debt
problems many experience today.
Arguments (both paternalistic and competitive) for the conscious
involvement of the state with the aim of reducing the number of debtors go back
many centuries, eg to early Pawnbroking Acts - "the first pieces of comprehensive
consumer protection legislation designed in the interests of the poor"208. Of course
there are also arguments for non-intervention. The Crowther Report advocated
treating consumers as "adults who are capable of managing their own affairs" and
therefore not restricting their freedom200. Hayek (whose work will be considered in
detail laier in this thesis) has warned of the destructive, unintended consequences of
regulation. Yet the state already (and inevitably) defines the rules by which the
market operates. The debate, as Howells puts it, is whether the law should be
concerned with contract formation only, or with substantive outcomes210. And. when
these outcomes are shown to compound the problems of the poorest, "only the state
can redress the balance and subsidise the poor borrower"211.
Others, however, would argue that the tendency to shift blame on to
"society" and look to the state for solutions erodes the values of personal
responsibility that are basic to the system The coercive power of the state may be
imprtant in the background, but the market simply cannot function unless most
people, most of the time, pay their debts out of a sense of moral obligation. This, it
is argued, is easily eroded when "excuses" are offered for debt and opportunities
given to avoid payment with apparent legal approval (eg in accessible low-cost
bankruptcy); from another perspective, that sense of obligation may diminish when
206 The Herald 5-3-94
G Borne, in Howells etc, 1993, p58
2^ Crowther Report, 1971, 2.1.17
2()y Orowther Report, 1971, 1.3.5
2'" Howells etc, 1993, pi03
21 ' Tebbutt, 1984, p204
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the debt is to an international grocery chain rather than to the corner shopkeeper
with whom one's relationship is more than contractual.
A Christian ethical response to debt may well take as a starting point a
presumption that debts should be paid, but that is not the last word, as the medieval
discussion of usury and the unproductive nature of money well illustrates (in a
manner which may be seen as either a radical challenge to current thinking or
simply out of date?12). This chapter has explored the facts of credit and debt in
Britain, and a response to these facts cannot afford to be selective about them, or
about the moral issues raised by them. While one of the key points made here has
been that stereotypical views of debtors or creditors are likely to be misleading and
lead to misguided policies, the fact is that the single parent struggling to make ends
meet on benefit is a more typical debtor than the reckless "credit card junkie", the
feckless teenager or the shrewd manipulator. Yet all exist, and finding responses
appropriate to each, and able to distinguish, is complex.
It is also apparent from the consideration of debi and how it is dealt with
that problems ofjustice are raised at many points and at different levels, but that it is
often far from easy to determine what the demands of justice mean in these
particular situations. Here, as in other contexts, it may be that "nobody knows ...
what justice is"?", or perhaps that everyone has her or his own idea, from the
minimalist refusal to go beyond "debts must be paid", through "justice as fairness" to
the more pro-active understanding that will be developed later in this thesis. This
chapter has raised some of the issues which that reflection must address later: the
next develops further many of the points raised here about credit and debt, in the
light of some original research
919
- - See further in chapter 3
213 Wootton, 1962, pi62
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2. Credit and Debt - Perceptions and Values
In addition to the preceding research review, original research was carried
out by means of a questionnaire and personal interviews. The frill questionnaire
(which appears as an appendix to this chapter) was completed by seven creditors
(drawn from banks, building society, finance company, fuel company and a
pawnbroker), seven "advisers" (from CAB, money advice project, consumer agency
and the legal profession) and seven "debtors" (contacted via CAB, a support group
and a college); all of these were personally interviewed (for around one hour) after
they had completed the questionnaire. In addition, the questionnaire (without the
case studies) was completed by members of four groups connected with local
churches - a Woman's Guild (WG), a women's group (WT). a men's unemployed &
retired group (G) and a peace and justice group (PJ1), totalling 48 people. A pilot
version of the questionnaire (with many of the same questions) was completed by
members of the local Probus (retired business and professional) Club (Pr).
The purposes of this research were
(1) to deepen the understanding of debt problems by tapping into the personal
experience of those directly involved from various angles
(2) to examine the perceptions which those involved have learned from their
experience and which they apply to their dealings with credit and debt
(3) to compare these perceptions of those closely and personally involved with those
of people drawn from the church and church-connected groups
(4) to see what values (especially of justice and forgiveness) people bring to bear in
this area or derive from it
(5) to raise and explore further some of the issues which emerged in the previous
chapter, and discover what those interviewed view as crucial issues
Particularly with a view to (3), several questions were drawn from those used
in other research projects, giving links to the previous chapter and a "control group"
where the other research had involved a wider sampling of the population at large.
Each person who completed the questionnaire was also asked to give the first digit
of their age and a self-estimate of their church involvement (1 = highly committed, 2
' This group had spent some time discussing credit and debt before filling in the questionnaire
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= regular attender, 3 = occasional attender, 4 = no involvement) with a view to
assessment ofwhether these were important factors in determining perceptions.
(Despite efforts to avoid personal influence of the interviewer on the
responses, it may be that one factor in the differences between some of these results
and those of other, wider, research could be a sub-conscious response to the source
of the questionnaire being a minister, influencing people to present what they might
expect ministers to see as their best side. I have no more concrete evidence either
way on this, but offer it as a slight caution with regard to some of the results.)
In the preparation of the questionnaire, questions were designed as clusters
with a focus, ie (A) Questions 1, 2, 3, 8 (linked also with 22 and questions rwo and
four in each of the case studies) - all intended to measure the extent to which
debtors are being blamed for their own problems (B) Questions 4, 5, 14, 17 (linked
also with 23) - all intended to measure the strength of perceived obligation to pay
one's debts (C) Questions 6, 7, 10, 18 (with possible links to 21 and question four in
the case studies) - all intended to measure the extent to which responsibility is felt to
rest on creditors (D) Questions 13. 15, 16 - all intended to measure enthusiasm for
the idea of a "fresh start" (E) Questions 9. 16, 19 - all intended to measure hostility
to bankruptcy.
However, the responses, to questions 1-19, of all those surveyed were
analysed by means of correlation matrix and factor analysis, to assess correlations
between responses to different questions and draw out possible common factors
underlying these responses. The result of this seems to undermine any sense of the
designed clusters as each representing one coherent viewpoint. The factor analysis is
therefore examined below in terms of which factors seem to be operating, and then
the responses to the individual questions (both on paper and in interview) are
considered in the light of that, before the original "clusters" are reconsidered At the
conclusion of this chapter, the issues raised, and the relevance of understandings of
justice and forgiveness in this context are assessed.
Factor Analysis
Factor analysis was carried out using Minitab programmes. Rotated
orthogonal factor solutions were explored, and the following (4 factor) analysis was
selected as the most useful (3 factor and 5 factor analyses were also carried out),
giving four factors with Eigen values over 2, explaining 54.8% of variance, with
only 3 questions (ie Q 14, 15, 18) loading r>0.4 on more than one factor and only
one question (Q17) failing to show a loading r>0.4.
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Principal Component Factor Analysis of the Correlation Matrix
Rotated Factor Loadings and Communalities (Varimax Rotation)
Question Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Communality
! -0.038 -0.086 -0.693 -0070 0.494
2 0.021 -0.232 -0 437 0.095 0.254
3 0.736 0.028 0.131 0.289 0.644
4 0.628 0.288 0.083 0.393 0.638
5 0.113 0.025 0.280 -0.629 0.488
g 0.217 0.719 0.102 0.289 0.657
7 -0.077 0.610 -0.153 -0.224 0.451
8 0.777 0.011 -0.135 0.042 0.623
9 0.401 0.026 0.096 -0.222 0.219
10 0.268 0.834 0.050 0.103 0.780
11 0.550 0.214 -0.333 -0.179 0.491
12 0.048 -0.092 -0 360 A Z"7A-u.o/v
A /"A 1
u.oul
13 0.028 0.128 -0.657 -0.022 0.449
14 0.585 -0.241 -0.043 -0.572 0.728
15 0.020 0.407 -0 582 -0.151 0.527
16 0 786 0.172 -0.036 -0.211 0.693
17 0.343 0.348 0.363 -0.348 0 491
18 -0.174 0.265 -0.410 -0.528 0.548
19 0.779 0.059 0.095 -0.075 0.625
Variance 3.8593 2.2484 2.1607 2.1352 10.4036
% Var 20.3% 11.8% 11.4% 11.2% 54.8%
This appears to show some general (moral ?) values operating in the thinking
of the respondents. Factor 1, in which Q 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 14. 16 and 19 load r>0.4 (all
positively), would appear to have a common theme of the personal responsibility of
debtors for their own situation, with an element of judging the debtor and reluctance
to offer an "easy" way out of problems through bankruptcy. However. Q 1 and 2 do
not load highly here, suggesting that any "judgment" is in relation less to the causes
of debt than to the response to it. Factor 2 shows high (r>0.4) loadings for Q 6, 7, 10
and 15 (all positively), suggesting a tendency to stress the responsibilities of
creditors/lenders at the time of making the agreement (Q18, which doesn't load
significantly here, relates to creditors' responsibilities at the later stage of sorting out
problems; although Q15, whose loading is fairly high, does seem to suggest
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creditors bearing the cost of extending credit which people cannot afford to repay).
Factor 3. with high loadings from Q 1. 2, 13. 15. and 18 (all negatively), seems to
reflect a tendency to look to factors beyond the immediate parties both for causes
and solutions to problems. Factor 4. where the high loadings are from Q 5. 12. 14
and 18 (all negative), appears to have a common element of concern for a basic
standard of living (possibly balanced by the threat of punishment (Q14).
The preliminary suggestion is, therefore, that there are four underlying
values operating to influence people's responses to credit and debt, ie
• personal responsibility (of debtors)
• responsibilities of lenders
• assessments of social factors
• concern for people's need for a basic standard of living.
Item Analysis
Responses to individual questions are now considered', comparing the
responses of the different groups and drawing on the amplifications of answers
given in interviews. In order to assess the statistical significance of differences in
response from one group to another, a chi-square test of significance has been
applied to the comparison of these differences, without dismissing completely
divergences which do not score highly (bearing in mind the difficulties of the small
scale of the survey especially in terms of the creditors, advisers and debtors)'. Two
correlation matrices (indicating correlation between responses to different
questions) wili also be referred to - one for all questions, based on the "CAD"4
responses, and another for Q 1-19 (plus the questions about age and church
involvement) based on all responses', and. for comparison, the results of other
research using the same questions will be drawn upon. This is intended to seek to
maintain a level of statistical integrity, while being aware that the size of the sample
militates against building a significant case on statistical analysis; the point, as noted
The questions are grouped according to the factor on which they load highly
^ The chi-square tests were earned out using the numbers "agreeing" - scores 1 or 2 numbers
"disagreeing" - scores 4 or 5 and numbers who "don't know" - score 3: actual numbers in each
category were compared with average numbers which were treated as the "expected" numbers:
only the responses from the groups who were asked all the questions 1-19 were used, ie C, A, D,
WG, WT, PJ, G. Alpha was taken as = .05
4 CAD will be used as an abbreviation for the creditors, advisers and debtors interviewed
-s These matrices show slightly different patterns, although the significance of the difference is
undermined by the small size of the CAD sample, they appear as appendices 2 & 3 to this chapter
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above, is much more lo draw out issues for theological and ethical reflection anu
response than to prove a hypothesis.
Questions Loading Highly in Factor 1 "Personal Responsibility"
Q3 : "People who are in trouble with debt do not know how to run their lives
properly"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G Pr
3.34 3.57 4.14 4 43 4.05 2.50 3.50 3.75 3.50 2.23
This question showed significant differences in response between groups*,
with those having personal experience of debt showing least agreement with the
statement, and the oldest groups (WG & Pr) showing most agreement. In fact, none
of the CAD respondents gave an "agree" answer score - a vastly different response
from Adler & Wozniak's results with this question (although they asked a simple
agree or disagree, winch may contribute marginally to the result) :
Group %Agree %Disagree %Don't Know
Creditors 0 57 43
Advisers 0 71 29
Debtors 0 86 14
A&W Control 66 27 7
A&W Debtors 74 24 2
Rock London 75 21 4
It is hard to see what reason there might be for this difference other than the
10-15 vear gap between the two pieces of research, suggesting that a greater general
level of reluctance to judge the competence of debtors may have accompanied the
rise in debt problems during the 1980s (which would also fit with the greater
tendency of older people to agree with the statement)8. One creditor and one adviser
did suggest a difference between ability to run one's life in general and ability to
manage one's finances; judgements about the former were not to be made on the
basis of the latter. Another adviser, who said that "the word is ignorance", spoke
about the difficulties of dealing with officialdom, suggesting that numeracy and
literacy, as well as mental health, were factors. Complicated skills are required to
live in the credit society . But the clear overall message from those involved in any
^ Chi-square value 21.25; p<05
^ Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p231; the Rock sample (Rock, 1973, pl5) from London is also cited there.
percentages are used for the results in this table to facilitate comparison
^ See also note below re general responses
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way with debt problems was a reluctance to blame the incompetence of the debtor
for the problem. Significantly, some debtors felt themselves to be good managers
(despite, in one case, having been through bankruptcy) because of having coped
with bringing up a family while dependent on benefit.
04 : "People should pay the monev they owe right awav even if that means going
short on other things"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G Pr PSI 3
2.79 3.14 4.00 3.86 3.67 1.92 2 30 3.00 3.40 2.42 2.08
Again there are significant differences10, with advisers and debtors less
inclined to have debts take priority over necessities, in contrast to the two women's
groups and to the PSI survey group. Advisers tended to speak about prioritising in
response to this question and Q5 However, one surprise was the lack of correlation"
between this question and Q5 (which might be read together as alternatives); this,
however was also the experience of the PS1 researchers, who asked both questions.
The slight difference in phrasing (between "going short on other things" and
"enough to live on") could be crucial; some respondents pointed to the difficulties of
assessing "needs" in this area.
08 : "People who don't pav their debts are dishonest"
; Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
4.43 4.71 4.43 4.52 2.92 3.90 3.75 3.80
Group %Agree %Disagree %Don't Know
Creditors 0 100 0
Advisers 0 100 0
Debtors 0 86 14
A&W Control13 39 56 4
A&W Debtors 10 69 i n
Rock London14 29 66 5
Among the CAD group, this question produced the highest average score (ie
strongest disagreement) of any; again there is a significant difference between the
^ Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, pi27, results adjusted to be directly comparable
' ® Chi-square value 24.24; p<05
ll R= -.03
'z Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p231
Does not add up to 100% in Adler & Wozniak published results
14 Rock, 1973, pi5
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groups'-y with the CAD groups being least likely to judge debtors as dishonest. One
adviser pointed out that, while bankruptcy recognises the plight of the honest debtor
who cannot pay, the courts do not otherwise recognise this. One debtor did want to
state that "jealous}', greed and abuse of the system do exist", and an adviser felt that
clients did not lie but gave their own perception and told their story in a way
designed to elicit maximum sympathy.
09 : "I would look upon someone differently if I found out he had been made
bankrupt"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
3.47 3.00 3.71 4.00 3.57 3.36 3.40 3.00 3.80
There was not a great degree of variation here16, with several respondents
making clear a difference between professional relationships which would have to
take account of past bankruptcy and personal relationships in which the} might not
be influenced by it. One adviser stressed that the "ordinary', run-of-the-mill"
bankruptcy was likely to be very different from the "That's Life" scenario of
unscrupulous debl evasion Another pointed out that some people went to
extraordinary lengths to conceal their bankruptcy, while others didn't seem to care
about people knowing. Some of the debtors were reluctant to answer this (and other
questions about bankruptcy) because it was felt to be beyond their experience, "not
for the likes of us" However, it did emerge in interviews that one debtor, a close
friend of two other debtors interviewed who claimed no knowledge of bankruptcy or
anvone who had been bankrupt, had herself successfully concealed her own
bankruptcy from these two friends. Another debtor who had been bankrupt also
spoke of finding it hard to tell people. One creditor admitted a difference here
between reality of his reactions and what he would like to be; another, who spoke of
a "gravy train" before the 1993 change in bankruptcy law, nevertheless spoke of a
need to recognise that people do mature and change. It would appear that there is
still an element of shame and'or guilt about bankruptcy, with some foundation in
people's reaction to those who have been bankrupt.
' Chi-square value 26.02; p< 05
Chi-square value 5.49, p>.05
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Oil : "Social workers should take over the budgeting responsibility of people who
are in debt"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
3.30 3.71 4.57 3.86 4.05 2.91 3.40 3.75 2.30
Group %Agree %Disagree %Don't Know
Creditors 0 57 43
Advisers 0 100 0
Debtors 29 57 14
A&W Debtors17 65 33 2
The main differences here were between the older groups (WG & G) and the
rest18. The welcome which Adler & Wozniak found among default debtors for this
suggestion was not to be found among respondents here involved in debt problems.
Perhaps surprisingly, the debtors here were slightly less hostile to the idea than the
creditors and advisers - none of whom agreed with the statement. Some creditors
ana advisers spoke of personal responsibility - "people will never learn if someone
else 'takes over'" - and of a threat to freedom if some such step were obligatory.
Others based their answer on personal opinions of social workers, while recognising
that some help or support with budgeting was often necessary. Debtors' responses
were more varied, still including some resentment of social workers, and also one
opinion that "what is needed is not advice but money".
014 : "People only pa\ whatever they owe because they are afraid of what would
happen if they got cauaht for avoiding payment"
2.94
5 C A D CAD WG WT PJ G Pr
1 3.57 4.43 2 43 3.48 2.54 3.50 3.75 1.80 2.98
Group %Agree %Disagree %Don't Know
Creditors 29 57 14
Advisers 0 86 14
Debtors 57 29 14
A&W Control19 44 52 4
A&W Debtors 44 54 2
'' Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p261
Chi-square value 24.01; p< 05
Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p243
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Perhaps the most interesting variation here20 is that debtors were markedly
more cynical about this than either advisers or creditors, one of whom cited as
evidence for his disagreement the tendency of debtors to offer more than they could
afford in payment. One adviser reported that the consumer organisation for which
she worked found "a strong sense of moral responsibility in Scotland". The
correlation matrix for the CAD group suggests fairly strong (negative) correlations
between responses to this question and questions 6 and 1021 (although neither of
these loads significantly on this factor), perhaps linked by a cynicism (or lack of it)
about people generally.
Q16 : "Bankruptcy is too easy a way out of debt problems"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
2.53 3.14 4.29 3.43 3.62 1.79 2.40 2.75 2.00
Again there is a significant difference between the advisers and others^.
Public perception of bankruptcy (possibly influenced by media stories) is different
from that of those involved in dealing with problems. There was a wide spread of
opinions, both in responses and interviews. Some debtors, as noted above, felt it was
not available as an option for them, especially if they were on social security Others
had experienced bankruptcy: one felt rushed into it (following a suggestion from a
doorstep debt-collector !) but had not found it an easy "way out" because of the
consequences: another also found that it did not bring an end to problems (at least in
the short term) but felt she should have gone bankrupt well before she did so,
thereby avoiding some of her difficulties. Some creditors did feel that the
restrictions put on bankruptcy in 1993 were necessary to halt the "gravy train", with
accountants seen as jumping on the bandwagon for personal gain by encouraging
people to see it as a soft option. One in particular was very concerned that it had
become an easy option with even customers with perfect payment records being
declared bankrupt; another, however, recognised at a personal level that he would
find it hard to contemplate for himself. One adviser felt that bankruptcy had
remained a distressful experience, never easy, while another admitted a sense that
money advisers may have been too keen to encourage people into bankruptcy
without making them aware of the full consequences. Concern was expressed at the
2® Chi-square value 21.16; p< 05
21 R- -0.62 & -0.63
22 Chi-square value 42.55, p<,05
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difficulties of access to bankruptcy posi-1993, especially since ii had been made
financially unattractive to eg solicitors to become involved.
019 : "People who have been bankrupt shouldn't be allowed to borrow money
again"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
2 63 3.14 4.43 2.86 3.48 1.71 2.60 3.25 2.80
Again the pattern of widely different responses to bankruptcy*. with debtors
apparently not generally seeking to exploit an easy way out. The concept of personal
responsibility appeared in comments like "you should learn from your experience"
and "once you've served your time it should be over".
Factor 1 - Summary
Overall, there does seem to be an understanding of personal responsibility
running through responses to the above questions. These questions also tend to have
a relatively high correlation with age (except Q9)24, suggesting either traditional
values less strongly held by younger respondents, or the reduced need for credit and
likelihood of debt among older people (as found by the PSI report), or attitudes
arising from less experience of debt. There were some signs in interviews that
people are more heavily influenced by experience, either personally or through the
media, in their general perceptions, than by general (moral) principles.
Drawing on the factor analysis, "factor scores" were obtained by multiplying
answers to 01-19 by the factor loading for each factor, giving an indication of the
strength of that factor for each respondent. Figure 1 compares the average factor
score for each group. This shows a significantly* greater emphasis on personal
responsibility among the Woman's Guild group (lower scores indicating agreement
with statements stressing this), with personal responsibility apparently seen as much
less important by advisers. Indeed, a general tendency emerged for those who knew
most about people with debt problems to place less emphasis on personal
responsibility than did "outsiders".
Chi-square value 35.27; p< 05
^ Average r~ 0.44, when no other question has a correlation value with age of >0.4
^ Variation Ratio (VR) = 7.97, p<01
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Factor 1
Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs WG WT
■ Factor 1 Avg Scores
Fig 1
Questions Loading Highly in Factor 2 - Creditor Responsibilities

















A strong element of agreement emerged throughout here», with the debtors
and unemployed retired group showing some doubts. Two advisers complained of
lack of restraint by lenders, especially regarding mortgages, while another
recognised the necessity of credit to some people, concluding that credit unions are
important (one of the debtors had been involved in starting a credit union, which she
felt was vety worthwhile). Among creditors, where agreement might not be so
predictable, there was a variety ofviews, from one who thought that credit should be
sold like any other commodity (such as double glazing or cabbages) to those who
regretted the competitive pressures on eg banks towards selling credit, with banks as
institutions and bankers as individuals scemg their interests as salesmen in selling as
much credit as possible. One pointed to a move from credit rating based on income
and expenditure to one based on past record in handling credit, while another saw
the inclusion of overtime as income as crucial to over-expansion of credit. Several
were critical of credit-pushing by shops (including interest-free credit), especially to
young people. There was a distinct sense of a new approach to lending worry ing
some who had been trained to a more cautious approach, though some felt that a
realisation of the extent of bad debt had led institutions more recently towards a
swinging back of the pendulum. Debtors were also divided, with some aware that
credit was not easily obtained by all (having themselves experienced difficulty
"unless you lie"), others aware that choices can be very restricted for the poor, but
some still concerned at what thev felt was made available even to those not workine.
26 Chi-square value 19.62: p> .05
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There was concern that people should be treated "equally" in the supply of credit,
and some feeling that this was not so. The only comment made (unprompted) about
the Social Fund was by a debtor who felt it was a great thing "if you can get money
out of them". Perhaps significantly, one creditor reported a substantial increase in
pawnbroking business since 1990. It had become a big business (with the largest
English firm recently taken over by an American company), dealing with those who
probably had difficulty getting credit elsewhere. There was still, he felt, an element
of shame felt by first time customers, though much less than in the past.
07 : "There should be legal limits on the interest that lenders can charge"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
1.39 2.29 1.17 1.29 1.60 1.17 1.10 1.50 1.70
Significant variation here21, with creditors (not surprisingly) least amenable
to legal limits, amid a general enthusiasm for such limits (despite some awareness
among advisers of the problems raised by these). One debtor felt that some "come
and go" about payments was more important than interest rates, while an adviser
was concerned at the way doorstep collectors could exert pressure and avoid
concern about interest rates through becoming a "friend". Although one adviser said
that the market does not operate perfectly, creditors were more willing to leave
matters to market forces; it "went against the grain" to have legal limits, which
could lead to a credit freeze, and credit controls of any sort were likely both to blunt
the creative urge and to prove ineffective because "money will find a way round".
One creditor also stressed the special problems of applying limits to small loans
where overheads were high
Q10 : "Anv company lending money should check first whether the person can
afford to repay the loan"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
1.36 1.43 1.67 2.00 1.70 1.08 1 20 1.50 1.40
Strongest level of general agreement with this statement2*, with debtors
expressing mild reservations (in terms of intrusive questions). One creditor again
expressed reluctance about legal enforcement of this, interference with the market
again being seen as stifling creativity. Another saw problems as rooted in the
division of responsibilities among salesman, retailer and finance company, with the
^ Chi-square value 21.98: p< 05
^ Chi-square value 13.52, p> 05
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salesman having considerable incentive to push credit, and little connection with
any problems that might arise); it was seen as important to deal with people, not
lending targets. A significant correlation^ appears to exist between this question and
church involvement, with those most involved most in agreement.
Factor 2 - Summary
Q15, which only just loads significantly in this factor, is discussed under
factor 3, where its loading is noticeably higher. All of the statements which are
discussed in this section were substantially agreed with by most of those
interviewed, showing a hostility to a "free" credit market. The common factor would
seem to be a concern with the granting of credit, with a consensus that the "free"
market of recent years gave rise to problems which might justify intervention in the
way the market operates. Although the terms were not used, it would be reasonable
to interpret this in terms of dissatisfaction with the justice of the market, having in
mind wider concepts of justice. The factor scores for this factor (see figure 2) reveal
some significant^ divergence of view between - at one extreme - debtors, and the
Woman's Guild group at the other, with the latter keenest to see creditors and or the
law enforce more restraint in lending. Debtors were not so inclined to see the
answer to problems as lying in restrictions on lending: they (and, to a iesser extent,






Questions Loading Highly in Factor 3 - External (Societal) Factors










Factor 2 Avg Scores
29 R= 0.5!
30 YR---5.77; p<01
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
3 52 4.43 3.43 4.00 3.95 4 04 3.10 3.25 190
Group %Agree %Disagree %Don't Know
Creditors 0 100 0
Advisers 29 57 14
Debtors 0 71 29
A&W Control31 17 76 7
A&W Debtors 71 29 0
Rock London32 35 60 s
Much of the significant variation here" comes from the unemployed retired
group (the only group tending toward agreement with the statement). Again, the
debtor respondents here seem different from Adler & Wozniak's; as elsewhere, it
may be significant that all the debtors surveyed here were contacted through their
having sought help (of varying sorts), while A & W's were contacted through court
records There may also be an underlying difficulty in defining what constitutes
luck: one respondent wanted to stress that losing one's job was not to be seen as a
matter of luck (as will be noted below, interpretation operates at two levels here -
the interpretation of w hat is the key event, and how that event is perceived).
02 : "On the whole, people who arc in trouble with debt are the poorest in the
community"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
3.25 3.57 3.00 3.29 3.29 3.58 3.60 3.75 1.78
Group %Agree %Disagree %Don't Know
Creditors 29 71 0
Advisers 43 29 29
Debtors 29 43 29
A&W Control34 25 70 4
A&W Debtors 42 58 0
Rock London3-3 26 73 1
3' Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p231
Rock, 1973, pi5
-1-1 Chi-square value 34 94: p<.05
Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p23l
35 Rock, 1973, pi 5
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Again there was a significant difference36 in the responses from the
unemployed retired group (possibly the most "deprived" group, apart from the
debtors, although no formal attempt was made to assess the social background of
respondents), who were clearer about affirming the link between poverty and debt;
advisers also showed a greater agreement with this link than any of Adler &
Wozniak's respondents. In interview, advisers generally felt that the poor have most
problems, and that most of the problems are with poor people, but that there were
affluent people (sometimes in changed circumstances) with severe problems (one
specifically mentioned problems with personal guarantees of business loans). There
could of course be some selectivity with regard to which groups of debtors are likely
to seek advice and with regard to which kinds of debt different creditors deal with.
Certainly creditor responses generally reflected different experiences, eg as between
fuel debt (close link with poverty, though not exclusively so) and banking debt (not
poverty-linked as the poorest are "unbanked"). Some impact of media stories of
affluent bankrupts and credit card "binges" may be seen here.
013 : "Debtors who can never realistically be expected to catch up with their debt
payments should bv iavv be offered a wav out that lets them start again"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
2.26 2 71 1.71 2 14 2.19 2.38 2.50 2.50 1.80
There was fairly clear general agreement with this statement37, particularly
strongly from advisers, with more reservation from creditors. There was less
correlation than might have been expected35 between this question and Q15 (which
initially seemed similar in thrust), which may reflect the impact nuances of wording
have on results; debtors in particular may have been more attracted by a solution
offering a chance to "start again" than by explicitly seeking writing off Creditors'
comments on the two questions were similar, and suspicious of a "way out" while
recognising a need in some cases for a chance to "start again".
Chi-square value 21.61; p<05
Chi-square value 9.99, p> 05
R= 0.44 overall, significantly less - 0.27 - when only the CAD responses are considered
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015 : "When someone really can't afford to pay their debt, they should have to make
regular payments which they can afford and the rest of the debt should be written
off'
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
2.39 3.00 2.21 3.43 2.88 2.46 2.10 2.00 1.70
It seems surprising that the lowest level of agreement with this statement
came from debtors59. It does not appear to be an expectation of debtors that any of
their debts will or should be written off; "you should pay what you owe however
long it takes". If debts were written off. people would abuse the system, getting
further credit elsewhere. Some creditors were also uneasy about relaxing the sense
of obligation to pay, but realistic in recognising that "you can't get blood out of a
stone", and it may cost the creditor more to collect than the value of the debt.
Perhaps creditors and advisers share a realisation that substantial amounts are in fact
written off regularly - a tact fairly successfully concealed from debtors. One adviser
was concerned that writing off was unfair to those who do pay, confessing to having
had personal difficulty in retaining impartiality regarding eg community charge
debt.
Factor 3 - Summary
Q18 is considered below, under factor 4, where it loads more highly. While
the suggested theme for this factor, of looking to factors external to the contracting
parties, at the stages of both cause and solution, does still seem plausible, it clearly
does not represent a clear determination of most respondents to look beyond the
debtor and creditor for the main causes or solutions. However, there is a recognition
that a fresh start for the struggling debtor does require some intervention, demanded
by justice. The factor scores shown here (in Figure 3) suggest some tendency*1 for
the unemployed / retired group to look more to external, social factors, with the
creditors and Woman's Guild less willing to look beyond the responsibility of
debtors and or creditors for explanations or answers.







Factor 3 Avg Scores
Fig 3
Questions Loading Hitrhlv in Factor 4 - Basic Needs
Q5 ; "People should make sure thev have enough to live on before paving anv money
thev owe"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G PSI 4> Pi
2.15 2.29 2.00 1.71 2.00 2.13 2.70 2.75 1.70 2.00 2.41
There was not a great deal of variation among groups here4-. See comments
on Q4. especially those noting the surprising lack of correlation between these two
questions in both this and the PSI survey, tending to bear out the analysis above in
linking this question with a sense of meeting basic needs more than an assessment
of obligation to pay debts.
Q12 ; "Debt would not be such a problem if social security benefits provided a fair
amount to live on"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
2.50 3.29 2.43 1.71 2.48 2.67 2.90 3.00 1 50
Again the debtors and unemployed retired group show a greater lev el of
agreement than others with this statement4', although a greater correlation might
have been expected between this question and Q244. One creditor drew attention to
two "levels" of disagreement with this statement, ie debt is not exclusive to benefit
recipients, and an increase in benefits would not necessarily solve the problem even
for those on benefit. One adviser stressed the difficulty of distinguishing wants from
needs as undermining the validity of the statement.
A 1
Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, pi27, results adjusted to be directly comparable
4^ Chi-square value 9.24: p> .05
4^ Chi-square value 16.1; p> .05, but, for the CAD group only, p< 05
44 R= 0.19
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018 : "Creditors should have to take account of the circumstances of people having
problems paving their debts"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
1.75 1.86 1.43 1.86 1.71 1 79 2.00 1.75 1.50
There was quite clear general agreement that this was "a good thing""'
Creditors, generally, believed that they already did take account of personal
circumstances, although one pointed to a tendency of some people with problems to
stay out of contact when they (the creditors) would have been willing to come to an
arrangement. Debtors, on the other hand, tended to report a reluctance of creditors
to do so. This may reveal a communication problem of confusing signals being sent
out (see below with reference to the case studies), and of different preferences in
ways of communicating.
Factor 4 - Summary
The common factor here, of concern for a basic standard of living, seems
quite clear. In the questions which drew attention to this, it was an important factor,
though not one which people often brought to bear when the question did not refer
to it. The factor scores shown in figure 4 display the two most deprived groups
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017 : "People shouldn't borrow money if tfaev cam afford to repav it"
Avg Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G PSI «'
2.04 2 14 2.43 2.43 2.33 1.61 2.40 2 00 2.10 1.32
There was general agreement with the statements, although advisers and
debtors seemed to show more doubts that the PSI report's cross-section of
respondents - "if the kids need clothes and you have a catalogue, what do you do?".
One adviser also felt that the statement begs the question of whether people really
know what they can afford when they borrow (in terms both of budgeting
competence and unforeseeable changes).
Reviewing The Original Clusters
Although the originally devised clusters do not seem to be borne out as
assessing coherent viewpoints, they are not without validity. The "creditors'
responsibilities" cluster is substantially reflected by factor 2 (with three questions
common to both); all the "hostility to bankruptcy" questions are to be found loading
significantly under factor 1 ("personal responsibility") along with additional
questions, suggesting that views on personal responsibility may underlie attitudes to
bankruptcy; "blaming the debtor" is not, it seems, as straightforward an issue as
mighl be supposed, though some of the later questions do tend to give a measure of
this (see below); "obligation to pay" is also more bound up in other matters than an
important single issue49: and a "fresh start", while seen as necessary in some cases, is
not perceived as a dominant concern. Attitudes, as measured here at least, are not as
coherent as one might have expected, stereotypes rarely hold for long, and the
values to be found in people's reactions are as complex as the issues themselves
were found to be in the previous chapter.
47 Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, pi27
^ Chi-square value 8 78: u> 05
Despite being discussed as a cluster theme in the PSI Report
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Other Questions (Pages 3 & 4 ofQuestionnaire)^
021 - Credit is ... Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G PSI
.. a sensible way of buying 1 1 0 2 1 o o 0 6%
a convenient way of buying 2 3 1 6 0 7 1 2 12%
.. occasionally necessary 4 4 6 14 14 3 3 5 37%
. never a good thing 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 43%
Score (1 / 2.33 / 3.67 / 5)» 2.91 2.83 3.47 3 06 4.06 3.04 3.33 3.80 3.85
These results are markedly different from those reported by the PSI survey
(and by the NCC survey of 1979, also cited by the PSI report). They concluded an
"overall impression of a view of credit which is at best cautious, at worst
antagonistic"^. This new research suggests a less antagonistic, though not
enthusiastic, view, also with most hostility to credit among older people; the
commonest view (58%) is that credit is occasionally necessary None of the CAD
group felt that credit was "never a good thing", although the debtors were marginally
less enthusiastic about credit than the other two groups. The creditors' response is
perhaps less enthusiastic than one might have expected; one creditor said
"personally, I would never borrow if I could possibly help it" ! Some advisers felt
that it depended who you were talking to, or about; another felt that the controversy
over the community charge had led to a change in attitudes to debt. One debtor
seemed to speak for several in expressing strong hostility.' to credit in principle but a
sense of being drawn into it by "necessity", such as the pressure to give the family a
decent standard of living that did not make them stand out.
Generally, comparisons of these with other question responses were difficult because of the format
of the questions; see further under individual questions
- * Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, p42
For comparison purposes, mainly in the correlation matrix, answers were translated into a range
from 1-5, ie (a) - 1, (b) - 2.33, (c) - 3.67, (d) = 5
Berthoud & Kempson, 1992, 1992, p43
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022 - Main reasons for debt problems...
Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G Tot A&WDA&W
(A) Unemployment 5 3 6 16 11 8 1 10 46 37 21
(B) Poverty/low income 1 4 7 12 7 7 3 6 35 23 13
(C) Illness 0 4 0 4 5 1 1 4 15 (10 0
(D) Marital Problems 0 2 1 3 1 1 0 1 6 (10 0
(E) Easy Credit 4 0 0 4 6 3 2 3 18 18 14
(F) Wrong Priorities 1 1 0 2 4 2 I 0 9 4 5
(G) Drink etc 1 0 1 2 11 2 0 3 20 29 11
(H) Lvg Bey'd Means 4 0 0 4 16 1 2 3 26 24 37
(I) Mismanagement 3 0 3 6 4 5 1 0 16 4 17
(J) Bad Luck 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 (4 0
(K) Ignorance 11 r\ 1i OA. A. r\\j n TA. <yj ! 1v+ Au
(L) Dishonesty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 l 4 4
(M) Inflation etc 0 o 3 3 1 0 0 3 7 6 6
(N) Other 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 11 2
Relatively few respondents took the offered opportunity to indicate any
which they thought were not significant reasons: only bad luck and dishonesty
scored more than five entries as not significant.
The responses were also classified among those which tend towards blaming
the debtor (F.G,H,I.L), those which tend towards seeing the debtor as victim of
circumstances caused bv others (A.BdriM) and other reasons (C,D,J,K), simply
adding together the number of responses ticking each category and subtracting any
crossed as not significant:
Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G Tot AAWD AAW
"Debtor as Victim" 9 9 16 34 24 17 6 21 103 84 54
"Debtor's Own Fault" 8 T~L 2 8 31 7 3 3 52 65 74
Other -2 5 -1 2 4 -1 -1 3 7 14 0
There emerges a strong tendency in these responses (as with A & W's sample
of debtors, though not with their control group) to see the debtor as victim rather
than cause of her/his problems, with unemployment and poverty viewed as the two
mam causes, and a general conviction that luck and dishonesty were not significant.
~ ^ Aulci' <x W czniak, 1981, p233
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The Woman's Guild group and, to a lesser extent, creditors tended more than others
towards seeing problems as "their own fault". One creditor felt that inflation in fact
helps people cope with debt (clearly true of long-term large commitments like
mortgages but less so of shorter-term "needs" borrowing). Another indicated that he
would neither expect nor want to know of marital problems or other "really
personal" business. One debtor felt strongly that drink was more likely to be a
symptom or response than a cause of debt; one creditor (the pawnbroker) who
argued for a link with drink and gambling admitted that this could be connected
with the proximity of his premises to pubs and betting shops (without suggesting in
which direction the causation operated). If unemployment and poverty are perceived
as the major causes of debt, then solutions (and "justice") must relate to these rather
than being restricted to the balance and contractual details of the creditor'debtor
relationship
Q23 - Justifications for not paving one's debts
Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
Ave No of Entries 2.14 2 71 3.57 2 81 2 41 2.67 3 3
Most Common d d a d d d d a
The question was ambiguous as to whether a moral or legal justification was
being sought, and some respondents commented on this. At a legal level, there is a
factual "right" answer of faulty goods (with some provision in certain circumstances
for articles bought by spouse and goods sold under pressure). Most, however,
appeared to treat the question as referring to moral justification. Faulty goods (68%)
was the only one of the possible justifications cited by more than half of the
respondents; it was also the most common response in Adler & Wozniak's version of
this question (they asked people to think of reasons, rather than offering suggestions;
the list of suggestions used here is drawn from their responses")- Lack ofmoney and
loss of job were next most commonly cited (48% & 46%), with the debtors and
unemploved retired group more likely than others to cite these They also tended to
see more items as justifying non-payment than the others, especially creditors (not
surprisingly), did.
■' Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p245
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024 - Creditor Remedies
Cdtrs Advsrs Dbtrs CAD WG WT PJ G
Ave No ofEntries 4 2.71 1 2.57 1.54 1.7 3.25 1.5
Most Common e e f e e e e c/e/f
Rarest g b/g most g g b/g b/g/i g/h/i
Not surprisingly, creditors found more of the listed remedies acceptable, and
debtors least, making this question the one conforming most strongly to stereotype.
There did appear to be a correlation between the number of remedies reckoned as
acceptable and church involvement - greater church involvement being linked with
finding more remedies acceptable*. However, it may be more surprising that even
creditors, on average, found only four out of the nine offered to be acceptable (eight
are allowed by Scots Law) Indeed, while there was a recognition that some ultimate
forms of restraint were necessary in the background, several creditors expressed
reservations even about the remedies which they were lamiliar with using. One lelt
that repossession (under mortgage) was too easy and open to abuse, and another had
"horrendous" experiences of repossession, with the anomalous position of being able
to throw a family out on the street while being legally obliged to make provision for
the family dog. Fuel disconnection was recognised as depriving a household of a
necessity, and unhelpful to people with problems; fuel authorities were said to be
doing this far less frequently, seeking alternative solutions One creditor had never
known of a warrant sale that raised enough to pay the debt: such remedies tend to
add to the problems. Yet some advisers reckoned that there was no better alternativ e
available, and that some such sanction was needed to avoid more people evading
payment. An adviser felt that lack of enforcement often led to increased problems as
debts mounted. There was hostility, especially among debtors, to the addition of
interest charges on late payments, as making matters worse. Clearly, there were
different approaches here according to whether one saw the starting point as a
debtor with problems or the need to keep the system functioning; in that, we may
glimpse an issue about justice (defined in terms of contract and "fairness", or in
terms of helping those who are seen as victims). We may also see in doubts about
various remedies a concern that the answer does not lie simply in effective
remedies; there may be room for creative forgiveness.
56 R= -0.69
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025 (a) "The single change of policy I'd like to see affecting debt problems is ...
Four creditors referred to a need for restrictions on credit here - restraint of
"inappropriate" credit and unsolicited promotion of loans, control of credit cards and
a return to previous credit controls were all advocated - and one sought continual
review of bankruptcy legislation. The advisers were more diverse; one sought an
"enforcement agency" on the Northern Ireland model to avoid the problems of
negotiating with individual creditors, another merely advocated greater use of
money advisers as intermediaries, one spoke of wealth redistribution and another of
increased benefit levels, one sought a move towards a US-style bankruptcy system,
while another advocated the end of warrant sales and poindings. Debtors were less
articulate about specific solutions, speaking of "more help" for debtors and people in
need, more concern for personal circumstances and the possibility of a "second
chance" for people written off by others. What seems to emerge is an unease about
"easy" credit among creditors, advisers generally seeking detailed changes in ways
of dealing with debt, and debtors feeling powerless hui seeking help.
025(b) The thing I think most unfair about debt these davs is ...
There was less contrast between the three groups here. Interest rates
(especially default rates) were mentioned by some in each group; wealth disparities
and benefit levels were mentioned by advisers and debtors; and several felt it too
easy to get into debt. Creditors spoke of the "pushing" of credit as unfair, and one
spoke ol a lack of neutral, easily-accessed counselling. Advisers spoke of creditor
harassment of debtors and unwillingness of those who push credit to take account of
circumstances when problems arise. Debtors spoke of the treatment of debtors "like
dirt" and the way people think of debtors. Thus, there were areas of shared concern
in relation to policy, and concerns about the treatment of people articulated in
different ways by different groups. Unfairness is felt at different levels, from the
personal to the macro-economic.
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Case Studies"
Questions (these were applied to each case study )
Please indicate your reaction to these statements with regard to this case, ie
]=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=unsure, 4=disagree. 5=strongly disagree
1. "This is a typical case of debt problems" 1 2 3 4 5
2. "This person brought the problems on her himself' 1 2 3 4 5
3. "There should be a better way of dealing with problems like this" 1 2 3 4 5
4. Which of the following do you consider the main cause of debt problems in this
case (please tick one)
(a) Economic circumstances beyond the debtor's control
(b) Non-financial circumstances eg marriage problems, illness
(c) Bad management by debtor
(d) Irresponsible lending (or extending of credit) by the creditor
(e) Poor communication between debtor and creditor
(1) Bad luck
tot nth<irV&/ —
5. Is there anything in this case that you consider unfair ?
6. Is there any other information you feel would help you judge the rights and
wrongs of this case ?
7. How might the law deal with cases like this better ?
(AfriResultsii Q l Q2 Q3 Q4Vic Q40wn Q40th
Creditors 3.14 2 2.33 0 5 2
Advisers 2.43 2.83 2 1 1 5
Debtors 2 2.67 1.14 3 1 4
Ave'Total n s">a— 2.5 1.83 4 7 11
Debtors were more inclined than others to see this situation as typical; it had
the highest level of agreement with the statement seeing the problems as having
been brought on by the debtor (though only marginally agreeing); creditors
especially saw it as the debtor's own fault; but the commonest main reason given
See appendix 1 for the case study scenarios, which were only used with the CAD respondents
Case study adapted from Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p289
^C> For all of the case studies, results given are averages for each group for Ql-3, and totals for Q4
grouped (as in Q22 above) as "debtor as victim" (answers a,d), "debtor's own fault" (c), or
"others" (b,e,f); (g) answers were classed, where possible, as appropriate. Some gave more than
one "main reason" in Q4
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was poor communication. Several advisers recognised in this story a common
"ostrich syndrome", partially brought on by an assumption that creditors will be less
flexible than they often are in fact. One adviser felt the creditor's failure to
communicate adequately was unfair, while another felt the warrant sale and
poinding were unfair; most recorded nothing as unfair. Only one adviser expressed a
desire to know what the original debts were for, though another wanted to know full
details of income and expenditure before making an assessment. Suggestions for
better solutions ranged from "breathing space" for debtors to get help before warrant
sales, legal help for debtor/creditor communication, an enforcement agency to
reschedule debts in light of all commitments rather than individual creditors, and
earnings arrestment. Clearly, the "poor communication" could be interpreted in
different ways; one creditor spoke of debtor ignorance running all through the story,
while others saw the creditor as at fault for failing to communicate properly Again
the warrant sale was picked out by one creditor as unfair, while another pointed to
the "buy-out" loan; some creditors wanted to know more financial details about the
size of the original debts, about home ownership, savings etc. As solutions, one
creditor advocated greater legal responsibility on creditors to check ability to repay,
and to communicate effectively, enforced through restricting creditors remedies
where these are not carried out. Other suggestions were of compulsory debt
counselling and restrictions on buy-out loans. Among the debtors, two thought the
warrant sale and poinding unfair (speaking from personal experience), two referred
to pressure, and one felt the wife should have helped out more; one thought the
separation "unfair" but typical. Two thought better advice was needed, while another
advocated a system of paying "an amount he could afford every week".
(Bhe Results Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4Vic Q40wn Q40th
Creditors 2.29 4.14 1.71 3 0 4
Advisers 2.43 4.5 1.67 5 0 2
Debtors 1.5 4.33 1.14 2 1 5
Ave/Total 2 07 4.33 1.51 10 1 11
Of all the cases this had the highest rating as typical, the strongest feeling
that there should be a better way of dealing with such problems, and the highest
level of disagreement with the suggestion that the debtor brought the problem on
herself. The commonest reason given as the mam cause of the problems was
"economic circumstances outwith the debtor's control". Several also mentioned the
^ Case study adapted from personal experience via college access fund
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delay in communicating the loss of benefit as crucial, and many considered it unfair.
Almost everyone found something unfair here - from the original marriage break-up,
through benefit levels and rules, to the advice of the council official to take up a
buy-out loan. It was apparent that Jean elicited special sympathy because she was
attempting to improve her own situation when everything seemed to turn against
her. and seemed to be on the verge of getting back into the "vicious circle" if she
stopped her course; she was seen as an example of the "poverty trap". Better advice
was again seen as important to dealing with such situations, although two debtors
also mentioned the absent husband's responsibilities (interviews were carried out at
a time when the Child Support Agency was being widely publicised). Several
creditors mentioned "pinning the (presumed) husband down" as how the law could
deal better with the situation, but benefit rule and level changes were also seen as
important by some. Two creditors and one adviser also felt that she should have
checked out her financial position before starting the course; two advisers queried
the propriety of the eviction order.







f) 4 f~\\ i "-»n
ytcvui vy-tWill
Creditors 3.14 2.67 2.2 2 5 4
Advisers 2 71 3 17 ] 83 5 0 4
Debtors 2.33 3 1.86 2 2 3
Ave/Total 2.73 2.94 1.96 9 7 11
This case showed the highest number of responses suggesting the main cause
as something that was the debtor's own fault, but this was still less than the number
seeing the debtor as victim; the commonest "main reasons" given were economic-
circumstances and bad management (mainly seen as such by creditors). There was a
wide spread of opinion as to how typical this case was, largely dependent on
different people's experience - from one creditor with banking experience in London
who found it highly typical, to the debtor who "didn't know anything about
mortgages and suchlike". Two creditors felt the story unlikely in terms of the bank's
behaviour (though it was a "true" story culled from a magazine article). While the
debtor was felt to be sailing too close to the wind, the bank's action in seeking
repossession were condemned as not even in their own best interests. Their lending
policy was also felt to be at fault in the early parts of the story (some wanted to
know more of the details of this before judging). One creditor felt that repossession
should be more difficult for lenders to gain, but there were few other ideas of better
^' Case study adapted from magazine article by the debtor concerned
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ways lo deal with is situation. One adviser stressed the powerless of the debtor to
influence matters, and suggested a continued occupancy on a fixed "fair rent":
another adviser suggested bankruptcy. Debtors generally joined in the condemnation
of the bank's refusal to wait, but otherwise found it hard to comment (none of the
debtors had had a mortgage). They tended to see the loss of his job as crucial to the
situation. While several respondents saw the debtor as contributing to his own
problems, there was some feeling that "this is how young people are" and that the
lender was equally at fault in assuming overtime as income (and the joint income of
a couple when the relationship was not stable).
Results Qi Q2 Q3 Q4Vic Q40wn Q4C)th
Creditors 3 4 1.86 1 2 3
Advisers 2.71 4.17 2.33 3 2 4
Debtors 2.5 3.67 2.4 i 2 3
AveTotaJ 2.74 3.94 2.2 5 6 10
This was rated as the least typical scenario (mainly because of the taking on
of the grandmother's debt), and the one with weakest support for finding a better
way of dealing with such situations (though still - just - typical, and one which could
be dealt with better); it is probably the only one in which a positive intervention in
support of the debtor is important to the narrative The fictional "twist in the tail"
involving drink and the children was added to see the extent it might influence
reactions to an otherwise "true" storv. Few saw it as important to their assessment -
generally a symptom rather than a cause, or "part of the vicious circle". However,
the commonest "main reasons" were bad management by the debtor and non-
financial circumstances (several added as (g) the taking on of the loan, and nearly all
saw tliis m some way as the crucial event). One adviser advocated the non-
enforcement of credit debt against benefit claimants, as in Northern Ireland, as a
legal solution: another felt the help needed was not legal. There was certainly
considerable agreement that this debtor needed a lot of help. Several felt a basic
injustice in the taking on of a loan that was not hers, and m the failure of the creditor
to inform her of this. One creditor admined that she would not have turned down the
offer to take on the loan, or explained the lack of legal obligation, but would not
take measures against the "debtor" when problems in paying emerged. Although
there was consensus about this as the crucial basic cause it was variously interpreted
Case study adapted from NCH, 1992, p28
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as oau management ny tne ueoior , poor communication, or uniair treatment 01 tne
debtor, some feeling that it was crucial whether the creditor claimed the debtor was
responsible for her grandmother's loan, while others were more interested in why
she felt herself responsible. Two debtors were the strongest in judging the debtor
here; one felt her taking on the loan was unfair on her own children (while
recognising that "it might have made her more stressed if she hadn't"), while another
was the only person whose assessment was based on the drinking episode at the end
of the story. One debtor had particular sympathy for the debtor in this story because
she had experience of taking on a family debt.
(Eka Results Ql Q2 Q3 Q4Vic Q40wn Q40th
Creditors 2.29 3.71 2.14 1 1 3
Advisers 2.43 4.58 1.67 1 0 6
Debtors 2.17 4.20 1.17 1 0 6
Ave'Total 2.29 4.17 1.66 3 1 17
Non-financial circumstances were seen as crucial











creditor was also frequently mentioned as unfair. Some advisers (and one creditor)
pointed to the help that should have been available with travelling expenses to the
hospital (one debtor said that few claim this even if entitled), and some to problems
with the procedure or the principle of the warrant sale, but alternative legal solutions
were not widely suggested, and one adviser pointed to an increase in warrant sales
recently (or at least in court orders paving the way for them, and reinforcing the
threat of them, even if they don't actually happen). One creditor suggested a
professional assessment of how realistic offers of payment are, and another that
court action should not be available to those who ignore offers to pay.
General Reflections on the Case Studies
(1) The following chart (Fig 5) shows the responses of the different groups to
the question as to whether the debtor brought the problems on her/himself (high
scores indicate disagreement with the statement that debtor brought problems on
her himself):
Case study adapted from Adler & Wozniak, 1981, p275
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Cases - Debtor's Own Fautt ?
5t
The advisers, as a group, consistently showed the least tendency to see the
debtor as having brought the problem on her himself, and the creditors (except in
case (D)) were generally most likely to blame the debtor.
(2) The correlation matrix does not show strong overall correlations between
responses to the same questions in different case studies, suggesting that people
responded to the individual case stories rather than bringing dogmatic views to bear.
In tliis context, media highlighting of "injustices" is highly influential, even, to some
extent, among those with personal experiences of debt problems which are different
from cases presented by the media as typical.
(3) Figure 6 shows the number of times each option was identified as the
"main cause" of the problems over all the case studies.
Main Causes of Problems
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Fig 6
Advisers were clearly more likely than the others to ascribe difficulties to
economic factors beyond the debtor's control; creditors tended to look to bad
management (by the debtor) or communication; and debtors also fixed on poor
communication as a major factor. Bad management by the debtor was equal second
among causes identified by debtors.
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£4) There are some problems of interpretation, eg where loss ofjob was seen
as the crucial factor this could still be seen by respondents as coming under a variety
of headings eg "economic circumstances beyond the debtor's control" or "bad luck".
This may not be as much of a problem as it seems so long as we remember that what
is being measured is people's interpretation of what they see as key events.
(5) There did seem to be some general characteristics of approach, in that,
broadly, advisers tended to pick out practical details which offered chances of
improving the situation, creditors were most aware of the wider economic context,
and debtors had the strongest sense of unfairness, without having many concrete
proposals to offer for change.
(6) There was, in some of those interviewed, a reluctance to generalise - "all
debts are different" said one debtor, and an adviser stressed the need to treat every
case as individual, rather than pigeonholing. This also tends to lead to greater
interest in individual "solutions" rather than in major structural changes which might
prevent debt problems arising but don't solve the problems of the presenting debtor.
Conclusions
Although age does appear to be a significant factor in influencing responses
to some questions - as noted above and in such other research as the PS1 Report - the
correlation matrix suggests that church involvement is much less so. There is no
K'»eic AitKAf ototietir 111-\ - r\r if* tKo infpriM^u- roonnncoc fXr nnv etrAtio Inil' Koinol/uou wiiiiwi .huiilUivui i > y/i in uiw iiuvi vivtt ivoja/aova ivji uuy ouvug ram uwmg, lituuv
between faith and the values at work here.
Related to this, one strongly expressed response from several people (both
advisers and debtors) seemed important to this thesis in general. Faced with
questions referring to "judging the rights and wrongs" of situations, many said they
did not want to get involved in such things. Among debtors, this seemed to represent
a reluctance (in some, though not all) to judge (or be seen to be judging) other
debtors, the assumption being that judging the rights and wrongs was equivalent to
judging individual people. Among advisers, there was a sense that judging clients
was a fundamental breach of good practice, that judging debtors or creditors was a
waste of time when the important thing was not to ask why the problem had
occurred but what could be done to sort things out, that "there are no rights or
WTongs in debt cases", or even that asking "moral questions" was not worthwhile
since the courts were only interested in technicalities and tactics. To some extent
this was seen as an antidote to media reinforcing judgment of the poor, and to the
arbitrary judgments of some creditors (one adviser quoted a creditor's description of
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a debtor as "she's not a nice person; she goes out drinking and has cable TV"). To a
greater extent this refusal to "judge" is both principle and practice of advice, where
impartiality is seen as crucial for credibility and effectiveness, rather than advocacy,
a role which might involve a clear siding with the debtor client. There may be some
tensions in the field ofmoney advice between these two roles, and advisers may not
always be as free from judging in practice as they might claim, but the challenge to
anyone seeking to cany out ethical reflection (especially in terms like "justice" and
"forgiveness") is real if Christian ethics is to mean more than the condemnation of
individual sinners.
Words like "justice" and "forgiveness" did not come readily to most
respondents. Several did have s strong sense of things not being fair, and one
creditor spoke for several respondents in saying that "a sense of injustice was
brought out by the case studies", but the response was predominantly to seek to help
the individuals involved rather than to change the system. When prompted, some
found it hard to pin down a meaning for "justice" in this situation. One creditor
stressed the limitations of "legal" justice in coping with a complex and fluid
situation; the system, he felt, adapts itself, through checks and balances, towards a
"voluntary" justice (although inbuilt interests can mean that some suffer more than
others in the process). Another felt that justice might refer simply to the unfairness
of failing to keep an agreement once made, or to a way of sorting out problems that
seemed fair from both sides. This last would seem to fit with the "impartial" non-
judgmental stance of most advisers (though not articulated by them in this way).
One adviser spoke about justice as having to do with power and powerlessness in
face of officialdom, where debtors feel a sense ofbeing judged and ill-at-ease.
Amongst both debtors and advisers, there were some who saw debt as a
symptom of an "unjust" society (stressing the need for a fresh start), and, as already
noted, a strong sense of individual injustices. But there was still a vagueness about
litis. For example, to one debtor, the lack of access to credit for the unemployed was
an injustice symptomatic of unequal treatment, while, to another, the pushing of
"easy" credit on those likely to have problems in repaying was itself an injustice. As
is explored elsewhere in this thesis, participation may in some ways be an ingredient
of justice which is particularly important in this context.
Hope, too, is a dimension in the background of this study. Few expressed
hopes of structural changes, and debtors in particular had low expectations of real
change, either structurally or personally; what was expressed, often forcefully, was
considerable frustration.
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Forgiveness was hardly a concept which figured in most people's
perceptions. The absence among debtors of any expectation of debts being written
off has already been noted. One creditor did speak about the way in which debt
forgiveness had entered into commercial currency when banks came to accept an
element of pragmatic debt forgiveness regarding Third World debt, but felt this had
to be limited, piecemeal and carefully calculated in terms of costs and benefits;
forgiveness as a gift would undermine the system. In fact, that may be part of its
attractiveness, but no-one in this survey was arguing for that.
However, some were keen to advocate the need for a fresh start (although
bankruptcy remains a controversial area, as noted above), and many spoke of debt as
a vicious circle out of which people had to be helped to break. It is in these ideas
that the need arises to explore forgiveness in this economic context. But there are
problems - forgiveness is not a concept in common currency here, and may be felt to
carry an implication that the debtor is to blame. And that issue of blame, its
appropriateness and its usefulness, has been crucial in this research What meaning
(if any) can we give to the term forgiveness ifwe see the debtor as victim rather than
culpable, and should we be talking, as one creditor suggested, about what it might
mean to "forgive" banks etc for bad lending policies which have led people into
debt?
Perhaps there may be some help here in the remarks of the creditor who saw
"how you deal with people" as the link with faith in this area; as in other areas,
relationships are crucial, but not an excuse either to privatise the issues or to
eliminate the socio-economic dimensions.
The individualism noted in the previous chapter as characteristic of most
research was also evident here, at several levels. The urgency for advisers and
debtors (to a lesser extent for creditors) is how to deal with the individual case, to
solve the particular problem (if possible) rather than the problems of the world.
Most people treated debt as a problem for individuals rather than for the community
as a whole. The responses found here are primarily to individual situations rather
than operating a coherent system of values; what has been done in this research is to
seek out underlying values - personal responsibility, "responsible lending", social
factors and the meeting of basic needs - which were rarely articulated. Indeed the
most significant factor found influencing responses was personal (individual)
responsibility
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That is. certainly not to sav that wider concerns of social justice were not
raised, and the three other factors found in the analysis all have clear public policy-
dimensions. The need for purposeful ethical reflection in this context is greater than
this analysis of responses may indicate: the statistics don't communicate as clearly as
the conversations with all three of the groups interviewed the desperate problems of
many, many people. Nor does the relative infrequency of use of the language of
justice and forgiveness undermine the importance of the issues raised; what remains
to be seen, and is challenged by this research, is whether Christian ethics can make a
useful contribution, not only to discussion but also to change, via that language. If
the language is not being used, has it lost any value it may have had9
On the other hand, the clear sense of injustice here does not eliminate the
complexities and difficulties of how we may use the language of justice and
forgiveness in this context, which are graphically illustrated by a story from one of
the creditors interviewed. After a lengthy process of dealing with a client's mortgage
problems came to a mutually satisfactory solution, the client wrote to him. with no
intended irony, that "I will be forever in your debt"!
77
2. Appendix 1 - Debt Questionnaire
Please indicate your response to the following statements, ie l=strongly agree.
2=agree. 3-unsure, 4=disagree. 5=strongly disagree
1. "On the whole, people who have been in trouble
with debt are just those who have been unlucky"
2. "On the whole, people who are in trouble with debt
are the poorest in the community"
3. "People who are in trouble with debt do not know
how to run their lives properly"
4 "People should pay the money they owe right away
even if that means going short on other things"
5. "People should make sure they have enough to live
on before paying any money they owe"
6. "Obtaining credit is far too easy these days"
7. "There should be legal limits on the interest that
lenders can charge"
8. "People who don't pay their debts are dishonest"
9. "I would look upon someone differently if I found
out he had been made bankrupt"
10. "Any company lending money should check first
whether the person can afford to repay the debt"
11 "Social workers should take over the budgeting
responsibility of people who are in debt"
12. "Debt would not be such a problem if social
security benefits provided a fair amount to live on"
13. "Debtors who can never realistically be expected
to catch up with their debt payments should by law be
offered a way out that let's them start again"
14 "PeoDle onlv oav whatever thev owe because thev
i r l . » •>
are afraid of what would happen if they got caught for
avoiding payment"
15 "When someone really can't afford to pay their
debt, they should have to make regular payments
which they can afford and the rest of the debt should
be written off'
16. "Bankruptcy is too easy a way out of debt
problems"
17. "People shouldn't borrow money if they can't



















18. "Creditors should have to take account of the
circumstances of people having problems paying their
debts"
19 "People who have been bankrupt shouldn't be
allowed to borrow money again"
(21) Please tick whichever one of the following you think expresses your point of
view best
(a) "Credit is a sensible way of buying"
(b) "Credit is a convenient way ofbuying"
(c) "Credit is occasionally necessary"
(d) "Credit is never a good thing"
(22) What would you say are the main reasons for people being in trouble over debt
- please tick what you xhink are the three most important reasons and pui a cross
against any you think are not significant reasons
(a) unemployment (b) poverty low income
(c) illness (d) marital problems
(e) easy credit (f) wrong priorities
(g) drink gambling bingo (h) living beyond their means
(i) mismanagement (j) bad luck
(k) ignorance (1) dishonesty
(m) inflation cost of living (n) other
(23) Would any of these be a justification for not paying someone you owe (please
tick any you think would be a justification) ?
(a) loss of job (b) death in family (c) no money/ unable to pay
(d) faulty goods (e) articles bought by spouse (f) illness
(g) company makes excessive profits (h) goods sold under pressure
(i) other
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(24) Which of these shouid creditors be allowed to do when a debt is unpaid (tick
those which you think should be allowed)
(a) cut off electricity gas for unpaid bill (b) cut offwater for unpaid bill
(c) evict tenant for unpaid rent (d) repossess house for mortgage
arrears
(e) "arrest" wages (ie have court deduct weekly amount from wages to pay bill)
(f) have court deduct weekly amount from social security' benefits
(g) have debtor imprisoned
(h) have court arrange "warrant sale" of debtor's goods
(i) add interest charges and legal costs to original debt
(25) Please indicate your views briefly on these two questions :
(a) The single change of policy I'd like to see affecting debt problems is
lb) The thing I think is most unfair about debt these days is
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Case Studies - Questions
The same set of questions was appended to each case study
Please indicate your reaction to these statements with regard to this case, ie
l=strongly agree. 2=agree. 3=unsure, 4=disagree. 5=strongly disagree
1. "This is a typical case of debt problems" 1 2 3 4 5
2. "This person brought the problems on her/himself' 1 2 3 4 5
3. "There should be a better way of dealing with problems like this" 1 2 3 4 5
4. Which of the following do you consider the main cause of debt problems in this
case (please tick one)
(a) Economic circumstances beyond the debtor's control
(b) Non-financial circumstances eg marriage problems, illness
(c) Bad management by debtor
(d) Irresponsible lending (or extending of credit) by the creditor
(e) Poor communication between debtor and creditor
(f) Bad luck
(g) Other
5. Is there anything in this case that you consider unfair ?
6. Is there any other information you feel would help you judge the rights and
wrongs of this case ?
7. How might the law deal with cases like this better ?
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Case Study (A)
John is a 27year old man. previously a salesman, who has been unemployed for 9
months. His 28year old wife is a bank clerk earning £250 (net) per week. He took
out a loan from a finance company in order to pay offother debts, butfound that the
payments on the loan were greater than those on the presnous debts.
His problems seem to start from the drop in income when he lost his job. Unlike
many others in this situation, the couple did not make any change in their lifestyle,
When they started to fall behind with their repayments and reminders came from the
creditors, they did not get in touch with the creditors to explain their circumstances
and come to a new arrangement. They assumed that unless they were able to make a
substantialpayment any offer would be turned down.
The debt reached £517.20. When a summons was ser\>ed on the debtor, he made no
attempt at payment, again assuming that any offer he made would be insufficient.
Yet he said "we just spevA the scurie as when we were both working ~ stupid debts got
bigger and bigger, and we just spent to forget them ".
Household goods (to a value of £250) were "poinded", which led the debtor to
contact the creditor and make arrangements to pay £20per week. This arrangement
only lastedfor four weeks before it broke down. A warrant sale was then intimated,
1n/J tsv * a,, J-y 11 f svsysi tlryn ry **rtn»v» siiry tri rtu^ri »cU. inn/ //jc/uo vuirig (/(uut. Uml trit. ct/ / iru u/ tyrvc-
down. On both occasions, these payment arrangements broke down because of
pressure ofother debt commitments.
The warrant sale took place; no buyers appeared and the creditor took possession
of the goods. The debtor and his wife are separating.
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Case Study (B)
Jean is a 30year old single parent of two children (Mark 12 and Gemma 10) who
started a college course in hairdressing seven months ago. Her marriage broke up
seven years ago, and although her former husband is believed to be a sales
representative living somewhere in England he pays nothing towards maintenance
of his children. Since the marriage break-up she has been living in council
accommodation, dependant on social security benefits, including housing benefit
paid directly to the District Council. She found it very difficult to cope with heating
bills and children's clothing, so she started using a clothing catalogue which gave
her time to pay.
When her college course began, she started to receive a grant of £3,500 per year,
paid monthly; this replaced the benefits she previously received (except child
benefit). By the time that she was notified that her housing benefit had been stopped
from thai date she became a student, the district council were claiming arrears of
£250 (ten weeks of the difference between what she had been paying and the full
rent without housing benefit'). She can see no way ofmeeting this debt, in addition to
her other debts of£53 (Scottish Power fuel bill) and £67 (clothing catalogue), each
of which she is paying off weekly (at £5 and £6 per week). A friend suggests a
finance company which will pay off her debts by extending her a new loan of £500,
which would also give her a bit ofspare cash; a District Council official encourages
her to accept this.
Jean thinks that her best course of action would be to withdraw from her college
course, saving the costs of travel and equipment, and go back on to benefit. The
council have been granted an eviction order by the sheriffcourt.
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Case Study (O
Gary (28) and his girlfriend bought a house (with a bank mortgage) for £46,000
seven years ago, feeling that it was an investment which they could afford. Shortly
after, their relationship ended, and Gary bought out his girlfriend's share with
overtime earnings from his work as an engineer. At that time he Mas also making
use ofa credit cardforfurnishing the flat to his own, fairly expensive, taste.
Then his overtime was reduced and finally cut altogether; he fell into arrears on
both the mortgage and credit card repayments, until a small inheritance helped him
topay offhis debts. However, with no overtime and rising interest rates, he could no
longer keep up the payments.
Recently, he was made redundant. Although his income support will cover 100% of
his mortgage after 16 weeks, the bank is not prepared to wait for this and seeks
repossession; but his house is no longer worth £46,000 and even after repossession
he is likely to owe up to £20,000. He says "There is no way I can move, I'm in too
much debt; I'm trapped; 1 have nothing. Everything 1 did have 1 sold off to pay off
debts. After six years of struggling to pay the mortgage, it's all theirs and I'm
£20,000 in debt How am 1 going to pay it back ? Will they take an arm ?" The bank
has not replied to his letters indicating the trap he feels he is in.
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Case Studv (D)
Carol (26) is a lone parent of two children, living on income support, out ofwhich
she was attempting to meet repayments on a loan which was originally her
grandmother's but for which Carolfelt morally and (mistakenly) legally responsible.
The pressure of these high repayments led to her going into arrears on her rent.
This in turn led to stress and depression.
The family attend a family centre locally where staff became aware that Carol wos
going without meals to feed her children, and even then the children were going
without breakfast and wearing shoes they had grown out of. The children started to
show behavioural problems (eg violent tantrums and bed-wetting), which Carol
datedfrom her debt problems and resultant stress.
The centre gave Carol support in budgeting and in coping with the children's
problems. They also helped her come to an arrangement with her creditors which
led to her paying off rent arrears at an agreed amount per week. When it became
clear that Carol was not legally responsible for her grandmother's loan, repayments
on that were stopped. These adjustments, together with the support she received,
made a noticeable difference not only to Carol but to the whole family.
However the improvement was not maintained. Carol fell behind with her rent
repayments again, and a visitor from the centre found the children in the house
alone until Carol returned, drunk, late in the evening.
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Case Studv (K)
Brian (39) was a local authority' driver but is now unemployed; his wife is not
working. They have two children; one, aged 18, is in part-time employment and the
other is 12 and at high school. Their income consists of unemployment benefit and
supplementary benefit.
Brian bought his daughter a bicycle for Christmas, on a credit agreement involving
twelve monthly payments of£10; he only made the first four payments. At this stage
his daughter was involved in a serious accident resulting in brain damage and
prolonged hospitalisation at some distance from the family home. The extra costs of
hospital visits etc, and Brian's unemployment meant that they were unable to keep
up the payments. (It also led to their falling behind on TV rental andpayments to a
clothing catalogue firm.)
He made contact with the local store where he had bought the bicycle, and they
referred him to their head office, to whom he wrote offering to repay over a longer
period at £4 per month. He received no reply from them, but a letter from a debt
collection agency threatening court action if the outstanding debt were no! paid in
full within seven days. He wrote to them offering repayment at £8 per month; this
letter was not acknowledged.
Brian next received a summons. He went personally to court and offered to repay at
£2 per week; this offer was accepted. However, after three months he started
missing payments (under financial pressure); attempts at negotiation produced no
agreement. Sheriff officers entered the (unlocked) house while no-one vt as present
, 'v, cr/~\rssfo iflirt s\-f / 7 9^) r)rten»//; o/~)wn fr^rr *Unann fuo iri c- i wmc Lj a. i *£\J. Lsc,of/ilz, oUfsjsct i jfyJIfi it tic. cjksc* tat
Work Department, the sheriff officers demanded payment in full as the only
alternative to a warrant sale. The anxiety of this (and the threat ofadvertisement of
the warrant sale in the newspaper) led Brian's wife to health problems for which the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3, Debt in the Bible - Jubilee-, Justice and Forgiveness
The two preceding chapters on personal debt set an agenda for Christian
ethical reflection, describing a context and drawing out issues, particularly of social
justice and forgiveness, which have to be addressed. To start with that (rather than,
say, this present chapter), may already indicate something of a methodology which
allows "the world" (rather than the Bible, or theology) to set the agenda for Christian
ethics. As indicated in the introduction, the research pattern adopted here has been
less linear than that, with theological. Biblical, and socio-economic strands
interwoven; it is presented it in this way in the hope of greater clarity, and in the
belief that this is the more crucial logical direction for Christian ethical reflection
which is in fact a process of dialogue among these different strands. To put it
negatively, Christian ethics cannot go by a straightforward process from Biblical
texts (or self-evident "Christian" principles) to concrete decisions or policies - "it is
no more possible to derive a contemporary normative economics directly from the
pages of scripture than it is to derive a biology from Genesis"'. The two must be in a
continuing dialogue which can still accept the Bible as uniquely authoritative for
Christian ethics: that demands, a method which will allow the Bible to speak in the
context set above, to inform Christian contributions to the dialogue.
11 a Christian perspective on the issues of justice and forgiveness
surrounding debt cannot straightforwardly transpose Biblical prescriptions into a
very different economy today, nor can such a perspective ignore the considerable
weight of Biblical material on these issues. Clearly there are complex questions
between these two extremes, about how we use Biblical material fruitfully here2.
This chapter will look at the Biblical material in its own context before dealing with
some of the issues of application to modern economic settings.
The Biblical Economy
What, then, were the crucial features of the Biblical economy ? Polanyi's
description of an "embedded economy" enmeshed in institutions both economic and
non-economic distinguishes the Biblical situation clearly from any sense of an
autonomous, "free" market. "The subordination of economic organisation to social
ends ... was for Polanvi a feature of all societies except that dominated by modern
' Stackhouse, 1987, p382
^ See eg Wiggleswortli, 1985, pp7ff
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market economy"3. We are therefore a long way from any perspective of the dangers
of tampering with economic, market "laws", and it is not surprising to find in this
context a "dynamic tension between aspects of cultic significance and injunctions
regarding social justice"4 in which the worship of God is seen as alternative to the
practice of economic injustice. In Polanyi's analysis, this is not simply a matter of
the economic power of church or temple (considerable though the latter was.
especially by the time of the New Testament, when its redistributive role had so
degenerated that it "came to be the centre of accumulation rather than redistribution
to the needy"3). The point is in fact less about a balance of power than the
integration of economic and other social fields whose autonomy had emerged
neither in fact nor theory. As Kloppenborg says, the absence ofGreek or Latin words
to convey the idea of "market" in the abstract is not to be seen as an intellectual or
linguistic failing but "a reflection of the structure of ancient society itself'®.
Only to a very limited extent, then, can we speak of anything which might be
called a "market" operating in Biblical societies, which were much more
characterised by reciprocity and redistribution as means of exchange, by patron-
client rather than the theoretically equally-balanced contractual relationships of
today , and by kinship as a crucial factor whereby relations with the immediate
community are viewed in a different light from those with strangers (as. eg. in the
matter of charging interest on loans). Indeed von Waldow argues that it is this
thought-world of nomadic kinship associations that is the origin of the Israelite
sense of social responsibility, even after the nomadic lifestyle had long since been
left behind8. Chaney, too, sees "biblical traditions such as those prohibiting interest
on surv ival loans to the poor and granting various other easements and protections to
debtors (as finding) their fountainhead in the communitarian values of pre-
monarchic Israel"9.
The Old Testament period is clearly one of an agrarian, land-based economy
(a "sub-asiatic agrarian formation", to borrow Belo's Marxist terminology10), and
while money may be seen to play a more important role in the New Testament
Humphreys, 1978, p63
4 Sloan, 1977, pl3
5 Myers, 1988, p79
6 Kloppenborg, 1990, pi 86
^ See Oakman, 1991. p34 5
8
von Waldow, 1970. pi87
9 Chaney, 1991, pi29
10 See Myers, 1988, p4S
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world" there was certainly nothing recognisable as a money-market in a modern
sense12.
Within this context, land distribution is the crucial issue (whether one
focuses on matters of production or distribution); land is the crucial unit both of
wealth and of production. Although Middelmann claims that "there is ... no
indication in the OT that land was mysteriously seen as the economic base of the
people"", there is in fact nothing mysterious about it, especially when all the
Biblical and non-Biblical stress on land distribution is recognised. Thus Finley sees
the demand for redistribution of land (along with the cancellation of debts) as the
"perennial revolutionary programme of antiquity"". The Old Testament also reflects
a continuing resistance to the tendency for the accumulation of large estates" which
is part of the background to the jubilee and Sabbath Year legislation, and this
continues into the New Testament period". We may also note the concentration of
land and property as the reverse side of the com of debt and insolvency, the one
trend reinforcing the other'7.
Several commentators note this concentration as a particular characteristic of
the OT age of the monarchy", when vacant lands w hich should have reverted to the
clan were appropriated by the king for personal use or as reward to officers";
resistance to this underlies the prophetic hostility to concentration of land and such
stories as that of Naboth's vineyard™. Thus the distribution of land at the occupancy
of the promised land was undermined - a distribution seen as having been based on
God's ultimate ownership of the land.
Some other characteristics of the Biblical economy (or economies, since we
may recognise certain developments through the period) should be noted by way of
background to what follows. The economic perspective (particularly, though not
exclusively, the peasant perspective) was one of limited good, producing conflict
over, and interest in the equity of, distribution21; indeed, it was probably not until the
11 See Stambaugh & Batch, 1986, p63
12 Finley, 1985, p23, who makes this point more generally re contemporary societies eg Rome, Greece
13 Middelmann, 1987, p38
^ Finley, 1985, p80
15 Wright, 1984, pi99/200
Myers, 1988, p49
12 See Oakman, 1985, p65
1 810 See eg de Vaux, p73
1 ^ See eg Vallelv. 1990, p207
2° IKings 21 Iff, see also ISam 8.14
21 See Moxnes, 1988, p77
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industrial revolution that the economy was viewed as anything other than a "zero-
sum" game, ie that while one might argue over the slicing the size of the cake to be
distributed was finite and fixed (at least in terms of human control)". When this is
linked with the monarchic nature of much of the Old Testament material, a
"command economy" with allocation by a central power emerges as the norm".
The development of private property can also only be said to be beginning
through the OT period. Schaeffer, for example, sees the jubilee as "a compromise
between the communism of more primitive times and the institution of private
landownership"24, and much of the OT legislation has to be understood w ithin the
context of a clan solidarity that was far stronger than any sense of individual
enterprise. That is certainly not to say that private ownership (even of the means of
production, ie land) was an idea alien to the OT, but it was only gradually
developing. Wage labour was also not regarded, at least in the OT. as the norm but
rather as "a temporary phenomenon, what the Oxford economist Donald Hay has
called a kind of social insurance for those who lost possession of their land until the
next jubilee"". Again, however, we may see a development towards a labour market
in the NT period.
Most of the above, of course, applies wirh equal force 10 other ancient
economies; were there distinctive features of the Biblical economies ? Gottwald. for
instance, argues that Israel's egalitarian social structure represented its strongest
challenge to surrounding societies26, and it is claimed that the ban on interest usury
was one sign of Israel's distinctive approach. Analysis below of the Biblical material
may help to clarify' this.
Debt in Biblical Times
One fact of Biblical (as well as other ancient) economic life is crucial to the
present study - debt. Despite a variety of attempts to mitigate its effects or intervene
in its downward spiral, debt was a common fact of life for the vulnerable ofBiblical
times. As noted above, along with land redistribution, the cancellation of debts was
a common ingredient of revolutionary programmes, and there is evidence from
several cultures of royal proclamations of release from debt obligations. Indeed,
proclamations of release from past debts may be seen as almost "a standard act of a
22 See Kloppenborg, 1990, pi88
jp J Kennedy, in Davies (ed), 1993, pi0624 Schaeffer, 1915, pi80/1
25 Vallely, 1990, p202
26 Gottwald, 1979, p409
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new administration, as m the contemporary edicts of Draco and Solon in Athens"^
(and the failure of such one-off edicts to eliminate the problems of debt may be
recognised in the recurrent need for more such proclamations). Finley also notes a
panic in Rome when the civil war that brought Julius Caesar to power was thought
likely to lead to a "demagogic" measure to cancel debts^8.
Several recent studies have examined the prevalence and causes of debt in
Biblical and other ancient economies. Goodman has drawn a detailed picture of the
mechanism of a supply-led expansion of credit and debt in first century Judaea, with
the rich of Jerusalem looking for an outlet for surplus funds®, while Oakman sees
taxation, over-population and poor harvests as more crucial factors in terms of the
burden imposed on the poor8®. The most substantial non-Biblical evidence comes
from Josephus' account of the Jewish (Zealot ?) revolt of 66AD. when the rebels set
tire to the "archeiafiles of the official archive of debt actions. Josephus describes
the burning of these records or bonds as designed to "win over a host of grateful
debtors and to cause a rising of the poor against the rich", and refers to the debt
archives as the "nerves" or "sinews" of the city11; he describes "the phenomenon of
widespread debt among the poor" as a major part of the "sickness" from which first
century Palestine suffered8-'. Whether the destruction of these records was merely
symbolic (as Goodman suggests) or the "scoundrels under the pressure of debts
imagined that if they burnt the marketplace and the public records they would be rid
of all demands (as Josephus claims33), both their "targeting" by the rebels and
Josephus' outrage show how crucial a source of grievance debt w as.
The dissidents who joined David in the cave of Adullam included escaping
debtors88, and Horslev argues that such revolts as David's and the Jewish Revolt of
66AD were the activity of bandit groups composed of peasants whose debts had led
to the loss of their land'8. He also suggests that "some of those who would have been
attracted to the (Jesus) movement in towns or cities may well have been people
recently displaced from their ancestral villages because of debts, that is, people for
^RB Coote & M P Coote in Gottwald & Horsley, 1993, p351
Finley, 1985, pi43
Goodman, 1983, p417ff
3® Oakman, 1985, p63
3' Josephus, Jewish War 11.427 (in Josephus, 1927)
Josephus, Jewish War VI 1.260 (in Josephus, 1927), as cited by Goodman, 1983, p417.8
33 Josephus, Jewish War VI 1.61 (in Josephus, 1927)
34 1 Samuel 22,2
33 Horsley, 1981, p409
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whom the traditional forms of community had completely broken down"*. Although
Freyne argues that Luke's picture of the prevalence of debt may be more Judaean
than Galilean'7, there seems little doubt that for both the setting of the Jubilee and
Sabbath year legislation and the environment in which Jesus lived and preached
debt was a harsh fact of life and key indicator of poverty. So Finley, speaking more
generally of ancient economies, says that "if one wishes to grasp the basic attitude to
the poor, one must look not at the occasional philanthropy but at the law of debt'X
The prevalence of debt is crucial to the interpretation of the texts,
particularly in the light of any tendency to "spiritualise" references to the forgiveness
of debts: if we are to suppose that Jesus, speaking to a crowd for whom economic
debt was a crucial, imprisoning fact of life, spoke of forgiveness of debts meaning
something quite different and without at ieast including financial debts, then his
gospel is reduced to a painful irony. Rather, debt is seen as the "paradigmatic social
„ iji ~ a \tt ~ t ,.1
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sermon on the plain and the Lord's Prayer. As we shall see, Jesus' "vision of the
liberation coming with the reign of God directIv attacked a principal component of
the Roman order in Palestine and attracted a following of people victimised by
debt"*.
It would be surprising, then, if there were not a considerable amount of
Biblical material relating to debt, yet precise understanding of the meaning of many
of the texts in an economy quite different from our own is problematic. In particular,
it appears to be an assumption almost throughout the Bible that loans are given to
meet crisis needs of consumption rather than to finance expansion or production:
nor is there any development in the ancient economy of what we now recognise as
consumer credit. This explains the absence of any overt distinction in the Bible
between loans given for need and those given for greed"; the latter is simply not
envisaged. Loans are generally seen as being given charitably, and therefore
"interest-taking is seen by the lawgiver as a device for trapping the poor into
permanent poverty"42.
36Horslev, 1989, pi20
37 Freyne, 1988, pi66/7
Finley, 1985, p40
39 Yoder, 1972, p41
4,3 Oakman, 1985, p73
41 Schluter, in Hartropp (ed), 1987, p7
4^ Sprinkle, 1994, pi71
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It is vita! to recall what was said above about the nature of the economy in
which this happened, since a great deal of what some modern commentators say
about the effects and the impracticality of the OT legislation on debt assumes the
operation of a free market in money which had not developed. It is quite wrong, for
example, to argue that legislation on debt remission and the banning of interest is
designed to discourage lenders from lending-"; any tendency in that direction
through "market forces" is expressly counteracted" and lending is positively
encouraged as a good work. To characterise the Biblical economic system as
"laissez-faire with powerful remedies" (such as the jubilee) designed to correct the
growing slope of the playing field" is attractive, but ultimately anachronistic in
implying too close a similarity between the laissez-faire market economies of todav
and the Biblical pattern.
Also, bearing in mind what has. been said above re the "embedded" economy
of Biblical times, it is important to consider how debt functioned within that
economy, not simply as an indicator of poverty or even as a system of "surplus
extraction" whereby the rich got richer and the poor poorer", but as a "formal
expression of relations of dependency and ( perhaps irredeemable) obligation"47, l ite
most blatant example of this is, of course, the close association of debt with slavery ,
but Goodman goes on to describe the mechanism by which the lender could not lose
- "If the debtor repaid the loan within the set time limit, the lender lost nothing and
gained a grateful friend. If repayment was made after the fixed period, as. perhaps it
was expected to be, the fine charged in the Judaean desert documents provided 20%
interest"48 (the parallel with modern credit cards is tempting, though again probably
anachronistic, and the penalty for non-payment certainly more severe, le forfeiture
of 'land or slavery).
Debt in The Old Testament
What, then, were the debt-related provisions of the Old Testament ? Loans
to see families through the kind of temporary difficulties that an agrarian economy
of uncertain harvests must face were clearly a common fact of Biblical life.
Provisions to regulate these were therefore also important. Pledges which
Hartropp (ed), 1987, p 146
^ Deuteronomy 15.9
A ^ . .
G Moore, in Davies (ed), 1993, pi 17
See Chaney, 1991, pl27ff
^Oakman, 1985, p57
Goodman, 1983, p422 3
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themselves threatened the continuing welfare of the debtor (such as basic clothing45
or tools for production50) were not allowed (again a modern parallel suggests itself in
the restrictions on what may be sold in a warrant sale or similar legal procedures for
debt recover}'). There were also restrictions on aggressive methods of debt
recovery^ (which seem to outlaw such as warrant sale procedure !). Alongside this,
of course, we would have to put the emphasis (as a matter of justice, says Schluter52)
on repayment and or working off of debts, but the weight of Biblical law and
prophetic condemnation is on the impact of arrangements on the poor, ie the
debtors, and on upholding their interests. The Biblical understanding of justice, here
as elsewhere, is not as blind to the vulnerability of the poor as a modern Western
view; God's justice is actively oriented to their rights.
Thus Nehemiah saw debt problems as threatening the whole fabric of
community", and the provisions for remission of debt have been seen as being ai the
heart of Josiah's reforms, in Deuteronomy 15.Iff, which, it is claimed, "would have
put a quick and certain end to poverty , toppling magnate creditors, if Josiah could
and would have enforced it"54.
The most obvious area of restriction, and safeguarding of the poor, is that of
interest or usury, where we get a flavour of the Biblical view in that the most
common word for interest in the OT is "nesheq", from the verb to bite. While there
are signs in many ancient economies of restrictions on interest rates, Israel may well
have been unique in its ban on the taking of interest within the community55. "The
prohibition against lending for interest has an important place in Israelite legislation,
in favour of the poor"50 says F.psztein, and it seems clear that the OT ban on interest
arose from a sense of the threat which debt (especially long-term debt) posed to the
community; it was part of a consistent attempt to avoid a spiral of increasing debt as
well as representing resistance to one member of the community benefiting from the
misfortune of another, an idea quite contrary to the whole notion of the covenant
community. In fact, it can be argued that the ban on interest focused on its damage
to relationships in the community rather than any intrinsic evil in it5'. "The Holiness,
49 Exodus 22.26/27
* ® Eg Deuteronomy 24.6
■'' Eg Deuteronomv 24 1 Off
Schluter, in Hartropp (ed), 1987, plO
Schluter, in Hartropp (ed), 1987, p9
~4 R B Coote & M P Coote in Gotrwald & Horsiey (eds), 1993, p351
See eg Hartropp (ed), 1987. pi42
Epsztein, 1986, pi24
Hartropp, 1987, p 143
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Deuteronomic and Covenant Codes as well as the Psalms and the prophets
consistently condemn the lending practices which encourage the accumulation of
personal wealth at the expense of the well-being of the community."58
As argued above, commercial loans were almost non-existent as far as the
Old Testament at least is concerned; "the loans mentioned in the Torah served more
to relieve the essential needs of the poor and hungry'"5. It may be argued, however,
that the different provisions regarding loans to foreigners reflect the fact that such
loans are more likely to be of a commercial, as well as of a more high-risk nature60.
Mills attempts to argue from Deuteronomy 23.19, which unlike Exodus 22.25 and
Leviticus 25.36/7 does not specify the charging of interest to the poor, the case for a
quite different basis for the interest ban. However, it seems much more reasonable
to read into the Deuteronomy text the presumption noted above that ioans (with the
possible exception of loans to foreigners) were charitable loans to those in need; the
legislation m Deuteronomy simply did not envisage a modern credit market. This
also seems more consistent with the OT hostility to the moneylender - a modern
hero who emerges as much the villain of the OT period as was the tax-collector to
NT society; his social role is perceived (perhaps accurately) in the OT as closer to
that of today's backstreet loan shark rather than the city financial dealer6'.
Although the New Testament may be said to assume a society in which
interest is routinely charged, there is no explicit overturning of the OT position; in
fact, Jesus' command to lend expecting nothing in return6' (crucial to the medieval
debate about usury) may point even further in the same direction. There is some
plausibility in Schluter's argument that this is "a command to the individual
Christian for his personal dealings" rather than one addressed to "the institutions of
the market-place or those who make economic policy"63, since that appears to have
been Jesus' immediate audience. However, set against the OT background and
particularly the key role of the temple in the economy of Jesus' time, it is hard to see
why the injunction should be so restricted in scope.
The institutions of the Sabbath vear and of the Jubilee are crucial to the
Biblical approach to debt and its problems. Linguistic links strongly suggest
58 Wee, 1986, p428
?9Epsztein, 1986, pi25
99 Epsztein, 1986, pi26
^ Eg Isaiah 3.12
Luke 6 3?
63 In Hartropp (ed), 1987, plO
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parallels between these institutions and other forms of debt cancellation and release
in the ancient near east, but there is little or no evidence elsewhere for such
permanent and regular institutionalised forms as the Sabbath and Jubilee years
appear to represent6*. Biblically, the decrees of Zedekiah^ and Nehemiah66 seem to
be "one-off" events proclaiming release from debt and slavery, rather than a
legislative pattern, although these are clearly linked by their theme into the
Sabbath/Jubilee cluster of legislation (referred to as "S/J" below).
I think it is appropriate here to speak of a "cluster" of legislation, referring to
such passages as Exodus 21.1-11, Exodus 23 10-12, Deuteronomy 15.1-18,
Nehemiah 10.32, Leviticus 25 and Leviticus 27.16-25: these belong to different
periods and different codes, and differ in detail, yet may well reflect the
development of one theme of debt-release and restitution for the sake of justice. The
Sabbath year provides for a seventh-year cancellation (or possibly suspension, see
below) of debts and release of slaves; since debt is the principal reason for slavery,
these two clearly reinforce each other. The Jubilee provides for a reversion of land
to the clan, and since debt is the probable reason for the loss of land, we can see this
provision as again representing a decisive breaking into the spiral of debt with
provision of resources for a new beginning. As Lebacqz savs, "there is release in
several senses: the release from indebtedness and the re-lease of the land so that
people can begin again"6". In the most thorough treatment of the Jubilee, North
argues for it being accepted as an unquestioned fact "that the jubilee was in essence
a super-sabbath"63, and this conclusion, already suggested by the numerology of the
"sabbath of sabbaths" seems a more satisfactory explanation than those that
concentrate on the differences and "tension" between the two areas of legislation66.
Wright attempts to construct a distinction between the "Hebrew" of
Deuteronomy and Exodus (a sociological identification referring to the poor) and
the Israelites (racially and religiously defined) to whom Leviticus 25 applies, but
this seems more a device to rescue the consistency of the texts for a fundamentalist
perspective than an aid to appreciating the meaning. What we have, surely, is a
cluster of texts which represent different attempts to address the same problem at
different times (or possibly different aspects of the same problem, as when
See egNeufeld. 1958, esp p55
^ Jeremiah, ch34
^ Nehemiah, ch3
u/ Lebacqz. 1987, pi24
68 North, 1954, pi29
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seriousness of debt); each generation may have had its own version of debt
easement because each generation encountered the problems of debt™. In them all
there is a mixture of cultic and socio-economic concern, characteristic of an
embedded economy and a theological perspective that seeks to express the
sovereignty of God equally in worship and politics. Before going on to consider
what the common theme is, however, we must look at some of the issues in the
interpretation of these texts.
Wright, for example, raises a doubt as to whether the Sabbatical release from
debt was a complete cancellation or merely a temporary suspension. Neufeld.
however, notes a consensus that this is a discharge, and that would seem to fit better
with the need for measures to counteract a credit freeze prior to the Sabbath year7'
and for the device of the prosbul (see below).
There is also disagreement on whether the seven and fifty year periods relate
to the particular transaction or to a universal year of release: "the humanitarian and
agricultural factors postulate a rotating-particular seventh vear whereas the cultic
factors presume simultaneous universality"72. It seems clear that the release of slaves
envisaged in Exodus 21.1 ff is after a period of six years of service, whereas the
more developed and centralised society of Deuteronomy 15 seems to be the setting
for a universal year of release from debts (again the evidence of Deuteronomy 15.9
on the danger of a credit freeze seems conclusive). Yet even in Deuteronomy the
release of slaves appears to be after six years of service, not in a universal year of
release. Doubts about the practicality of a universal fallow year in a vulnerable
agrarian economy tend to influence analysis here, but it seems clear that the jubilee
(with its stress on proclamation) was - at least in the terms envisaged by Leviticus 25
- a universal year of release and return, which might in turn tend to support those
who argue for it as a drawing together of the various other elements in the cluster.
Thus Porter says that in Leviticus 25 "old laws concerned with economic and
social relationships are collected, systematised and reinterpreted to take account of
developments that had occurred in the course of Israel's history"75. Noth, however,
argues on linguistic grounds (especially the use ofyobeT) for a relatively early date74,
70 See Chancy, 1991, pi39
* Deuteronomy 15.9
72 North. 1954.'pi84
73 Porter, 1976, pl96'7
74 Noth, 1965, pi 84
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and North on more socio-psvchological grounds sees the jubilee as located in an
undeveloped economy at a time of optimism and therefore as belonging to the time
of the occupation '. The principal problem with such views is that later texts such as
Nehemiah 5 do not appear to acknowledge such legislation. It therefore seems best
to recognise the jubilee ofLeviticus as having absorbed earlier legal traditions76.
Another debated issue - whether the jubilee year was the 49th or 50th or an
"extra", possibly abbreviated, year - does not seem critical for the present study.
However it is very much part of the discussion of the more vital issue of the
practicality of the whole jubilee institution.
In making an assessment of this, it is particularly hard to escape from the
assumptions of a modern economy and enter into a past age's realism. Some
commentators seem to make an unwarranted jump in moving from the near-
impossibility of many of these provisions in any modern society to the conclusion
that they represent Utopian idealism or a "quixotic institution"77.
Thus, Westbrook points out that "modern commentators, beginning with
Wellhausen. have dismissed the Jubilee provisions as the work of an idealistic
theologian who must have lived during or after the exiie"~:, while Porter sees the
jubilee as designed to be a "practical basis for the restored nation"7' and Segundo
views Leviticus 25 as an attempt to spell out a topos or political, legislated locus for
the Utopian year of the Lord's favour80. If the latter modem consensus is accepted, we
need not worn about the problem of how to reckon years: if we wish to challenge
this, however, we must reckon with the real practical difficulties of an apparent two
years without sowing or reaping, as well as the social upheaval of the jubilee land
return. 2Kings 19.29 gives instructions about fallow years, and IMaccabees 6.49 &
53 provide some evidence of the difficulties caused by observance of the Sabbath
year, but other evidence of the observance of the Sabbath or Jubilee years is scant.
Nehemiah 5 may be held to represent an application of S/J principles, but this is
only on the one-off basis of a royal decree rather than the application of legislation
felt to be binding. And Josephus provides no examples of the kind of heroic
75 North, 1954, P205
76Gnuse, 1985, p43
77 Patrick 1985, pi85
7^ Westbrook. 1971. p211
79 Porter. 1976, pi97
^ Segrindo, 1985, p205
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obedience to the legislation which he claims to be characteristic of every single
Hebrew".
While the argument from silence cannot be conclusive of the non-application
of the Jubilee, it does seem unlikely that the institution was a fact of Israelite life for
any prolonged period. Yet that does not force the conclusion that it was never
intended for practical application. As argued already, there arc significant parts of
the legislation that are designed to meet some of the practical difficulties; these
would have been unnecessary if all that was at stake was a Utopian image, and it
seems to be stretching the point unduly to suggest that these are merely rhetorical
devices to emphasise the possibility of its application without implying a serious
expectation that it would be applied*?. We may also note the practicality of steps to
ensure not only that debt-slaves were released but that they had the resources to
make a new beginning without immediately falling back into debt as in Jeremiah
34.8ff.
The device of the prosbul. in particular, seems designed to overcome some
such problems in practice, indeed (by legal fiction) almost to evade the force of the
legislation. Possibly in reaction to commercial development and the credit freeze
around the times of sabbath or jubilee years, the prosbul of Rabbi Hillel was a
.4 -ii -i ~.r i u. ♦ ^~ — ...l;-t.
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may in fact show a pressure close to the time of Jesus for strict application of the S J
principles*3. (In passing, we may reflect on the likely effects of the prosbul - in the
short term, an opening up of credit which might help the poor, but in the longer term
more likelv a permanence of debt which the S J cluster was designed to avoid" - and
on the fact that here was opened the possibility of evading the Biblical injunction by
private contract**.)
Despite the claims of Josephus noted above, it is hard to substantiate any
consistent application of the S/J principles, nor even, with North, of an
interpretation thereof "which was felt to accord with the intention of the legislator
without involving cataclysmic upheavals in the national economy"*6. But it is
important to recognise in this cluster of legislation an evolving attempt to deal with
8* See discussion in North, 1954, p85
^ Amit, in Reventlow & Hofrnan (eds), 1992, p55
Yoder, 1972, p69 70
S4 See Myers, 1988, p78
8-^ See Goodman, 1983, p422
86 North, 1954, pS5
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a matter of justice in the community at a practical level and in a way that belongs to
the embedded economy of the time in its mixing of religious, social and economic
concerns (which may account for the modern sense of the quixotic nature of their
appeal).
The Meaning and Purpose of The Old Testament Legislation
Before seeking to derive any modern meaning for this cluster, we must try to
be more specific about their meaning in their original context. There is here a vision
in which "abuses and inequalities have been set aside so that the social order can
rellect the will ofGod who acts graciously towards his people and will have them do
the same to each other"8'. The SJ cluster presumes an initial "just" distribution of
land, reflecting the assertion of God's sovereignty, and in particular his "eminent
domain"8? over the land. While Griffiths is correct in his claim that this does not
translate into communal or state ownership89, it equally does not lead to a modern
concept of private property in land God's ultimate ownership is reflected in the
community concern against the accumulation of large estates (whether by the king
or any other person or group), and therefore in interventions such as the jubilee to
prevent this recurrent tendency from spiralling. The economic implications of divine
sovereignty are here taken seriously.
The restoration provisions of Leviticus 25 reflect this into support for the
family, as many commentators note90. However, their association with many other
measures in the cluster contradicts any claim that the preservation of "the family"
(however understood) is the main aim here; rather, they are a key part of the "social
security system" of the Old Testament9'; the fundamental concern is the economic
justice in which the welfare of the whole community is safeguarded. Those who
would stress the preservation of "the family" as its aim fail to reckon with its refusal
to let the problems of one generation determine the life chances of the next (fifty
years probably representing a generation in this regard) and equally to let the
success of one generation be passed down to the next (a cornerstone of "new right"
defences of the family). Novak argues that it is the preservation of the Sabbath that
is the dominant concern (rather than lending to the poor), on the ground that "the
Sabbatical year was a reality for all whereas the need for loans was the reality only
8^ Rogerson & Davies, 1989, p245
88 North, 1954, pi58/9
89 See Vallely, 1990, p201
90 Eg North, 1954, p215 & Wright, 1984, pl.98
°' Biggar & Hay, 1994, p60
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of a poverty-stricken few"*-. This is doubly to miss the point; those in need of loans
were more than a few. and the purpose of the Sabbath - "made for man" - is that
God's sovereignty should be reflected throughout the life of the nation, injustice that
demands the forgiveness of debts breaking into the spirals of growing poverty. The
laws of debt-release are not (as elsewhere) signs of the occasional benevolence of a
ruler but part of a "holy rhvthm" which links the practicalities of social justice firmly
into the community's relationship with God and is "given its beat by the treatment of
the dependent"".
The Sd legislation is based on equality in God's sight, and thence on equality
of human needs*4; it seeks to limit inequalities that develop, to "forestall human
greed and chicanery from being institutionalised in a way that kept the poor
permanently from having access to resources"". While it is fair to argue that a
simple economic equality of result is not necessarily the basic content of this justice,
it ts clear that intervention to prevent inequality feeding on itself is a vital part ot the
justice that reflects God's will and purpose for the community1; the redistribution of
"immoderately concentrated wealth" is not a question of charity but of rights - a
"debt in justice"". "The jubilee makes clear that justice is neither primarily
retributive nor distributive; it is restorative or corrective"*1, which is, for Lebacqz.
what makes it such a potent image for justice in an unjust world, an active policy
rather than idealistic blueprint. In the jubilee, God's justice is reflected; in the
jubilee, therefore, we learn about the character of that justice and how it is to be
FcaliScd. It IS in OFic ScQSe a icSpOOSc tO God's aCtlOFi - "The tr^iSfOfGIatiGij 0f the
exile is and remains a divine wonder. It demands a human response. They must
proclaim the release of debt"** - in another sense, it is a response to injustice and
arises from the Biblical insight that "there is something profoundly wrong with a
system that traps people in debt, offers no hope of escape and excludes them from
active participation in society"**.
The dominant concern of this cluster of legislation (indeed the theme which
holds the cluster together) is debt and the problems for individuals, families and the
- ~ Novak, m Berger (ed), 1990, p42
93 Hamilton, 1992, pi08-114, 136
94 See Soelle, 1992, p96
95 Crosby, 1988, pi 73
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whole community which result from that. Wenham says quite simply that "the main
purpose of these (jubilee) laws is to prevent the utter ruin of debtors"100. Yet others
point out that the jubilee provisions themselves do not explicitly deal with debt-
release; "it does not prescribe a release of debts, except in the interpretation of
Josephus"101, but. recalling what has been said above about the prevalence of debt.
Josephus is correct in concluding that the rehabilitation of the debtor is the purpose
of the jubilee and the basic sabbath-vear release from debts must in some sense be
implied in its provisions. "To release a man from indenture and to restore to him his
patrimony is to cancel all his debts, since these two conditions represent the final
stages of bankruptcy""*. Indeed, it is quite reasonable to draw parallels between the
S/J cluster and modern bankruptcy law as responses to similar circumstances of
hopeless debt, with the vital difference that modern bankruptcy law aims more at
securing "justice" among creditors than the rehabilitation of the debtor which is the
priority for the OT"». Sayle's call, noted above, for us to "depawn the old ram's
horn, breathe deep and let rip one mighty debt-dissolving, economy-reviving,
interest-slashing, bank-baffling blast"1" may never have been intended to be taken
literally, but it does dramatically capture the urgency with which the Old Testament
views the problem of debt and the need for counter-measures which allow for the
rehabilitation of the debtor in the interests of the community.
Perhaps we should come back down to earth by recalling again the stress
which some claim the OT also places on repayment of debts in eg Psalm 37.21.
Schluter argues that while "those brought up in Western tradition often believe a
nAr\r mm Vior o n oUf tA ronov i ri aK Aro^itAr c *m*-> 1 \r Ar» tUo AfAnn rlc aF V\io k<amn
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poor ... the OT recognises no such right"10;. Quite the contrary: the stress may not be
on any "right" to refuse repayment, but creditors' rights are never seen as absolute in
the Bible. The S/J cluster undermines any sense of the absolute justice of contractual
obligations, and, in stressing much more the ban on usury and on taking pledges
which inhibit livelihood, the OT recognises the crucial relevance for justice of the
realities of power in contracts.
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This radical transformation of the situation created by unfair concentrations
of property - "the most radical household command of the liberator Economist"10" -
has elements of release, redistribution, remission, restoration, and liberation (the
liberation that is the characteristic of the Sabbath, writ large in the jubilee). Assman
is therefore right to say that it is not adequately reflected in "perverse jubilees" of
highly conditional international debt forgiveness which are accompanied by "fresh
mechanisms of subjection and dependency"107. To modern (Havekian) eyes it may
well seem to benefit the inefficient, giving them the same property as if they had
been efficient; in its OT setting it seeks social justice by means of the forgiveness of
debts.
In the S/J cluster of socio-economic legislation, forgiveness has an economic
reality as part of justice rather than as a competitor to justice. Thus Assman is right
in seeing it as an unbiblical "perverted" understanding of justice which sees it as
"just" for Third World nations to pay their debts, and a departure from justice to
forgive these debts10' That is the reverse of the thinking which underlies the S.T
legislation, where, as North says, "just as a man must forgive his neighbour seventy
times seven times (Matthew 18.22) so he should relinquish his claim on a
neighbour's property after seven times seven years"109. We shall see below how this
concrete sense of forgiveness in the OT is carried into the NT.
The Debt Code
Before thai, however, some consideration must be given to the way in which
Belo and others have built on the OT stress on debt in the analysis of what he calls
the debt code. Belo finds just two basic systems operating in the legislative texts of
the Old Testament - a pollution (or contagion) code (broadly associated with priestly
concerns) and a debt code (broadly found in the social concerns of OT law) - and
reads Jesus as excluding the former to make way for an internationalised and
radicalised version of the latter110. 1 do not propose to go into detailed criticism of
this approach, but I would want to say that it seems inevitably reductionist in its
attempt to reshape all the disparate legislation of the OT into these two categories,
but helpful in at least two aspects.
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Belo rightly builds on the parallels between "debt" and "sin" (basing this
especially on the fact that many of the OT words for forgiveness, translated in LXX
as "aphiemihave their roots in the cancellation of debts). However, the consistent
use of "debt" for "sin" is not always true to the Biblical language and may serve to
confuse the issues. In linking the OT emphasis on debt with its understanding of sin,
Belo says that he prefers the language of debt to the language of sin "because that is
the meaning underlying the Aramaic word that New Testament Greek translates as
"aphesis(fundamentally a release or letting go); again this is indeed part of the
truth "Partly by way of the cultus, partly by way of prophetic preaching, the OT
developed with increasing force the thought that man's sin makes him a debtor
before God", although it is only in later Judaism (which views the relationship
between man and God in iegai terms) that the metaphor of indebtedness is more
fully developed in the direction of man gening in arrears with good works and
thereby becoming indebted to God1*2.
This link between debt and sin is perhaps more straightforward in the
different setting of the "sub-Asiatic agrarian" economy: "unlike the Israelite notion
of debt ... which was rooted in the practice of reciprocity and gift exchange, our
modern debt code is based on an ideology of social contract and a political economy
ofmarket exchange; thus we instinctively think of debt in economic terms"1". So too
Polanyi speaks of the "capacity of primitive society to produce indebtedness of a
non-economic nature"1". This seems to locate debt and sin both firmly in terms of
relationships, without in any sense diminishing the importance of financial debts to
the Biblical picture. I will explore this further below when I consider the NT use of
some OT passages, since this is more clearly developed in the New Testament.
The other vital part of his case lies in seeing the purpose of the debt code
"rooted in the peasant political economy of reciprocity" as being "to promote justice
and equity in the community""'- or in Belo's own words "the object of the debt
system ... was social equality"116. It is, then, in the context of a drive for social
justice, in which debt is seen as the paradigmatic social injustice and justice is
111 Belo, 1981, p39
112Hauek, 1964-74, p565
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promoted, crucially, by the forgiveness of debts, that the Biblical legislation on debt
and related topics is to be seen.
Debt in The New Testament
Along with the S/J cluster, this understanding of debt as paradigmatic for sin
(and therefore of a social understanding of sin as more than merely derivative) takes
us forward into the New Testament, where the Nazareth pericope of Luke 4.16ff
seems to suggest a link between Jesus and the Jubilee (particularly in the light of
evidence that the jubilee laws were used as inspirational basis for radical action on
other occasions)117.
In his very thorough study of the jubilee imagery in the NT, Sloan makes a
strong case for the programmatic incident at Nazareth having clear jubilary roots
and meaning for the audience, both verbally and thematically. In returning to
Nazareth. Jesus may have been living out the jubilee return118, possibly at the start of
a Sabbath year11*; in reading the verses from Isaiah 61. he would have evoked jubilee
imagery familiar to his synagogue listeners12*; thus Yoder concludes that Jesus
proclaimed in AD26 a jubilee "able to resolve the social problem in Israel by
abolishing debts and liberating debtors whose insolvency had reduced them to
slavery", which would be a "refreshment" which would prefigure the re-
establishment of all things, a messaianic eschatology realised in Jesus1"1.
Mediated through Isaiah 61, the jubilee image had become eschatologicai
and messaianic. This does not mean, as Middelmann claims, that the proclamation
of the jubilee year was always purely a reminder of what would come when God's
rale was established, without any immediate socio-economic relevance1"; "the text
(in Isaiah 61) is still seen as describing literal activity, but Israel has moved from
doing to receiving and the time for this activity has been moved from the present to
the future"1" The fact that, by the time Jesus echoed it at this keynote moment, the
jubilary imager)' had acquired this significance did not empty it of its primary socio¬
economic meaning12,1; the work and words of Jesus confirmed and re-interpreted
that meaning, affirming the jubilee as a demand expressing God's sovereignty and
'17 Numbers 36, Jeremaiah 34, Ezekiel 45, ail cited by Blosser, 1979, p77
JM Ford, in Cassidv & Scharper (eds), 1983, p82
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jUSticC - "telling them that jubilee iS GOuS Cull for his people tO COiieet the
inequalities that have come up among them"125. In the Nazareth pericope, the shock
of the "today" in Jesus' words after reading from Isaiah 61 was that the jubilee
proclaimed was no longer postponed to an eschatological age to come, a theological
Utopia, but sought "to insinuate itself in the very existence of the real world"126,
through Jesus himself. As a conflict story, this incident describes the opposition to
this good news for those trapped in literal indebtedness, from those who routinely
profit from the patterns of indebtedness that characterise "business as usual"127 and
who pay lip-service to a jubilee that will never come.
The Isaiah/Lukan passage is "one which states the messaianic expectation in
the most expressly social terms"12* (especially if we understand that the "captives"
are most likely those imprisoned or enslaved through debt12*), and the poor, to whom
this message is good news, are those who welcome the "announcement of the
jubilary reversal of their socially oppressed condition"130. Thus, Sloan also points out
that "dektos" in Luke 4.18 translates the Hebrew "rason" of Isaiah 61.2, a word
which in its verbal form refers to the payment of debts. Of course, even in Yoder's
understanding of the gospel as jubilee, the gospel indeed "seeks more than the
attainment of well-being and efficacy determined on the world's narrow
distributional and compensatory terms" (le more than debt remission, slave
remission and wealth redistribution)111, but to jump from this to a spiritualised
reading which denies the socio-economic dimension or relegates it to the sidelines is
to distort the gospel which Jesus' listeners heard at Nazareth and elsewhere - "to
interpret jubilee as merely a material paradigm for spiritual truth (where
forgiveness of debts means God's forgiveness of our sins ...) is a severe distortion of
the very thing which Jesus was deliberately emphasising"112.
The recognition of Jesus as a herald of the jubilee is characteristic not only
of Luke's gospel111, but is also a strong dimension of Matthew's Jesus, for whom a
"Sabbath-Jubilee societal conversion" was a crucial theme13* and debt-forgiveness a
125Blosser, 1979, p258
126 Fager, 1993, pl21
J22 Ringe, 1985, p79128 Yoder, 1972, p34/5
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demand for entry into the kingdom1". Arguing (in support of Trocme) that Jesus'
understanding of the kingdom is generally rooted in the prophetic understanding of
the jubilee year. Yoder cites Luke 6.17ff, Matthew 18.23-35, Luke 16. Iff, as well as
the Lord's Prayer, as instances where Jesus is, in effect, saying "practice the jubilee"
and recognising debt as the paradigmatic social evil: "in the 'Our Father', then. Jesus
is not simply recommending that we might pardon those who have bothered us or
made us trouble, but tells us purely and simply to erase the debts of those who owe
us money"1". Ringe would add Matthew 11.2-6 and Luke 7.18-23 (+36-50) as
further echoes of the jubilee imagery of Isaiah 61. While (surprisingly) doubting
whether Jesus himself knew of the jubilee associations of much of his message, she
concludes that "the message brought by Jesus to mark the experience of humankind
at the near boundary of God's reign was in fact, if not necessarily in conscious
intent, a Jubilee message"117. Jesus' attack on the Temple trade (Mark 11.15-33) may
also be claimed as a recapturing of it as house of praver and therefore of
cancellation of debts when its ^distributive role had been subverted into penalising
the poor in the name of the "debt system"1". And Luke 12.29-31 parallels Leviticus
25.20-21 with regard to anxiety over the faith risk of the Sabbath year. We may well
also see the parable references to debt not purely as using debt as a metaphor, but as
part of "Jesus attempt to publicly express critical truths in ... a repressive political
context" which would allow only indirect references to serious economic problems1"
("the public authorities undoubtedly would have perceived even in the hint of a
public proclamation of the abolition of debt a subversive revolutionary agenda"140).
Just as debt had not disappeared as a social phenomenon by the time of the NT.
then, neither has reference to the S/J cluster of legislation dealing with it been lost in
the gospels; its prominence in the Nazareth pericope is picked up repeatedly through
ibii rtoc-fNald m T of rl'c Dfn
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Forgive Us Our Debts
That the Lord's Prayer is a jubilee prayer is a matter of academic
controversy, but what is clear is that it shares jubilee concerns and imagery, most
notably in the "debts" petition. But how literally (ie economically) are references to
"debts" to be understood in this and other New Testament passages ?
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Tmmedintelv we mav note the linpnistie differences between the Matthean3 ~ ~ J ~~ ~ O" ~ ~ " "
and Lukan versions. Matthew, at 6.10. uses "opheilema", which primarily refers to
economic debts, but in his gloss on that verse in 6.14/15 uses "paraploma",
translated "failings" or simply "sins" and lacking the concrete economic reference of
"opheilema". Luke, in 11.3, first uses "hamartias" (sins) and then "opheilonti"
(debtor). It seems clear that these three Greek terms are all attempts to translate the
Aramaic "hobha" in which the notions of debt and sin are intertwined (which is
hardly surprising in terms of the OT background and "debt system" discussed
above).
Bailey argues that the Lukan version, in changing the word for "debt"
between the two clauses, tries to accommodate the double-sided nature of the
Aramaic141, and one might see the Matthean gloss in the same terms. Yoder,
however, argues that the gloss arises from a desire to broaden the obvious material
meaning of debts; similarly, Sloan says that "the spiritualising comments of
Matthew 6.14-15 still assume that the particular activity of forgiving the real
financial debts of one's fellow man is to be included in the now broadened
injunction to forgive the sins of one's feliow man;i'«, This wouid seem to be borne
out by the established connection between Matthew 6.12 and Deuteronomy 15.2.
The reference to human activity in the second clause, especially in the Lukan
version, is so striking in the context of the whole prayer that it can neither be
ignored nor discounted in terms of its importance to Jesus'".
As Kloppenborg points out. debt and bread were "the two most immediate
problems facing the Galilean peasant, day labourer or non-elite urbanite"'". Oakman
therefore reads the "debts" petition in synonymous parallelism with the previous
"bread" petition, thus drawing together what more "spiritual" interpreters would pull
apart, and arguing that "rather than infractions against God, Jesus primarily asked
through this petition for release from the earthly shackles of indebtedness"'".
Especially in the light of what is said above about the prevalence of debt in Jesus'
audience, "would such people have made no connection between their material need
' 4' Bailey, 1976, vol2, p78
]4~ Sloan, 1977, pl41
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uiiu the inOSt profound cXpfcSSiGn Oi the aiPuS of the JestiS xliOVciiiciit, ie the Lord's
Prayer
Several commentators have noted the tendency of modern English
translations to render invisible the material economic significance of the petition,
some suggesting cynical reasons for this. Thus Hinkelammert (thinking of the text in
the context of modem Third World debt) says that "to continue to speak of the
forgiveness of debts as a condition of God's forgiveness of our debts would have
turned out very expensive for those who want to have the debt repaid. It is much less
expensive to change the translation of a text, even though it is a sacred text"'*7. That
may be over-cynical, but it is surely important to keep the material reference in clear
view, if only so that the shades ofmeamng may continue to interpret each other.
The harsh facts of life and spiritual needs are not consigned to separate
compartments here; sin and debt are inextricably linked. But it matters precisely
how we categorise this link. To describe debt as a Biblical metaphor for sin reduces
the significance of financial debt to the level of such other metaphors for sin as that
of the archer "missing the mark": the remission of debt is more than a metaphor, or
even an illustration, perhaps an image or paradigm of the kingdom. Whatever the
appropriate terminology, it is clear that disciples cannot anticipate the kingdom
without forgiving real, financial debts. Bearing in mind the "peasant perspective" of
the gospels, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. If Jesus' words on debt and
forgiveness are merely metaphors without concrete reference, his audience - for
whom debt was certainly one of the hard facts of life - were the victims not merely
oi' a possible misunderstanding but of something more cruel. On the contrary, the
NT shows more awareness of the realities of a subsistence economy from the
underside than does most contemporary Greek or Roman literature"*, and only a
modern spiritualising presumption can undermine the material reference of the
Lord's Prayer, and other gospel references to debt.
Not that these are always straightforward. The parable of the "crafty
steward" (Luke 16.Iff) - which has its roots in peasant debt-slavery at the time of
Jesus"' - may be one warning sign for us of the complexities of the Biblical
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steward which his master camiot repudiate"*. Another difficult passage (Matthew
26.11) in which Jesus appears to be content with continuing poverty, also has roots
in Deuteronomy 15 (especially v4 & vl 1), in which context it emerges that Jesus is
saying that charity will not itself eradicate poverty - "the routine relief-works the
disciples wanted to promote perpetuate the process of pauperisation rather than
eradicating it"'5'; only the radical new beginning envisaged in the S/J cluster can
successfully undermine the structures of inequality that are reflected in debt.
Modern notions of capital and investment are quite foreign to New
Testament thought, but what is clear is that "debt is ... abhorred in the Jesus
movement group, and forgiveness of debts (sins) assumes the rank of a core value of
the gospel tradition"'". In terms of the "debt code", Jesus transforms a "sin-
management" system into action for liberation from sin-debt, breaking into the circie
of reciprocity and the vicious circles of injustice to achieve justice by forgiveness.
The crucial word is "aphesis", which Bultmann says "significantly modifies
the verbs of remission or forgiveness, since the original sense of the Hebrew verbs is
that of cultic removal or expiation of sin, while 'aphienai' has a legal sense"'55. Since
it translates yobel, deror and semittah, it clearly carries echoes of the jubilee,
recalling that cluster of imagery when it is used in fne New Testament (especially in
Lukc-Acts) for forgiveness. Its primary meaning is that of legal release, from
obligations such as debt or even marriage, and then, by extension, of forgiveness.
Thus intrinsically it "does not go too well with 'sin"''54 and in LXX, it rarely, if ever,
means forgiveness (in a moral sense), the only possible instance being Leviticus
16.26 in relation to the scapegoat ritual when the primary meaning is probably more
in terms of sending away55.
In the New Testament, not only is it a key word at programmatic points in
Luke-Acts, but it echoes, in different senses, around the passion narratives (eg
Matthew 27.50, Mark 15.37, Matthew 26.56, Luke 23.34). It is, then, a word which
not only reminds us of the literal sense of forgiveness of debts but maintains the
sense of forgiveness as costly liberation; more common in the gospels as a verb than
a noun, it is the dynamic of God's justice, whose prototype is release from the
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vicious cycle of debt. We may also note that it also forms part of the Biblical
association of healing with forgiveness - healing as release from powers that prevent
fullness of life; as Horsley says, "the link between healings and forgiveness is thus
also rooted in, but provides a transformative response to the prevailing social
conditions of poverty and indebtedness"'*.
Thus, as Ringe says, the onset of God's reign is marked by "forgiveness and
release from the patterns of debt and obligation by which the old order is
maintained"'". Again, recognition of the spiritual dimension of this release should
not be allowed to privatise its meaning or undermine its economic reference; we
look toward an "'economy' of forgiveness" in which we participate as both forgiver
and forgiven"*, and the 'economy' referred to is more than metaphor. Economic
realities (especially the harsh ones such as debt problems) are the areas in which the
impact of God's reign will be first felt"".
This is particularly (though not exclusively) true of Luke's gospel, where the
"proclamation of the kingdom is coloured by economic language"'60. Moxnes makes
a strong case for reading Jesus as representing a return to old values of internal
solidarity - "a return to a simpler form for social organisation based on the solidarity
of the village community and a rejection of the patronage system controlled by the
u .ihjiu. TU:. ..,.14 u .—J ^ J—* .J
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to kinsmen and to those outwith the community, and perhaps of the exclusion of
"urban" property from the jubilee principles (Leviticus 25.29-31). Lang, for
example, notes that "the generosity and amity usually shown towards a kinsman
have no place in the market and are supplanted by pure calculation of profit"'6-, and
Oakman sees Jesus as resisting the urbanising pressures typified by rigorous
accounting for debt - "the ruthless accounting of debts and balanced exchanges are
renounced", he says, in favour of the general reciprocity of the village community'61.
As we shall see below'", in the parable of the good Samaritan and elsewhere, Jesus
may be seen as seeking to internationalise the solidarity of the early covenant
community rather than leave the developing market to the profit motive alone. Yet,
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while Jesus did proclaim a kirigdoiii which had echoes of the past, he was also
clearly announcing something new. We are not being faithful to the gospel if we
reduce its radical message to a hearkening back to some good old days in a way
which ignores the changed economic and other realities of our own time.
Of course, one response to changed situations is to soft-pedal or even
gradually ignore aspects of the gospel. That seems to have happened with the
emphasis on debt we have discovered throughout the OT and gospels. Economic
language of debt is much less prominent in the Epistles, despite Paul's fondness for
metaphors from the market-place; perhaps this represents his writing for
communities that do not share the peasant perspectives or debt problems of the
gospel audience, and his preference for "charizomai" over "aphiemi" as the verb of
forgiveness may reflect a theological desire in that context to stress God's grace
rather than economic liberation. "Charizomaihowever, also can refer 10
forgiveness of debts (eg Luke 7.42 3) and may serve to link that forgiveness with
God's grace. (Yet there is still the irony that many of those Protestants who insist
most strongly on grace rather than merit in meeting spiritual needs often reverse the
order when it comes to material needs'")
Tow ai ds Today
What we have done thus far is to locate Christian ethical reflection on debt
within the discussion of justice and of forgiveness, both of which are seen as key
activities of God demanding human response in the community. What. then, can be
made of tins rich vein of Biblical material towards a Christian contribution to the
current debate ? This cannot simply be a recovery of a lost blueprint which can then
be applied to modem economies, but must be a matter of finding a way of
translating kingdom values into modern markets.
It might be helpful to begin with some brief consideration of how the church
has dealt with these questions over the generations. From the beginnings of
Christianity, issues of wealth and poverty were "indissolubly connected with the
meaning of salvation"166, and remission of debt was a fundamental dimension of that
concern161. Gonzalez is able to cite many of the Church Fathers on this economic
theme168, yet also notes that Augustine, while a strong opponent of usury in
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principle, protested at the "great crime" of those whose rebellion destroyed the
"extortionate letters of credit by which the rich held (the poor) in bondage"'-®. In
itself, that is symptomatic of the way in which "the liberation signalled by the
church's stunning doctrine of forgiveness, not least of debt, gradually slipped off the
church's agenda (through Platonic and Stoic tendencies), until the empire's
orgamsation in the fourth century of great estates, including the churches', worked
by serfs made the key freedom from debt a dead issue"'7® (or at least one to be
evaded by the church).
Usury, however, remained a major preoccupation of Christian ethics
throughout the medieval period, until it also gradually disappeared under economic
pressure after the Reformation. Ruston has outlined a process whereby the Fathers'
discussion of usury within a (Biblical) framework of justice that was "distributive, or
rather redistributive" degenerated into a "formalistic cul-de-sac" (of philosophical
theory about the unproductive nature of money) which "was unable to deal with the
economic changes of emergent capitalism1"1. Luther still preached against usury and
urged his fellow-pastors to refuse communion to usurers; he saw it as "living off the
bodies of the poor", and was concerned "not merely about an individual's use of
money but also about the structural social damage inherent in the ideology of the
'laws of the market'"17?. At one point, he argues for Christians to give serious
consideration to practising a jubilee173; however, when some of his more radical
followers suggested remission of debts on a Jubilee model as normative for society
at large, Luther resisted this attempt to "make God's free grace into social
legislation"174.
Although there were signs (eg in the Jesuit Molina) of some change in the
medieval rigidity, Calvin probably led the way into an acceptance of interest under
stringent conditions. It may be rightly claimed that Calvin dealt with interest "as an
apothecary deals with poison"17*; he is quite clear that the ban on usury is for the
protection of the poor, and scathing about the money-lenders who "sit at their ease
without doing anything and receive tribute from the labour of all other people"1"6. He
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did. however, distinguish between loans for consumer purposes (typically the relief
of distress) and loans for productive purposes, which were probably not envisaged in
the Bible but became the basis of capitalism; on the latter, moderate interest might
be charged, in compensation for loss of use of the money and the risk involved. This
tentative opening of a door was more important than the conditions with which
Calvin surrounded it, especially when he went on to say that only equity (and not the
rules of casuistry) could decide when interest was justified and to what extent'7?;
"Calvin's indulgence to moderate interest ... was remembered when the
qualifications surrounding it were forgotten"17S. Thus the watershed had been crossed
and the church, for which usury had been arguably the major issue of the medieval
period slowly came to terms with the changes in the economy and the emergence of
capitalism Whether this is seen simply as an accommodation or as a creative
rethinking in the light of changed circumstances may be a matter for argument, but
it seems to me that, if the medieval thinking had been grounded more in the Biblical
background outlined above and less in philosophical ideas of the productivity or
otherwise of money, Christian ethics might have retained something more credible
and creative to say than has been the case. Tawney sees this point as the one at
which expediency (under the guise of equity) is substituted for supernatural
injunction as the criterion which opened up Christian ethics to the development of
capitalism179; more sympathetically, Preston sees Calvin's as an "interim ethic" on
the way toward a secular theory' of the market""0. We may certainly note that from
this point Christian ethics started to lose any substantial concern for issues of
interest and debt until recent studies inspired by the Third World debt crisis.
Advocacy of any kind of interest-rate ban would appear to be confined to the Islamic
world (where it is claimed not to hinder entrepreneurial activity, although debt
problems remain"') and to fringe groups within Christianity (my own research
showed no substantial correlation between advocacy of restrictions on interest rates
and church involvement).
Before moving to the present day, two other practical expressions of a
Christian economic ethic are worth noting. In the medieval period the Franciscans
eventually gained Papal support for their "monies pietatis" developed to offer cheap
loans to the poor and precursors of the municipal pawnshops of later generations in
177 See Schulze, 1985, p63-65
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continental Europe. They saw these us derived from the sume concern tor justice us
informed the ban on usury, but were strongly opposed by moral theologians whose
more formalistic approach saw these as in breach of the church's teaching on usury
since interest was charged, though at a much lower than "market" rate1*";
preservation of the form of a Biblical injunction can become destructive of its
purpose and content.
Reaching closer to home and to the present day lies the institution of
sanctuary for debt, grounded in the Mosaic law of cities of refuge. Hannah speaks of
a "mercenary and mischievous trade" in protection by unscrupulous churchmen
leading to the demise of ecclesiastical sanctuary1" (much, perhaps, as the medieval
church abused the power of forgiveness). Certainly, after the Reformation, the
church in Scotland abolished the right of sanctuary for all except debtors, but the
area around Holyrood Abbev remained a sanctuary for debtors until well into last
century, only falling into disuse once imprisonment for debt was effectively
abolished. It is difficult to be precise about the significance of this (particularly
when the Holyrood sanctuary had probably more royal than ecclesiastical roots), but
the opportunity of sanctuary (the "privilege of girth") attracted some notable
residents, including a future French king and a steady stream of "distinguished
English characters"184 (although its attractiveness was probably highly relative).
Closely linked with what would now be called bankruptcy, it may be seen as
indicative of attitudes towards debt and debtors: there was. for example, provision
for debtors to emerge from the sanctuary on the Sabbath, and even to attend
meetings of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland1"! Set in that context,
of a generally more tolerant attitude to debt than might seem the case today,
sanctuary for debtors was "an important element ofjustice"18®.
It would be hard to make of these a continuing story of coherent
development of a Christian ethic of finance and economics, even if we were to
examine the works of such as Adam Smith, who saw his economic theory as bound
up with his theology, or Thomas Chalmers, who propounded strong economic views
as a leading churchman, but there is evidence that the distancing of the church from
"secular" economic thinking is of recent origin and the Christian concern for debtors
1§2 See eg Ruston, 1993. pi7Iff
Hannah, 1927, p60
18C Ewan, 1988, pp59&63
185 Hannah, 1927, pss
186 Ewan, 1988, p65
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and their problems is not an invention of recent radical theology: rather it is an
attempt to recapture something lost to the modern claim for the autonomy of
economies and the market.
If the need for theologians and economists to do some thinking together, as
suggested by Meeks"7, suggests some serious Christian ethical reflection on these
Biblical themes and their application to current situations, the question remains as to
how we cross the cultural divide. The approach of the Jubilee Centre in Cambridge
is to speak of a "ladder of abstraction" up which we move slowly and cautiously in
order to retain loyalty to the Biblical witness while still speaking to the present
situation188. They go on to suggest that "it is the pattern of relationships between
institutions and resources - family, kinship, state, land, capital, community - as well
as the pattern of relationships of ail those institutions with God himself - which God
wants us to replicate in societies today""89; and for them the key institutions are the
A„A — 2U - .4 + ^ A . A U,. A Tk. I J-
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idea of this is initially attractive, but the choice of key institutions and the decision
about where to stop on the ladder both seem fairly arbitrary decisions with regard to
which are the key Biblical injunctions and which are the social changes we should
simply accept without attempting to "turn the clock back". Perhaps some such
arbitrary decision-making is inevitable, but I'm not convinced that the idea of the
"ladder of abstraction" is really helpful, since it seems to gloss over choices as to
which elements of the Biblical picture are to be retained in concrete fonn and which
we may abstract from.
What is more helpful in their approach is their understanding of
"relationism" as a third way, between creation ethics and kingdom ethics, an
alternative to Marxism and capitalism. The description of this in terms of
maintaining a balance of power among the key institutions seems at times to rest on
an assumption of a stability in their inter-relationship through Biblical times which
is not true to the facts, the sense that Biblical ethics are fundamentally relational
ethics (or, in the language of feminist ethics, ethics of connectedness) is important.
The focus of Biblical concern is on the quality (rather than the form) of
relationships, described in tenns of love and justice. Thus, poverty is seen in the
Bible as a loss of ability to participate in the community"*1, and the focus of Biblical
1 ^ Meeks, 1989, passim
See eg Schluter & Clements, 1990, p48 and passim
See eg Schluter & Clements, 1990, p49
Mott, 1987, p30, citing Leviticus 25.35-36
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concern about debt (as we have seen) is on just relationships within the community
which are threatened by debt, and saved by forgiveness.
Crosbv suggests that this "underlying, relational meaning of justice" might
provide the "fusion of horizons" between first and twentieth centuries'". It is by
seeing the Biblical teaching on debt in the context of (relational) justice that we may
begin to see fruitful ways of applying it today, and the "fusion of horizons" derived
from Gadamer and others seems to offer a hermeneutic method which allows for
proper "distantiation" (ie the kind of contextual reading of the text attempted here, a
"differentiation of concepts and strands of thinking within concepts"192) as a
necessary' preliminary before "the ancient conceptions (can be) translated into the
language and structural knowledge of another period"'". That process must neither
be short-circuited (by applying Biblical norms across a massive cultural divide) nor
evaded (by assuming that the divide renders them irrelevant or inapplicable). To
understand the jubilee and its justice within their original context and structures, and
then to share, through dialogue and action, in working out how these might operate
today is the church's task, and that of the Christian ethicist.
Lebacqz suggests that the jubiiee provides a useful "image" of what justice
looks like in an unjust world194, pointing us, as noted above, towards a "restorative"
understanding of justice. Again, this seems helpful, if taking us a step further than
the Jubilee Centre from the Biblical base, when she says that "these traditions are
intended as images that evoke responses not as laws that prescribe solutions"19-4 she
mat be providing a creative way of responding to the Biblical picture rather than an
accurate account of its original character Perhaps too. the idea of restoration takes
us too far in the direction of creation ethics and away from the ethics of the
kingdom, and of renewal, although she also speaks of "renovation". The issue is
whether debt release simply restores an original just pattern or opens up the
possibility of something new. Either way, Lebacqz is right to warn of its incomplete
and fragile nature - the element of risk which characterises forgiveness as the way to
justice. Similarly, Oakman speaks of the "generosity (which) undercuts the
prevailing order established on the assumption of a strict quid-pro-quo ... 'justice'
preserves those assumptions"'96. God's justice and forgiveness, at work together in
191 Crosby, 1988, pi6
McDonald, 1993, pi60, see also pi64
'Q;1 Frey, in Reventlow & Flotman (easy 1992, pi00
194 Febacqz, 1987, pi22
19-s Lebacqz, 1987, pi27
196 Oaknian, 1986, pi65
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the jubilee, not only disrupt human standards of justice but human notions of
economics19", as graphically illustrated by the parable of the labourers in the
vineyard which embodies the challenge ofjubilee justice198.
Ringe is more reticent about the value of the jubilee, which she sees as a
once in a lifetime event which cannot therefore be translated into eternally
appropriate structures1". Certainly we should be wary of anything claiming to be an
eternally valid or just structure, but the jubilee was not simply a "once in a lifetime
event". It was a recurrent form of intervention in the workings of the economy - "in
the face of such social strife (between the mighty and the lowly), justice requires an
intervening power"*0, to protect the community and its values.
In this context, it is hard to sustain North's argument that the jubilee
represents "the legislator's sound instinct to interfere as little as justice permits in the
economic life of the individual"m1 (the thought underlying that comment is
anachronistic for an embedded eeonomvJ If the jubilee is seen as at least includino
the announcement of God's reign and its impact on economic life, than it can hardly
be argued that the impact of this on the life of individuals is to be minimised.
Summary
As Mott says, the key question (which this chapter has attempted to answer)
is "how did this provision function in its own culture and how can that function be
approached in another culture"*". What, then, has emerged ?
• debt was a recurrent and widespread problem throughout the Biblical period
• what we have termed the S J cluster of legislation represents an attempt to
intervene in the economy in order to break into the spirals of debt
• this theme is echoed and developed in the New Testament, notably in the
story of Jesus at Nazareth and in the Lord's Prayer
• debt is a major Biblical theme, both in its material sense and as a metaphor
illustrative of distorted relationships and of sin
• the Biblical response to debt is a paradigm of the Biblical response to
injustice, and the jubilee is a paradigm ofGod's justice
'92 Oakman, 1986, p 166
198 Lebacqz, 1983, p41
199 Ringe, 1985, p98
200 Mott, 1987, p27
201 North, 1954. p217
202 Mott, 1987, p30
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• release from debt is a paradigm of the forgiveness of the powerless which
characterises the gospel of Jesus.
Debt. then, is a key theme of the Bible, because it was a key fact of life in
Biblical times, especially for the poor. How the community deals with debt is seen
as vital to its character and life, and to its recognition of, and response to, the
sovereignty of God. Grounded in that recognition and rooted in the embedded
economy of its time, the S/J cluster is the keystone of the variety of structures in the
OT designed to secure justice through the forgiveness of debts, which is important
in itself, but not to be seen in isolation from other socio-economic questions The
S J cluster and the ban on usury inform a Christian perspective on justice, at one
level denying the legitimacy of exploiting or profiting from another's misfortune,
and at another breaking out beyond a Hayekian, procedural form of "justice". The
content of this Biblical understanding of justice focuses on relationships, not in a
narrow spiritual or emotional sense but including, crucially, economic relationships;
its purpose is not merely to interpret or to comment from a moral or theological
perspective, but to chsnee or renew.
Jesus confirmed this liberation as characteristic of the kingdom, by his
teaching, by his healing ministry and through his redemptive mission - by his
evocation and practice of jubilary justice. In this not only are we provided with a
powerful image of God's justice at work in an unjust world, tackling basic human
problems, but in forgiveness of the paradigmatic injustice of debts, the dynamic of
that justice is opened up for us. Forgiveness, then, has an economic meaning;
theologically and economically that forgiveness is oriented towards justice. Just as
thai is worked out Biblically in the context of the impact of debt on the communities
of the Bible (especially from the peasant, debtor perspective), so any modem
interpretation is not merely a problem of the exegesis here attempted but must also
work from the understanding of debt today detailed in earlier chapters.
The common vocabulary is of justice and forgiveness, so the next step is to
look more deeply at the concept of (social) justice, starting from what we have
learned from our examination of debt about the active, creative Biblical
understanding of justice from below, and about justice as God's demand.
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4. The Context for Reflection - Social Justice
The previous chapter found a great deal of Biblical material in relation to
debt, which reflected debt as a widespread social problem throughout the Biblical
period. Crucially, it emerged that the Biblical treatment of debt set the issue in the
context of justice; that in turn sets the agenda lor this chapter, which will explore
Biblical and theological thinking on justice, taking liberation theology (and, within
that, the work of Miranda in particular) as providing a helpful base. This chapter
will thereby seek to establish an understanding of social justice which can inform
ortf) oom r r% PKricfiort OAnfriKiifiAn fn rvnlifirol rlicoticcmnunu wvii v ej u V^lli lonuii wviiliifulivu iv/ pv/imwui uiiu wvt/ut/imv uiovuooivn,
particularly of debt.
"Ln the twentieth century, Christian ethics has become concentrated on the
question of social justice", writes Michael Keeling1, reflecting the major part which
the topic has come to play not only in academic discussion but in numerous church
pronouncements on social issues. While some would complain that this has been a
diversion from matters of individual morality (seen as more properly and
traditionally the church's concern), there are many far from the radicalism of
liberation theology who would affirm that "the way of the gospel and the way of
justice cannot be separated"-1.
There are both Biblical roots and a long pedigree of Christian tradition of an
ethical response to social and political questions in terms of social justice. Medieval
discussions of "just price" and "just wage" may sound dated; indeed they are derided
from both left and right. Hayek and those who base justice on freely agreed
contracts would see the terms as meaningless1, while liberation theologians would
dismiss them as Canute-like reformism which fails to reflect the Bibiicai view,
attempting to define "unjust profit" when the Bible has no place for "just" profit1.
Yet they represent one age of Christian response to economic injustice, as also does
the long tradition of critique of usury which we noted in the previous chapter as
being, at its best, rooted in considerations ofjustice rather than the nature ofmoney.
Dussel draws on this tradition when he ironically describes interest as "the sin of
! Keeling, 1990, pi
^ Zorilla. 1988. p79
^ See eg Sterba, 1980, p!?9
^ Miranda, 1982, p50, see also eg Dussel, 1988, p94
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usury transfigured to the virtue of saving ... the bourgeois virtue of economy (saving,
hoarding) condemned by the Fathers, the church, and justice itself'5.
Two reservations about the recent ecumenical enthusiasm for ringing
statements on social justice are particularly relevant to the current discussion, first,
the way in which the Bible is used may come too close for comfort to a selective
fundamentalism which jumps from the Biblical to the contemporary without
sufficient allowance for the dramatically different economic framework (see the
discussion of debt above). Thus Frey complains of an "ecumenical pathos ofjustice"
which tries to transpose motifs and laws from kinship clan-based societies to present
day market society*; it is therefore easy for political critics to deride the "unreality"
of such statements as failing to deal with the practicalities of today's economy.
Secondly, church statements may tend to assume a greater consonance
between reason and revelation, or between "general norms drawn from the Biblical
vision" and "societal notions of justice and equality"'. These may be a major part of
the reason why such statements seem to be less in vogue in the 1990s than in the
previous two decades This second point may also be indicative of a wider problem
in the discussion of social justice, namely the lack of a clear consensus about the
meamng of the term, which appears to depend a great deal on "where one is coming
from" both in terms of social status and ideology. Maclntyre has explored in depth
the problems of "rival justices, competing rationalities"* as a characteristic of
western pluralist societies in which most people "tend to live betwixt and between,
accepting usually unquestioninglv the assumptions of the dominant liberal
individualist forms of public life but drawing in dtlTerent areas of their lives upon a
variety of tradition-generated resources of thought and action, transmitted from a
variety of familial, religious, educational and other social and cultural sources"9.
This view is widely accepted, among commentators from left and right, and
it is important to note that what is being highlighted by Maclntyre and others is. not
simply the existence of different political instincts in terms of what justice is but an
underlying ideological or philosophical diversity; conflicting claims, all couched in
the language of justice, are possible because of this diversity, giving rise to
considerable doubt as to the usefulness of the concept. Newbigin goes further,
s
Dussel, 1988, pl33
^ Frey, in Reventlow & Hotman (eds), 1992, p99
' Lehacqz, in Brown & Brown (eds). 1989. p63




saying that the liberal-democratic, free market world view reveals its bankruptcy
precisely here, as it "makes it impossible to give any clear meaning to the word
'justice'"10, since any such clear meaning would depend on a teleological
commitment which has been effectively privatised.
While there is some consensus about the problem, responses vary, ignatieff
bemoans the absence of a "shared language of the good" and seeks a new "language
for our need for belonging""; Rawls has attempted to reconstruct a concept of
justice based on a lowest common denominator of consensus, as free as possible of
ideology though still with its own distinctive rationality; so, similarly, the recent
Commission on Social Justice, tracing the lack of consensus about justice partly to
the successes of the "welfare state", has tried "to articulate some widely held
feelings about the character of our society and to describe them in a way that makes
sense""; Hayek has attacked the "mirage of social justice" as a thin disguise for
sectional interests which destructively attempts to impose a ideological view on
"society" when there is no such thing as an agreed teleology. All are responding in
their different ways to the same situation analysed by Maclntvre, yet none of these
seems finally satisfactory in reconstructing a view of justice which adequately
reflects the Biblical understanding11.
The approach adopted here has been to follow Maclntyre's basic argument,
and indeed to continue with him when he says (towards the end of his argument)
that a point has been reached "at which it is no longer possible to speak except out
of one particular tradition in a way which will involve conflict with other
traditions"" Without assuming a necessary common ground of reason and Christian
revelation, the discussion has been approached from within Christian tradition, in
particular seeing the Bible as of crucial and authoritative value towards building an
understanding of the meaning of justice; as Gutierrez, in a much-quoted phrase,
says, "justice and right cannot be emptied of the content bestowed on them bv the
Bible"15. That approach, however, has not meant constructing a (theological)
inn nf nictioA onrl tlvpn offptyir"\t'tio tn or\nb• tV\p nrmnmlpc orrntprl of* rotlvpr tlvp
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Christian theological and ethical reflection on justice is the context in which a
10 Newbigin, 1992, p309 & 310
' 1 Ignatieff, 1984, p 14 & pi39
1 0
Commission on Social Justice, 1993a, p 16
1 2
1 - See further below-'
Maclntyre, 1988, p401
' Gutierrez, 1983, p211
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response is sought lo the issues raised in the specific situation of debt as discussed in
the first two chapters.
Liberation Theology And Justice
This approach would seem to fit readily with the "praxis" methodology of
liberation theology where the question of social justice plays a more prominent part
than in many other theological stances. They "reject any consideration of justice that
is abstract and ahistorical The idealistic procedure of first attempting to clarify what
justice and then seeing how it can be applied to present circumstances is rejected"16,
in favour of starting from the realities of the context, emplovmg the tools of the
social sciences "to analyse what is happening and to locate the present injustices"17
and with "the theory of dependence and the concept of structural violence
(providing) the descriptive and evaluative dimensions ... of their social reality"18.
(See discussion below on the implications of this in terms of starting from injustice,
and whether it does not simply beg the questions.)
Underlying liberation theology's argument here lies a critique of the
WesternHellenised approach to truth, theology and Biblical interpretation. Miranda,
for example, cites Aristotle's "classic thesis" that "truth is incompatible with the
condition of the slave"19. Although usually less blatantly so, Western theology
consistently reflects the perspective of the privileged, under a guise of objectivity, in
contrast with what liberation theologians would claim as their own more Biblically-
based approach. The texts indeed "read differently when received through the prism
of poverty and powerlessness"70: heard thus, they compel theology into the service of
the God who acts to liberate, and therefore into praxis rather than abstraction
(There may be an irony here. If, Biblically , truth has lo do with knowing God, and
knowing God is bound up with justice, truth may very well be incompatible with
slavery, or at least with an acceptance of slavery - turning Aristotle almost full-
circle. Here, as elsewhere in Miranda's work, there may be an echo of Pannenberg's
thesis that truth is only knowable in the kingdom.)
What, then, does this approach mean for the discussion of (Biblical) justice ?
Following Lebacqz, we may identify three central claims of liberation theology - (1)
16 Garcia, 1987, p20
11 Lebacqz, 1987, pi50
Garcia. 1987, p76
19 Miranda, 1964, p262
90z Brueggemann, Book Review ofMiranda, 1974, in Interpretation 29 (1975), p434
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thai the Biblical God is a God of justice (2) that to know God is to do justice and (3)
that justice and love cannot be separated.
For Miranda, any understanding of justice has to start with God. and his
demand on us; as Garcia puts it - "it is ultimately a Biblical understanding of God as
the God of justice and life that makes us commit ourselves to the struggle for
liberation"*5. Of itself, this is well within the mainstream of western theology.
Writing in 1951, Quell and Schrenk saw God as the "author" ofjustice - "all mutual
relationships in Israel were viewed in the light of the idea of justice ... The Old
Testament doctrine of God is based on the idea of justice"**. Von Rad sees the Old
Testament understanding of justice as the reflection of God in person addressing
people**, and in Harper's Bible Dictionary Mott says that "justice is founded in the
being ofGod. for whom it is a chief attribute"24.
However, Miranda's argument goes further than simply seeing the practice of
justice as a sign or an effect of knowing God. In fact, he expressly rejects such
terminology2-: to know God is to practise justice (and this is not a tradition of the
Bible but "the Biblical tradition itself, the irreducible novelty of the message of the
Bible"-*). This would seem to take him further than Garcia who sees the struggle for
social justice as pari of salvation history'27; the logic of Miranda's argument is that
the struggle for social justice is salvation history . Such an "earthing" of salvation is
clearly foreign to the more spiritual understanding of much Western theology.
Novak, for example, says that the "greatest single temptation for Christians is to
imagine that the salvation won by Christ has altered the human condition"28. From
liberation theology would come the counter that a "salvation" which does not alter
the "human condition" means nothing real; the salvation history of the OT obviously
deals in political realities and to remove the salvation that is in Christ to a "spiritual"
plane breaks the continuity between the testaments that is basic to much of
liberation theology.
*•' Garcia. 198/. p 188
22 Quell & Schrenk. 1951, pi
22 Old Testament Theology-, voll, SCM Press, London, 1975, p95
24 Mott, 1985, p519
2-; Miranda, 1974, p44 5
2^ Miranda. 1974. p53
22 Garcia, 1987, p90, also citing Gutierrez, 1974, p 168
2^ Novak, 1982, p343
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Liberation theologians would therefore reject the theological separation of
justice from justification29. Thus Miranda denies any distinction between real and
imputed justice39, basing this on affirming the continuity of the understanding of
justice from the Old Testament into Pauline theology - "Paul's revolutionary and
absolutely central message, that justice has been achieved without the law. would
lack all force if this were not precisely the same justice that the law hoped to
realise"3'. Redemption and justification, then, do not take place in a vacuum or in
the interiority of the soul but represent "precisely God's effort to restore the whole
network of relationships that have been broken by sin"32. And Wall, discussing the
Biblical justice which, he says, is "not managed or manipulated by human notions of
fair play but derived from the radical mercy of a liberating God", speaks of "social
justification (a process) or human liberation (its result)" and of the transforming
grace that is a constituent of the social gospel33.
This, then, clearly implies a rethink of much accepted Biblical interpretation.
It is not simply thai we are called to make room in our theology for the demand for
justice that goes beyond its more obvious occurrences in the OT prophets to what
Bauckham describes as some of the more surprising occurrences ol justice
references3" (often concealed in Tnglish translations at least by the use of alternative
words such as righteousness33), but thai the demand struggle for justice is what it is
all about.
The God who demands justice defines his own terms, and redefines ours,
otherwise justice no longer has any transcendent demand beyond self group interest.
The tendency of Western theology to dilute, idealise, or simply evade the radical
demands of the Biblical God is for Miranda clear breach of the second
commandment. A domesticated God who is no longer experienced as
demanding commanding (justice) is an idol.
What emerges from Miranda, then, is a theology of revelation, in which the
more we attempt to describe the content of justice the closer we come to
objectifying God (which is, ultimately, to evade his demands). To identify justice,
7Q See eg Tamez, in Jones (ed), 19S8, p33ff, see also ch6 below
30 Miranda, 1974, pi74
3' Miranda, 1974, pi52
3^ Birch, 1991, p96
33 R W Wall, in Samuel & Sugden (eds), 1987, p 113, 118, 121
3^ Bauckham, 1989, chs 3 & S
3" See below
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anu therefore God. with any particular programme is clearly idolatrous (as several
opponents of liberation theology have, ironically, rushed to point out); indeed, as
Garcia stresses, "our justice is not God's justice"*, but the demands of God are
nonetheless concrete. Indeed, Miranda often seems to equate God's demand for
justice with his transcendence, which, he says, "does not mean only an unimaginable
and inconceivable God but a God who is accessible only in the act of justice"*7. As
Lebacqz points out, this seems to leave hint without any proper "recognition of the
limited nature of even7 earthly achievement ofjustice"38.
Dussel also wrestles with this problem of attempting to hold together the
transcendence of God's demand with the concreteness of that demand for justice -
"'liberate the poor'", he says, "is absolute (not relative) and nevertheless concrete"39.
This leads him to a distinction between the "moral" (which is relative to a particular
context, le to do with being good in Egypt) and the "ethical" (which transcends the
present context and has io do with liberation from Egypt). The ethical addresses
people through conscience, which he describes as "a listening, a hearing the voice
calling to me from outside, from beyond the horizon of the system: the voice of the
poor calling for justice"36. Miranda's similar solution - "the God who does not allow
himself 10 be objectified, because only in the immediate demand of conscience is he
God. clearh specifies that he is knowable in the cry of the poor and the weak who
seek justice"3" (my emphasis) - also begs the question of the relationship of the
authority7 of conscience to that of the Bible. Tor all their realism about ideology, and
their hermeneutic of suspicion. Dussel and Miranda seem to invest too much in the
reliability of (individual) conscience here. Dussel also seeks a more concrete
reference point in the "Utopian justice prevailing by anticipation in the base
Christian community"4-, but the realities of such communities today (as of the
communities of the early church described in Acts) are too ambivalent, or. to pui it
theologically, subject to sin, to bear the yveight he puts on them.
Neither, then, seems to offer a way out of this paradox, though one may lie
in the distinction between recognising God in the particular demands of justice in a
given situation while refusing finally to identify God with these demands. A
-'"Garcia, 1987, p99
^ Miranda, 1974, p48
Lebaeqz, 1987, pi59
1<? Dussei, i988, p7o
40 Dussei, 1988, p38
4 ^ Miranda, 1974, pjs
42 Dussel, 1988, pi04
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narrative approach might have made space for at least provisional sketching of a
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Miranda offers little help in working out what the demand for justice means in
practical terms and situations (unless these truths are held to be self-evident).
Bevond Static Justice ?
A static concept of justice, then, defies the second commandment, as
expounded by Miranda; again, "our justice is not God's justice"43, and therefore we
seem to be left with dissenting views and competing understandings of what God is
saying to us in the demand for justice. Lebacqz offers a way forward from what
seems to be a dead end here, in starting from the "lived realm " of the experience of
injustice44, which Heyne claims is the Aristotelian method43. This seems attractive,
not least because it roots discussion in something both practical and vivid, rather
than the blurred edges of ideas of justice4*. However, as we shall see in studying
Hayek, that in itself can be felt to beg many of the questions; is all inequality
injustice, or. as the Commission for Social Justice argue, only some (unspecified)4"?
- does talk of injustice imply a (personal) cause?.
Historical consciousness (from the perspective of the poor) and Biblical
remembrance intertwine, says Lebacqz, to inform our response to the realities of
injustice, ie to open us. to God in his demand for justice. This, would seem to be a
more fully praxis-based approach than Miranda's, rooted as it is in the interplay
betw een the experience of injustice (which is seen as primary ) and the Biblical store
of God's partnership with those who hunger and thirst for justice; the best of justice
talk indeed coming out of justice walk48. This approach would, however, seem to be
problematic where there is dispute as to what is unjust (as we have seen in the area
of debt, even among the debtor "victims"). It is also backward-looking, when the
Biblical picture ofjustice seems much more coloured by hope.
In so far as their analysis allows for definition when the stress is on the
transcendent, concrete demands of justice, the terms in which liberation theologians
see the demand for justice as being defined are different from those of classical
analysis of justice. Like other liberation theologians, Miranda does not argue for
4-* Garcia, 1987, p99
44 Lebacqz, 1987, pi0
4-; P Heyne, in Block (and others) (eds), 1982, p464
46 Sturm .1988, p96
4^ Commission on Social Justice, 1993a, p 16
4^ Lebacqz, 1987, p65
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justice defined in terms of natural law or natural rights (even where these are held
derived from Biblical revelation). Such approaches tend to be conservative of the
status quo (as Marx penetratingly points out), able to offer criticism of abuses in the
system but not of the system itself; thus, natural law theory "sacralises a static and
stratified society"49 and capitalism is taken as "the way things are" (and therefore,
ahistoricallv, justified as the created order). Liberation theologians would claim to
be more Biblical, and closer to Marx, in rejecting any fixed concept of human nature
and in seeking a more radical break with the system than the reformism which
simply aims to make it run better, more "efficiently".
Similarly, liberation theologians cannot accept the amorality of a positivist
concept of justice under the law - again no critique of the existing system seems
possible, and the status quo is "justified" m a "twisted righteousness" which is the
"official legality of exploitation, the 'free' contractual agreement the weak and
impotent enter into because they have no other remedy"90. Miranda draws here on
Paul, who, he argues, "denies that man's invention, called law, is capable of
achieving justice in the world"5'. (Both positivism and particularly Hayek's related
attack on the "mirage" of social justice need to be taken more seriously than they are
here (where they may be caricatured), not least because they represent so much of
the prevailing "wisdom" of the West; this will be the substance of the next chapter.)
Traditional Roman Catholic official teaching has divided "justice" into
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crucial element), without full)' freeing itself from the problems of natural law
theories or adequately dealing with the problems of conflict between the different
dimensions. A major part of contemporary debate lies in the conflict between the
commutative, contractual, procedural, view of'justice adopted by Hayek and those
who stress issues of distribution, participation and power.
Some Christians have found encouragement in Rawls's work, whose
attraction lies in its grounding of a concern for the poor in a consensus and a
hypothetical social contract rather than ideology. However justice as "fairness" or
"equivalence" fails, as we shall see below, adequately to reflect the dynamic of
Biblical justice. The "principles of social justice" outlined by the Commission 011
Social Justice (equal worth of all citizens, ability to meet basic needs, spread of
Bonino, 1975, pi 15
Miranda, 1982, p34
^ Miranda, 1974, pi84 5
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opportunities and reduction of unjust inequalities)" might seem to hold possibilities,
but their approach of attempting to articulate general beliefs produces analysis
which is neither sharp enough in its critique nor free enough of complicity with the
prevailing (British market) ideology.
Miranda's View ofBiblical Justice
Miranda (as. Brueggemann points out) "bears sound academic credentials of
Western education"", and his exposition of justice reflects that (if only to establish
credibility within the Western academic tradition). He proceeds by expositor* word-
study and by following the motif of justice through the Bible, and this gives the
reader a sense of a selective fundamentalism which fails to take seriously the Bible
as a historically-conditioned and -rooted document. Indeed, Miranda himself,
claiming to speak for liberation theologians in general, says that "we are shameless
conservatives ... looking for the literal gospel ... (who) take the message of Jesus
literally and without gloss"5"' - a reaction, no doubt, to the ability of Biblical criticism
to evade the demands of justice in the Bible by carrying assumptions into
interpretation. Some more recent liberation theology (eg Gutierrez' later work) is
more willing to use tools of Biblical criticism (especially analysis of the socio¬
economic bases of Biblical narratives), but that produces problems of its own. if. as
Lebacqz argues, the Bible is suspect because of "the biases built into it by the human
communities that formed it"", it is hard to see how it can still carry the demand of
God for justice without there being too many available escape-routes: perhaps this is
what pushes Miranda and others towards fundamentalism. To some extent this
represents the recurrent problem of Biblical authority, but raised here in a specific
way which raises the question of the compatibility of a praxis-based method with
one which stresses transcendent authority as much as Miranda does.
Miranda's account relies heavily on his interpretation of the Biblical
synonymic parallelism of "sedekah" and "mispat"*«, using one word to illuminate
another with which he seeks to establish it as synonym: "Even the most
supernaturalistic exegetes recognise that sedekah umispat ('justice and right') is the
most clearlv technical term that the Old Testament uses to signify justice for the
^ Commission on Social Justice, 1993a, p 16
Brueggemann, Book Review ofMiranda, 1974, in Interpretation 29 (1975), p432
Miranda, 1982, p4
Lebacqz, 1987. p59
^ I have retained this transliteration in preference to a variety of others in the quotations which
follow, simply for clarity
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poor and oppressed, social justice ... This is clearly a hendiadys, ie an expression in
which the two words are meant to signify one thing"5". The basic case for this
"technical term" is well made by Miranda's detailed expository studies Sometimes
he convincingly convicts conventional exegesis of "watering down" the demand for
justice, yet there are other occasions when, by investing words with an undue weight
of theological meamng as if the "theological concept structure is directly related to
the words"5', he creates a tautology which neglects nuances of meamng. The effect,
therefore, sometimes seems simply reductionist in biurring the shades of meaning,
and depends too much on which term is chosen - arbitrarily - as the 'master' from
which all others are to be illumined.
If there is indeed a great richness and depth of meaning in these two words
which is not fully conveyed by the narrower Western philosophical or forensic
concept of justice, they may repay further study than Miranda's, which is oriented
towards re-establishing the divine demand for justice rather than drawing out the
nuances of its meaning. In similar vein, Mott suggests the rule of thumb that
whenever one reads "righteousness" or "judgment" in the context of social
responsibility (translating sedekah, mispat etc), "justice" would be a better
translation, bu1 he gives much more of a sense of the depth of meaning of justice in
The Bible. Sedekah. he says, has the sense "of a gift, of abundance, of generosity",
while mispat communicates "relief, release, and deliverance"59. Both, then, are
positive in spirit: even when justice has a punitive dimension, it is never purely
punitive but always aims towards "creating and preserving community"®6. Both
words have an element of forensic reference but are part of the language of
salvation. Thus, Snaith sees sedekah as primarily religious rather than ethical, but
this does not relegate it to the private realm; rather it roots and empowers the
concept, in God, and deepens its meaning of bringing justice in the land®'. Mispat,
too. may have a basically forensic meaning but that does not confine it to a Western
understanding of the verdict of a court".
The Biblical understanding of justice requires both elements of the
hendiadys; to split the terms leaves one struggling with the problems of priority
^ Miranda, 1974, p93
• Barr, 1961, p234, where he describes this tendency ofmany theologians and especially of Kittel's
dictionary
59 Mott, 1982, p63
60 Mott, 1982, p63
Snaith, 1964, p69
62 Birch, 1991, pi56
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between justice as retribution and equivalence and justice as salvation and grace".
Together in hendiadys the terms represent justice for the poor, and, moving into the
New Testament, dikaiosyne does not represent a different understanding. As
Miranda argues, if it did refer to something different, Paul's discussion of
righteousness justice in Romans would be meaningless. It signifies God's creative
work, and "clearly has the dimension of new creation", oriented toward justice and
judgment".
While there are limits to the value of such exegetical word studies,
particularly when we start to allow for changes in meaning of both words and ideas
even within the Biblical period, it is clear that our division of concerns and meaning
between the socio-economic, forensic, and soteriological aspects ofjustice is foreign
to the Biblical world (as noted previously in the discussion of the embedded
economy). The tendency within market societies to "treat ever more dimensions of
life as private, that is, unaccountable"", and to respect the "autonomy" of the
market, runs quite contrary to this whole way of thinking, implying as it does that
there are areas beyond the jurisdiction of divine justice. The autonomy of economics
may be seen as a valuable achievement of modernity only in so far as it is
understood as relative to the priority of God's will, and does not become a b ranny
imposing its own model of consumer relationships on other areas".
Underlying the Biblical breadth of meaning of justice may be seen the
difference between the Hebrew sophet and the Western judge. "In the Hebrew verb
soph.e! the translators of the LXX saw not exactly the neutral function connotated by
our 'to judge' but rather to do justice to someone who in one way or another has been
oppressed"67. As in the Book of Judges, the sophet (noun) refers primarily to a
deliverer, t he mispat which is the result of his actions is therefore tar more than a
verdict in a Western court: "here is no Justice blindfoldlv holding the scales in just
equality. She watches for the rich, and, Brennus-like, throws in her sword against
them"68. Santa Anna, also, contrasts the blind, balancing goddess of the classical
imagery of justice with what he describes as the Hebrew understanding of "justice
from below"®. The key is the righting of wrongs, the function which links the
G Weinfeld, in Reventlow & Hofman (eds). 1992, p245
64 Stuhlmacher, 1986, p81 & 82
65Meeks, 1989, pi82
66 WCC, 1992a, p9 & 36
^ Miranda, 1974, pill
68 Snaith, 1964, p71 2
6Q In Jones (ed), 1988, p7
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"av enging chiefs" " of the Book of Judges through later kings to judges closer to our
own. and it is against this background that the visions of God as the Judge and as the
one who saves may he reconciled. Justice (or righteousness) is not a static quality or
attribute of God but characterises his interventions - "it is dynamic, as active as his
wrath"7'.
This has important implications for the Biblical understanding of justice.
What emerges is a Biblical understanding of justice in which "while due process is
not omitted ... the dominant concerns are substantive, material and benefit-
oriented"^. This has three crucial characteristics which distinguish it from most
Western philosophical understanding it is relational and creative and is not
impartial.
Relational Justice (Justice and Love)
Getting to grips with much of this Biblical material requires putting aside our
individualist assumptions 111 favour of a view of people in society, le in relationship
with one another. Bven Pauline theology, long interpreted on individualist lines,
"actually docs not think of the individual as existing by himself' 3. That is not io say
that, in the Bible, persons disappear into "society" (which would be the precise
converse of Mrs Thatcher's famous dictum that "there is no such thing as society");
rather, for the Bible at least, the concept of the individual abstracted from social
relationship is just that - an abstraction, displacing the reality of persons in relation
It follows, then. that, as Newbigm puts it. "The Biblical understanding of justice is
relational. Justice is a function ol interpersonal relationships"7'1. Jantzen also,
regretting the extent to which justice has been subsumed within a dominant,
masculine, framework of competitiveness, seeks to recover an understanding of
justice in a framework of "connectedness"75, which seems in line with the Biblical
r hah '
» iv m .
So many of our assumptions are individualist, and so much do we take it for
granted that we are individuals first and members of society second, that it is
difficult to be consistent about this relational understanding. Even Schluter and Lee,
who have suggested this as the crucial insight on which social theory can be rebuilt
70 Miranda, 1974, pi 12
7' Quell & Schrenk, 1951, p43
72 Mott, 1985, p>20
77 Quell & Schrenk, 1951. p47
7^ Newbigin, 1992, p?10
7> Jantzen, 1992, pi 1
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(iii "The R Factor"), say that "a just society is one whose individuals (and by
extension whose institutions) have relationships that are good'l?", wineh SCcniS 10
leave the individuals still as the primary unit.
l he Bible goes further by focusing on relationships - justice is "relational
more than it is rational"77. Within a general understanding of Christian ethics as
dealing with the quality of human relationships the scenario is of injustice
corrupting all relationships in society, the basic root alienation infecting all
relationships (original sin); "theologically speaking, an unjust social order distorts
our relationships with others and with nature"7!. The recurrent Biblical phrase "I am
the Lord your God", as Miranda notes, roots the ethical demands of the law in
remembrance of God's dealings'relationship with his people (his saving justice).
Justice on such a model ceases to be a norm or law but becomes a matter of "the
establishment and maintenance of right relationships"7".
An economy, for example is seen (despite attempts at the de-moralising of
economic exchange) as consisting of people in relationship: "Christian economic
ethics constantly (and rightly) assumed that economic transactions were relations
between people"*". It is in this context that the importance to liberation theologv of
"dependence theory" can be seen as well founded: relationships of domination are
unjust in the same way as even a kind-hearted slave-owner is unjust.
This foeus on economic relationships is important, lest the stress on "the R
factor" be seen as making what we tend to call "personal" relationships primary for
Christian ethics. Such a tendency underlies liberation theologians denial of the
distinction accepted in Western theology between love and justice ("one of the most
disastrous errors in the history of Christianity ... under the influence of Greek
definitions"-). Our attempt to distinguish these two may well tend to sentimentalise
and blunt the cutting edge of the gospel and the move from the demands of justice to
"works of mercy", almsgiving and the connotations of "charity" may be seen as an
evasion, but the distinction is widely made. Niebuhr, describing love as the
"impossible possibility", felt that economic and political affairs had to be governed
by the "nicely calculated less and more" of justice*7, and Quick claims the "antithesis
7^ Schluter & Lee. 1993, p259/60
77 Lebacqz, 1987, p78
78 Garcia, 1987, pSl
79 Bonino, 1983, p85
Forrester & Skene. 1988. p95
Miranda, 1974, p61
Niebuhr, 1937, pl03 & Niebuhr, 1932, p68 & 81. discussed in Lebacqz, 1986a, p85
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between justice and love, law and gospel, has always given to Christian ethics their
distinctive character" (reflecting, he argues, the difference between the two
testaments, another differentiation which liberation theologians would challenge)".
It would seem futile to deny that this purported distinction between love and
justice has been abused to gloss over the realities of conflict and to fuel glib talk of
reconciliation that minimises pain and excuses oppressors. (It is part of the
challenge of this work to speak meaningfully of forgiveness without falling into this
trap of cheap grace.) The need to keep two concepts in synonymic parallel does not
justify the reduction of the meaning of one to that of the other without mutual
enrichment, but the need to hold together the love and justice of God is crucial to
any Christian perspective on social justice.
Liberation theologians are not alone in this insistence on keeping the two
f 'f 'irnupc tV\nt "nietioA ic iuot r\f tiro 1 r\i tV\it 10 in
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it""; without this, justice is deprived of its creative dimension - love becomes
sentimental and justice degenerates into legalism. Similarly. Mott, arguing against a
contrast between love and justice (though maintaining a close relation rather than
identity ol the two), savs that ditterenuation makes justice a "static and conservative
term"8-. It also tends to downgrade justice as inferior, the best we may hope for in
this world bui destined lo disappear when the kingdom comes and love rules.
Rather, I would share liberation theologians' endorsement of Ricoeur when he says
llt'il clvytt' or tan n f \vp IT* Ik** pnurila- thpuua n v oiivy v> nuie wi liv; liiiuwi oluiiuiii.^ w 1 i\./ y w »uivli >*w aiuivv wucii 11 y iiiv
counterpart and supplement of. or the substitute for, justice; love is co-extensive
with justice justice is the efficacious, institutional and social realisation of love"86.
The substitution of one for the other may ride uneasily with accepted English
usage (eg in the context of the good Samaritan story where "doing justice" to the
injured man would seem an uncomfortable phrase), and the terms will still have
their appropriate usages (justice, perhaps, most fittingly describing "love at a
distance"8 ) Indeed, justice may therefore be the appropriate expression of love in a
society of strangers, of "mediated"88 or "contingent"89 relationships; love, then.
83 Quick, 1940, p48
84 Tillich. 1974, pi5
Mott, 1985, p519 and Mott, 1982, p62Q 1
00 P Ricoeur : "El Conflicto : Signo de Contradiccion y de Unidad ?", in Criteria 1668 (Buenos Aires,
24-5-73), p255, cited in Bonino, 1975, pi 14
83 Forrester & Skene, 1988. p77
88 Ignatieff, 1984, plO
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appropriately referring to situations of "relational proximity", le "a closeness 01
relationship between two individuals through which each is able to recognise the
other more fully as a complete and unique human being"30 But that cannot mean
that, coming to a concrete example, the "contingent" relationship between debtor
and creditor demands that the latter simply seek the "justice" of the repayment of the
debt without regard to the personal circumstances of the debtor, of which only
"love" could take account. In keeping the terms in close relation we are holdmg on
to more of the richness of the Biblical material and retaining the Biblical sense of
justice as more than due process, equivalence or even fairness. When Keller
concludes that such constituents of "the good life" as "empathy, sympathy,
magnanimity, forgiveness, the readiness to help, to console, to give advice - all of
these are virtuous attitudes and acts beyond justice''^, she may be accurately
describing the limitations of most philosophical theories of justice, but fails to
account for the full force of the Biblical Christian understanding, which holds love
and justice together in the power or activity ol God.
That understanding is a major Christian reservation about Rawlsian justice,
"Christian theological notions of justice substantially qualify' the adequacy of justice
as fairness and suggest that it needs augmentation" because it is ultimately
"corrosive of Christian understanding of the person and of community"93 However,
it is not simply that justice as fairness needs to be augmented or seasoned with
justice as generosity. Sedekah. Biblically, does carry a sense of (God's) benevolent
generosity93; the God reflected in the parable of the labourers in the vineyard is
indeed "far more interested in being graciously generous than 111 calculating each
person's degree of righteousness"94. But this is more basic to the understanding of
justice than being merely an augmentation of fairness, particularly one which might
carry some of the paternalistic connotations of "charity". It is not to do with the
content of justice (as distribution by merit or any other calculation, or otherwise) but
about the dynamic nattire of justice as rooted in the grace of God93, the creative
nature of Biblical justice. This rootedness in grace (which Wall sees as
characteristic of the jubilee99) removes Biblical justice from distribution according
90 Schluter & Fee, 1993, p276
91 Heller, 1987, p324
Forrester, 1994, p5
9-"' Snaith. 1964, p/G i
Stuhlmacher, 1986, p33
9-S Moft, 1982, p63
96 Wall, in Samuel & Sugden (eds), 1987, pi 13
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to merit, indeed from any Justinian sense of justice its giving each his due; it is not a
refinement but is basic to the Biblical understanding.
Creative or Dynamic Justice
As already noted above. Tillich sees the retention of this inter-relationship of
love with justice as crucial to his understanding of what justice is. As well as the
dimensions of distributive and retributive justice, he suggests a "third form" to be
called "transforming or creative justice", based on the fact that "the intrinsic justice
is dynamic"". Mott, also, sees justice as "a deliverance ... (which) puts an end to the
conditions that produce the injustice"9'; Biblical justice is dynamic, "creative, in
contrast to the preserving justice of the Aristotelian type"99.
There are dangers in this view. Quick, describing Leninist "justice" in similar
terms as being "evangelical" (because it has the fundamental motivation of the
deliverance of the poor) but as ceasing to be just as it becomes a tool of the
communist gospel'". The truth in this lies in the gap which opens up between
Leninist justice and Western justice, but that is not conclusive of the former ceasing
to be just. Particularly if we move from Leninist to Biblical justice, a "tool" of the
gospel or of the will of God, we may well recognise a gap between that and
conventional Western ideas which does not make Biblical justice "unjust" but rather
points to the need for renewal ofWestern thinking, for Christians at least.
Lebacqz goes further than Tillich when she sees this character of justice not
as one model, even the "intrinsic" one, but as the Biblical picture of justice which is
"not retributive in the sense of focusing on the punishment of the offender" nor
"distributive in the sense of asking how some ideal social order would distribute
goods". Rather, Biblical justice is "reparative, restorative, restitutive"101. Unlike
classical theories, this has not to do with "giving each his due", but with correcting
injustices1®2; it is not about re-arranging distributions or structures but about enabling
new beginnings (as in the jubilee)105. Novak describes "the attempt to model an ethic
of economic distribution primarily upon rectifying justice, that is the attempt to
represent economic justice as primarily recompense for past injustices or
97 Tillich, 1974, p64
98 Mott, 198?, p?20
99 Mott, 1982, p65
100 Quick, 1940, p?2
Lebacqz, 1986b, plO
'97 Lebacqz, 1987, pi 50
Lebacqz, 1987, p 128
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misfortunes" as being "pseudomessaianic">"\ Thus he recognises the Biblical roots
of the notion of "rectifying justice" while pointing to the dangers of political
programmes which claim to embody this divine justice. The point is, I think, well
made but only in so far as it undermines any claim to finality or infallibility of the
advocates of policies of rectify ing justice; it cannot be allowed to justify' a Christian
quietism which simply accepts the results of past injustices as given. As Lebacqz
points out, it is in such institutions as the jubilee that the Bible recognises rectifying,
creative justice at work. Viewed in a static snapshot, the cancellation of debts
indeed seems "unjust", but set in a socio-historical context it embodies the dynamic
of justice. Similarly, the parable of the labourers in the vineyard "thwarts our
expectations about justice only because these are not formed with the Jubilee year in
mind"io-\ There is, therefore, a clear difference between this approach and the
ahisiorica! approaches of such as Rawls and Hayek which exclude questions of
restitution for past wrongs by taking the present situation as given, and therefore
beyond such judgments of justice or injustice'06.
As Newbigin points out, there is underlying this a Biblical challenge to
rtrpvailino vipwc nf npnn1p nnH Qnn'ptv thp "nnpn Qprrpt" nf thp oncrvpl that "thp
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justice of God is manifested in his justify ing of the ungodly - that is in his
establishing of a relationship with himself which makes it possible for injustice to
be overcome by God's justice, for sin to be recognised, acknowledged and forgiven,
and new relationships established through which even the unjust (as we all arei may
learn to live in peace"10. Consideration of this theology of justification will be
postponed largely to chapter 6, but two areas of relevance to the present discussion
of justice - reconciliation and the social content of justification - will be noted
briefly here.
The discussion above of love and justice referred to the danger of cheap
grace in Christian advocacy of a reconciliation in the name of love which leaves
existing injustices untouched. Lebacqz's understanding of justice as restorative
might also be said to lead readily towards reconciliation, but it is redress which she
(like Mott) stresses here'0*. In her chapter on "justice and the oppressor", there is no
word of forgiveness expressed: rather she (like the Kairos theologians) complains of
104 Novak, 1990, p4 6
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a cheapened solidarity and a "facile reconciliation" which is characteristic of
oppressors urging the oppressed to "forgive and forget""*. Miranda, too, has little
positive to say of forgiveness or reconciliation, speaking of Jesus upholding the
"vindictive justice of the Old Testament""". He finds it "criminal" to "defend
repression by the procedure of quoting to the oppressed the verse about turning the
other cheek""), gut Biblical forgiveness is not equivalent to moral laxity, nor to be
seen as "tolerance, compromise or acceptance of evil, as a good-natured easy-going
bonhomie""*; it is "a genuine act ofjudgment, maintaining God's justice ... a form of
redemption which knows no compromise with evil""5. Gou's word addressed to the
oppressor is, therefore, a word of rebuke and restitution, always a word which
"requisitions justice""". Thus, reconciliation looks to the effective removal of
contradictions and injustices rather than explaining them away or ignoring them.
This will be further developed below, along with the social content of
redemption justification
What, then, of grace ? Garcia writes that "the actualisation of justice and the
opportunity to experience new ways of being a person have at their foundation the
reality of the gift of grace"'". The God who is known (reveals himself) in the
demand for justice gives the power to achieve justice and to "do justly" (which, we
shall see. may be where forgiveness enters into the picture). The Biblical jubilee (to
which 1 .ebacqz is drawn in her analvsis of justice) may be a significant linking
concept - but again not one which Miranda stresses. However, if this is an image
rather than a programme1^, are we faced with a form of utopianism which defeats
the basic (Marxist) premisses of some liberation theology and leaves us with
Niebuhr's paradox that "the vision of a just society is an impossible one, which can
be approximated only by those who do not regard it as impossible"'" ? Is any
attempt to evaluate situations by the criteria of the kingdom indeed "a flight from
the real problems and possibilities of betterment""', or an openness to the God who
' ^ Lebacqz, 1987, p90
' '0 Miranda, 1982, p75
| J * Miranda, 1982, p77
' lzBonino, 1975. pi21/2
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is somewhere "doing his thing, overthrowing the existing order"119, rather than
reforming it°
Justice and Partiality
Rooted in the grace winch comes from beyond any current horizons, Biblical
justice is dynamic creative and has to do, crucially, with relationships. We depart
further from Western "classical" notions on the issue of partiality. Miranda cites
John 3.17 as rejecting a concept of judgement which is not saving (ie bringing
justice), a concept that belongs much more naturally with an English (or American)
idea of the role of the judge than with the Hebrew and OT concept of judge. "It is
not the :biind: rendering 'to each his own' - which presupposes a stable and basically
unchangeable order - but the liberation of those who have been deprived of the
conditions for an authentic human life"'*1. This aspect of the preferential option for
the poor is basic, but not exclusive, to liberation theology. Karl Barth can be cited
for the basic premiss that God takes sides with the victims of injustice: "God always
takes his stand unconditionally and passionately on this side and on this side alone:
against the lofty and on behalf of the lowly"1?1.
But to deny the impartiality of justice is to be in conflict with one of the
basic assumptions of most commentators. The impersonal "blindness" of justice
which like PtnH ie "nn rperv^rter r>f nprcnnc" tActe 10 141 trpnlino pnrh ncreon nlil'P
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or treating like cases alike, is generally seen as at the heart of what justice is about
(and even what agape is about122). Thus Quick says "justice ... while it is personal in
so far as it treats even person as an end in himself, is nevertheless impersonal in so
far as u treats ail persons alike"123. The judge who knows one of the parties to a case
is disqualified from acting because of his personal knowledge. Woodhead suggests
that it is a masculine, distorted concept of agape which stresses equal regard for all,
when even Jesus had a disciple whom he especially loved; it is this "equal regard"
which she rejects as. authentically part of love but sees as necessarily bound up with
justice that leads her to separate the two12«. But the Biblical insight that God's justice
is rooted in his knowledge and love for us may start us thinking in another, more
personal direction.
' Alves, in Christianity and Crisis, 33.15 (1973) pl7s
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Further, even-haudedness. in an unjust world, perpetuates injustice; in a
world where injustice is endemic, an abstract concept of justice (blind, with
carefully balanced scales) will fail to right wrongs. Seeking the kingdom in a torn
and conflictive society must mean taking sides with the victims; in situations of
inequality, "justice must be partial in order to be impartial"'". It is only by a genuine
compassion which identifies with the oppressed and shares their perspective that we
get beyond the comforting assurances of an apparently impartial complicity with an
unjust status quo - tears may indeed be the best way to get the dust out of our eyes.
In relation to debt, there are issues raised here about the extent to which justice has.
to operate by rules (such as those providing for bankruptcy) which can be exploited
by the unscrupulous as well as liberating those trapped in debt, or can take greater
account of personal circumstances'". The case seems sufficiently made, at least that
a Christian view of justice cannot take all the connotations of impersonal, impartial,
blind justice of the classical model for granted
Sin and Injustice
The "flip-side" of this approach to justice may be seen in the consideration of
sin. "From a liberation perspective, sin is not only an individual, personal and
inward or spiritual fault but also a material, collective and socio-structural
phenomenon", says Garcia"' But this concept of structural sin is not new or unique,
going back at lea-st to a 1937 ecumenical World Conference at Oxford'" and the
work of Niebuhr. and continuing as a commonplace of modern church
pronouncements on social justice. Within liberation theology, this structural sin is
variously described in terms of domination, dependence, alienation, anti-
community, or injustice. Miranda, at one point, denies an identification of injustice
with sin. while holding on to the sense that, for Paul and other Biblical writers "sin
is incarnated in social structures, in the powerful wisdom of the world, in the human
civilisation which forces us to act in a determined way in spite of the contrary
conscience which man still has regarding what is good and what is bad"'» It is
possible to retain a sense of personal responsibility within this without relegating
structural sin to being a phenomenon secondary to individual sins. It is also possible
to speak of structural changes which may "eradicate some specific ways sin
125 Mott, 1982, p66
yy See further below ch5b
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manifests itself socially"'30 without speaking as if the (economic or political)
revolution were about to abolish sin. Although a "theology of the cross debunks
every ideology that claims that the original sin that infects all humanity will be
removed as a result of structural changes in the world wrought by human praxis""',
it represents a caricature of what Miranda and others are saying to suggest that this
is his claim. However, that a theology of the cross can profoundly illuminate an
understanding of the demand for justice is evidenced in the works of Moltmann and
Gunton'32.
In fact, it is in this deeper concept that liberation theologians take sin very
seriously indeed If anylhing, they may fail to be radical enough when they struggle
(by means of their stress on individual conscience) to retain individual responsibility
in situations of original sin, as does John Paul 11 in continuing to see personal sin as
"the fundamental category"133. It is in that sense of original, structural sin (which
insinuates itself between buying and selling134) that Christianity can speak of sin
without identifying an individual sinner.
Criteria for Justice
While the account of justice given above to a large extent precludes
definition of the content of justice, liberation theologians, as Garcia repeatedly
notes, are clear that need rather than merit is the basic Biblical criterion for justice.
Distinctions (of a charity-based approach) between the deserving and undeserving
poor are ruled out as foreign to the Bible, and need rather than merit is decisive of
what one is due. "Justice is a distributive concept, concerned with the question ot
how economic goods and social services are to be distributed" says Garcia'33, adding
thai tins arises because of Scarcity (implying the "zero-sum" perspective which
market proponents deny as an assumption). "Holiness" writes Dussel "is the love
tVi'if effiionlAO rjiirirlAp t V\ Vi'yctc3 r\f ooojy nno'c r»/=»^r1c-niyiti.iu.1 oil tuiti ul v iuwo cvwi v uiiue, wn tiiw Ucloio ui cuvn oiiw o iivvuo ~ .
Tins idea of need as basic to justice is shared, for example, by the
Commission on Social Justice137, but to say that justice demands distribution
according to need may beg questions. Unless human needs are said to be equal
1JU Garcia, 1987, pi43
i •-> 1 1
1 C F. Braaten, The Apostolic Imperative, Augsburg, Minneapolis, 1985, pi 01 '2
'32 Moltmann, 1974, and Gunton, 1988, discussed in chapter 6
133 Langan, 1991, p277
'3' Ecciesiasticus 29 1 2
135 Garcia, 1987, pi41
136 Busse! 1988 nl74
117 '
Commission on Social Justice, 1993a, p 16
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(Soelle declares the sabbath jubilee legislation takes this as its starting point118), how
are they to be assessed? Newbigin argues that, by the privatisation of questions of
human destiny, in liberal democratic society "the only basis upon which 'needs' and
'wants' could be weighed against each other is excluded"139. IgnatiefT. while
recognising the language of need as one (non-teleological) language of the good,
raises the issues of whether there are to be "experts in need" or whether people are
to be left to choose what they need11® (if that is not a contradiction in terms). The
market claims to give that freedom, yet can only register needs that are expressed in
purchasing power so that "in a modern consumer society wants are manufactured to
meet the needs of industry while the needs of people remain unmet"1-. Which
"needs", then, are to be recognised ? We may well agree with Nyce's endorsement of
Ruether, saying that "God's will done on earth means the fulfilment of people's basic
human physical and social needs: daily bread, remission of debts but the
number of words used to qualify- "needs" itself shows the problems of definition of
which needs are to be satisfied. Miranda, who takes this principle of allocation "to
each according to his need" from Jesus (whom he sees as being "in fact a
communist""13) to communism as the only system avoiding the exploitation and
spoliation of some by others143, also recognises that liberation salvation means more
than meeting the physical needs of the poor145; justice is about relief from
oppression, rather than purely matters of allocation or distribution.
Meeks raises another reservation about the language of needs, which
"seldom serves the just distribution of access to life anu life abundant ni the public
household"144. This takes the discussion not only into non-material needs but also
icoiioc rvf" noriioinntinn cnt'o tVxot it ir tl-va* 1 ■»-/-*£* o tKpt nPAnlp TlPff! Ill
tiiiw loouwo vt put uwiputivii. i>vcrv ic > ou t o uiui it io iue iwjvui vvj uial pwvpiw iivvu 111
order to participate in society that are basic to the criteria liberation theologians
offer for justice14. and participation has been a continuing dimension of Roman
Catholic teaching on social justice148. It also may be seen running through the
approach of the Commission on Social Justice, under the guise of "opportunity" and
i3S Soelle, 1992. p96
139 Newbigin, 1992, p310
140 Ignatieff, 1984, pi4, 78 & 136. 7
'4' Newbigin, 1992, p309
142 Nyce, 1990, p89
143 \4iranda, 1982, pi8
144 Miranda, 1982, p30
143 See Lebacqz, 1986, pi09
146 Meeks, 1989, pi 77
147 Berkley, 1992~ p353
'4^ Lebacqz, 1986, p69
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ihe need for a welfare state that is enabling'-Jnsl as the S J cluster of legislation
did not leave matters simply with the cancellation of debts but sought the return of a
(material) base on which future participation in the community could be built, so
justice is denied where there is social and economic exclusion, in areas where "there
is simply no economy - no banks, no shops, no work"150. As Mott argues, justice
concerns people in community and therefore is oriented toward re-establishing as
active, participating members of a community those who have been excluded151 (the
reasons for which exclusion may range from debt to disability). Participation is,
then, a vital constituent of justice, which, as we have seen, raises complex issues in
relation to credit and debt, when participation in the credit society is at stake.
Yet Schluter and Lee rightly point to the ambivalence of the concept of
(individual) choice as conclusive of the satisfaction of needs or creative of justice -
exercise of choice can "rectify structural injustices which otherwise would keep
people tied into bleak and unworkable relationships ... but clearly choice is more
than a guardian of justice"152, referring to its glorification within consumer society
and destructive possibilities for relationships. In fact, in the name of preserving
freedom of choice, injustice can be exacerbated. Similarly, the Commission on
Social Justice's "new agenda of opportunity", autonomy and choice, based on the
argument that "there is a limit to what government can do for people but there is no
limit to what they can be enabled to do for themselves"1" not only has
uncomfortable Biblical echoes of Babel, but seems in conflict with the injustices
which have resulted from the exercise of power by those who can easily "do for
themselves". Yet opportunity and choice are not to be discounted entirely as
ingredients of social justice, especially when view ed m the context of participation
in the community.
Another term from traditional Roman Catholic teaching (going back to
Aquinas) which seems to be re-emerging, sometimes as a substitute for justice, is
that of the common good. Langan sees this as John Paul ll's preferred term to
justice, and Dorrien, from a more radical perspective, speaks of "reconstructing the
common good"1^. Particularly in light ofMaclntyre's analysis discussed above, it is
clear that such a reconstruction is more than problematic, and the term does not
Commission on Social Justice, 1994, p95, 104 & passim
' Commission on Social Justice, 1994, p81
Mott, 1993, pSl
152 Schluter & fee, 1993, p43
' ^ Commission on Social Justice, 1993a, p52 & 11
1Dorrien, 1990, title and passim
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seem to solve any of the quandaries or problems of justice discussion Thus Jenkins
speaks of a paradox of current thinking - "there is no common good: we cannot have
it. we probably should not have it, and we desperately need Primarily, in
response to "lived" injustice, it is justice which we need, and which is demanded of
us, although a reconstructed common good could contribute towards that by
challenging the ideology which justifies "the way things are".
Conclusion
What then, are the positive characteristics contributed by liberation theology
to the understanding of social justice? Justice, here, clearly has the blindfold off, and
is much more than a juridical or procedural concept; it has to do with relationships,
with human needs and with righting wrongs, in a much more proactive,
interventionist, restorative way; a sense of collective, community responsibility is
stressed against an approach stressing individual responsibility and guilt. And it is
not a theory or a set of principles, but a series of concrete demands and experiences;
to paraphrase a famous phrase of Marx, theories of justice tend merely to
describe understand injustice (even excuse it), when the point is to change things
Sometimes Miranda's case in particular seems clearly selective. To say that
"all Biblical legislation originally had the purpose of looking after the rights of the
neighbour"'^ seems to be selecting one strand of the tradition (as represented by eg
Dent 5.15's exposition of the Sabbath commandment as concerned with the rights of
the poor) arbitrarily over another (represented bv Exodus 20.11 which roots the
Sabbath commandment in the pattern of divine activity in creation), fhe question is
whether the argument is ultimately reductionist; does he reduce God to the demand
for justice, or is it others who reduce God in order to avoid the demand for justice ?
There are. 1 think, serious exegetical problems in Miranda's work which
make it inadequate as an account of social justice. Ultimately, he may be more
trapped by his Western training (he studied theology at the University of Frankfurt
and bibiical studies at the Biblical Institute in Rome in the 1960s) than he realises or
admits. Alternative approaches, such as narrative theology with its exposition
through story rather than wordmotif studies, might well be more productive in
drawing out the Biblical demand for and meaning of justice (as is suggested by
Tebacqz's stress on "remembering" as crucial to justice). However, the basic thesis
' JenJdns, 1994, p2
Miranda, 1974, pi43
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that God is known in the demand for justice is, I think, only refuted in so far as it is
an exclusive claim.
There is. in liberation theology and beyond it in the work of Lebacqz. Mott
and others, a profound and consistent challenge to rethink "accepted" (in Western
thinking) interpretation. Our (reformed) individualism (read into the New Testament
especially) may take us away from the uncomfortable truth of words to our
societies-communities; doctrines such as the Lutheran two kingdoms may be
accommodations, with little Biblical basis. What emerges is, as Mott expresses it, a
justice which is "a call for action more than a principle of evaluation", an
intervening power or deliverance, which has continuity with God's action (and
therefore with love), which is concerned with persons in relation, in communities,
and which seeks restoration of, and to, community: it is a demand and responsibility
for persons and for governments1".
While the jubilee cluster of legislation proved in the previous chapter the
bridge from debt towards justice, it also provides a dramatic paradigm of the
Biblical understanding of justice, which "always requires the redressing of
unbalances and the restoration of people to a new beginning place"11-8 and in which
forgiveness or mercy is seen as a dimension of the justice that comes from God.
Although this consideration of the theology of social justice has larselv been
a step removed from matters of debt, it provides a context in which liberation
theologians and ecumenical bodies have mounted their critique of the international
debt crisis15', fhus they have challenged the "perverted" thinking by which it is
automatically "just" to repay and unjust to remit the debts which are so crippling to
many Third World countries, and the "perverse jubilees" whereby debt adjustment
1 L * j i p • p ^ ^ i p p ^ •nas uccn accompameu by iresn mechanisms Oi subjection160, m lavour Oi a creative,
Biblically modelled justice which takes account of people's needs and is oriented to
the future and to the establishment of right relationships.
Ln terms of domestic debt, the Commission on Social Justice, at a macro-
economic level, have pointed to the credit explosion as diverting resources from
investment into consumption161, while Galbraith has also drawn attention to the
massive subsidy to the "contented" in the USA via government underwriting of
157 Mott, 1993, p79-87
'6s Lebacqz, 1983, p41
' -" See eg Jones (ed), 1988, passim
Assman, in Jones (ed), 1988, voll, p20
'61 Commission on Social Justice, 1993b, piv
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savings and loan companies, and a culture in which entrepreneurs may "fail" but can
do no wrong162. Schluter and Lee's relational perspective has led them to question the
impact of interest-charging 011 relationships and to see that relational justice
demands new financial instruments1".
in this chapter, too, we have seen that the understanding of justice developed
here brings a different perspective to bear on creditor/debtor relations; it is not only
the "extra mile" of love which demands that the circumstances of both creditor and
debtor be taken into account by the other, but a Christian understanding of justice
will consider their needs, their relationship and their power within the economic
setting in which they make their contract These piecemeal attempts to set debt
problems in a Biblical justice setting (along with the comments interspersed in this
chapter) provide a glimpse of what is possible; the purpose of tins study is to
contribute to a more comprehensive analysis, responding to the inescapable demand
of justice in this area. Before that, time must be taken to reflect on two theoretical
assaults on the whole concept of "social justice'. Hayek is chosen as representative
of the new liberal right which currently sets the agenda for political thinking in the
I Ik' nl lonct nnd Mnrv ic rhnspri hpmticp the fliherntinn thpn1nov3 ihinkino outlined
' ' - —• ; ........ *■- —..... .... v * - - - - y .......
above draws on much of his work yet comes to very different conclusions. Their
secular arguments strike at the validity of any notion of social justice (and
particularly at some of the aspects of Christian understanding discussed here); they
have to be taken seriously by any Christian attempt to argue in the name of social
justice.
Galbraith, 1992, p75
163 Schluter & Lee, 1993, pi99 & 270
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5. The Assault on Social Justice
«
(A) Marxism
The understanding of social justice developed in the last chapter is quite
explicitly Christian, derived from the Bible and other aspects of Christian tradition,
but it cannot be exempt from secular critique. Indeed, many of the criticisms of
theories of social justice, from both left and right, have focused on the religious
dimension of (or justification given for) social justice. The task of this chapter is to
take seriously at least two major forms of critique, and assess whether the
understanding developed above can survive them, and in what form.
At first sight it may seem strange to list Marxism along with those who
attack the concept of social justice, when most people would more naturally see
Marx as an ally in upholding the validity of the demand of / quest for social justice.
Ellul, for example, reckons that the challenge of Marxism to Christianity is
"obviously based on justice"; communism, for him, "has as its objective the creation
of a just society"'. Theologians of liberation, like Miranda, who are often said to be
infected with Marxism, identify God with the demand for/of justice. Further, "when
we read Karl Marx's descriptions of the capitalist mode of production in Capital and
other writings, all our instincts tell us that these are descriptions of an unjust social
system"*.
However, a closer reading of Marx's (and Engels') writings reveals that this
pervasive impression is in fact quite contrary to what the writers themselves say. In
fact Marx and Engels have some scathing and incisive things to say about the
concept of social justice, and there are some surprising similarities between what
they say and some modern liberal criticisms of the concept, possibly reflecting the
common influence ofAdam Smith on their economic ideas.
Before starting into that, it should be noted that entering as a theologian into
discussion of the Marxist texts is like entering into a minefield, and one which has
certain similarities with that of Biblical exposition / criticism; arguments hinge on
niceties of translation (notably of recht-rooted words), debates arise about the use of
irony in the texts (notably in Marx's analysis of justice in capitalist society), and
there are fierce disagreements about the internal consistency of the Marxian corpus.
1 Ellul, 1988, p6
^ Wood, 1972, p244
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While Marx's expressions of views on justice may indeed be "bewilderingly
ambiguous" and impossible to reconcile with each other1, the argument here is not
based on the infallibility of the text. Since the purpose is not to provide a full critical
evaluation ofMarx on justice but to establish whether he has anything to say which
might either undermine the validity of the concept of social justice, or help to refine
that concept, this account will not concern itself with issues of internal consistency
except insofar as these threaten the validity' ofMarx's particular points of critique. If
Marx has something penetrating to say, it will be given full weight even if he may
have said something else that points in a different direction.
Many of the key areas in Marx's critique of (social) justice have at least
echoes ofmore recent liberal and Conservative attacks on the concept, particularly
in relation to (a) the vagueness of the concept, which threatens its usefulness and
ultimate validity (b) the tendency to concentrate on matters of distribution rather
than production (c) the relation of a concept of justice to the system in which it
operates (d) a suspicion of values (as against a rational or scientific approach) (e)
issues relative to Kantian "respect for persons" (f) the priority' of freedom over
matters of social justice (g) questions of spontaneity' vs control/planning in society
(h) a rejection of primitive communities as models for later societies and (i) matters
relating to the form, content and result of rules. These areas will now be considered
in turn, before movmg on to areas in which Marxist analysis is in line with aspects
of the Biblical picture outlined in the previous chapter.
The Concepts of "Social Justice"
Marx and, especially, Engels anticipate Hayek's criticism of appeals to social
justice as meaning all things to all men, therefore being meaninglessly vague and
simply causing confusion and division. "The conception of eternal justice therefore
varies not only with time or place but also with the persons concerned, and belongs
among those things of which Mulberger correctly says "everyone understands
something different""*; justice is "social phlogiston" (a non-existent substance once
thought to be given off during the combustion process), and Marx notes that, among
the moralising socialists each sect has its own notion ofjustice and rights5.
Where Hayek goes on to suggest that appeals to justice therefore camouflage
claims based on envy and self-interest, Marx develops the argument in two
3Elster, 1985, p217&230
4 Engels in Marx & Engels, 1988, p381
5 Marx, 1977, p566
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directions. First he points out that, to have any real meaning, justice must refer to the
(production-based) system in which it is claimed to be present (or absent) (see
below for further discussion of this); but he also suggests that, without reference to a
concrete system or situation, justice represents a "goal with no historical content"*.
On this latter point, then, he seems to come to the same conclusion as Hayek - social
justice is a mirage. It would be unrealistic to argue against the variety of concepts of
(social) justice, or to dispute Engels' finding that even the acceptance of universal
philosophical principles of justice seems quite compatible with serious disagreement
as to what sorts of social arrangements are just and unjust7 (and this even before the
emergence of the pluralistic society !). Yet it would be equally unrealistic to deny
the power of the appeal to (social) justice, even in the absence of any significant
consensus as to its meaning.
Machan suggests8 a distinction between conceptions (of justice), which will
vary, and the concept which ties the various conceptions together. I'm not convinced
that this is helpful as a distinction unless the concept can be clearly formulated; nor,
however, does it seem necessary for there to be a consensus (far less unanimity)
about the meaning of a concept or conception for it to be possible to talk
meaningfully about it so long as the basis of one's discussion is spelt out. In other
words, the Marxist criticism at this point seems to function more as a warning
against woolly thinking than as a conclusive attack on the validity of the concept.
Justice and The "System"
Marx, however, goes on to sav that the validity of the concept of justice is
further undermined by its reference to matters of distribution rather than production.
"It was in general incorrect (of the socialists who emphasised justice) to make a fuss
about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on it. The distribution of the
means of consumption at any time is only a consequence of the distribution of the
conditions of production"9. It is, then, the system of production that is crucial and
determines (or, Marx suggests in less determinist passages, restricts and influences)
the pattern of distribution. Of course it is not only the Marxists who would stress the
importance of production against distribution, and the neo-liberal stress on the free
market as the basis of a free society is very much tied to the private ownership of the
means of production. The paradox here may be thai the concept of a share-owning
6 Wood, 1972, p270
^ Engels in Marx & Engels, 1988. p381
8 1QSS ">
9 Marx.'cGP, pi 5
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democracy is based on a Marxist assumption about the significance of the ownership
of the means of production (both neglecting the separation of ownership from
control in modern capitalism).
Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Programme" is a sustained assault on those
socialists who think that the problems of capitalism can be solved by appeals to
justice in the distribution of its products; such reformism cannot grapple with the
root problems until it recognises that systems of distribution (and other systems,
political and legal) are aspects of the basic productive activity. Without arguing
between a hard, determinist reading or a softer one with more room for interaction
between production-base and "superstructure", there does seem to be enough
validity in Marx's thesis to force the conclusion that any social theory that fails to
take account of production as well as distribution has a severely limited viability
(and the "conversion" of Conservatives to this view may strengthen the argument
here !). That leaves the question of whether the concept of justice necessarily refers
only to matters of distribution. If injustice is experienced primarily in the context of
distribution, that surely does not mean, as Marx seems to suppose, that we cannot
talk meaningfully about justice in the system of production (so long as justice may
refer to results of actions and of systems, a question discussed below).
Marx, however, would argue that each system of production "creates" its
own concept of justice through its own internal logic; thus slavery may be reckoned
to be unjust within capitalist society but not so in feudal society. Again, there is a
similarity with those who, from a different base, would see the development of an
understanding ofjustice being a matter of developing the logic of the system. It is on
this "system-relative" account of justice that Marx can be held to claim that
capitalism is "just" (and indeed that attempts to adjust the pattern of distribution will
be "unjust" in terms of the logic of the system).
There is some dispute about the reading of Marx here, between those who
argue a "fundamentalist" line quoting passages in which Marx denies the injustice of
capitalism, and those who claim that he has his tongue firmly in his cheek here,
satirising the logic of the capitalists. When Marx describes the market as "a very
Eden of the innate rights of man which satisfies the rights of freedom, equality and
property"", his purpose is not to give the market the eternal stamp of virtue! As
McBride says, Marx uses justice occasionally at least to mean "action in accordance
10 Vid Wood, 1972, Husami, 1978, Holmstrom, 1977, etc
11 Marx, 1954, 1.172
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with the established rules of the dominant socio-economic system and nothing
more"12: for example, Marx says that "this content (of juristic forms) is just
whenever it corresponds, is appropriate to the mode of production"13. What is clear,
then, is that Marx employs a concept ofjustice as a system-relative term, by which it
makes sense to describe fraud as unjust within capitalism but doesn't make sense to
speak of low wages as unjust within that production system.
Marx also criticises this bourgeois concept of justice whereby "capitalist
transactions generate the appearance that they are transhistorically just"". Thus he
cites with disdain contemporary approval of the Sutherland clearances as "one of the
most beneficent clearings since the memory of man"13. But Elster rightly points out
that Marx's criticism here is of the pretensions of the claims made: he is not making
the counter-claim that such transactions are transhistoricallv unjust1'.
Where there is doubt is as to whether Marx would see any use for a concept
of justice in providing any external criticism of the system. Although Husami
argues that Marx provides a critique of the injustice of capitalism from a proletarian
standpoint, it is hard to find examples ofMarx using the concept in this way. Indeed,
he says quite explicitly that "right can never be higher than the economic structure
of society and the cultural development thereby determined"17. So Wood argues that,
for Marx, "justice is not a standard by which human reason in the abstract measures
human actions, institutions or other social facts. It is rather a standard by which each
mode of production measures itself'". Wood goes on to claim (rightly, I think) that
this does not commit Marx to ethical relativism, since "one does not have to be a
relativist to believe that the justice of an action depends to a great extent on the
circumstances in which it is performed"". However, this would seem to lead
logically to the conclusion that reforms of capitalist distribution in the name of
social justice are likely to be "unjust" (as inappropriate to the system), and Marx
(like Dussel and other liberation theologians) is scathing of reformists who fail to be
sufficiently radical in either critique or action. However, in a system which is not
static but continuously in the process of changing, the resultant conflicts about what
12 McBride, 1977, p76
13 Marx, 1959 3.340
^ Elster, 1985, p220 (my emphasis)
15 Marx, 1954, 1.683
|6 Elster, 1985, p220
i7 Marx, CGP, pi4
] 8 Wood, 1972, p256/7
19 Wood, 1972, p259
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is jiist may be part of the process of change in the interaction of base and
superstructure (much on the lines of Marx's own analysis of the internal
contradictions of capitalism)^. Perhaps this insight underlies Marx's own comment
that the demand for justice only arises in a system that is incapable of fulfilling its
demands.
There is, of course a dimension ofMarxism that claims to be scientific rather
than moralising. Although Husami claims2' that Marx's critique of capitalism is
primarily moral (and indeed this may be how many people understand Marx), Marx
himself emphatically denies this, notably in his criticisms of the "moralising"
socialists. In this he is close to those theorists of justice like Rawls who claim to
develop a theory on purely rational logical lines without reference to the
arbitrariness of values; like them he does seem often to get values in by the back
door. It is very difficult to read the analysis of capitalism, the discussion of
"fetishism", "alienation", "exploitation" without hearing a sense ofmoral outrage not
dissimilar to that which informs the appeal for justice; it is equally hard to see what
meaning can be given to terms like "distorted" and "undistorted" desires and
consciousness without implying an appeal to some idea of values. Thus Gould says
that "Marx's description of the social facts is at the same time a consideration of
their normative import"22; while he gives no systematic account of the underlying
values, the force of his critique of alienation and exploitation within capitalism is
clearly normative23 and implies an understanding of justice. In fact, exploitation may
be seen as the Marxist paradigm of injustice24.
While denying bourgeois concepts of human nature, Marx's concept ofman's
"species being" underlies much of the scientific critique, if sometimes as a hidden
agenda. He could see the futility of appealing purely to moral ideals, but his
doctrines of historical inevitability' and of revolutionary motivation are very
problematic (in much the same way as others have problems with the concept of
rational self-interest)-. Perhaps when Husami claims that "Marx can validly employ
the principle of just distribution according to needs to evaluate capitalism"26, he has
forgotten that Marx claims not to be conducting an "evaluation". Although Marx
2® SeeMcBride, 1975, p214
91 •
Husami, 1978, passim, esp p63
22 Gould, 1978, pi70
22 Gould, 1978, p 129
24 Kvmlicka, 1990, pi71
2- Buchanan, 1982, pl01'2
26 Husami, 1978, p57
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does refer with apparent approval to the slogan "from each according to his ability,
to each according to his needs" as a characteristic of communist society?7, he does
not use it as a tool to evaluate capitalism, nor as the blueprint for building
communism. Indeed the concept of desert, and the "contribution" principle, function
more in this way; later Marxist practice, however, has tended to stress the needs
principle as a criterion of distributive justice.
Values in Marxism
It might be argued that, like the neo-liberals, Marx operates from a Kantian
base of respect for persons and the refusal to treat them as ends. His characterisation
of the "mutual pillaging" of the market, in which people view each other's needs and
desires as levers to be manipulated, shares enough of this Kantian basis to function
as an important critique of Hayek's position on this28. Capitalism inevitably entails
using people as means rather than ends, an instrumental relationship of which
money is the expression.
This analysis of the market, of course, depends on an understanding of
freedom that has a clearly economic dimension. For Marx, the free creation of
objects is the very basis of personality and development; the private ownership of
the means of production defines the unfreedom of the majority , and the apparent
willingness of the worker to enter into a wage-labour contract is not conclusive of
his real freedom in the situation (the freedom and equality of such transactions
being an illusion)29. In fact, it is not unreasonable to read Marx as having an ethic
that is more freedom-based than justice-based, to see freedom or self-realisation as
the central value of his analysis, and to view justice as being important primarily as
a step towards freedom10. He is very hostile to the coercive apparatus of the state as
a weapon of the bourgeoisie and, like Hayek, believes that theories of (social)
justice typically justify restrictive legal systems31. His analysis of exploitation is
much more based on the denial of autonomy than on a claim (such as made by the
socialists) of injustice; "this exploitation of the labourer by capital is not a form of
injustice, but it is a form of servitude"32. The communist society is not described as
just but as one of "autonomous, socially regulated individuals"31.
27 Marx, 1977, p569
2^ Buchanan, 1982, p39
2^ See Buchanan, 1982, p54
30 Gould, 1978, pl62& 129
31 McBride, 1977, pi37
32 Wood, 1972, p277
33 Buchanan, 1982, pl64
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Marx stands against a planned economy or society; in fact, as we shall see,
that is why he rejects a role for a concept of justice in communist society'. Like
Hayek, he stresses the spontaneity of this society, and in that sense would see it as
beyond questions of justice, which belong in a competitive individualist society
which, inherently, cannot satisfy the demand for justice it induces. Buchanan
suggests that Marx rejects an adversarial i adjudicative concept of justice in favour
of a view of justice as a "spontaneous harmonious order"*4; the difference from
Hayek, then, being that Hayek has a similar model to describe capitalism now rather
than a future society. Again, however, there is little evidence in Marx to suggest this
spontaneous order is to be seen in terms of justice Rather, in its spontaneity and in
its abundance it is beyond justice. Justice, then, is seen as at best a necessary evil in
capitalist conditions of scarcity, and at worst a "barrier to a higher form of
community under abundance", when "it is better if people act spontaneously out of
love for each other, rather than viewing each other as bearers of rights, because a
concern for justice displaces love"*5. This separation of justice and love, as noted in
the previous chapter, implies a restricted view of justice, but Buchanan does not
convincingly show that Marx rejected this concept or advocated (or even regularly
used) the wider concept found Biblically and discussed in the last chapter.
Marx, with emphasis equal to Hayek's, rejects an idea of a return to the
values of an (idealised) primitive society. Because of his stress on the development
of the production base, he rejected "the tendency of other thinkers such as Rousseau
and Hegel to idealise the political life of the ancient world and to long for its
restoration"*; he also saw tribal societies as being based on an "immature
development of man individually"*7 and thus achieving social integration at the
expense of the development of human personality.
Underlying much of the above discussion is the question of whether the
justice of transactions is a matter of form or of content, and whether that justice
depends on the consequences of the transaction. When Wood says "the justice of
transactions, Marx says, is not a matter of form but of content"** (a statement for
which he gives no reference in Marx's work), he seems to mean that juridical forms
(and therefore theories of justice that concentrate on these) are meaningless if
3z* Buchanan, 1982, p82
3^ Kymlicka, 1989, p 122/3
36 Wood, 1972, p254
3 ^ Marx, 1954, 1.79, cited by Buchanan, 1982, pl3
38 Wood, 1972, p257
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abstracted from the situation (production system) in which they arise. This does not
prevent him from going on to say that "the justice of acts or institutions does not
depend for Marx on their results or consequences"?*, a conclusion with which Hayek
would be happy However, we must remember that this is in the context of justice as
an internal criticism of the system; "for Marx, a transaction is just on account of its
function within the whole, and not on account of its consequences for the whole"*1.
For Marx, the results of a transaction are a function of the system; therefore,
to comment on results in terms of justice is to use the concept in a way in which
Marx is, generally, unwilling to do, as external criticism. It may be worthwhile to
look at this in the context of a more specific example - Marx's analysis of
exploitation. Despite using what seems a value-laden term, Marx purports to discuss
this in value-free terms; he certainly refrains from calling exploitation unjust (as
seen above). Exploitation is a descriptive term, not of distribution matters, but of
"forced, unpaid, surplus labour, the product of which is not under the producer's
control"41 In his analysis, Marx concentrates on the explanation of this, not on the
consequences in terms of the living standards of the workers. Thus he resisted those
who sought to mount campaigns for a "just wage", on the grounds that an
improvement in wages cannot undo the exploitation that is inherent in the system of
privately owned means of production Thus, while for the contemporary reader and
indeed many avowed Marxists "the claim that ... exploitation and injustice are
disjunctive is not tenable"42, Wood and others are right in asserting that Marx
himself tried to keep the concepts separate. Marx's effort does not seem ultimately
convincing beyond his own narrow, juridical definition of justice. That definition
may be partly a linguistic problem, for both English and German, though especially
for German in which the same root recht covers law and justice. We may well wish
to see Marx as accepting the validity of a legal / juridical concept of "justice" but
rejecting a concept of "social justice" which refers purely to the distribution system
("distributive justice"). He certainly is to be distinguished from the liberals in his
rejection ofjuridical equality as the means to preserve moral equality43, and he is, in
one sense, more radical in his individualism since he rejects the possibility of
39 Wood, 1972, p258
40 Wood, 1972, p289
41 Holmstrom, 1977, p359
4^ Husami, 1978, p?8
43 Kymlicka, 1989, p!06f
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"justice" achieved through general rules because any general rule must by definition
neglect relevant differences44.
One reason for his rejection of "social justice" is in terms ofMarx's rejection
of moral ideals as effective in producing change. I can find very little evidence for
Husami's claim that "such (Marxian) norms (as justice) serve a critical function in
transforming the consciousness of the proletariat, conferring on it the power of the
negative or making it the agent of revolutionary change"45. Nor do the passages in
the Critique of the Gotha Programme in which Marx speaks of the "contribution"
principle ("to each according to his contribution") and its transcendence in
communist society by the "needs" principle) seem adequate as the basis for a
reconstructed Marxist hierarchical view of justice (such as Elster postulates4*).
Buchanan, Wood and others are right in contending that this is not Marx's own
analysis; it may well, however, be a useful refinement or development of part of his
critique.
However, there is another problem, relating to the validity of such a term as
"Marxian norms". Marx eschews the use of concepts of justice or right appropriate
to one (eg communist) society as tools of criticism of another (eg capitalist); "the
temptation to apply post-capitalist juridical standards (however they may be
understood) to capitalist production can only derive ... from the vision of
postcapitalist society as a kind of eternal juridical structure against which the
present state of affairs is to be measured and found wanting"47. Marx refuses to use
the "vision" of a communist society in that way; and as seen above he does not
describe communist society as "just" anyway. Rather he would see it as having
transcended the questions of justice that arise in capitalism (and earlier societies)
due to conditions of scarcity and conflict: democratic control will be sufficiently
harmonious and bountiful to eliminate distributive conflicts4".
There may be an over-optimism here about the impending redundancy of the
concept, (particularly if abundance replacing scarcity is its precondition), and later
Marxists have stressed the "needs" principle as a criterion of justice. However, it is
undeniable that Marx believed not that communist society would conform to a
particular pattern ofjustice but that it was beyond such concepts, in much the same
44 Elster, 1985, p221
45 Elster, 1985, p39
46 Elster, 1985, p229/30
47 Wood, 1972, p270
4^ Buchanan, 1982, p58
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way as it would be beyond religion as the factors prodticing religious consciousness
would disappear. There would of course be some Christians who would see the
Kingdom as beyond justice in the same sense of adjudication of rights; in fact may
be said to fit readily with the Pauline treatment of the Law, as Tillich picks up when
he says "he who needs a law which tells him how to act or how not to act is already
estranged from the source of the law which demands obedience"*9.
Perhaps Marx's most important contribution to the study of justice lies in his
critique of ideology. "Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas,
views and conceptions, in one word man's consciousness, changes with every
change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his
social life?"50. (Judging by the number of philosophers and theologians who assume
the opposite, the answer to Marx's question seems to be "yes".) The basic point here
may be taken to be that "in every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling
ideas"5" and "each new (ruling) class ... has to give its ideas the form of universality
and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones"". Thus appeals to
concepts of (eternal, absolute) human nature are abstractions since human nature is
seen as in continuous transformation; thus Bentham, for example, takes the English
shopkeeper as the norm of "man" ( a "grocer's shop" model that may have recently
been in vogue, though largely displaced by the consumer model).
Again there are "soft" and "hard" interpretations ofMarx's argument here At
the "hard" end, we are left with no role for philosophy even in the interpretation of
society, at the "softer" end, we have what is now a commonplace of the sociology of
ideas, that the content of apparently universal concepts is historically conditioned. A
resultant sharpening of our senses when we hear appeals to "justice", and a wariness
of how the concept can be abused would be useful fruit of Marx's argument. In
Christian terms, we might say that original sin affects our moral thinking and
concepts with the desire to justify ourselves (which need not be self-conscious). He
is not simply saying that ruling classes manipulate the world of ideas to their own
advantage, but that even with good will ideas and concepts are children of the time
(or more precisely the mode of production in which they arise). However, Marx
does leave some room for ideas within the process of change. "When people speak
of ideas that revolutionise society they do but express the fact that within the old
49 Tillich, 1968, Vol2, p54
Marx, 1977, p236 (Communist Manifesto)
Easton and Guddhat (eds), 1967, p438
Easton and Guddhat (eds), 1967, p439
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society the elements of a new one nave been created"". On that argument, one might
see that the perception of injustice in capitalist society would be a sign of its
emergent contradictions. The danger, for Marx, would be either in getting distracted
by dealing with philosophy rather than revolutionary praxis, or in getting side¬
tracked into dealing with the symptom rather than the cause. Tinkering with the
superstructure is, for Marx, wasted effort.
Does Marx Leave Room For Justice ?
Is it possible, then, to say that Marx has room for a concept ofjustice? Lukes
describes four positions which have been "ably and convincingly defended", namely
(1) Marx thought that the relationship between capitalist and worker was just (2) he
thought it was unjust (3) he thought it was just in one aspect and unjust in another
and (4) he thought it was neither just nor unjustM. All of these arguments have been
drawn on above, and for the purposes of this thesis one of the most important points
seems to be that Marx does see the use of a concept of justice as a test of the internal
logic of a system; in that sense it may even help to make clearer the internal
contradictions of the system. It is when we come to the possibility of a concept of
social justice furnishing an external demand that Marx allows less validity in the
concept. Both Marx and Engels criticise the "mystification" and "glorification" of
the concept of justice, seeing it as an attempt to give socialism a higher ideal
orientation by replacing the proper materialist base with a "modern mythology"55.
What is not always clear is whether they simply saw this as an abuse of the concept
(and their own efforts directed to "clarity' the role of the concept of justice in social
life"5®) or whether they would reject any constructive role for the concept
As Wood also says "those who attempt to construct a Marxian idea of justice
from Marx's manifold charges against capitalism are at best only translating Marx's
critique of capitalism, or some aspect of it, into what Marx himself would have
consistently regarded as a false, ideological or mystified form"". As noted above,
Marx (partly for linguistic reasons) saw questions of justice as inevitably tied up
with questions of rights and "the concept of a person as essentially a being with a
sense of justice and who is a bearer of rights is a radically defective concept that
53 Marx, 1977, p236
Lukes, 1985, passim
33 Marx, 1961, p31
56 Wood, 1972, p245
57 Wood, 1972, p272
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could only arise in a radically defective form of human society"*'. (But what, then, is
the basis for the evaluation "distorted"?). Some claim that Marx is simply rejecting
bourgeois concepts of justice and rights, but it seems clear that in fact Marx makes
"determined efforts to expunge all talk about justice from the basic vocabulary of
social criticism"**. Attacking Proudhon and others, Marx categorises talk of social
justice as "obsolete verbal rubbish"60 and Engels, in an article on "a fair day's pay for
a fair day's work" says that, seeking an answer to questions of fairness, "we must not
apply to the science ofmorals or of law and equity, nor to any sentimental feeling of
humanity, justice or even charity. What is morally fair, what is even fair in law, may¬
be far from being socially fair. Social fairness or unfairness or unfairness is decided
by one science alone - the science which deals with the material facts of production
and exchange, the science of political economy"61 (thus taking us back to a system-
relative evaluation).
Conclusion : Marx, "Biblical" Justice and Debt
Perhaps it is in greater conformity with the Marxist view and terminology
when Dussel suggests a more limited aim for an ethic of justice, which he says
"need not define its imperatives positively in advance ... (but) need only negate the
prevailing negation"62. Certainly, Kymlicka says that Marx views justice as a
"remedial virtue, a response to some flaw in the community that can and will be
overcome"6*, and this seems in line with what was found in the previous chapter
(particularly in Lebacqz).
We also found there that Biblically justice is concerned with relationships. In
similar vein, Lang says "the social relations that consist in living off one's own work,
using the fruits of one's labour and disposing over it oneself - that is just for Marx"64,
and Gould's attempt to reconstruct Marx's underlying "ontology of justice" focusses
crucially on relationships. She says that, for Marx, justice is not abstract principle
but concrete social relations, in the reciprocity of "social relations in which agents
mutually enhance each other"6*. That, more than equitable distribution of goods, is
the key to justice; it appears to take place in the market, but the underlying
Buchanan, 1982, p51
Buchanan, 1982, p84
Marx, 1977, p569 (Critique of the Gotha Programme)
61 Engels, 1967, p98
62 Dussel, 1988, pi07
63 Kvmlicka, 1989, pi00
64 Lang, 1979, pi 17
65 Gould, 1978, p 171
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relationship of dependence involved in the private ownership of the means of
production means that the apparent reciprocity is merely instrumental, not treating
each agent as an end in herself. The equality that matters is therefore not a matter of
distribution of goods but of "an equal right to determine the forms of social
organisation and access to the means of production"66.
With regard to the starting point of this inquiry into justice (ie credit and
debt), Marx has a great deal to say about the role of credit in the genesis and
development of capitalism: "with capitalist production an altogether new force
comes into play - the credit system - ... (which) soon becomes a new and terrible
weapon in the battle of competition and is finally transformed into an enormous
social mechanism for the centralisation of capitals"6'. In the light of all that has been
said above, it would be surprising ifMarx's concern were not with macro-economic
matters in relation to production, rather than matters of distribution and personal
debt, and with analysis rather than evaluation. Indeed, one impact of his critique
may be to point to setting such matters in their wider context. Detailed analysis of
what Marx has to say on these issues is, however, beyond the scope of the present
thesis and the economic system he analyses also seems far removed from the credit
and consumer society of the 1990s, although what he says about the fetishism of
commodities and of money may be strikingly appropriate. Thus he speaks of the
way in which under capitalism "a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in
debt ... (so) public credit becomes the credo of capital and want of faith in the
national debt takes the place of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which may not be
forgiven"68. He also speaks scathingly of the way in which the national debt becomes
"the only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective
possession of modern peoples"6", tracing it as having a crucial part in the misery of
the people, and echoing much that is said about Third World debt today.
Rather than talking of the impact of usury upon the proletariat, Marx gives a
dispassionate, historical analysis in the Grundrisse70. He also discusses debt in a
historical perspective, in a passage worth quoting in full:
"The class struggles of the ancient world took the form chiefly of a contest
between debtors and creditors, which in Rome ended with the ruin of the
plebeian debtors. They were replaced by slaves. In the Middle Ages, the contest
66 Gould, 1978, pi74
67 Marx, 1954, 1.571
68 Marx, 1954, 1.706
69 Mare, 1954, 1.706
7® See Lallier, 1989, p286
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ended with the ruin of the feudal debtors, who lost their political power together
with the economic basis on which it was established. Nevertheless, the money
relation of debtor and creditor that existed at these two periods reflected only the
deeper-lying antagonism between the general economic conditions of existence
of the classes in question"7'.
Thus, although he does not set personal debt in the justice context that is the
approach of this thesis, Marx does set it in a wider context in which there are
underlying considerations ofjustice to be found.
Marxism does deny a morality which is the judgment of actions by
conformity to a set of a priori, abstract norms; logically it precludes the demand for
social justice since that demand has nowhere to come from. (Marx rejects the use of
the vision of communist society for this purpose). Yet it is hard to deny that Marx's
concept of man in his "species being" does in fact give some content to a view of
human nature and therefore an opening to those who would claim that "Marx's
moral commitment and ethical outlook ... were in fact the motive force of his life's
work"". Ultimately, I agree with Wood that "if Marx chose to call these evils of
capitalism not injustices but something else, they still sound to most of us like
injustices, and it seems that we should be free to apply this term to them if we
like"7'.
Ifwe choose to do so we would use terms with greater precision and greater
understanding of ourselves and our social structure by taking on board much of what
Marx has to say against the use of the terminology of social justice. He does not give
a programme or definition of justice, but an analysis of eg exploitation and
alienation that will inform our justice talk and remind us that talking is not what it is
all about.
71 Marx, 1954, pi35
72 Zeitlin, 1967, p23
73 Wood, 1972, p267
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5. The Assault on Social Justice
(B) Havek (The New Riehtl
More obviously than from the Marxist left, the concept of social justice has
been under sustained attack from the right, especially the neo-liberal New Right, for
whom Hayek is a key theoretician. Hayek is scathing about the "preachers of
morality" (including many "clergy of all Christian denominations") who "while
increasingly losing their faith in a supernatural revelation, appear to have sought a
refuge and consolation in a new 'social' religion, which substitutes a temporal for a
celestial promise of justice"', leadmg to the dangerous error of making 'society' the
"new deity to which we complain and clamour for redress if it does not fulfil the
expectations it has created"^.
In response, it is tempting to seek to reclaim the moral high ground when
Hayek characterises life in the market economy repeatedly as a "game", especially
out of concern for the game's losers. Yet, not least because of its considerable
influence on British politics over recent years and therefore a sense in which it
represents the starting point of current discussion, it is important to ask what
Hayek's critique of the "mirage of social justice" has to say to the account of justice
developed above.
One way into this, in the form of an examination of the parable of the good
Samaritan read from a "Hayekian" perspective is offered in an appendix to this
chapter as illustrative of the argument of the chapter. This parable, or at least a
popular understanding of it, may be said to be representative of a moral consensus in
at least British society (of a kind Hayek denies3); further, a large part of the
discussion of Hayek's work may be said to centre on the same question as the
parable - "who is my neighbour?"4. The Biblical narrative5 is therefore considered
section by section, raising the issues that would seem to arise from Hayek's work.
What emerges most clearly from that discussion is a series of conflicts
between Hayek's perspective (or its implications) and many of the moral notions we
might take for granted not only in Christian terms but indeed in modern secular
1 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p66
2 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p69
^ See further below
^ See eg Forrester, 1990, pi 1
5 Luke 10.25-37
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society. This should not surprise any student of Hayek, since he repeatedly
characterises many accepted ideas as throwbacks to our past (almost a Marxist
tendency to relate ideas to the economic base of the society in which they have
grown). The particular points of conflict apparent in the discussion are (1) Hayek's
rejection of any teleology for society, as incompatible with the pluralism of the
Great Society and dangerous to its freedoms (2) his attack on the assumptions of the
"do-gooder", with regard to both the efficacy and appropriateness of "the kindness
that kills" (3) his distrust of obligations imposed on "society", or on individuals
other than by contracts freely entered into. The challenge, then, is to look critically
at such moral values as ideas of "justice" to see how much is indeed misplaced
nostalgia for the security of Egypt when the "great moral adventure" of the open
society leaves us floundering in the wilderness. The church has too often defended
yesterday as if it were the kingdom, and must be wary of substituting a "parade of
compassion" for morality or justice without a realistic assessment of the benefits or
otherwise of our actions*.
Despite his disavowal of teleology and religious/metaphysical assumptions,
Hayek's work seems to start from the question "what must we do to maintain the
Great Society?" (the basic values of which remain largely unquestioned while other
values are written off as "near-animal tribal instincts"')- Walker notes that "ethical
transcendence becomes a little-noticed casualty in Hayek's war against
constructivism"8, yet finds it easy to restore it just because Hayek already has slipped
it in the back door in the new deity called "catallaxy".
Two crucial issues arise from the problems of any attempt at harmonising
Hayek and the Christian tradition of which the parable is a paradigm. First, there is
the question of relationships in modern society. If we believe that Christian ethics
deal with people-in-relationship rather than the atomised individual that is basic to
neo-liberal thought, we need to look seriously at what is said about the nature of
relationships in the Great Society we live in. Is the instrumental/contractual model
the only realistic possibility, or can we safeguard something more communitarian
without eliminating personal responsibility? Atherton argues that to stress the
importance of (market) mechanisms is to recognise that the collective reality is
more than the sum of the individuals involved, and goes on to claim that
"relationships are improved by being translated into procedures", citing industrial
6 Green, 1990, p29
7 Hayek, 1978, p68
8 Walker, 1986, p97
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procedural agreements as paradigm9, when these may be better seen as indicative of
fractured relationships rather than constitutive of good relations. Gray, on the other
hand, is clear that markets flourish in an "individualist moral culture"; modifying
Hayek's perspective slightly, he considers that "relational goods" or principles can
never be what ultimately matters since "what alone matters in political morality (is)
the well-being of individuals""* (Hayek would substitute the freedom of individuals,
as we shall see).
We may well react against a "rational choice to eschew personal ties and
commitments", but can "rationality and self-interest work in tandem to reduce the
range of moral obligations men owe to other, known men and extend the moral
obligations one owes to all human beings by virtue of their abstract status as equal
but anonymous contributors to everyone's development"11? Could that in fact be the
message of the parable, since it does seek to include the Samaritan as "neighbour"
on the basis of his role in the story as helper? If "the existence ofmisfortune morally
requires that help be offered", does the form of help become simply "a pragmatic
question, depending on which available types of help are most effective"1*? Does
loving one's neighbour demand a response on the basis of need or does the "abstract
signal price take the place of the needs of known fellows as the goal" towards which
efforts are to be directed"? Is it really the case that nobody knows the value of his
activities to his fellows "except in so far as the market tells him"1'1? Is "need" too
elastic, and therefore exploitable, a concept (like social justice) on which to base
anything solid; if not, whose definition of need is to be followed - the state's, the
"professionals'", or the needy person's1-5?
The other issue, central to Maclntyre's discussion of justice and discussed
above1®, concerns the basis for any attempt at a Christian social ethic. Are we still
attempting to build on the capital of Christendom in an inherited consensus on the
goals, as well as the means, of our life together, or are we fooling ourselves in
imagining such a consensus as able to survive the impact of secularisation on its
foundation17? If the consensus has broken down, should we be attempting to rebuild
9 Alherton, 1992, p218
10 Gray, 1992, pp25&41
' * Crowley, 1987, p44
^ Hoover & Plant, 1989, p216
13 Hayek, 1978, p61
14 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p77
15 See CSJ, 1993b, p20
* ® Chapter 4
' 7 See Plant in Elliot & Swanson (eds), 1989, p21
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it from a Christian base (which may lead to something akin to fundamentalist
theocracies such as Iran, or the ideology of the "Christian Right" in the USA), or
from a broader, more rationalist base, such as Rawls suggests?
Having raised these questions, we move on to a critical evaluation of Hayek's
assault on the concept of social justice and its (ab)use, recalling the question
formulated by T S Eliot as a challenge, and answered unashamedly by Hayek :
"When the stranger says 'what is the meaning ofthis city ?
Do you huddle close together because you love each other ?'
What will you answer ? We all dwell together
To make moneyfrom each other' or 'This is a community' ?'s
Why Markets Work (Knowledge and Intention)
Finding a way into a critical evaluation of Hayek's thought on social justice
is a bit like breaking into a circle; in fact, part of the problem of Hayek's analysis is
that his arguments are often circular19. However, we may take as a starting point
what Hughes considers to be Hayek's crucial insight (which earned him the Nobel
prize), that markets, when functioning smoothly' and unfettered, provide "a
decentralised mechanism for co-ordinating the decisions of a large number of
economic agents'> Thus we have the picture of an anonymous mechanism (rather
than a managing mechanic) which merely co-ordinates (rather than replacing or
even, apparently, modifying) the decisions of free individuals (understood as
economic agents) with no specified ulterior motive.
Hayek himself states, as the fundamental fact on which his attack on the
"mirage" of social justice is based, "the impossibility for anyone of knowing all the
particular facts on which the overall order of activities in a Great Society is based"21.
The "Great" or "Open" Society is one in which pretended knowledge or wisdom is
dangerous folly. Thus it is dangerous for planners to assume that, even with
sophisticated technological data and tools at their disposal, they can determine
conclusively the consequences of particular economic actions. Humility is called
for, before the invisible hand of the market which alone can harness the limited,
diverse, specialised knowledge of each individual agent, the god who alone knows
every detail22. Gray rightly sees this "epistemic" argument as fundamental for Hayek.
It is not based on the practical difficulties of computing the knowledge, but on the
' ^ Chorus 111 from "The Rock"
See Crowley, 1987, and below
2® Hughes (and others), 1991, p2
21 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p8
22 Walker, 1986, pi 15
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inherent nature of the knowledge, which is "irretrievably scattered and cannot be
subject to centralisation" but is "made available for general use ... via price
signals"^. The effectiveness of these signals is undermined by attempts to regulate
the market. Indeed, even for individuals to aim at "doing good" rather than acting
out of rational self-interest may be counter-productive because of the
unpredictability of outcomes (although Hayek weakens his own argument here by
failing to apply the same unpredictability of outcomes to actions taken out of self
interest).
Clearly, there is an important point here about the limited effectiveness, and
unplanned outcomes, of economic planning, especially as the complexities of the
market seem to develop as fast as our computerised ability to understand and predict
them; there are more than enough examples of failed economic plans, of the 5year
or shorter term variety, to justify much of what Hayek is saying here. However, the
limitations of knowledge, and therefore of policy, may not be conclusive of the
value of attempts to adjust market mechanisms for specific objectives (of which,
more below).
What is more of a problem, however, in this picture of "ignorant men and
beneficent markets"^, is the (largely unsubstantiated) claim that the price
mechanism effectively utilises such diverse knowledge as its actors have. Clearly, in
a perfect market, each transaction influences all other later transactions, however
infinitesimally; but wonder at the complexity of this should not lead to blind faith in
the efficiency with which this occurs when not all market actors have equal
influence on the mechanism. We will see again below that a great deal turns on the
question of (and definition of) "efficiency".
Before that, however, there are two other questions crucial to Hayek's
rejection of "social justice". The first, which closely relates to his assertions on
"ignorance", is the question of intention.
For Hayek, the whole concept of social justice is "anthropomorphic"^,
because it is meaningless to use words like "just" or "unjust" to describe a state of
affairs which no-one has intentionally brought about. Poverty, for example, is
usually simply the impersonal result of the operation of just rules; unless there is a
clear and recent breach of these rules (which, as we have seen, might just about
23 Gray, 1992, p7
2^ Crowley, 1987, chapter heading
25 Barry, 1979, pi34
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cover the good Samaritan scenario, but not, for example, the inheritance of property
acquired by thefl generations before), the situation is to be taken as the result of
accident, and therefore a "given" of the present states - "the observation of a rule of
just conduct will often have unintended consequences which, if they were
deliberately brought about, would be regarded as unjust"*7.
It is, then, inappropriate to attach moral value to market processes (even if
Hayek occasionally does it himself!); like asking whose sin caused the man to be
born blind. But, as in the Bible story, the crux may lie in the response to the
situation; intention, surely, relates to passing by on the other side as clearly as to
inflicting injury, yet Hayek is unwilling to prescribe positive rules ofjustice.
Equally important to this question of intention is the question of
foreseeability. It is a well-established legal principle that intention may be imputed
where the consequences of action are reasonably foreseeable. Even allowing for
what Hayek says on the limitations of knowledge and predictability, it is clear from
experience that certain actions will result in deprivation for many people (although
specifying which individuals may be impossible). It is this last difficulty that Hayek
uses to "escape" from this problem, claiming that "it is only because we cannot
predict the actual result of the adaptation of a particular rule that we can assume it
to increase everyone's chances equally"21. General rules which could be shown to
lead to debt problems for a certain proportion of the population are acceptable
because not intended to lead any specific individuals into debt.
Hayek applies the same argument to the question of coercion and freedom.
Only if freedom is deliberately restricted by someone or some identifiable group can
we speak of coercion, or even lack of freedom. A man at the door of the baker's
shop barring my way restricts my freedom to buy bread, but neither my poverty nor
my rich neighbour who has bought up all the available bread would be seen by
Hayek as breaching my freedom. He might make an exception in the case of the
bureaucratic state's policy leading to the creation of a "bread mountain", but that, for
Hayek, is a different matter; this, in fact, is where his argument breaks down, since
he applies the test of foreseeability to the results of attempts to interfere in the
market, and even to the advocacy of market solutions, whose positive effectiveness
is, for him, foreseeable.
26 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pl31 & p60
27 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p39
28 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p4
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Collective Goals and Efficiency
Talk of policy takes us to the next dangerous area - that of collective goals.
We have already seen» that, for Hayek, the breakthrough towards the Great Society
lies in agreeing to live together on the basis of agreement about means but not about
ends. As Barry puts it, Hayek rejects all "end-state" or "patterned" theories'®; the
state cannot justify' coercion on the basis of particular ends, except in "special cases"
such as war or natural disasters (although it is not clear why these should be
allowable exceptions)". Indeed, even to speak about an "agreement" to live together
on a certain basis is dubious; society is the "undesigned product of an evolutionary
development"", and any attempt to change that will produce all the horrors of
totalitarianism. It is not difficult to see where Hayek's horror of "volksgemeinschaft"
comes from; but whether this is the inevitable consequence of tiny attempt to
"design" society, or to pursue common goals, is by no means clear.
Hayek says that "we should regard as the most desirable order of society one
which we would choose if we knew that our initial position in it would be decided
purely by chance"", but it is not clear what this means. How, for example, do we
weigh freedom against material prosperity in that equation? And, even in purely
material terms, do we assume the cautious approach of Rawls ("maximin"), or
confident!)' gamble on getting a high place in an unequal society, or place ourselves,
as Hayek assumes, at the average or median point? Such attempts to eliminate
human choices or shared values in the name of rationalism seem unrealistic.
Hayek's formulation also seems to beg the question of efficiency. He
assumes the productive superiority of free-market capitalism, and it may be the
pragmatic attack on the effects of policies aimed at social justice that is more
important to his case than his philosophical arguments against the mirage". In fact,
he says it is only by ignoring conceptions of merit or need that the market produces
a "more efficient allocation of resources than any design could achieve"", defining
efficiency or "the purpose of the game" in terms of making the best use of available
skills". Hayek proclaims the "brilliant" success of the Great Society in "abolishing
OQ
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poverty in the absolute sense"*', and it often seems that the value of the Great
Society is seen in its (material) fruits - both their quantity and quality, though not
their distribution. Thus Lord Harris has spoken of the "evidence of history that the
market is the most lavish distributor of good things"**, an argument depending partly
on the current absence of alternatives (rendering other solutions literally Utopian)
and partly on a Northern perspective ignoring the market's tendency to suck many of
the "good things" from poorer countries. Substantial recent research also suggests
that, even in an absolute (as well as a relative) sense, the last fifteen years of the UK
market have left the poorest worse off*».
Hayek eschews the argument that markets reward the deserving*®, but
proclaims the value of their greater efficiency, which is self-evident, not least
because the process of evolution ensures that the most efficient are the ones that
survive. Thus, he argues "the ultimate decision about what is good or bad wiii be
made not by individual human wisdom but by the decline of the groups that have
adhered to the 'wrong' beliefs"4' The argument, here, is circular - what is sound
succeeds, and what succeeds is sound*2 - and also sits very uneasily with his defence
of liberty. There may well also be an assumption that the efficiency of market
society is to be found in that goods go to those who want them most, but when that
is reduced to those who are willing to pay most for them it carries an implication
that each amount of money is worth the same to each agent4* (cf the widow's mite).
Dictionary definitions of efficiency speak of an ability to do what is required,
about effectiveness in achieving objectives. The crucial underlying difficulty with
Hayek's analysis is that it is logically inconsistent with a society which has no
collective goals - no sense of "what is required" or of "objectives", unless these are
arrived at by the market's co-ordinating mechanism (in which case the argument is
again circular).
Ifefficiency is concerned with achieving goals, can we speak of efficiency in
the pursuit ofjustice, rather than efficiency and (distributional) justice as alternative
goals? The latter approach leaves us arguing about the relative merits of increasing
the size of the cake or redistributing the existing cake. Butler, for example, arguing
37 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p!39
3^ Harris etc, 1985, p5
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that the primary aim is to increase the size of the cake, derides the notion thai there
is an "income pie to be distributed and that the process of producing that pie can
continue unabated until the next distribution"". This not only reflects the key idea
that there is no "distributor" to be blamed for an "unjust" result, but also joins Marx
in believing that production and distribution cannot be separated. Thus, Hoover and
Plant plead for the left to continue to see the centrality of production to distribution,
and not assume that the problem of production has been finally solved, leaving only
matters of distribution to be decided45.
There may still be decisions to be made between maximising the product and
"just" distribution, but it is important to remember that we are not dealing with
separate systems of production and distribution. While there is an apparent left/right
agreement here about their inseparability, it should be noted that, where production
is basic for Marx, it is (on the face of it at least) the distribution system ("the
market") that is central to Hayek. Hayek's model of the market, however, assumes a
capitalist mode of production sensitive to the market and not to other pressures or
constraints.
However, there may be no necessary trade-off between justice and
efficiency. Atherton, writing from a Christian perspective, rightly says "to choose an
alternative system because it is morally preferable but much less efficient is quite
likely to produce more disturbing consequences for human living"44, but the contrast
may not be inescapable. Justice without "efficiency" may indeed be a "moral lame
duck" (particularly if he means justice that is ineffective), but the language of
efficiency is capable of concealing even more sectional interests than that of justice.
"Wealth creation within a market economy bounded by a concern for justice"47 may,
as Griffiths argues, be possible: indeed there may be a substantial economic as well
as social, cost of inequality48.
Several commentators, including Hayek himself, note that the evolution of
capitalism in various ways sows the seeds of its own destruction. Moore notes that,
while economists may proclaim competition as the best way of securing efficient
use of resources, businesses continually seek to undermine or avoid competition,
and seek co-operation rather than competition within the firm. For Hayek, it is the
44 Butler, 1983, p97
4-* Hoover & Plant, 1989, p218
4^ Alherton, 1992, pi97
47 Griffiths, 1981, pi 17
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evolution of large industrial organisations, insulating their workers from the
immediacy ofmarket forces, that give rise to the demand for "just wages" etc; thus,
Barry notes, "as the market evolves it creates a moral order antithetical to its further
evolution in a spontaneous manner"49. A contradiction, then, appears in Hayek's view
of spontaneous evolution, as the process begins to negate itself; if the market was
not producing a powerful demand for something that could conveniently be labelled
"social justice", there would be no need for Hayek's attempt to stop the "witch-hunt".
What is Social Justice ?
This takes us to the next major plank of Hayek's case: there is, he says, no
real, agreed content for the concept of social justice. At the start of his lecture on
"the atavism of social justice"*), he claims to have spent a decade seeking
unsuccessfully the meaning of the term, ending in the conclusion that "with
reference to a society of free men, the phrase has no meaning whatever"". There are
two points here - (a) that the vagueness of the term leads to meaninglessness, and (b)
that to give it any real meaning demands a move away from the Open Society.
The variety of usage of "social justice" as slogan cannot be disputed (and has
already been noted tn chapter four, drawing on Maclntyre's work). As Butler notes,
it is used to represent (a) envy (b) nostalgia for the small community of common
purpose and (c) camouflage for the interests of some group52; even folk of goodwill,
seeking to avoid any of the above, will still have a wide range of views as to what is
just - an inevitable fact of life in a pluralist society. Does this mean that the concept
has lost any power to transcend, to exert a demand, rather than simply provide a
specious justification, cloaking competing claims? If so, why does the concept have
sufficient power to worn Hayek and others? Hayek's comparison with belief in
witches would suggest that social justice need have no reality for the search for it to
be as destructive as a witch-hunt; the analog)', however, doesn't quite hold. Witch¬
hunts are simply an esoteric aberration unless belief in witches has some hold on
people; that does not take us to the Peter Pan idea that if enough people believe in
fairies then fairies exist, but it does mean that belief in "social justice" (however
vaguely understood) is important to people - sufficiently important in the UK of the
1990s for the Labour Party to establish a Commission on Social Justice. If
politicians and others find it useful to put their case in terms of social justice, and to
49 Barry, 1979, pi43
50 Hayek, 1978, p57ff
51 Hayek, 1978, p57
52 Butler, 1983, pl03
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debate whether or not a given poliey would be socially just, then the term must have
some force and enough of a core meaning to be usefully understood.
Of course, a great deal of the discourse does indeed consist of intuitive
reactions and assessments, not coherently formulated"; and there are almost as
many competing (and conflicting) theories of social justice as there are people
willing to write on the subject. In a society lacking "first order moral agreement"* it
will be difficult, if not impossible to achieve a widely accepted coherent account.
Even if that can be achieved, however, Hayek would see a credible demand for
social justice as even more dangerous. Its advocates are not simply deluded, but
pose a grave threat to "most other values of a free civilisation""; theirs is not an
"innocent expression of goodwill" but a "dishonest insinuation" which is destructive
ofmoral feeling and personal responsibility".
At one level, this is because he sees such claims as inevitably exclusive of
"outsiders" (back to the good Samaritan), which may be often true, but not
inevitably so At a deeper level, the demand for social justice, while presented in
moderate terms, will inevitably lead to a radical change, from spontaneous to
directed society, from cosmos to taxis, if such demands are to be satisfied. As we
have noted, Marx would agree that a revolutionary change would be needed, not so
much (in his terms) to give the concept meaning as to achieve the reality of what is
sought. For Hayek, striving for litis unattainable goal will produce highly
undesirable consequences in terms of personal freedom and the moral environment.
A government which attempts to achieve social justice cannot but be acting in an
arbitrary way, not "playing the game", and infringing seriously personal freedom. To
evaluate this requires consideration of Hayek's understandings of justice and of
freedom.
Justice and rules are vital to the Great Society, to preserve its basis in Hume's
trinity of stability of possession, transference by consent and performance of
promises57. Rules of just conduct deal, therefore, with transactions rather than their
results - a procedural understanding of justice58. Despite agreeing that, in the
absence of any absolute system of morals, there are no positive criteria of justice,
53 So Hayek, 1978, p58
Plant, in Elliot & Swanson (eds), 1989,, p 19
55 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p66/7
56 Hayek, 1982 (Vo!2), p97
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Hayek decisively rejects the legal positivist position, seen as an excuse for arbitrary
exercise of power. In what seems a distinctively common law understanding, he sees
justice as determining law (rather than the reverse), and solutions as discovered, not
decreed, by judges who reflect the consensus that has emerged within the system59.
There is, then, a negative test, of conformity with the system; thus "all valid
criticism or improvement of rules of conduct must proceed within a given system of
such rules"60, otherwise it is Utopian (a problem Marx also faces, as we have seen).
Machan argues that this is not as static a concept as might seem, since new rights
can emerge as the system evolves by resolving its own internal contradictions61.
Hayek, then, clearly belongs within the classic liberal tradition which
confines justice to "the impartial application of abstract rules involving no more
than equality before the law, the enforcement of the rules of contract, tort and
property, and the maintenance of a system of criminal law"62. Thus, contracts or
voluntary agreements are fundamental to his understanding of justice and of society;
they represent "an ultimate ideal for social interaction"". Justice, then, means
fulfilling contracts; debts must be paid, regardless of any circumstances other than
the proper making of the original contract. Barry sees this move from justice as
reciprocity (which he describes as a "cultural universal") to justice as the
performance of contracts as an easy and tempting one, but one which unduly
narrows the meaning of justice, leaving us without a concept to evaluate
distributions". Certainly there is a long Christian tradition which would stress that a
procedural concept ofjustice is not sufficient65.
Basic to Hayek's understanding ofjustice is the principle of universalisability
- rules applicable to all, in rational relationship to each other, and justice that is
blind. Intervention to redistribute in the name of rectifying justice would be a breach
of this pnnciple; "though it might seem reasonable so to frame laws that they will
tend more strongly to improve the opportunities of those whose chances are
relatively small, this can rarely be achieved by generic rules"66.
See Machan, 1985, p202 etc
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Yet, it is not clear that generic rules are incapable of building social justice;
universal child benefit is widely reckoned to be one of the most effective means of
combating poverty. Further, the question of "rules applicable to all" seems to beg a
few questions. For example, would a "no dogs except guide dogs" rule be acceptable
on Hayek's criteria? And, if defined exceptions are allowed, would the legal
structure of apartheid be acceptable as "just"? The principle is superficially
attractive, but not as credible as the basis for justice as might appear. Machan
suggests that a Kantian "respect for persons" underlies Hayek's insistence on rules
applicable to all, but if such "respect" refuses to deal with the realities of human
need it lacks credibility®7. Indeed, there is a fundamental conflict between an
anonymous rule-based understanding of justice and a personalist view which starts
from the real outcomes of market and other mechanisms on people's lives";
"whereas (Hayek's) justice concentrates on rules, social justice concentrates on
people"®*. If, as Machan suggests, Hayek believes that if you take care of the rules
people can take care of themselves, this scarcely accounts for the casualties of the
market.
Hayek's Core Value - Freedom
In the absence of a consensus about principles of social justice (such as
might sustain the "no dogs except guide dogs" rule while rejecting the apartheid
rules which are in similar form), there is a real danger in the exercise of what
therefore appears as arbitrary power by government, and it is this, treating people
differently, that Hayek sees as a threat to freedom. The Magnificat, therefore, is far
from noble in its picture of a God who fills the hungry with good things while the
rich are sent empty away.
Hayek goes so far as to say that "freedom (in the sense of being allowed to
act on the basis of one's own moral beliefs) is inseparable from rewards which often
have no connection with merit and are therefore felt to be unjust"7®. The problem
may be traced back to Roosevelt's "four freedoms" which squeezed questions of
need into the assertion of personal autonomy, opening the door for the advocates of
social justice to undermine freedom while claiming to defend its reality. Thus
Hoover and Plant argue that "there are certain goods which are so necessary for
67 Machan, 1985, p268-76
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individual agency and action that they should be provided for collectively and
intentionally rather than through the market"71; this leads to a presumption for equal
distribution, in the absence of any reason why not. This link between freedom and
resources reflects a sense that empowerment should be seen as a dimension of any
realistic understanding of freedom (though one which, as already noted, Hayek
would not share, arguing from his negative understanding of freedom as absence of
coercion). The problem lies in reaching agreement on what are these basic human
needs, when the concept has proved elastic. Hayek's argument here, that once started
on needs there is no stopping the expansion of the concept, is a powerful one,
though somewhat undermined by his own allowance of a minimal welfare state to
deal with absolute deprivation.
On a more philosophical level, Hayek argues that freedom "means that in
some measure we entrust our fate to forces which we do not control"72 (almost seif-
abandonment to the divine providence of the invisible hand), rather than mastery of
our own fate. We are left, then, with a freedom that is to be found in the absence of
intentional coercion but has little to do with achieving outcomes or with real
opportunities. Market-induced poverty (if it is legitimate even to speak in those
terms) is not to be seen as a limitation of freedom"', and the position of someone in a
poorly-paid, unpleasant job could only be reckoned unjust if someone assigned him
that job rather than his "choosing" it in the freedom of the market7'. Behind this,
there is an unrealistic assumption about ease of entry to and exit from markets
which denies the constraints (and pain) which are part of that in any known, real
market situation. An understanding of freedom which fails to include this dimension
of participation would seem to lack realism; to say that "the market benefit benefits
all participants but not everyone chooses to be a participant"75 is to ignore what it
means not to participate.
Choice is an essential ingredient of this understanding of freedom; what the
market provides is precisely freedom of choice, and Schluter and Lee rightly see a
fundamental conflict between this individualist understanding of choice as a
supreme value and a relational understanding with a wider sense of obligation76.
Although they recognise that there are circumstances in which choice can "rectify
7' Hoover & Plant, 1989, p210
72 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p30
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structural injustices otherwise would keep people tied into bleak and unworkable
relationships"77, they also see the destructive potential of this possessive
individualism on relationships. The language of choice, especially if it represents
only freedom from legal constraints, also seems of limited realistic relevance to the
debtors discussed in chapter one' many of those interviewed in chapter two felt they
had no real choices.
More convincingly, Hayek argues that freedom is the necessary basis of
moral values, and that dependency (such as is induced by the demand for social
justice) is the enemy of responsible moral decision-making. We have noted above
how this can be brought to a pragmatic level in providing the rationale for "passing
by on the other side" by assigning responsibility to "society"; it is also the basis for
Social Fund and Student loans replacing grants. Again, there is an underlying
individualist assumption in this. While Christians may be attracted by Walker's
derivation of this concept of freedom from a Christian "freehold on one's soul",
Hayek may have a better grasp of the communal social dimension of Christian
moral thinking when he sees Christianity as a threat to such values as private
property7'. For all that the jubilee sought to liberate people from dependency, the
individualism of Havekian freedom still rests uneasily with the Biblical view of
justice outlined in chapter four above.
Ultimately, Hayek's only argument to justify freedom as supreme value is a
circular one in terms of utility or efficiency; freedom is efficient, and what is
efficient is what produces the most freedom79. No justification is offered for
removing freedom from his analysis of moral relativism in relation to other
concepts, nor any basis for assuming a consensus about freedom that is absent in
relation to other values. There is, here, a concealed choice of freedom over welfare,
the superior value of freedom being taken, generally, as self-evident. The
concealment of the option between freedom and welfare is symptomatic of Hayek's
denial of political choice - "in a society of omniscient persons, there would be no
room for a conception of justice", he says, since omniscience would include
knowledge of the relative importance of the (known) effects of one's actions'0 Thus,
evolutionary rationalism takes the place of political choice.
77 Schluter & Lee, 1993, p43
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If the two great enemies of politics are "indifference to suffering and the
quest for certainty in matters which are essentially political"*", one can find both in
Hayek. Although he does allow for some security against deprivation (without
defining how this is possible without opening the door wide to disaster), he
considers (as noted above) that absolute poverty has been brilliantly abolished in the
Great Society (falling at least into what he himself sees as the tribal trap of
excluding from consideration "outsiders"). When he says that inequality of result
does not make a transaction unjust he is using a stipulative definition of justice to
avoid dealing with poverty; when he speaks of not allowing known and concentrated
harm to count against diffused benefits to many*2 he has to suspend his own
strictures on ignorance of effects to justify inflicting harm: when he describes those
who have to learn by bitter experience that they have misdirected their efforts he
seems to pass by on the other side of unemployment, which disappears into the
efficiency with which the market uses available skills.
The justification for this apparent indifference to poverty is in terms of the
threat which measures to eliminate (or even alleviate) poverty will pose to the Great
Society'. Yet, despite Atherton's attempt to win Christians away from an "undue
concentration on poverty"*3, there is a clear conflict between this approach and the
understanding of poverty as injustice which was crucial to the Christian concept of
justice developed above*4. For that latter concept, justice demands more than that
"debts should be paid"; it demands that the economic and social, as well as legal,
circumstances in which the debt was incurred be considered, and indeed that the
poverty' of which debi may be symptomatic be the urgent starting point of concern
and action. Hayek's strictures here may be usefully taken as warning of the
unintended consequences of such interventions in the market, without ultimately
undermining the need for something to be done.
"Catallaxv"
Hayek describes the network of exchange mechanisms (markets or
economies)*-4 as a "catallaxy", from the Greek (New Testament) term katallassem (to
reconcile). Only the openness of this "catallaxy" can admit "outsiders" into the
"community'" and change them from enemies into "friends" (or at least fellow
81 Crowley, 1987, p280
82 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p!22
8^ Atherton, 1992, p284
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players in the market). Thus Kennedy argues that while the market may not have
saved our souls it might claim "to have replaced conflict with competition, and a
wide degree of co-operation"86; the interests of producers and of consumers are
"reconciled" by price signals. But this seems a long way from the New Testament
roots of the term. Although Shriver has shown how the urgencies of getting on with
the business of making money have contributed to reconciliation between Eastern
Europe and the USA87, the willingness of the desperate to contract for interest rates
of, say, 500% in order to clothe their children hardly constitutes "reconciliation"
with the loan-shark (though it may reflect the necessities of a temporary
partnership).
To participate in the catallaxv is to play a game - according to the dictionary
definition, combining skill and chance - which is defined by the rules. Unless
someone is cheating, there is no need to justify the result of the game, since it is just
that, the outcome of a game that is played because it increases the chances of all.
For Hayek, there is no middle way between this game played in the Great Society,
and the designed and directed life of totalitarian society (despite the fact that, in the
West, we have lived between these two extremes for all of this century at least, with
a shifting balance) The virtues of "playing the game" may be appealing and
sufficient when the game is played by those who wish to play it, and when the
outcome is not a matter of life or death; but players in the market have no realistic
alternative, and it is only by closing one:s eyes to those who suffer after falling down
a snake that the view from the top of the ladder seems exhilarating.
As Crowley points out, for Hayek, "the Great Society ... is the only one in
which man's selfish, utility -maximising nature can become rational, responsible and
morally fulfilled"88, not by conversion but by the market's ability to translate our
pursuit of gain into doing good. Thus he follows Adam Smith in arguing that we
look to the rational self-interest of the baker, rather than his beneficence, for our
daily bread. This Great Society is peopled by individuals and is "in fact
irreconcilable with 'solidarity' in the true sense of unitedness in the pursuit of known
common goals"89. The market works to harmonise individual interests with the
general good, but group interests are almost inevitably contrary to the general good
Yet (as seen above) the spontaneous evolution of the market seems to foster the
8^ Kennedy, in Davies (ed), 1993, p90
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growth of groups playing together, and it is hard to see why the market mechanism
cannot logically handle that with the same efficiency as it handles individual players
with their own objectives.
Economics and Morality
This language of reconciliation and of playing the game is, perhaps
deliberately, provocative to Christians who would want to take both reconciliation
and economic life with more moral seriousness than Hayek's use of these terms
seems to imply. Behind Hayek's philosophy lies what Walker describes as an uneasy
mixture of agnosticism and respect for traditional moral values*. He shows great
respect for a cultural heritage which he sees as creating a moral consensus on
matters of personal morality, basic to the system of just rules, a consensus which
may be breaking down as much as any consensus on public morality, whence the
need for its defence. The problem for Hayek's case is that the operation of the
market itself evokes consumer values that may, in the long run, be hostile to the
traditional values he wants to cherish.
However, even Walker, in his attempt at a Christian "rehabilitation" of
Hayek", has to admit that "those whose moral thinking and sentiment have been
formed in any significant measure by Christian moral tradition will ... tend to find
little common ground with Hayek"«. Noting how uncomfortably an ethic of love and
servanthood sits with the neo-liberal vision (and that Christians cannot be content
with the Havekian word of comfort quoted in the appendix - "he does most good
who pursues gam"), Walker nevertheless claims that "the disjunction Hayek
introduces between the market order and Judaeo-Christian moral tradition is
intellectually unnecessaryTo substantiate this, he invites Christians to see in the
"invisible hand" of the market the hand of the God who in all things works together
with his people for good. Indeed, "the spontaneous mechanisms of the market may
be a mercy of God, a mechanism providentially suited to man's imperfect nature"*,
dealing (as socialism fails to do) with human sinfulness by accepting it and
integrating it ("corralling" it with incentives). Thus market mechanisms become the
new deity of Hayek's thought. Santa Anna speaks of the effect of this as the
90 Walker, 1986, p63
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"sociological sacralisation" of the "laws" of the market*-, and Assmann points to the
deification of the market as economic thought's attempt to "retranslate the essence
of Christianity"9®, close to idolatry. Preston therefore seeks to steer a middle way
between the market as God and the market as Satan, arguing for a demystification
which would remove it from the structures of heaven and hell; markets, like other
economic constructs, need to be taken "seriously, but not too seriously"97, reckoned
with but not worshipped.
Although he finds Hayek's theory of the market as spontaneous order without
overall purpose "unacceptable to Christian opinion, contradicting as it does
Christian beliefs in creation, providence, stewardship and human relationships"9*,
Atherton wants to defend the autonomy of economics, and therefore the market. Just
as Christianity was foolish in failing to recognise the autonomy of science and its
truth in the battles against Galileo etc, so the church is foolish in seeking to assert
authority over against the laws of economics which are as incontrovertible as the
law of gravity Thus he rejects the "pre-modem" view of such as the World Council
of Churches that economics (and other disciplines) are ultimately "subordinate to
God's will"99, a view reflecting the "embedded" economy of Biblical times.
Economics, however, does not describe a separate part of reality; it always works in
a particular (political, legal, cultural) context, and is itself a legal and political
construct rather than a spontaneous order100. Clearly, the market is part of reality
with which Christians have to engage (seriously and with adequate understanding of
economics), but it surely cannot be hidden beyond theological or ethical critique in a
defence of its "autonomy" which fails to distinguish description of how markets
work from evaluation of the effects of their working. That critique must surely also
seek to limit the tendency of the market to encompass every area of life in its
language and ideological grasp.
We may see the result of Hayekian policies in the UK of the 1980s as
reversing the embedding of ancient times - "where market transactions used to be
embedded in a wider web of social relationships, nowadays our social relationships
are becoming embedded in, and often conditional upon, the pervasive relationships
95 III WCC (CCPD), 1992, p20
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and relative forces of the market"101. At least one economist wishes to see this
process reversed, believing that further progress is only possible "if the economic
rationality ofmarket procedures is firmly embedded in a complex system of social,
non-market regulation of money and nature"10?, and the Commission on Social
Justice firmly reject the idea of "the economy as an autonomous and self-regulating
sphere that pays for necessary but burdensome social expenditure ... there cannot be
a healthy economy in a sickly society""1'. Theologically, the sovereignty of God
would appear to leave us with no alternative, so long as that sovereignty is not
confused with the sovereignty of the church. When Sedgwick argues that "the
dynamics of enterprise and wealth-creation mirror the nature of God", he is doing
more than making theological comments on cultural change or "rediscovering the
dynamic of society under the creative energy of God in Christ""*; like Walker's, his
is a legitimising theology (in which the disavowal of value-judgments simply serves
to conceal them) rather than a genuinely contextual one.
Although the argument of this chapter has been a critique ofHayek's analysis
from a Christian perspective, those Christians who wish to continue to speak of
social justice have to take heed of much of what Hayek says (a) in sharpening the
precision of our thinking (b) in realising that attempts to adjust the effects of the
market have effects throughout the network (c) in learning to reckon with, or even
harness, market forces and (d) in accepting the limitations of our knowledge of the
effects of policy, in concluding, the challenge of this is explored by returning to the
context of debt.
Concluding Comments - Havek and Debt
While Hayek has little specific to say about debt, the freeing-up of the credit
market described above105 has been one aspect of a series of policies derived from
his thinking, and much of the debate noted there is reflected in the theoretical
discussion here. For example, the two very different understandings of freedom and
justice found here in Hayek and Marx lead to very different policies with regard to
credit and debt. The Havekian perspective leads to a "free" credit market
unrestricted by legal constraints but little concern for pragmatic or economic
inhibitions on participation; if "the poor pay more", that is because the market
101 WCC, 1992, p35
102 Altvater, 1993, p260
103 CSJ, 1993b, pi3
'04 Sedgwick, 1992, pi79
105 Chapter 1
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allocates resources to those who will make best use of them, and poverty will not be
seen as an excuse for evading payment of debts. Although sceptical of appeals to
justice, Marxism will be more inclined to analyse the exploitation within the legal
rules of the system, and more interested in economic restrictions on freedom. Both
would be hostile to an approach which seemed paternalistic, and both would see
issues of debt as matters of distribution, and of secondary concern; neither would
therefore expect to achieve " social justice" by tinkering with the way the law deals
with debt.
Altvater recognises Third World debt as the clearest symptom of the failure
of the market106, indicative of a failure to deliver what is claimed, and of structural
injustice. But it is when the issues regarding repayment are considered that the
contrast between Hayek's limited, contractual sense of justice and the wider view
advocated in chapter four above is clear. Under what he sees as the perverted notion
of justice (which would include Hayek's), Assmann recognises that it is "just" to pay
in full, and "unjust" to remit the debt107; no further questions can be asked beyond
whether the original agreement was legally entered into, and outcomes, in terms of
the lives of those affected, are irrelevant.
While the conflict here is clear, in other areas the issues are more subtle.
Galbraith and other economists have argued that credit "allows the person with
energy and no money to participate in the economy more or less on a par with the
person who has capital of his own", as well as allowing money to be allocated to
those who will use it most efficiently108. Efficiency (in Hayek's sense) and the wider
sense of justice as including participation and empowerment (to which he is
opposed) would seem to arrive at the same conclusion in favour of a free credit
market. However, as has been noted in chapter one, it is by no means clear that the
freed-up credit market actually functions in this enabling way.
Debt may be seen as crucial to the market economy; in a sense, it is the
essence of capitalism. Thus Schluter and Lee argue that "it is paradoxical that, in a
system where so much has been invested to remove the stigma from borrowing, the
inability to service debts remains an acute form of social disgrace" and the debtor
seen as "a flawed consumer stripped of rank for incompetence with cash"100. Just as
Marx's homo faber is undermined by unemployment, so Hayek's consumer / market
^ Altvater, 1993, pi26
Assmann, 1990, p59
Galbraith, 1975, p79f; see also Schluter & Lee, 1993, pi9%<9
^ Schluter & Lee, 1993, pi65
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participant is disabled by debt; a more developed understanding of justice than
Hayek's is needed to deal with the issues here.
In a related way. advocates of the New Right see loans as the prime, market
method for helping the poor. Charity encourages dependency; state provision
concentrates power and so leads to injustice»o. Both erode the crucial sense of
personal responsibility, whereas loans leave that intact and keep the recipient as a
player in the market game. As with international debt, however, this scenario cannot
cope when repayment becomes impossible. In fact, as Altvater argues, it is not
orderly repayment but recurrent debt crises that are historically the norm"', and
writing off is an everyday fact of life, though one which more often takes the form
of a "subsidy to the contented" (Galbraith's description of American baling out of
Savings and Loan Companies)'" than a genuine attempt towards "justice".
This brief, particular, contextualising of Hayek's thought on justice suggests
that a concept of social justice not only survives his critique but is a necessary tool
for dealing with the problems of the market economy he so wholeheartedly praises,
Clearly Hayek is right to challenge an illusion of moral agreement behind a
smokescreen called "social justice". But that is not to deny the possibility of action
or the value of dialogue on the subject. To achieve a Christian contribution to this
we need to avoid ah false gods - whether markets or societies - and make room for
the transcendent God of justice, as a challenge to pluralist, consumer society rather
than the harbinger of a new theocracy.
' '0 Novak, in Berger (ed), 1990, p37
111 Altvater, 1993, pi25/6
1 Galbraith, 1992, p48/9 and elsewhere
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5B - Appendix
An Examination of the Parable of the Good Samaritan
from a Havekian Perspective
The Question(s) - Luke 10.25-29
Immediately (v25) we are involved in what Hayek would characterise as a
dangerously teleological issue, which might lead to a fruitless search for agreement
in society about the purpose of life together, and to "end-dependent" rules which
will undermine the Great Society. The "Great" (or "Open") Society is a "cosmos"
sustained by "end-independent" rules, rather than an ordered (totalitarian) society
("taxis"). Thus, on the one hand, Hayek rejects the coercive implications that he sees
as necessarily bound up with the attempt to forge agreement on the ends of life
together. On the other hand, his belief in the "existence of a widespread opinion on
the principles of just conduct, but the impossibility of agreement on the ends at
which just conduct should aim"', underpins his entire political and legal theory. (The
lawyer in the story assumes agreement on ends while his question arises from doubt
as to the "principles of just conduct", or at least their precise implications).
However, the question may be allowed in this case, since it is. apparently, purely
personal - not "what must we do ?" but "what must I do ?" - and therefore
compatible with the pluralistic society that Hayek cherishes, so long as there is no
attempt (such as the "Law") to make the answer normative.
The initial answer which the lawyer himself gives, from the Law, is,
however, inappropriate to the Great Society, which has outgrown "such feelings as
love which constituted the highest virtue m the small group"?. lx>ve, Hayek
continues, "is a sentiment which only the concrete evokes, and the Great Society has
become possible through the individual's efforts being guided not by the aim of
helping particular other persons, but the confinement of the pursuit of their common
purposes by abstract rules"'. Love, for both Jesus and the lawyer, is not a sentiment,
and is evoked primarily by God (whom Hayek would certainly not include within
the concrete).
1 Crowley, 1987, p85
2 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pi50
3 Hayek. 1982 (Vol2), pi50
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However, this brings us to a key point. The fundamental question - "who is
my neighbour9" - shows clearly that this whole story deals with a transitional period,
in Hayek's terms, between "tribal face-to-face society" and the emergence of the
Great Society. Hayek sees the tribal phase as that of the great codifications of ethics
in the major monotheistic religions*, and this clearly fits with the developed "social
security" system of the Law, typical of an "embedded" economy. We might well
claim that that system was not as hostile to the "alien" as Hayek claims such systems
inevitably were, but the emergence of the lawyer's question may be seen as a clear
sign that the problem of the "outsider" was a real and growing one, made more
urgent by increased mobility.
It may well be that Hayek has this parable and its grip on our thinking in
mind when he complains that our verbal tradition is still dominated by duty to
neighbours; but he sees "neighbour" as identified with the fellow-member of the
tribe, and implying hostility- to strangers5. For Hayek, the extension of rules of just
conduct to all (as the Great Society- emerges) means a lessening of obligation to
"neighbours"®: so we may see behind the question the problems and indeed
impending collapse of a neighbour-based ethic, and Jesus' attempt to rehabilitate it
for a changed society. In a recent lecture in Edinburgh, Jenkins has drawn attention
to the impact of the scale and complexity ofmodern market societies which, despite
the high technology of communication media, actually inhibit effective
communicating, meaning that "the values of moral face-to-faceness" cannot any-
longer be applicable7. Ignatieff has also spoken of this problem; on the one hand, it
seems that "only a society of strangers, ofmediated and indirect social relations has
the dynamism to achieve progress"*, but (in contrast to Hayek) he goes on to argue
that we need "to find a language for our need for belonging which is not just a way
of expressing nostalgia, fear and estrangement from modernity"9 (which couid be
precisely what Jesus is offering). This we will return to in looking at the
implications of the parable.
^ Hayek, 1978, p61
5 Hayek, 1978, p61
6 Hayek. 1982 (Vol2), p90
7 Jenkins, 1994. p4
8 Ignatieff, 1984, p! 19
9 IgnatiefiE, 1984, pi39
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The Scenario (Luke 10.30)
The first point to notice here is that we are dealing with a victim of what
even Hayek would call injustice, ie harm intentionally done to him by individuals.
His situation is, therefore, quite different from such as (a) the prodigal son, or the
hungry or the naked (from the parable of the sheep and the goats), who are simply
losers in the market game and (b) the blind, crippled etc, whose misfortune is just
that and cannot sensibly be described as unjust.
What is less clear from Hayek's work is what the injustice done to the man
implies in terms of response. The legal system has to enforce the system of just
dealings that has been breached by the "brigands", but do the passers-by have any
obligation to help the man when they are clearly not responsible for his plight ? The
idea of an obligation on "society" is, for Hayek, a nonsense"1, but he does seem to
leave a door open when he allows for rules of just conduct, which are normally
negative, to include some positive injunctions when "accident has temporarily
piaced persons in a ciose community with others"". And of course such accidental
contiguity may be seen as an opportunity for altruism rather than an obligation of
the "law" (in either Hayek's or the Biblical sense); even here, however, Hayek would
want us to be cautious about what action is, in fact, doing good (as we shall shortly
see).
The Passers-bv (Luke 10.31-2)
Any righteous indignation at the apparent indifference of the priest and the
Levite may be misplaced, a throwback indicative of our unwillingness to "shed
moral views developed for the tribal society"". The achievement of the Open
Society is at the cost of "the attenuation of the enforceable duty to aim deliberately
at the well-being of the other members of the same group"". Even if it were argued
that we are here dealing not with "enforceable duty" but with a moral obligation of
altruism, there are still questions which arise. "We (still) regard it as really better to
help one starving man we know than to relieve the acute need of a hundred men we
do not know, but in fact we generally are doing most good by pursuing gain"". Thus
those who pass by on the other side may be akin to the entrepreneur who builds up a
10 SeeMachan, 1985, p259
11 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p36
12 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pi46
13 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pi46
14 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pi45
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business and a fortune, and does more good thereby than if he had given his goods to
the poor's; "some altruistic conduct aimed at the benefit of some known friend that
in the small group might be highly desirable need not be so in the Open Society and
may there even be harmful"'®.
There are several reasons for this. First, the rule of conduct may not be
universalisable; journeys from Jerusalem to Jericho become impossible if one has to
stop and deal with ever)' casualty one comes across. Second, the market provides the
most effective way of dealing with any situation and interfering in its normal
functioning may have unintended undesirable consequences; one cannot know, but
it may well be more efficient to pass by knowing that someone with less pressing
commitments at journey's end will be a more effective helper, at less cost to the
economy, than my diversion of my time and skills from what the signals of the
market tell me I should be doing. As Professor Hughes puts it (regarding overseas
aid), "as markets are typically much larger and more quick to respond (!) than any
aid organisation, it is much better to work with them rather than to attempt to
supersede them"17. Such "rational insight" should therefore dominate over our
"inherited instincts" in the "great moral adventure" of the Open Society".
However, it may be argued that priests and Levites are not productive
entrepreneurs likely to be generating wealth at the end of the road. In fact, as clergy-
type figures, their callousness may be seen as indicative of the way in which
personal moral responsibility is undermined by talk of "social justice"; they pass by,
mentally composing sermons blaming "society" for the ills of the victims of the
Jericho road. "The ubiquitous dependence on other people's power which the
enforcement of any image of social justice creates inevitably destroys that freedom
of personal decisions on which all morals must rest"". Thus Hayek laments a
modern lack of the faith and patience to build up voluntary organisations for
purposes we value highly, attributing this to the use of concepts like social justice to
shuffle off responsibility on to the government^. This seems both factually untrue
with regard to the growth of "charities" and contradictory of what Hayek himself
says of the destructive nature of collective action and of the dangerous futility of
interfering in the market. However, there is a real issue here in terms of the
15 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p98
16 Hayek, 1982 (VoI2), p90
1 ^ Hughes (and others), 1991, p7
18 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p91
19 Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), p99
^ Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pi51
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compatibility of an ethic that stresses personal (individual ?) responsibility (and
thereby charity) and an ethic that focusses more on social responsibility and
therefore social justice.
The Samaritan (Luke 10.33-351
Here, at least, we have a man who has sufficiently emerged from tribal
thinking to recognise some obligation to a member of another group. The danger, as
Hayek would see it, is that we try to generalise from his willingness to help a person
of his own free choice towards some kind of enforceable obligation when we have
in that sense "no moral links to strangers'^'. (This becomes relevant when we hear
Jesus say "go and do likewise".)
Leaving aside the question (discussed above re the other passers-by) of
whether the apparent altruism of his action in fact does good, we may note one or
two details. Mrs Thatcher, noted that his accumulation of capital enables him to
complete his aid to the victim (v35), while another follower of Hayek, Butler, sees
the rich as having, among other beneficial functions, the possibility of
experimenting in charity; Hayek himself claims that only the accumulation of
capital in donor countries that makes overseas aid possible, although it may well be
argued that it is the process of capital build-up in the North that creates the
deprivation in the South which aid tries to alleviate.
The money, of course, may only be necessary because of the absence of an
accessible, free Health Service - the existence of which would not only have
undermined the Samaritan's sense of personal responsibility but so distorted the
economy with "free-loaders" as to prevent the Samaritan earning his money (and
render the victim not worth mugging). More seriously, Hayek would lead us to
expect a higher standard of care from the innkeeper who receives clear "signals" or
incentive by payment, than from a supposed public service. The Samaritan does not
let this incident distract him from his role in the market for long and moves from
helping this one, known, man to his normal role of helping (in unintended and
unknown ways) many more unknown men through his participation in the market
economy, in which there is neither Jew nor Greek, only consumers.
The "Punch-line" (Luke 10.36-37)
Jesus' reference to "proving himself a neighbour" (v36) may be the clearest
indicator of what was said above, that we are dealing with a situation of transition in
Forrester, 1990, p 11, citing Hayek, 1982 (Vol2), pi65
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which the ethic of the past (tribal) is struggling to come to terms with a new
situation of greater mobility which challenges its limitations, and that the purpose of
the parable is to extend the older ethic into the new society by simply expanding the
concept of "neighbour" on which it is based (without what Hayek would see as the
necessary attenuation of duties to "neighbour"). Jesus may be seen as dealing with
the transition by proposing that strangers be treated as neighbours, while Hayek
precisely inverts this by arguing that progress demands that neighbours are treated as
strangers22. Having established the Samaritan as "neighbour" (on the basis of his
actions), we have done more than widen the group; we have destroyed its ability' to
agree on ends (or end-dependent rules). Samaritans will not accept the (Jewish) Law
as the basis of society, and we are inevitably involved in a pluralist, open society'
which can only survive by agreeing on "just" means independent of ends. Like it or
not, we have moved from status to contract as the basis of relationships2', and the
ethics of "neighbour", however defined, are no longer appropriate. In practical
terms, the level of duty' to neighbours expected by Jesus, to an apparently unlimited
number of "neighbours" cannot be sustained without seriously damaging the
efficiency of the whole "catallaxy"; if everyone is always stopping to help casualties,
no work gets done!
One possible objection to much of the above might be that Hayek and Jesus
are talking about different issues: Jesus is dealing with moral obligations voluntarily
entered into, while Hayek "was not concerned with the moral realm"2', but with
matters of law and coercion. However neither of these holds up as a hard-and-fast
distinction. Jesus and the lawyer were discussing the meaning of the Law, which,
while not the same as a modem legal system, was also not simply one moral option.
And, like Marx, Hayek does not sustain a consistent scientific objectivity of
evolutionary rationalism; as quoted above, he repeatedly talks about moral issues.
This reflection has shown that his theories represent a basic challenge to the
social ethic embedded in the parable of the Good Samaritan. In attempting to
achieve a synthesis, Walker has to bend both elements. Admitting that "the Bible
affirms man's corporate, others-centred identity as much as it affirms his
individuality"25, he goes on to argue that "the ethics of the Hebrew-Christian
22 Forsyth, 1988, p245
2^ See Plant in Elliot & Swanson (eds). 1989, pi6 & p21-22
2^ Machan, 1985, p 141
25 Walker, 1986, pi 13
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scriptures are not hyper-altruistic"®, and so to temper the element of self-sacrificial
love with a positive moral content for enlightened self-interest, which thus turns out
not to be a sin after all. On the other side, he picks up Hayek's stress on agreed
moral rules of just dealing (to defend personal liberty) and wants to widen this : "it
seems clear that moral rules covering the whole range ofjust and humane behaviour
are also needed for a viable spontaneous human order"". [On this basis, he sees a
need "to identify those people (or that category of people) to whom one has a
genuine obligation deliberately to aim at their welfare"21 - "who is my neighbour ?"].
But this extension is surely precisely the point at which Hayek claims that the whole
spontaneous order is undermined and we are on the way to totalitarianism. "Hayek's
belief in the existence of a widespread opinion on the principles of just conduct, but
the impossibility of agreement on the ends at which just conduct should aim,
underpins his entire political and legal theory"29 As Plant has pointed out» the new
right sees a clear line between personal, private morality where there is consensus,
and public morality upon which there is no consensus and which must therefore be
subservient to the market's mechanisms, lest we be dragged from cosmos to taxis.
26 Walker, 1986, pi 13
22 Walker, 1986, pl08
2® Walker, 1986, pi 14
29 Crowley, 1987, p85
Elliot & Swanson (eds), 1989, pi 1
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6. From Justice To Forgiveness
Forgiveness vs Justice 0
Having considered in some depth two secular critiques of the Christian
concept of social justice developed in chapter four, it now seems appropriate to deal
with a more specifically Christian objection to the stress on justice, namely that.
Biblically and theologically, justice is tempered with (or even superseded by) mercy
While this argument clearly has social and political consequences, it is primarily
theological and will be considered here first in theological terms. However, the
approach adopted will arise from the reflections on justice discussed above, and will
ultimately see mercy or forgiveness less as a competitor to justice than as a crucial
part of the (Christian) dynamic ofjustice.
A crucial insight of liberation theology, which has become a commonplace
of Christian thinking (and church statements) on social justice, is that sin takes not
onlv individual, personal form but infects social (political and economic) structures,
so that even when the rules of these structures are kept and applied honourable, by
people of goodwill, injustice results - "the good that I would I do not"1. In the light
of that understanding, it seems logical to consider the Biblical picture of how sin is
dealt with, the self-sacrificial love which McGregor says is "the only Christian
method of overcoming evil"'. That clearly leads us to forgiveness - "the divine
correlative of human sin"': in other words, forgiveness is how God deals with sin in
the world
Thus, if our concern for social justice makes us aware of the sinfulness of
structures (and if we see in them the demonic principalities and powers of the New
Testament), the divine (and Christian) strategy for overcoming them is forgiveness,
"precisely so that the eradication of sin should take place in the most Christian and
effective way"4
Yet words like those of Sobrino cited above are rare in liberation theolog>
(and generally in Christian discussion of social justice), where forgiveness does not
appear to play a major role. There are two main, connected reasons for this.
® Romans 7.19
^ MacGregor, I960, p?2
^ McDonagh in Richardson & Bowden (eds), 1983, p214
4 Sobrino in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p53
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First, there is a "commonsense" feeling that justice and forgiveness are
alternatives - a feeling rooted in the (criminal) law-court model of justice, with an
underlying sense of justice as equivalence. Thus Willmer says that consideration of
forgiveness is absent from our standards of justice because of "a sense that
forgiveness and justice are incompatible qualities and lines of action"*, and
Elizondo, relating the matter (crucially as we shall see) to questions of atonement
and justification, says that "according to the norms of a sinful humanity that repays
crime with crime, the justice ofGod who repays sin with loving forgiveness appears
as totally unjust ... to our unjust humanity the very justice of God appears as the
annihilation of justice"6.
This issue is a recurrent theme in literature. In Shakespeare, when Portia
pleads for mercy, she owns that it "mitigates" or "seasons" justice , implying that it
may only be by reining in one's zeal for justice that one can allow space for mercy or
forgiveness: it is not unreasonable to add that "temperings are tamperings'T Angelo
similarly claims to show pity "most of all when I show justice, for then I pity those 1
do not know, which a dismiss'd offence would after gall"? We may hear here an
echo of Hayek, in that the exercise of forgiveness seems to imply a failure to treat
like cases alike, and to prefer the neighbour to the stranger, unless forgiveness
becomes a general rule (which may be a contradiction in terms - see below).
It may be significant that the Shakespearean examples resort to theology as
the area in which we might find reconciliation between the two. Milton, too. locates
the conflict within God. with the cross as able to "end the strife of Mercy and Justice
in thy face discern'd"10. Yet this reconciliation is by no means straightforward. In
Anselm's formulation. "What kind of justice is it to give everlasting life to him who
merits eternal death ? How then, O good God, good to the good and to the wicked,
how do you save the wicked if this is not just, and you do not do anything that is not
just ?"», or as Fiddes more recently has put it, the justification of the unjust is
"contrary to all the rules of human justice and in plain contradiction of conventional
legality"12. It will already be apparent that we are using a range of terms
5 Willmer, 1979a, pi03
6 Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p73
2 Merchant ofVenice Act 4 Scene 1
^ Murphy & Hampton, 1988, p 167
Measure for Measure, Act 2, Scene 2
Paradise I^ost. Ill, 407, cited by Talboft, 199.3, pi51
'' Anselm, 1965, pl26'7
12 Fiddes, 1989, p86
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(forgiveness, piiy, mercy, justification, justice) whose distinct meaning will be
explored below in the course of a discussion of atonement, but before moving to this
I want to indicate the second reason for the rarity of talk of forgiveness in
discussions of social justice.
There is. I think, a justifiable suspicion that talk of forgiveness may be a soft
option for the Christian faced with injustice - "a word for the softness which
degrades man by releasing him from all that is unbendable and demanding"".
Forgiveness is seen as the mechanism by which prophetic faith becomes the religion
that is opium for the people through its teaching of an acceptance that allows the
oppressor to go on unpunished and unchanged, oppression to continue and the voice
of the oppressed to go unheard. So Moltmann says that "if it is only taken by itself as
healing power for sinners and the miserable, without criticism of what is and what
considers itself of importance, the gospei becomes the uncritical compensation for
existing evil"'4.
The Kairos document condemned the "church theology" which talks easily of
reconciliation as the Christian aim in situations of conflict and fails to reckon
seriously with the realities of injustice: we are not called to compromise with evil or
come to terms with it. but to overcome it". Talk of forgiveness, then, can mean a
glossing over of injustice, a failure to take seriously the consequences of sin or
appreciate its gravity. This criticism is not to be dismissed lightly. Sermons on
forgiveness addressed by the oppressor (or even the comfortable outsider) to the
oppressed run the risk of peddling cheap grace. We may not entirely agree with
Simon that we are involved as Christians in deadly sin when we "wish to extend the
atonement of Christ to the perpetrators of unrepented evil"" (this seems ultimately
Pharisaic), but we cannot escape from the cost and the challenge of forgiveness, to
all concerned, and must hold together the absolute and unconditional nature of God's
forgiv eness with the suffering that is its cost1 .
Nor can we dismiss lightly the concern that forgiveness may be interpreted
as weakness to be exploited. The onus is on those who advocate forgiveness to show
that it benefits more than the privileged, especially when it seems to run contrary to
the drive of liberation theology to bring the forgotten to remembrance as pan of the
13 Willmer, 1979a. pi03
'3 Moltmann, i y 79, p 171
'3 Kairos, 1986, pi 1 12
I1 Simon, Atonement: From Holocaust to Paradise, J Clarke, Cambridge, 1987, p49
'7 See Phoenix in Frost, 1990, p7S
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building of social justice18. And there is a further danger, that calls for forgiveness
may contribute to the culture of "blaming the victim". In the context of abusive
relationships, for example, pressure 011 the victim to forgive may become a further
burden placed by society on the abused, reinforcing a tendency for the victims to
blame themselves (for a failure to forgive). As Hinchliff points out, we have tended
to lay this burden on minorities and the powerless, ie those who we think can be
compelled to forgive1*.
Advocacy of forgiveness, then, can serve in many ways to deflect attention
and action from the root injustices, to avoid rectifying the evil2®. It is therefore
crucial to stress that forgiveness is not about condoning, tolerating, excusing,
justifying (in a non-theological sense), forgetting, or even understanding evil: the
acknowledgement of sin. and its acceptance as sin. are part of the process of
forgiveness, whereby evil is overcome. Sin which is hidden, in any of the above
ways, continues to determine reality, whereas forgiveness is oriented towards a
refusal to let the realities of today's sin (injustice) determine tomorrow. In this sense
it is quite the opposite of forgetting sin; "forgiveness is about the free
acknowledgement of offences alongside a refusal to allow them to define the future
of relationships"21,
Brakenhielm distinguishes two kinds of forgiveness - exculpative forgiveness
(which seeks to evade or deny responsibility) and admissive forgiveness (which
takes sin and responsibility more seriously)2-'. While he finds both varieties present
in the gospels - "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do" seeming a clear
example of exculpative forgiveness - he rightly sees Jesus as talking more often of
admissive forgiveness. Yet the common language of much (Christian and other)
advocacy of forgiveness is clearly exculpatory, speaking in terms of understanding
and tolerance, and arguing a justification for forgiveness by playing down the
seriousness of the sin or the guilt of the sinner. It is the tendency of this language
towards moral laxity or indifference that has led many to campaign for "zero
tolerance" toward male violence against women: tolerance which simply accepts or
excuses abuse is indulgence rather than what the gospel understands as forgiveness.
The force of such campaigns, particularly when the powerless are being urged to
18 See Duquoc in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p42
Hinchiiff, 1982, p205
Brakenhieim, 1993, p7
2' Gunton, 1988, pi90
^ Brakenhielm, 1993, p 16
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forgive the powerful while the balance of power is left undisturbed, has to be
admitted. The language of forgiveness has. therefore, to be distinguished from moral
indifference and a false neutrality if it is to have continued force. As White puts it,
"forgiveness is not offered out of moral indifference ... (but) real reconciliation
between persons demands thai moral guilt is faced and exposed"". That is, in
Brakenhielm's terms, admissive forgiveness: in Bonhoeffer's classic account, it
avoids the cheap grace which is "grace as a doctrine, a principle, a system ... the
forgiveness of sins proclaimed as a general truth ... justification of sin without the
justification of the sinner"-*.
In this way the disturbing, challenging element in forgiveness is preserved
"because it is rooted in the truth of the victim"", nowhere more clearly than on the
cross. When that unconditional offer of forgiveness (which does not depend on the
oppressor realising beforehand the nature of his sin - "they know not what they do")
effectively challenges the status quo and its realities, it provokes repentance and
opens up the future to justice, in a way that the "justice" or "equivalence" of
compensation cannot do. Thus White argues that "mere compensation leaves the
past unredeemed" whereas "forgiveness and reconciliation involve something like
the will to accept ihe evil consequences and to recreate the situation for good"-4.
That such forgiveness offers the kev to opening up the future in Northern
Ireland, for example, may be easy to say from the comfort of this side of the water,
but many who know the hurt of the situation at first hand have probed the meaning
of forgiveness and the "healing of memories" in their situation"; from that kind of
reflection, and practical commitment. Una O'Malley says that "contemporary
nationalist politics must make room for forgiveness: only in this way can we have
justice in our relationships"".
It would seem. then, that there is not only a compatibility of justice and
forgiveness but a creative interaction which is distinctively Christian and allows us
to say that "(Jesus') way of being just, like that of God, consists in being merciful"29.
As noted above, this is, in fact, the paradox of the atonement: the discussion of that
23 White, 1991, p4 3
24 Bonhoeffer, 1959 p35
Duquoc, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p43
2^ White, 1991, p99 & pS9
22 See eg Falconer, 1988
2^ Frost, 1990, p-17
2f' Rubio, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p85
202
which follows is particularly as illuminated by the "metaphors" of justice and
justification.
Justice. Atonement and Justification
"in its justice, humanity had judged (Jesus), condemned him. sentenced him
and killed hint"30, and his response on the cross was not a cry for justice or revenge
but for forgiveness. After the cross and resurrection, therefore, it is no longer
possible to equate an abstract system of legal justice with the will of God; to say
otherwise, and elevate human legal justice into a supreme principle, is to limit God.
whose justice is of a different kind - lustitia iustificans. seeking repentance and
renewal. "Restorative justice, as it is revealed in the Bible, alone has positive power
for overcoming sin"3', and it is in this concept of "lustitia iustificans" that the
potential lies for building the bridge which Moltmann seeks to forge between
liberation theology and traditional reformed theology - "the Reformation doctrine of
justification and the present day theology of the liberation of the oppressed need not
be opposites but can provide mutual correction and enrichment"^. So, too, from the
other side of the reformation divide. McDonagh writes that "theologically, liberation
is the equivalent of salvation, redemption and justification, in that genuinely
theological sense of the justice of God transforming unjust human beings into the
just"33.
Hampton's suggestion of a move from criminal to private law as the
paradigm here may be helpful (so that we can see God as hat ing the right freely to
give up his rights, ie to forgive)3'', but less necessarv if we take account of the
different role of the judge in Hebrew (as opposed to Roman, and Roman-derived)
courts. The Hebrew judge has a more active role, to save people from oppression;
his justice (as already noted in chapter four) is not that of the blindfold and
balancmg scales, but of action to liberate from what oppresses. So the primary
concern of God as judge is still salvation, rather than the pronouncing of a verdict.
This is what underlies Tamez's point that God's concern is nor juridical but salvific,
that His main desire is to save or to liberate rather than to forgive35.
3® Elizondo, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p74
31 Schrey, 1955, pi83
33 Moltmann, ly9i, p46
,3 McDonagh, 1989, p23
3^ Murphy & Hampton, 1988, pi 76 7
33 Tamez, 1993, p 163
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"This Hebrew setting means that 'justification', while a legal term, is at root a
matter of relationships to be justified is to be received back into the fellowship of
the community"*. This insight is bound up with a relational understanding of the
justice, justification and forgiveness of God. with the emphasis on the quality,
sustaining, renewing and healing of relationships as the sphere of divine activity.
"Many Western theologies of atonement have tended to be legalistic, making it
appear that God is a God of law before he is a God of love rather than the reverse,
and so failing to do justice to the personal, relational aspects of the matter"'7. On this
model, then, justice is not a state (such as might be defined by the legal decision of a
Roman judge) but "something that takes place between God and the world or
between people"*: justification is not a static achievement but a dynamic state
always in the process of moving forward*, because it describes the continuing
activity of God.
Gunton's work seems to blur the distinction between justice and justification
considerably more than might be acceptable to more traditional Protestant
understandings of the terms. Although he rightly claims Luther as an ally in stressing
the active, creative aspect of justice justification, he admits that most Protestants
have relapsed into what he calls a "pre-Reformation understanding of justice as
merely distributiv e"1*. Dunn, too, speaks with apparent regret of the moment "w hen
the pre-Reformation belief in the justice of God gave way to the Reformation belief
in justification by faith"". To stress that justification is more than a pretence, or a
legal fiction, but a renewed relationship saves God from degenerating into Irving's
"stock-exchange divinityjustification is the activity of the God of justice. As
Fiddes stresses, justification (which he equates with forgiveness) is more than a 'get-
out-of-jail-free-card'; "it is not an impersonal notice of acquittal which could be
issued long ago and left lying around for us to pick up in due time, but a healing of
relationship that must involve us now as the ones who are estranged"1". This
relational and active understanding, which avoids the compartmentalising of justice
and justification and which can be traced back to the work of Cremer and
36 Fiddes, 1989, pS7
32 Gunton, 1988, p87
3^ Gunton, 1988, pi04
39 Tamez, 1993, p84
40 Gunton, 1988, pi03
4' Dunn, 1992. pi
42 Gunton, 1988, plOO
43 Fiddes, 1989, pi72 3
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Kasemann44, seems much more than a convenient way out of the difficulties of the
paradox as stated by Anselm above; it also is an authentically Biblical insight,
resting heavily on the Old Testament roots of the idea of justice. The alternative
"attempt to maintain a separation of justification and justice ... a fundamental
perversion of biblical religion" is found by Suggate to be characteristic both of the
"German Christians" of the 1930s and of Thatcherite Britain, with disastrous
consequences in both for Christian concern for social justice4'.
From the Old Testament we might also be helped to go beyond an
individualistic understanding of atonement and justification. Weaver finds in
Teviticus a pattern of atonement in which the community has two crucial functions
of making known to the offender his sin and of enabling him to make atonement40:
but she still tends to see the simier as an individual. The Old Testament acts of
confession4 are acts of the community, and rituals such as the scapegoat are for the
healing of the community (a fact which Fiddes notes, but doesn't always take
seriously48)- Some reflection of that healing and of solidarity in guilt is found in this
Church of Scotland Order ofPublic Repentance -
"Ye have heard also the affection and care of the Church towards you. their
penitent brother, notwithstanding your grievous fall, to wit. that we all here
present join our sins with your sin. we all repute and esteem your grievous fall to
be our own: we accuse ourselves no less than we accuse you : now finally we
join our prayers with yours, that we and you might obtain mercy, and that by
means of our Lord Jesus Christ"4'.
If there is a solidarity in guilt, which the ritual of the OT attempts to deal
with, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, should we not see a solidarity in the
atonement achieved on the cross (it being expedient that one man should die for the
people) ? The tendency inherited from the Reformation to concentrate on individual
sin and its forgiveness may have blinded us to the social and even cosmic dimension
of justification; the curtain in the Temple is lorn, rather than exclusive passes to the
holy of holies being passed out selectively to the chosen.
Thus Brakemeier argues that "the Protestant church is challenged to abandon
a narrow individualistic view of justification and to rediscover the social
44 See Brauch, 1977, P525fT
4'S In Dunn & Suggate, 1993, pS2
4^ Weaver, 1994, p 161
4^ Eg Ezra 9.6ft'and Nehemiah 9 5ff48 Fiddes, 1989, pi07
4<) Church of Scotland, 1868, p48
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implications of the gospel ... justification by grace becomes excitingly relevant when
we discover that the law from which it liberates us embraces also the social
structures which determine our lives"50. This challenge was to some extent
anticipated by Gregor Smith and Haddon Willmer, and has been taken up more
recently by Dunn and Tamez. Willmer's argument for a "politics of forgiveness" is.
he says, derived partly from a desire to "earth" a theology of the atonement51, and he
cites tiregor Smith's comment that
"the total invitation to forgiveness, acceptance and reconciliation needs to be
understood much less in individualist terms and much more in corporate and
relational terms ... less as a kind of insurance policy with bonuses for the
bourgeois individual and more as the re-establishmcnt of a mighty and unique
community, the all-inclusive community centred upon God with man1'".
Both Dunn and Tamez seek to reclaim the full force of Paul's understanding
of justification by faith, set in both its Old Testament and its social contexts, as "a
banner raised by Paul against any and all such presumption of privileged status
before God by virtue of race, culture or nationality, against any and all attempts to
preserve such spurious distinctions by practices that exclude and divide"53. Tamez
ar gues further that "the fundamental problem for Paul was thai there is nox even one
just person capable of doing justice in order to transform the reality characterised by
injustice"; justification, then, is how "God makes it possible for human beings to do
justice"54.
The individualist understanding of justification by faith winch these accounts
seek to correct is dangerous for a number of reasons. It can deny the social
consequences of (even individual) sin. in order to liberate the sinner from guilt, it
can function as good news for the oppressors while leaving them unchallenged and
the oppressed without hope: by abstracting forgiveness from any social context, it
can exclude its social relevance; and it excludes human participation in the ongoing
dynamic of justification. As Driver puts it. the tragedy is that "the full-orbed New-
Testament meaning of the saving death and resurrection of Christ and their
consequences for the salvation of God's people and the restoration of creation have
come to be perceived as an abstract 'saving' transaction which allows sinful and
Brakemeier, 1988, p218
y* Willmer, 1979b, p208
52 Smith. 1970, p50
Dunn, 1992, pi 5: see also Tamez, 1993, p96
54 Tamez, 1993, p!07& 110
206
violent people and fallen structures to remain unchanged"; or in the graffiti he
graphically cites - "God can't be trusted; Franco is in heaven"".
"If it is true in general that it is important to stress the social character of
Christianity, it is especially true for the practice of forgiveness, which is so open to
the danger of privatisation"*; the growth of a social and cosmic understanding of
atonement (glimpsed in the dramatic pictures of Revelation) opens up the
possibilities of a politics of forgiveness that is loyal to the Biblical understanding of
persons in relation, in community, and in creation. So Gunton says "there can be no
merely moralistic or personalistic discussion of salvation which does not root human
life in the context of the created order as a whole ... the theory of satisfaction tends
to concentrate on the legal and moral rather than the cosmic aspects of the divine-
human relationship"".
Again there may be seen the beginnings of blurring of another Reformation
distinction, between justification and sanctification. Gunton speaks regularly of a
justice (justification) that transforms; "the justice of God is transforming action
achieved through the crucifixion of Jesus"*. To some extent this is a necessary
outcome of the more active understanding of justice already discussed. From such
an understanding, McDonagh believes that "the Reformation debates as to the
meaning of justification and its distinction from sanctification, for example, are ...
no longer relevant here"*, and Dunn argues that the relational, creative
understanding of justice takes us beyond the either/or conflict between justification
as making righteous or counting righteous because "in reality the relationship
envisaged is something dynamic, and presupposes that the divine partner acts on
behalf of, in and with the defective human partners, drawing them into the
relationship, sustaining them within it and acquitting them in the final judgment"*0.
Flowever, it is one thing to say with Emerson that "man needs redemption
before he can be creative"", and quite another to speak of atonement actually
transforming; that is, redemption may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for sanctification. Surely the Reformation insight here is that the process is not
automatic, that the cross does not cause repentance and renewal but enables both, in
55 Driver, 1986, p30
^ Rubio, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p89
57 Gunton, 1988, p95
58 Gunton, 1988, pl92
59 McDonagh, 1989, p23
60 Dunn, 1992, pl7
Emerson, 1964, p96
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other words that there is a risk in the offer of forgiveness, which may produce the
repentance and renewal which are constitutive of justice, but may not. Thus when
Rubio cites Papal authority for the proposition that "through this spirit of mercy the
world becomes more human"6?, we may rightly point to situations where the spirit of
mercy has simply been exploited
Yet, loyalty to the importance of that insight should not blind us to the
incompleteness of justification understood solely as legal pardon; the Biblical
witness is that forgiveness does in fact heal®. Thus Moltmann, citing Schlatter in
support, argues that justification is not merely the retrospective forgiveness of sins
but has a creative, forward-looking dimension. "The righteousness of God which
reveals itself in the gospel to the godless . .. does not as yet set man down at his goal,
but only puts him on the road to it. It makes him part of the process through which
God establishes his divinity, his justice and his glory"". For Moltmann, this opens up
an eschatological dimension of justification; for our purpose it may be sufficient to
note the orientation of righteousness, justification, and the justice of God (all seen as
dynamic processes not static states) toward renewal. In this respect, Willmer does
not put it strongly enough when he says that "because Christ died for the godless he
hoped for a rehumanisation through solidarity with all people""; Moltmann's graphic
picture of being set on the road seems more fully to reflect the power of the cross.
Justification, reconciliation and change do belong together, or the cross and its
power evaporate in a spiritual haze.
The Meaning of Forgiveness
Justification, as Fiddes says, is neither a "transplant ofmoral qualities" nor a
legal pretence66, but a renewed relationship in which the active, creative, redemptive
justice of God is at work seeking to renew persons, communities and the whole
creation, and that starts with forgiveness. This seems to correspond with the root
meanings of forgiveness in the Bible. Salach, in the OT, refers primarily to the
lifting of a weight, and so fits naturally with a sense of liberation; similarly, aphesis,
in the NT, basically refers to release from a legal obligation, most notably debt, and
so is used (Luke 4 .18) of deliverance to the captives. Thus Emerson says that "in the
Old Testament, forgiveness does not mean denial of the past: rather it comes to
^ In Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p92
^ See eg Mark 2.1-12
^ Moitmann, 1979, pi66
65 Willmer, 1990, p341
66 Fiddes, 1989, p87
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mean removal of the effect of the past on the present"6-; this can equally be said of
the New Testament understanding. Or, in the language of modern psychology,
"forgivers reject the possibility that the rest of their lives will be determined by the
unjust and injurious acts of another person"68.
At one level, then, forgiveness is "remotivating" (Brakenhielm borrows this
phrase from the anthropologist Desmond Morris), but it is more than the offering of
a new beginning, a blank sheet, to the individual. Forgiveness is God's way of
breaking into the spirals of injustice that can never be overcome by equivalence; it
breaks the logic of law (in the sense of the lex talionis - see Matthew 5.38-42) so
that "we shall now be free from the damning power of our past because the
generative power for a new future will be embedded in our present"69. This sense of
"breaking in" to a cycle of injustice may seem to lead naturally to the conclusion
that forgiveness questions interrupts the processes of injustice from outside'"'. This,
however, is problematic if we are attempting to relate forgiveness to social justice;
other than divine intervention, there can be no "outside" from which the challenge of
forgiveness can come (as Marx points out). Yet even in atonement, it is by getting
inside the situation of the victim that God, in Christ, brings the offer of forgiveness.
Thus, while we may see forgiveness as the power (or even the creative justice) of
God at work in a situation, it has to work within the situation: if this brings
"something different"7' to bear, that must come from, or at least through, the victim,
as on the cross. (This may beg. for the moment, the question of who can forgive, to
be considered below.)
Jensen argues that forgiveness means "to exhaust in one's own being the
consequences one has suffered so that these consequences will not cause further
damage", though, since these consequences are concrete, this must affect more than
attitudes72; there is an inescapable cost to be paid - "nothing less than a journey of
painful discovery"78. It is when we reckon with this cost that it becomes possible to
accept the contention that forgiveness and punishment may not be incompatible.
Brakenhielm, for example, cites a Biblical basis for this in Numbers 14.18, where
divine forgiveness is held alongside divine punishment even of children and
67 Emerson, 1964, p82
68 Flanigan & Mauro, cited by Glynn, 1994, p50
^Moltmann, 1979, pi64
7® Eg Duquoc, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p42
7' See Giinton, 1988. pi 91
7^ Jensen, 1993, pl54ff
73 Fiddes, 1988, pi58
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grandchildren for the sins of the parents. His argument fits well with what he has to
say on "admissive forgiveness"; it is because forgiveness is not the same as
condonation that it may include punishment and the reparation which Lebacqz sees
as crucial to justice. But that punishment must be oriented toward, even subservient
to. forgiveness; punishment (or reparation), for the sake of forgiveness, for the sake
of justice. This moves in the same direction as Duff's argument that forgiveness is
incompatible with the condemnatory responses which seek to exclude the criminal
from our concerns. Rather, it is inclusive, oriented toward participation in a shared
future"1.
To emphasise the cost of forgiveness, and to suggest its compatibility with
punishment and or reparation, seems to deny the common link between forgiving
and forgetting. Luther argues that, since we hope that God will forget our sins, to
speak of forgiving without forgetting is a sham75, and no doubt it sometimes is. But
forgiveness is to do with how we deal with the past, not repressing its memory,
because we remember our sins, we hope that God will not hold them against us, will
liberate us from them, and that may be the very opposite of denial or of forgetting.
We need to do more about the legacies of past sin injustice than forget them;
forgotten, they are likely to retain their power and effect.
It is time now to return to the question (touched on above) of who is to
forgive, or, rather, who can forgive. There is a persuasive secular argument that only
the victim can forgive7®, not least as a safeguard against cheap grace offered from
the sidelines. Brakenhielm cites Dryden ("forgiveness belongs to those who are
injured") and Dostoievsky (in "The Brothers Karamazov") in support of this
argument" for restricting the power to forgive to the victim, but ultimately he cannot
agree with them. And Hinchliff points out that while it may seem presumptuous to
tell the victim to forgive, it may be equally presumptuous to decide on behalf of the
oppressed that things have gone too far for forgiveness7*.
A sense of loyalty to the victim may rightly inhibit forgiveness being offered
or proclaimed by the unhurt. But the issue of who can declare the transcendent
reality ofGod's forgiveness is very much a part of Jesus' conflict with the teachers of
the law; the gap in the Old Testament between God's forgiveness and human life (a
74 Duff; in Garland (ed), 1990, p45
75 Luther, 1962, p283
7^ See eg Murphy & Hampton, 1988, pl66ff
77 Brakenhielm, 1993, p33
7^ Hinchliff; 1982, pl99
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gap to which Shriver notes the jubilee as the conspicuous exception79) is bridged in
the New, when Jesus points to the forgiveness of God as directly available. This
becomes a question of whether forgiveness is purely a transcendent reality or
whether we are to find traces of it in the world90. If forgiveness is to become an
immanent reality with the power to make lives new, it must be offered in Christian
solidarity with the victims; thus Brakenhielm says that "another person who is able
to identify in a unique sense with the injured party can in effect become party to the
right to forgive"9'. That, of course, is the crucial point where the cross is significant;
it is in becoming the victim that God becomes able to forgive92.
Wherever that identification and solidarity are taken seriously (and not
lightly assumed), a community can act together in offering (and receiving)
forgiveness as well as in working out its meaning; forgiveness there is rooted in
solidarity, in the concern of the community for the "little ones"". As in the New
Testament, forgiveness is learned in community. That cannot be other than costly,
and it is predominantly the forgiver who pays the price; the community that seeks to
be a locus for forgiveness has to accept that cost". Within such a forgiving
community, the risk is apparent of pressure to forgive becoming an added burden on
the oppressed victim, but the converse is that the initiative in forgiveness is firmly
with the oppressed (and those who can enter into genuine solidarity with them).
Swinburne argues that if forgiveness involves only the victim it becomes
condonation; only if forgiveness is accepted, involving a change of heart by the
wrongdoer, can it be considered effective forgiveness". Similarly, Fiddes says that
"forgiveness can be offered freely from one side only, but for it to achieve its aim it
must be received"90. To some extent, this is a problem of an individual, rather than a
relational understanding of the meaning of forgiveness; in another sense, it stresses
the element of risk already noted as being of the essence of forgiveness. The
initiative, and risk-taking, are inescapably with the victims and those who can
identity' with them; but the effectiveness of forgiveness and its completion depend
on a renewed relationship (sometimes referred to as reconciliation). So Brakenhielm
^ Shriver, 1995, p238n
8® See Duquoc in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p36/7
81 Brakenhielm, 1993, p34
8^ See eg Fiddes, 1989, pi85
8^ Weaver, 1994, pi68
8^ See Church of Scotland, 1868, p48, cited above n49
8^ Swinburne, 1989, p86
86 Fiddes, 1988, pi60
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concludes that while repentance is not a condition for forgiveness it is part of its
completion - "what is needed to bring forgiveness full circle"87.
To remember that may be a safeguard against the assumption that
reconciliation means compromise (a particular danger in the politics of forgiveness),
in arguing for the retention of both justice and reconciliation within Christian
political vocabulary, O'Hanlon suggests three crucial elements for a reconciliation
that is more than papering over the cracks - a clear recognition of the offence, an
unconditional offer of forgiveness and the payment of the cost of forgiveness88. The
first of these elements has already been fully discussed above, in distinguishing
forgiveness from condonation, and the third is at the heart of the theology of the
atonement; but does forgiveness have to be unconditional ? O'Hanlon sees this as a
crucial break from a contractual model of relationships, and Brakenhielm also sees
it as being of the essence of forgiveness to be "unconditional - spontaneous and
without reservation"89. It is only this which can prevent forgiveness from becoming a
matter of calculation and thereby, again, cheap grace - "just as the law is not
strengthened by making justification conditional (cf Galatians 3), similarly justice is
not strengthened by making forgiveness conditional"90 (however tempting that may
be, particularly when we move into politics or economics and concerns about
exploitation come to the fore).
Inescapably, advocacy of forgiveness challenges the belief in just deserts
which Galbraith sees as crucial to the culture of contentment. As noted in chapter
five, even Hayek admits that this meritocratic system of market rewards and
punishments is a fiction, but it is a powerful myth, resistant to ideas which seem to
challenge it, as forgiveness inevitably does. "God's justice is more than fair. It is a
creative rather than an arithmetical fairness"91, ie it is beyond the "quid-pro-quo"
justice of equivalence. That conclusion of the CTPI study group on punishment is
shared by at least one liberation theologian, Gutierrez, who argues that the God of
the Bible does not stay on the level of justice but is an unpredictable God who
"loves gratuitously"^. Gutierrez has also argued that the prophetic language of
justice has to be held together with the mystical language of gratuitous love if the
three-dimensional fullness of liberation (political'social liberation, personal/human
82 Brakenhielm, 1993, p39
88 In Hurley (ed), 1994, p50/51
89 Brakenhielm, 1993, p 13
99 Torrance, 1986, p56
91 Wood, 1991, p80
92 Gutierrez, 1991, p39
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liberation, and liberation from sin) is to be realised**. This creative, gratuitous,
unpredictability may be seen as taking divine justice beyond the moral dimension.
God's grace does not conflict with the quest for justice, quite the reverse; it operates
not in a world of straightforward cause and effect but of "freedom and
gratuitousness"9*, as the forgiveness out ofwhich justice grows.
In perhaps a similar vein, Mackintosh sees forgiveness as having its origin
"beyond morality"; religion, he says, characteristically takes sin more seriously than
the moralists yet at the same time retains an openness to forgiveness**. In one sense,
we are here back with the paradox with which we started, and the apparent
contradiction of forgiveness and "justice". Ignatieffmay well be right in contending
that "a purely secular morality is an ethics without ultimate forgiveness"9®, but what
we have learned is that forgiveness only contradicts a narrow and static concept of
justice as fairness. The element that is "beyond morality" (at least Ignatieffs "purely
secular morality") is the creative dynamic, the power of God at work in forgiveness
for the sake of building justice - looking forward rather than back.
Forgiveness and Hope
OUanlon, however, is not alone when he characterises justice as subservient
to reconciliation in Christian perspective. The case argued here is quite different -
that forgiveness is the way towards justice, but a justice which, as we have seen, is
more than legal Legal justice encloses, blocks off the future, whereas forgiveness
opens the horizon of hope, towards a fuller justice. It is liberating, at several levels.
It sets people free from the logic of revenge - as glimpsed in recent years in Ireland,
even if "the fact that Christ's followers have been freed from obligations of revenge
has not found root"9'. It undermines any sense of the hubris of self-righteousness,
since it is in being forgiven that we find the challenge and courage to forgives. And
it liberates reality from the grip of oppression (and of the oppressors); "to forgive is
to liberate, love the oppressed through a sinful reality and thus liberate that reality;
love the oppressors and thus be prepared to welcome them and also destroy them as
oppressors"99. Sobrino's concept of "forgiving reality", which seems a profound
understanding of atonement, deserves further study as to its practical meaning, but
9^ Gutierrez, Drummond Lectures (unpublished), Stirling, 1995
94 Gutierrez, 1991, p39
95 Mackintosh, 1941, p 13
96 Ignatieff 1984, p99
97 OMalley in Frost, 1990, p46
^ See Sobrino, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p54
99 Ibid, p55
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we make a start when we realise that forgiveness is not simply the gospel to the
oppressor while justice is the gospel to the oppressed; forgiveness has to find a way
into sinful structures"*1.
The concept of hope, opened out by forgiveness, is crucial here. The gospel
of justification only has power, as Moltmann points out, "when it is directed
critically towards the eschatological transformation of the unjust world""";
forgiveness, as noted above, opens the horizon of hope against the closed future of
revenge and the justice of equivalence. "The real choice in politics is between
actively believing in the reality of human hope through forgiveness or succumbing
to the human meaninglessness we are left with if there can be no real release from
what we have made of ourselves, our societies and our world through individual and
corporate sin""". This really restates the Pauline theology of the failure of the Law
and the need for grace103. The cross is where the justice of God enters into the life of
the world - through the representative victim - to bring hope through forgiveness
(the reality of which is shown in the resurrection). And it is at the cross and beyond
it that the "equilibrium ofmemory and hope" is maintained104.
Towards A Social Meaning Of forgiveness
Forgiveness may, as Brakenhielm points out, be commonly understood in our
culture as an event between individuals and within "primary" groups such as the
family; "forgiveness in the relationship between larger groups (for example,
nations)", he says "is almost an unknown concept"103. For many theologians the
Reformation understanding of justification has proved blinding as to the social
meaning of forgiveness. "We understand (forgiveness) primarily in individualistic,
psychological terms. There are religious and economic roots of this
misunderstanding ... grounded in the principle that sin and forgiveness are
individual matters""*. Indeed, the process of individualisation and privatisation
began before the Reformation. Despite the importance of forgiveness in the life of
the early church, Shriver says, theologians failed to give it due attention in their
ethical expectations for public life, setting a path which led to the "sacramental
* See further below
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captivity" of forgiveness in the medieval confessional10, whereby ils political
significance was primarily as a weapon of ecclesiastical power (although the
individual "conversion" in the confessional of an exploiter of slaves like Las Casas
into an apostle of Indian liberation shows that it could have liberating
consequences108). There are some signs that the Reformers sought to break through
this captivity and we have already noted some signs that Calvinism stressed the role
of the Christian community m confession and forgiveness109. But it is difficult to
dispute Shriver's contention that the Reformers generally left forgiveness "in
captivity in the church and a stranger to politics"110, a matter between the individual
and his God which might have some consequences in terms of the individual's
attitudes to other individuals, but nothing more.
Once we start to see a social dimension to sin. and to see the sinner as more
than a "monad"111 (not necessarily the same thing), we are led into a search beyond
that individualism. There may be more to the political dimension of forgiveness than
the political significance of forgiving individuals.
However, this is not straightforward. David Jenkins, in seeking to relate
forgiveness to social structures, speaks of the "necessary mediating processes which
have to go on in relating these personal categories to structures and institutions"11^
And Arendi claims gospel backing for her assertion that "forgiving and the
relationship it establishes is always an eminently personal (though not necessarily
individual or private) affair in which what was done is forgiven for the sake of who
did it"11'. The distinction between individual and personal is helpful, in terms of a
relational understanding of forgiveness, but what does the personal character of
forgiveness mean9 Biblically, the power of God is at work in and through and
against structures ("principalities and powers"), and forgiveness is a kev dimension
of that power. It might therefore be argued that, while the "principalities and
powers" depersonalise, the justice thai comes by forgiveness repersonalises. or
humanises, by building community. The terminology of the "personal", however,
may have a tendency to distance the personal from the structural, and it is important
Shriver, 1995, p49
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to keep the Biblical sense of a forgiveness that invades structures as well as more
"personal" relationships.
It certainly seems clear that it would require an extension of the normal
(western) usage of the term to speak of forgiveness in other than personal terms.
Daly suggests that we proceed here by analogy from individual personal
relationship, expressing a caution against a reaction to individualism that becomes
"a charter to abandon the inescapably individual and personal characteristics of a
phenomenon such as forgiveness"114. These "individual and personal characteristics"
are not as inescapable as they may seem; indeed, such OT practices as the
scapegoat and jubilee seem to suggest otherwise But they are certainly engrained in
western culture to such a considerable degree that going beyond them becomes
difficult, as a politics of forgiveness must realise, if only to challenge. Daly's
suggestion of proceeding by analogy' may be accepted so long as we do not assume
that we are talking about a "second-class" concept of forgiveness subsidiary to the
"real thing" (see further discussion of "diluted" forgiveness below).
Daly raises two issues when he asks whether the politicaL'social embodiment
of forgiveness amounts to more than the sum ol individual attitudes: as we shall see,
there may be more to the political dimension of forgiveness than the political
significance of forgiving individuals, and the characterisation of forgiveness as an
attitude seems inadequate. The question then is - what form does this social
embodiment of forgiveness take? If liberation theology' has worked out "a
spirituality of forgiveness betyveen social classes"114 (and I cannot find any
substantial yvorking out of that in any liberation theologian), what form does it take9
As Harvey Cox puts it. "this raises the question of how a whole society, or indeed a
whole civilisation repents and starts over"1", a question with yvhich the Kairos
theologians yvrestled.
The theological or theoretical difficulty which leaves social forgiveness
relatively unknorvn or unexplored is a function of our individualist culture (and
theology) rather than a necessity' of the (Biblical) concept of forgiveness. Yet the
schism between the ethics of lnteriontv and the ethics of society has a long
history117. Luther, as we have seen, attempted via the doctrine of the two kingdoms
lo remove forgiveness from any social context, and Niebuhr is also cited by
' ty In falconer, 1988, p 105
115 Peters, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds). 1986, p3




Brakenhielm as hostile to any political praxis of the ethic of the Sermon on the
Mount in this way - "genuine forgiveness of the enemy requires a contrite
recognition of the sinfulness of the self and of mutual responsibility for the sin of
the accused; such spiritual penetration is beyond the capabilities of the collective
man"118, However, the forgiveness we have been discussing is relational; it may still
be characterised as personal without being individual. As Arendt recognises, any
speaking of forgiveness depends on a "plurality, on the presence and acting of
others"119; indeed, for her, it arises not from the transcendent, from outside, but
"directly out of the will to live together with others"120. Or as the poet Robert Frost
puts it, "to be social is to be forgiving"121; there is no warrant for restricting it to a
narrow definition of "personal" relationships. Biblically, the story of Joseph may be
read as one in which God's people Israel traced their origin as a community to a
painful process of forgiveness and reconciliation122, both of which remain critical for
the continued existence of the covenant community.
Even (perhaps, especially) where questions of individual responsibility for
injustice recede into the background of the consideration of sinful structures, a
politics of forgiveness has a part to play in the quest for social justice. From the very
outset, any Christian engagement in politics demands forgiveness, or else we recoil
in horror from the whole dirty business. As Willmer points out. any act of consent to
government involves forgiveness123, since even authorities ordained by God are
imperfect and in need of redemption; thus, the politics of forgiveness may represent
the "ultimate realism" which recognises the inevitable imperfection of society
without ceasing to struggle for justice124. On the one hand, purity of doctrine or of
lifestyle may be seen to be at risk in Christian political activity, which therefore
stands the more in need of justification by faith; on the other hand, it is only by
engagement with social realities in the incarnation and crucifixion that God brings
his forgiveness to bear in the world. Thus. Fiddes sees in Christian political
engagement a pattern of resistance and submission which is characteristic of the
pattern of the cross, and of the process of forgiveness123
118 r Niebuhr, 1937, p 121, cited by Brikenhielm, 1993, p51
119 Arendt, 1959, p213
120 Arendt, 1959, p221
12'Cited in Frost, 1991, p202
122 shriver, i995, p24
123 Willmer. 1979b. p214
124 Hinehliff, 1982, pi90
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Attractive though this may seem, there remain further problem areas for the
social dimension of forgiveness First, as already noted, there is an element of risk in
forgiveness. Even if it seeks repentance and is oriented toward transformation,
forgiveness can be exploited, especially (though not exclusively) if it degenerates
into cheap grace. But forgiveness which starts at the cross can not be a deal done
when repentance is proved; the risk is of the essence of the gratuitousness of
forgiveness. Thus a Waldensian/Methodist Church statement says that it cannot be
reduced to a mechanism integrated into the legal or political process, becoming
thereby an object of calculation1*.
However, this reluctance to "profane" the divine forgiveness also has to
avoid the danger of Pharisaism (Mark 2.7); in Christ, God's forgiving love is let
loose in the world where it runs the risk of exploitation. Another way of putting this
might be to say that the power involved in forgiveness is enabling rather than
dominating. Indeed, "the one who wants to forgive must enable the other to accept
his offer and win him back into fellowship freely""". So the politics of forgiveness
gives the initiative to the oppressed, to the "powerless", in building justice, which is,
on the one hand, very much in line with the thinking of liberation theology, but also
open to a charge of lack of realism.
A further serious charge against any politics of forgiveness is the blurring of
the distinction between the guilt) and the victim when it is claimed that "all have
sinned" and stand in need of forgiveness. Niebuhr's reservation about the capacity' of
"collective man" to recognise this spiritual truth has been noted above, but even
where it is recognised, serious problems arise. In the abstract it is easy enough to say-
that it is Pharisaism to deny human solidarity in sin12*, and Christian to wail for him
who is without sin to cast the first stone, but if we are faced with sin on the scale of
Nazism or apartheid "a theology of reconciliation through God's solidarity with his
enemies would be suspected of dangerous unreality"12*.
The cross cannot be pressed into the service of self-righteousness or self-
justification, and a theology of original sin undermines any suggestion of the
absolute tightness of any cause or movement, but this does not commit Christians to
neutrality in all conflicts. Willmer seeks a solution to this difficulty when he cites
1^6 Waldensian/Methodist Church document cited in Flonstan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p29
127 Fiddes. 1989, pi72
128 Willrner, 1990, p340
129 Willmer, 1990, p332
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Barlh's description of what forgiveness is - "that men can be for one another in spite
of the fact that they have much against one another which they cannot overlook and
forget"13". I think Sobrino is making fundamentally the same point when he says that
"Jesus loves the oppressed by being with them and loves the oppressors by being
against them"»'. Both seem to stretch the language of "for" and "against" almost to
breaking, but that is precisely what both Gunton and Fiddes realise the cross does to
all metaphors for understanding it. The problem is to tum this into practical politics
without lapsing into "dangerous unreality".
If the justice to which forgiveness is oriented seeks the rebuilding of
community (reconciliation), I think Fiddes is wrong in assuming that this means
compromise. He states that "to hold back and seek a compromise in the very teeth of
victory is to give the Spirit of God the opportunity to heal the breach and create a
new social order"13-, but this lets down his argument from the atonement. The cross
does not represent God's compromise with evil, but his radical wav of tackling evil,
and the politics of forgiveness has to remain loyal to that if it is not to degenerate
into laxism. To speak of forgiveness is not to commit oneself to consensus politics;
that is to forget the seeking after repentance. Similarly, Glynn's attempt to construct
a politics of forgiveness around the American constitution with its "institutional
basis of social and religious tolerance" seems unduly complacent, and lacking the
cutting edge that such a political adventure demands.
Some of that cutting edge (and the cost of forgiveness) may be heard in Karl
Barth's disturbing words in the late 1940s, when he said that Christ's invitation to
'come unto me' is addressed to "you unlikeable ones, you wicked Hitler boys and
girls, you brutal SS soldiers, you evil Gestapo police, you sad compromisers and
collaborationists, all you men of the herd who have moved so long in patient
stupidity behind your so-caiied leader '1". As always there is the suspicion of taking
their sins less than seriously, of cheap grace that avoids rather than seeking
repentance. But there is at work here the justice of God in rebuilding community
through forgiveness, and the strength that the Biblical witness sees in forgiveness.
There remains the basic problem of "politicising" theological truths. "The
danger of collapsing salvation into a particular form of creative action is that the
universality and challenge of religious truth becomes compromised. Grace is not
|30 Willmer, 1990, p338
'3' Sobrino, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p53
132 Fiddes, 1989, p206
133 Earth, 1945, p40
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available only for those with politically or economically correct opinions"13*. Up to a
point, what Sedgwick says here is undeniable; justification by faith is not reducible
to a political programme without considerable violence being done to its full
meaning. But nor can it be locked away from any significance in the political world,
where inaction may be heavy with significance in the face of injustice It is not a
matter of "collapsing" or reducing tnith, but of responding with theological integrity',
in faith, to God and to particular situations in the real, social, economic and political
world. The creative action that is thereby demanded is always, by definition,
"particular", and risky; here, as throughout the Christian life, the humble, Lutheran
admonition "pecca fortiter" applies as encouragement to action, warning against
absolutism and reminder that all stand in need of forgiveness.
forgiveness Diluted ?
A further question arises as to yvhether this analysis, seeing forgiveness as
creative of (rather than alternative to) justice, reduces forgiveness to merely a
Christian political tactic. I don't think this is necessarily so Forgiveness is, of itself,
the work of God. and expresses the yvill of God. which is completed,
eschatologicallv. in justice. Some have argued that "pardon" is a better description
of the application of forgiveness in such areas. Thus Brakenhielm. who, as noted
above, is sceptical of social applications of forgiveness (though he does make the
interesting suggestion that social workers may administer something like social
forgiveness to their clients135)* cites Doyvnie in support of the contention that "yve
pardon as officials in social roles but forgive as persons"1*. He goes on to draw a
clear line between the pardoning that seeks to maintain a legal community and the
forgiveness that is appropriate to moral and personal community, but, as he himself
savs. there are many different aspects of forgiveness (as there are of community) and
it is not clear that the linguistic device of reserving forgiveness for the personal
realm and pardon (which seems a kind of second class forgiveness) for the world of
social structures is either necessary or useful.
A similar reservation might apply to Tamez's use of "amnesty". In a
translator's footnote to Tamez's book, "The Amnesty of Grace", Ringe notes her
contention that justification by faith amounts to the "gracious cancellation of all
condemnation, every punishmeni and indeed the entire world view that rewards
134 Sedgwick, 1992. pi 19
'3-s Brakenhielm, 1993, p8
1 *6 j^r,a.]<.<riiliicIiTi, 1993, p26
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privilege and merit"; ll is neither pardon nor declaration of innocence but a
"gracious declaration of amnesty for all humankind"137. As noted in the earlier
discussion of atonement theology, there are limitations to any legal metaphor in
conveying the full meaning of justification or forgiveness, and the weakness of
"amnesty" seems to lie in its failure to convey the effective demand of forgiveness
on the forgiven.
It is not any second-class, extended, or analogous meaning of forgiveness
that is sought in social structures, but the full reality of forgiveness; the quotation
marks in which Meeks encloses his argument that Third World debts which cannot
be paid must be "forgiven" are unnecessary, representing too much of a concession
to the privatisation of forgiveness. That is not to say that the issues arc
straightforward. In terms of Third World debt, for example, it has been argued that
the ianguage of forgiveness of debts is inappropriate because "careful historical
analysis suggests that it should be creditor nations which should seek forgiveness for
policies which lead to impoverishment and indebtedness of and within debtor
nations ... (and the problem is) a matter of justice rather than of mercy"13*. Similarly,
both Jensen and Swinburne argue in different ways for a "disanalogy" between
financial and moral debts, feeling that the former are straightforward to deal with
while the latter are more complex. The first two chapters of this thesis suggest that
is not the case vis-a-vis financial debt, and my contention would be that the
theological groundwork of this chapter can illuminate precisely these complexities.
Radical forgiveness is appropriate, indeed necessary, in and for structures and
systems as much as in what are generally called "personal" relationships. The next
chapter will explore the practical difficulties in realising the potential significance
of forgiveness in political and economic situations, as part of the quest for justice,
t hat will take this theological or theoretical discussion back towards the original
context of debt.
Conclusion
Before moving to that, it may be helpful to summarise briefly the argument
of this chapter. The theological argument has built on the understanding of justice
developed in chapter four; as Tillich expresses it, in relation to God, justice "means
creative justice and is expressed in the divine grace which forgives in order to re-
137 Tamez, 1993, pl94
'3S Western European Churches' "Final Statement", in Jones, 1988, p44
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unite"1*'. Thai creative jusliee is encountered in the atonement (as God identifies
with the victims, and so can and does forgive), and in the Pauline doctrine of
justification by faith. Therefore, rigid distinctions between justice and justification
or between justification and sanctification distort all three elements (which may be
distinguished, but not separated). Justification by faith is primarily about breaking
barriers and enabling justice to be done. Although Luther and modern theologians of
liberation may well have been asking different questions (Brakemeier suggests
Lutheran theology answers the question "how do I, as a sinner, find a gracious God?"
while theologians of liberation are responding to the question "how do we, the poor,
find a just world?""®), the theology of justification by faith - freed from its
individualist assumptions - offers a way into a profound understanding of three-
dimensional liberation, with the sociaL'political economic dimension crucial to this
study It also offers a profound challenge, as we shall see, to the ideology of the
market.
Despite Tillich's reservations about a language of forgiveness which
trivialises sins (sins are forgiven, he says, but estranged people are justified),
forgiveness need be neither trivialising of sin and its consequences nor
individualistic. What has emerged here is an understanding of forgiveness which is
far from forgetting or condoning evil. Admissive forgiveness, we have seen, neither
evades nor trivialises sin. recognising that sin which is hidden or denied is likelv to
retain its power. Forgiveness is about breaking the power of past or present sin to
corrupt the future, and that is not a matter of having a tolerant attitude. Therefore,
like the Law, forgiveness is not an end in itself; it is how God tackles sin. which is
personal, relational, structural. Forgiveness is creative of justice in all these
dimensions, and that is a costly and risky process which is a task of the community
as a whole and aims at restoring people to participation in the community (as in the
Jubilee).
The danger of forgiveness being seen as a "soft option" releasing Christians
from the demands of justice has some practical basis in the story of the church, and
that avoidance of cheap grace underlies the low profile of forgiveness in liberation
theology. But forgiveness which provokes repentance (rather than awaiting
repentance as a pre-condition) undermines oppression profoundly, breaking into
spirals of injustice. The word of God to the oppressor (and any other sinner) is
139 Tillich, 1974, p66
140 Brakemeier, 1988, p217
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therefore a word of forgiveness, at precisely the same time as it is, as Lebacqz
argues, one which requisitions justice141. That is the word we are called to hear, to
speak and, most crucially, to live.
That word, then, has to become flesh not only in psychological but in social
and economic reality, in relationships - personal, political, economic - and in
structures. What remains to be seen next is what form that word (to oppressor or to
oppressed) may take when expressed in the social worlds of politics and economics;
might justice again (as in the jubilee) demand that debts be forgiven ?
141 Lebacqz, 1987, p83
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7. The Social Reality of Forgiveness
Having developed a theological grounding for, and tentative definition of,
the social reality of forgiveness, the next logical step might be to work from these
principles towards social and political practice which seeks to apply what we have
discovered. However, there is a real danger of that becoming Utopian, and it would
not reflect the interactive relationship of theory to practice adopted in this thesis
(and laid out in the introduction). Rather, particular situations will be considered in
the light of the above discussion, and events assessed in terms of what in the nature
of forgiveness has been at work. This will provide the final material with which to
return to the original debt context outlined in the first two chapters, into which the
concluding chapter will reflect the subsequent discussion
Indeed, this approach is similar to that taken by several of those who have
considered the politics of forgiveness in recent years. The "Forgiveness and Politics"
project of the British Council of Churches in the 1980s produced a series of case
studies1 as their main output; Brian Frost's book on "The Politics of Peace" (which
largely came out of his involvement in the BCC project) considers eleven
international situations held together by the "thread of forgiveness"2; the Amanecida
Collective made several visits to Nicaragua and discussed the issues of
"revolutionary forgiveness" with many people there as the raw material for their
book1: and the bulk of Donald Shriver's recent book is spent in considering what an
"ethic for enemies" means in three specific international relationships4.
All of these reflect from a clearly Christian perspective, but with a
conviction that this is appropriate to, and helpful within, secular situations. Their
starting points are all similar to McDonagh's, when he says that "the awesomeness of
justice as transcendent in origin is balanced by the intimacy ofjustice enablement as
immanent in people"; this "justice enablement" is God at work in forgiveness, the
God "whose justice and mercy are so deeply intertwined"-5. Several relevant points
arise from this. First, forgiveness, as we have seen, is an exercise in enabling (rather
than dominating) power; it is part ofGod's "letting be"*, whereby He takes the risk of
* See Krusche & Moltmann, 1987, and Shriver, 1987
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liberation rather than domination. From there, it seems reasonable to move to
recognising God in the secular experience of forgiveness, though this should not
become an exercise in Christian imperialism.
Several authors in this field draw attention to the (surprising) claim of
Hannah Arendt that "the discoverer of the role of forgiveness in human affairs was
Jesus of Nazareth. The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and
articulated it in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously"'.
Mention of Jesus may be a warning of a danger in the overemphasis on God's part in
this - a return to the reservation of forgiveness to God alone which was the
substance of disagreement between Jesus and the scribes and Pharisees. Thus, Daly
goes too far in his claim that "there is ... something inescapably 'religious' about
forgiveness and atonement"8, nor are we dealing (as Bonhoeffer suggests) with
merely a "faint shadow of the forgiveness which Jesus Christ vouchsafes to faith"9 in
secular contexts. "We Christians insult and diminish what has been revealed in Jesus
crucified ifwe allocate forgiveness again, as in most of the Hebrew scripture, to the
recesses of God's unique power"i°. While Arendt realises how crucial this is, she
seems to go a step too far when she says that Jesus denies that the power to forgive
comes from God It is crucial to retain both the transcendent source and immanenl
reality of forgiveness.
However securely we may intertwine justice and mercy in the theology of
the cross, this does not lead straightforwardly to the politics of forgiveness.
Wrestling with this, Kenneth Kaunda says "if I have found no way of coming to
terms with the cross as a political strategy, at least I have been able to cling to it as a
means of personal regeneration"". It would be easy to respond to that theologically
(as Niebuhr and others have done) in terms of the cross being resistant to reduction
to political strategy, but any politics of forgiveness must come to terms with the
cross and learn its significance. And Kaunda's words exemplify clearly one of the
difficulties already noted, the individualism and privatisation of our theories of
forgiveness and atonement.
Arendt sees forgiveness as an essential power for social change, a theme
taken up by Shriver when he notes that the OT law on such as the jubilee year is
7 Arendt, 1959, p214/5
^ Daly, in Falconer, 1988, plOl
^ Bonhoeffer, 1964, pi 18
Shriver, in Frost, 1991, pi97
'' Kaunda, 1980, pi79
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"addressed not to self-eonsciousness but to selves-in-relation, selves alienated, and
selves restorable to each other"'-, recognising that "the community of humans,
beginning with Israel, can be smashed by the sins of humans; but God can and will
repair that community. And a leading name for the repair is the forgiveness of
sins"15. Along with others, Arendt may be cited as seeing the crucial nature of
forgiveness as breaking the "chain-gang of mere cause and effect from which life
has laboured so long and painfully to escape"1*; "without being forgiven, released
from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were,
be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover"15 (a secularised
version of the doctrine of original sin).
In their own practical contexts, Kaunda and Tutu speak of forgiveness as the
key to dealmg with the "horrible entail of the past"1*; Kaunda even sees a particular
African gift for forgiveness as meaning that Zimbabwe will not seek its own
versions of the Nuremberg trials" (a remark which seems quite a startling pointer to
the different standards we are prone to adopt in proportion to our distance from any
given situation of conflict). Forgiveness is liberation from re-enacting, and from
mechanically reacting to, the past; from wallowing in the guilt of the past, opening
up a "capacity for renewed society"1®. Thus Shriver sees forgiveness as enabling new
justice by repairing the breach between the agents and victims of old injustice". This
seems to lead to the crucial questions of where (and when) repentance comes into
this and of whether forgiving means forgetting, both of which are issues to be
explored in the specific contexts now to be discussed.
One of the problems with Brian Frost's book lies in the diversity of
experiences which are included under the umbrella of forgiveness. In his
introduction, Shriver notes that "what he (Frost) calls forgiveness may sometimes
rightly be called by other names"*1. In general there seems to be an acceptance
implicit throughout the book that non-violence is a form of forgiveness; the very fact
of the title - "The Politics of Peace" - emerging from a study of forgiveness and
politics seems to beg the question of the relationship of forgiveness and peace. Of
12 Frost, 1991, p!96
^ Frost, 1991, pl86
' ^ L van der Post, The Night of the NewMoon, Hogarth Press, London, 1970, p 154
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Kaunda, 1980, pi80
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course it is obviously difficult to speak of forgiveness while waging war against
those one claims to be forgiving, but it is not clear that forgiveness and non-violence
are to be identified. The way in which the Amanecida Collective wrestle with the
issue of violence and forgiveness, while not ultimately satisfactory, seems to me a
helpful pointer on the way. In personal terms, their understanding of the tension
between "I hate" and "I don't hate" in the same person(s) at the same time and the
relationship of that to forgiveness also seems helpful21, at a deeper level than the
conventional "hate the sin, love the sinner" formula which seems unrealistically
neat.
In various other writings, the medieval "treuga dei", the Roman "parcere
subiectis" and the power to commute the death sentence are seen as in some ways
analogous to forgiveness, yet falling short of its full meaning. Similarly, Fiddes
weakens the concept of forgiveness when he equates it with seeking compromise22,
another assumption implicit in some of Frost's book; as the Kairos document notes,
the cross does not represent God's compromise with evil. When Frost says that "one
of the main aspects of forgiveness is ... the willingness of politicians to allow
systems to coexist and live side-by-side even though there is disagreement about
aims and goals"2* - Hayek's Great Society as the embodiment of forgiveness - again
we seem to have lost the essence of forgiveness in a general commending of
toleration under a new name.
One thing which is very clear from the diverse examples in Frost's book is
the extent to which the forgiveness of individuals often has political significance.
Again, it might have been helpful to have had more analysis of the precise meaning
of forgiveness here. Daly covers some of this ground when he stresses the
"limitations" of politics which he says cannot enforce forgiveness, only create a
climate in which forgiveness (necessarily personal, in his understanding) can grow2*.
This seems to diminish the significance of legal forms of forgiveness (eg amnesties),
or at least deflect from an analysis of which legal forms do in fact represent
forgiveness (eg statutes of limitations, parole, bankruptcy law, pardons, etc), and
even of the relationship of punishment to forgiveness2*.
Amanecida, 1987, p84
" Fiddes, 1989, p206
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Of course, it is only out of the diverse range of material Frost gathers that a
satisfactory analysis, and eventual definition, of forgiveness can emerge Although
we have explored theologically the meanings of forgiveness, the Bible does not offer
a precise definition or even precision in the use of the concept: as Shriver notes,
"with an imprecision that could only have annoyed rationalists like Immanuel Kant
the biblical names for the norms of human life overlap, imply, exclude and modify
each other"24.
Before going on to look in more detail at two of the situations described in
Frost's, Shriver's and the Amanecida Collective's studies - post-war Germany and
more contemporary Latin America - it might be helpful recapitulate some of the
issues which have already emerged. At a basic level, forgiveness has to do with a
refusal to let the past determine the future; it is not to be equated with condoning or
excusing evil, nor with the forgetting of the injustices of the past; it is not "cheap
grace", but rather has a cost; it is crucially about relationships (social and more
narrowly personal). Forgiveness looks in hope towards justice; it initiates change by
evoking (though not guaranteeing) repentance and redirection. While there is always
a risk in that it may be exploited, it is the radical alternative to the escalation of the
"justice" of retaliation to the point where eyes for eyes leave everyone blind.
Forgiveness is the creative dynamic that breaks into the spirals of injustice.
It may be significant that nearly all of Frost's examples are drawn from
situations in which a society can be said to be struggling to emerge from a
conspicuously unjust past such as apartheid, slavery. Nazism, dictatorship, etc. All
of these are areas where the injustice of the past is almost beyond dispute, and
where society may be said to be putting that aspect of the past behind it (though
there are serious disputes about the extent to which this last point is true). Situations
where the "injustice" is more current (or currently contentious) may be more
problematic and produce a different understanding of forgiveness as dealing with
present injustice rather than exclusively with the entail of the past. However, there is
much to be learned from the two scenarios, and from the different perspectives from
which they are approached.
Post-war Germany
The situation and dilemmas of post-war Germany in the aftermath of the
holocaust continue to raise many issues around forgiveness even as the jubilees of
26 Frost, 1991, p 195
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many of the significant events of the ending of the second world war are marked;
indeed, some of the dilemmas have arisen again in the situation of the reunited
Germany of the past few years (and the of signs of neo-Nazi groups emerging
therein today). Crucial among these issues are (a) questions of forgetting and denial
of the past - which may become confused with forgiveness; (b) the importance of
the gravity of the offence - which may be thought to undermine the possibility of
forgiveness; (c) the question of "who can forgive ?" - which may limit the
possibilities of forgiveness; and (d) matters relating to repentance - as a pre¬
condition for, or outcome of, forgiveness. It may also be highly significant to note
the perspective from which comments are being made. Elie Weisel, who has
repeatedly been quoted as hostile to any thoughts of forgiveness, speaks most
closely from the perspective of the victims of the holocaust27, while Jurgen
Moltmann writes explicitly as one who first heard the Stuttgart Declaration as a
German prisoner of war in my home town of Glasgow2®. Even Brian Frost (who
writes about Germany's role in Europe from a British base») and Donald Shriver
(who writes about "Germans and Americans" from the US side of the Atlantic®0)
have the subtly different perspectives which may result from the different power
relationships of their two home countries in relation to post-war Germany.
It has been argued that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, embodying
the victors' justice of retribution after the First World War, were a key factor
exploited by the Nazis on their road to power; Thielicke and even Bonhoeffer (in his
early writings) express German resentment at this "open wound"31. A politics of
forgiveness might well take this as an instructive starting point, a lesson to be
learned, but consideration here will begin from 1945.
There seems a clear consensus among writers in the field that forgiveness
cannot be about a forgetting of the past especially if that means denial - "those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"32. Thus the Stuttgart
"Declaration of Guilt" of the German churches in 1945 is seen as crucial and
commended by Frost as repudiating all efforts to vaporise German guilt or make that
a matter purely between German}' (or Germans) and God". Any proposal which in
22 See eg The Scotsman 27-1-95
2^ Krusche & Moltmann, 1987
29 Frost, 1991, ch3
Shnver, 1995, ch4
3 ' D Bonhoeffer: No Rust\' Swords, Collins, London, 1977, p76
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the name of forgiveness would seem to sweep the past under the carpet seems to
smack of very cheap grace. Conscientisation (to borrow a term from another
context) has therefore a part to play in forgiveness, not simply so that the victim
should "understand" the oppressor, but that the oppressor should grasp what he has
done (is doing7); one cannot be forgiven without accepting the sinfulness of what
one has done. So the identification and condemnation of the offence is a necessary
(preliminary) part of forgiveness. For Shriver, it is the crucial first strand of
forgiveness in the political context which "gets its real start under the double
impetus of judgment and forbearance from revenge"14; the moral truth of the
injustice must be accepted before anything worthy of the name forgiveness can be
completed.
Yet Shriver is noticeably less enthusiastic about whether the Stuttgart
Declaration embodies this recognition. Because he places such stress on
remembering the injustice, he is suspicious of the brief and, arguably, bland phrase
in the declaration of "solidarity in guilt" which admitted "with great pain ... that
unending suffering has been brought by us to many peoples and countries"; real
forgiveness would have demanded that the horror of the holocaust and more be spelt
out. On the one hand, this Declaration was shocking enough in its context to
provoke anger in Moltmann and his fellow prisoners of war in Glasgow15, and it
certainly was a first step away from "publicly pretended innocence"1*, significant
especially because it came on the initiative of many of those, such as Niemoller, in
the Confessing Church who could have sought to justify themselves and deny
complicity and or solidarity in guilt. At its own historical moment, it was welcomed
as opening the way toward a deeper justice than that which had been expressed by
Versailles or at Nuremberg". On the other hand, it left open the possibilities for the
three techniques for suppressing guilt suggested by Krusche as operating in
Germany after 1945 - dissociation from one's own guilt by focusing on others',
privatisation of guilt by internalising it within the church (some evaded the force of
Stuttgart by denying it was a document of any political significance18) and the fading
3^ Shriver, 1995, p8
3^ Krusche & Moltmann, 1987, p41
36 Shriver, 1995, p87
3^ Krusche & Moltmann. 1987, p9
3 ^ Krusche & Moltmann, 198 7, p 14
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out of guilt*. Moltmanns considered reflection forty years later sees the Declaration
as an important new beginning which was as much confession of hope as of guilt".
Perhaps one of the important lessons here is that forgiveness is not to be
confined to a moment, but describes a process with many strands intertwined. The
Stuttgart Declaration played an important process which included later more
specific confessions, the 1952 West German "Equalisation of Burdens" Law (giving
reparations to some of those who suffered property losses during the war) and
various Allied responses, going on still through the marking of anniversaries. Harvey
Cox, writing in 1968 on the statute of limitations in relation to war crimes, is at
pains to stress that "forgiveness allows no cheap escape from one's past"41. But what
is "cheap"? The reflection on Stuttgart suggests that may well depend on who is
being asked.
Clearly the enormity of the holocaust plays a part in all this thinking, though
those who speak of forgiveness are always likely to be accused of failing to take
seriously the hurt of others, unless (as we shall see) it is the injured who speak. Can
the enormity of the offence "destroy the language which invests forgiveness with
meaning and reference"?", or does that place an unacceptable limit on the power of
forgiveness? If Christians can justly be accused of failing to take seriously their need
for contrition and repentance before lecturing Jews or anyone else on forgiveness
here, they have also sometimes been too quick to identify the unforgivable sin.
Disappointingly. Arendt. relying heavily on Christ's word from the cross
("Father, forgive them, they know not what they do"), confines forgiveness to acts
with unforeseen consequences: for her, it simply does not apply to "the enormity' of
crime and willed evil"". This does not seem a convincing account of the gospel of
forgiveness, or even of the particular text, which is addressed to people who thought
(as much as any convinced Nazi) that they knew what they were doing. We cannot
exclude any offence from the possibility of forgiveness, but would do well to think
of such extreme cases as the holocaust as a corrective to our language of forgiveness
becoming too glib, and to any easy equation of forgiveness with understanding as if
that were all there is to it. Thus Moltmann says "that we are all sinners is a
commonplace which becomes a lie in concrete situations because it draws a veil
Krusche & Moltmann, 1987, ppl Iff
Krusche & Moltmann, 1987, p47
41 Cox. 1968, pi70
42 Daly, in Falconer, 1988, pi 10
43 Arendt, 1959, p215
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over what was actually done"4*. In that light, we need to examine the language of
forgiveness carefully but not necessarily discard it. Ultimately, if forgiveness is
about how we are set free from the past, on the path to new justice, it is all the more
vital to find its meaning in situations of this gravity.
Yet even with safeguards against the cheapening of the grace of forgiveness,
the accusation of laxism is still likely to be made if the word of forgiveness is
spoken from the sidelines (or by the offenders themselves, or those identified with
them). In the context of the holocaust, can only those who were there forgive, or
those whose families were victims, or any Jew? Are the apparent differences
between most Jewish and mos1 Christian comments on the appropriateness of
forgiveness after the holocaust fundamentally a matter of theology or of experience?
No-one can deny that words of forgiveness which come from the victim
cam greater power and credibility, and those who seem closer to the side of the
offender may be rightly criticised for too easy a word here. As noted already,
theologically, forgiveness "only comes from the hands of the ultimate and
representative victim"4*. The power of forgiveness is therefore "rooted in the truth of
the victim"44, and can only be effectively conveyed m solidarity with the victim(s);
but must it wait on the individual victim? It is not clear that we can talk
meaningfully of forgiveness without it involving the victim somehow, and indeed
part of the attraction of the politics of forgiveness may be that it leaves the initiative
with the oppressed or offended4", whose recovered sense of self-worth may be a vital
part of the process of forgiveness. Yet rigid adherence to the "only the victim can
forgive" formula would almost totally exclude any social'political dimension of
forgiveness. How can a government speak a word of forgiveness when it is not the
victim? Once again, the only answer here seems to lie in breaking free of
individualism, and recovering the role of the community as the locus in which
forgiveness is both learned and mediated. Forgiveness is indeed a "corporate task"48.
Shriver explores many of these issues in a detailed consideration ofPresident
Reagan's visit to Bitburg in 1985. Having initially declined to visit a concentration
camp (to avoid "reawakening the memories"49), the President proposed to lay a
44 Krusche & Moltmann, 1987, p47
45 Willmer, 1990, p339
4® Duquoc, in Honstan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p43
4^ Frost, 1991. p4
4^ Weaver, 1994, pi64
49 Shriver, 1995, p94
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wreath at a German military cemetery at Bitburg, where, it emerged, there were the
graves of several officers of the Waffen SS. An attempted gesture of reconciliation
thereby became a subject of intense political conflict (especially in the United
States), dramatically so when the President presented a congressional medal to Elie
Weisel. President Reagan, who had, in the heat of a press conference, claimed that
the SS men were "victims of Nazism ... just as surely as the victims of the
concentration camps"50, spoke of reconciliation which could include remembering,
while Weisel attempted to dissuade him from going to Bitburg on the basis that his
place was with the victims of the SS not the criminals, and that memory and truth
have priority. Perhaps surprisingly, Weisel quite expressly denied any "collective
guilt" - "only the killers were guilty"si.
Clearly, political forgiveness, even m the symbolic gestures of leaders, is not
straightforward. Albeit in less intricate, but more passionate, form, many of the
theological issues discussed above surfaced in this controversy about the meaning,
cost, appropriateness and form of forgiveness in what, forty years after the events,
was clearly a highly charged issue. Shriver finds the most discerning words on the
matter in a speech of the West German head of state, von Weizsacker, who wrestled
with the problems and pain of identifying with the victims and argued that "whoever
closes his eyes to the past becomes blind to the present"; because we seek
reconciliation, we "must understand that there can be no reconciliation without
memory"52. While von Weizsacker later was reluctant to use the language of
forgiveness to describe his message, Shriver finds in it many of the crucial elements
- painfully accurate identification and confession of a nation's sins, restraint and
forbearance towards enemies who duplicated or collaborated in these sins, seeking
after justice without revenge, and "above all the hope that through right
remembering of history a people can rightly turn themselves politically toward
reconciliation among themselves and with their former enemies"53.
If Shriver welcomes von Weizsacker's words as the culmination of a process
of national repentance that started at Stuttgart, is he right in seeing this as a
necessary preliminary to forgiveness? Frost quotes words from Polish Prime
Minister Gomulka - "the sins of the German people against the Polish people are
great ... Reconciliation and forgiveness apply only to those who are prepared to do
?0 Shriver, 1995, p95
Cited Shriver, 1995. p97
Cited Shrrver, 1995, pllO
Shriver, 1995, pi 12
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penance. Without contrition there is no forgiveness"* - and many close to victims
argue, with some force, for this necessity. Yet, it is disturbing when Shriver writes in
one place that "the Bible knows of no consummated forgiveness in the absence of
repentance" and goes on to deduce that the world has the right to keep the jury out
on the Germans' right to have the past considered past until we are sure that
Germans have forsworn Nazism". The key word is "consummated"; many others
with similar reluctance to speak the word of forgiveness before repentance note "the
plain Biblical assertion that repentance often comes after and not before
forgiveness"*.
At another point, Shriver argues that public repentance is one of the four
necessary strands in political forgiveness, and these strands are interwoven in the
fullness of forgiveness: no one strand, then, has priority, in logic or in time, and the
process of forgiveness cannot wait on complete repentance before it begins.
However, when Mollmann speaks of there being no forgiveness without atonement,
just as there can be no reconciliation without the restoration of justice57; this seems
to come dangerously close to justification by works. Is this simply a matter of words
- whether we mean by "forgiveness" the necessarily unilateral initiative that cannot,
Biblically, wait on repentance, or the "consummated" process of restored
relationship and justice which clearly does demand repentance, and that at more
than a verbal level - or is there something more here'.' This seems to relate to the
issue raised earlier with regard to justification and sanctification: we might usefully
say that sanctificalion is the consummation of justification, completing the process,
as repentance is part of completed forgiveness. But it is significant that Shriver's
stress on adequate repentance becomes greater when he is dealing with concrete
cases in which the danger of glossing over pain is most acute.
What is repeatedly clear is that, politically at least, forgiving does not mean
forgetting. Cox speaks of God's willingness to forgive and restore, rather than
forgive and forget, and the Amanecida Collective almost turn the popular phrase on
its head when, like Shriver, they conclude that forgiveness has to do with re¬
membering what has been dismembered5®, with putting back together what past
injustice has torn apart.
Frost, 1991, p3 3
In Frost, 1991, p 195
56 Cox, 1968, pi 72
Moltmann, 1991, p4 9
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Latin America
This dilemma over repentance may take us from Germany to Nicaragua,
where the Amanecida Collective wrestled with the problem of forgiveness in the
revolutionary situation of the mid 1980s, where not only was there a lot to forgive in
the structural violence and injustice of the recently overthrown past, but many of
those personally responsible were actively and violently trying to regain the power
to renew these injustices. They are honest enough to admit to it being only their
majority view that "if revolutionary forgiveness is to occur the victimiser must not
only confess. The victimiser must repent, cease the violence"59. Clearly this arises
from an awareness of the perversion of the concept of forgiveness at the expense of
those who have been, and are being, abused. Yet we still have to come to terms with
Jesus' word of forgiveness addressed to "a people unrepentant, starved for
forgiveness, bent upon harrowing, bludgeoning and bombing the Power of Love
right out of the world ... (ie) in spite of their refusal to repent"60. Which, ultimately,
is the cheapened grace - the forgiveness that is undemanding, and fails to challenge,
or the forgiveness that is conditional and contractual and fails to liberate? Somehow,
forgiveness must surely be both unconditional and challenging (in order both to be
true to the Biblical witness and effective in breaking into the cycle of action and
reaction), which is hard enough to achieve in personal terms and harder still in the
political realm where any structuring of forgiveness will be likely to make it open to
becoming a matter of calculation.
A Waldensian'Methodist church document from Italy seems to go too far
along this lme when it says that "forgiveness is not to be profaned by withdrawing it
from the ambit of God's gratuitous grace and setting it in the mechanisms of a
juridical and moral contract in which it becomes the means of exchange and the
object of calculation"61 (which seems to remove any practical possibility of a social
reality for forgiveness in the name of preserving its purity). But there are limits to
politics here, especially if one holds to a personalist understanding of forgiveness in
which the renewal of personal relationships cannot ultimately be achieved by
legislation62; many relationships, however, are politically economically structured
and therefore crying out for the politics of forgiveness.
Amanecida, 1987, p 1 OS
Amanecida. 1987, pi09
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On the one hand, forgiveness cannot be postponed until after the revolution
if it is to be a revolutionary force. But how then do we reacl when the "forgiven"
oppressor refuses to repent or change his ways ? Forgiveness is readily seen as
weakness. From feminist as much as Nicaraguan situations, the Amanecida
Collective ask whether forgiveness can be "nothing more than limp acquiescence to
reigns of relational terror whether in personal relationships or international affairs"".
Like Frost, they cite the example of Tomas Borge, and his personal and political
forgiveness of former national guardsmen, many of whose reaction to this liberation
was to go off and join the Contras. Does this exemplify the weakness, or risk, or the
one-sided injustice of forgiveness?
"A one-sided restriction to the perpetrators and forgiveness of their active
sins has made Protestantism blind to the suffering of the victims and their passive
sins and to God's saving and judging 'option for the poor'"", writes Moltmann.
Clearly, a theology of liberation which speaks only of that forgiveness has failed to
engage with the reality of the situation, but has a theology of liberation which omits
that dimension not also lost something cnicial to its revolutionary power? Does the
insight that we share the need for forgiveness unacceptably blur the distinction
between the oppressor and oppressed, or rather open a way forward together which
may be more creative of community (and therefore more "just") ? As Mollmann
goes on to say, "the true Reformation doctrine ofjustification is the theology of the
liberation of those without rights and of the unjust"". This fits well with the Latin
American perspectives of Elsa Tamez (in her recent book subtitled "Justification by
Faith from a Latin American Perspective"66) and Gustavo Gutierrez, who argued in
his Drummond lectures6" that liberation is three-dimensional - social political
liberation, "human" (personal) liberation, and liberation from sin - and that these
three dimensions must be held together.
This, however, does not commit us to a neutrality which the gospel
commands us to abandon so that "the Christian must love everybody, but not all in
the same way; we love the oppressed, defending and liberating him; the oppressor,
accusing and combating him"68. Similarly, Sobrino speaks of forgiveness impelling
^ Amanecida, 1987, p89
64 Moltmann, 1991, p46
6-s Moltmann, 1991, p46
66 Tamez. 1993
67 At Stirling, 1995, unpublished
6^ Girardi, in Frost, 1991, pi42
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us tu "love the oppressed through a sinful reality anu thus liberate that reality"05, and
Gutierrez says that "there is no way not to have enemies; what is important is not to
exclude them from our love"10. The tension of this is necessary since love of enemies
is clearly a dimension of political forgiveness; as Daly puts it "human forgiveness is
an analogical mimesis of divine forgiveness, and love of enemies is its paradigmatic
test"7'.
How, then, can forgiveness be reconciled with justice in Nicaragua ? The
Amanecida Collective claim to have "caught sight of some of the characteristics of
forgiveness that - if embodied in our lives, in our nation and in Nicaragua - can
create justice"", which is precisely the theological understanding arrived at above.
Indeed, if forgiveness has no orientation toward justice it may have no rightful place
in politics. Yet many theologians, from Aquinas to Luther to Niebuhr (as well as
secular philosophers such as Arendt), have resisted the belief "that these two
(forgiveness and justice) can be much connected in the public sphere, by Christians
or anyone else"73. In general, we may say that this is done in the name of saving us
from dangerous unreality1, whereby "every effort to transfer a pure morality of
disinterestedness to group relations has resulted in failure"7''. However, the politics
of forgiveness does not belong to what is called a "pure morality of
disinterestedness" but to the strategy of dealing with immoral society and the
building of a justice that consists more in the building of community than the purity
of law. Indeed we may see it as pan of the radicalism of a Christian understanding
of justice that goes beyond a "managerial justice" which can only tinker at the edges
of problems without challenging underlying structures. Yet, forgiveness can never
guarantee justice; the element of risk is inevitable and we have to accept the fact
that acts of forgiveness "could well have the result of entrenching evil still further"73,
without that compelling us to reduce forgiveness to an afterthought when oppression
is overcome. The gospel call is indeed to revolutionary forgiveness; the political
challenge is to find the social forms m which that can take shape, of which Frost
gives many examples in the realities of some grim situations.
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It is crucial for this to see forgiveness as descriptive of a quality of
relationships, rather than the more common vocabulary of an act or attitude. Martin
Luther King, for example, says that forgiveness is "not an occasional act; it is a
permanent attitude"7* and Kenneth Kaunda speaks of a "continual willingness to live
in a new day"77. Falconer's stress on a power or energy in forgiveness is helpful to its
integration into the dynamic of justice, but the only escape from individualism is to
locate forgiveness not in terms of dispositions but in relationships, the Biblical basis
for which has already been outlined above.
Shriver seems in sympathy with this approach when he says that "over
against many a rational system of ethics from the Greek to Kantian, biblical moral
norms are chiefly directed at the preservation, correction and restoration of
relationships between God and humans and among humans themselves"78. So when
Moltmann speaks of the need to translate the theology of the atonement "from
objectifying, legalistic terms into human and personal concepts" he can speak
readily of relational understandings of sin and atonement7*, and forgiveness fits
readily into McDonagh's picture of a justice that is in person and community,
relationship and structure80. The move from relationship to structure is an easier one
than from individual to state in our understanding of forgiveness, though not without
problems of its own.
This is very fully explored by the Amanecida Collective, who conclude that
"from a liberation theological perspective, the people's forgiveness of their
oppressors is based on their trust m the relational, communal fabric of both divine
and human life well-iived ... to forgive is to invite back into right relation"81. The
revolution which repeats the oppressions of the past by inverting them is a common
enough scenario; this liberation perspective, oriented primarily toward rebuilding
community, has forgiveness as a crucial dimension in order to seek genuine freedom
from the injustice of the past.
^CS King (ed): The Words ofMartin Luther King, Collins, London, 1984, p23
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Again, forgiveness in Latin America is enabling rather than compelling - "the
forgiveness of sin which is quite undeserved and unexpected enables relationships to
be freed from the burden of the past and to grow in a more wholesome way""; that
same power for renewal can be effective in the structured relationships of political
society. "Forgiveness is an act of 'integrative power' enabling the other to be.
enabling the other to take responsibility for himself or herself", so again we may
see forgiveness not as contradictory of freedom and responsibility but as creative of
these.
Some Other Political Contexts as Illustrative of Forgiveness
Glimpses of this social reality of forgiveness may be seen in other contexts
too. The situation in Northern Ireland has moved on considerably since "Reconciling
Memories" was published in 1988; indeed the theological work reflected in that
book, as well as the very practical projects of reconciliation (at Corrymeela and
elsewhere) that are interwoven with it. may in time be seen as playing their part in
the progress that has been made. Many of the issues discussed above have been part
of the political debate over the past year, such as the cost and risk of taking the first
steps toward forgiveness or reconciliation (not least for politicians struggling to
maintain credibility within their natural support base while reaching out to build
bridges towards the "other side"). This, of course, is a situation with a particularly
religious dimension, where the "Iribal" identity of warring factions is perceived as
one into which they were baptised. Where baptism into the death and cross of Christ
degenerates in this way. there is an urgent need for clear theological thinking which
(in terms of the theological argument outlined above) might find the forgiveness that
is needed precisely at that point. Current debates, around the extent to which laying
down arms by the IRA (and or the UK government) is a necessary preliminary to
further talks and a political settlement which might embody a form of forgiveness
building justice and breaking free of the past, also reflect the discussion above on
repentance and power-shifts in relation to the process of forgiveness.
Many feminists have written on issues of forgiveness in relation to abuse84.
This is also a political issue, in which those who feel a close identity with the
victims are advocating "zero tolerance" and are reluctant to talk of forgiveness.
Sharon Ringe has written of her conviction that "as long as the one to be forgiven
Falconer, 1988, p91
Falconer, 1988, p91
84 Eg Koontz, 1994
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still holds power over the other ... one cannot ask the one who has been wronged to
forgive"'5. As with the holocaust, those whose apparent natural affinity is with the
perpetrator rather than the victim are rightly reluctant to speak glibly of forgiveness
in such situations, particularly when there is a long history of denial or excusing of
the sin Yet the word of "revolutionary forgiveness" must be spoken, by those who
can identify- as fully as possible with the victim, or there is no hope. Indeed, it is the
seriousness of the offence which demands a way forward, although that way of
forgiveness can (as argued above) include punishment and challenge to the power
balance of those involved, with a view to the rectifying justice of which forgiveness
is a crucial part. Within that perspective, there will indeed be times when Christians
should attend primarily to the exploitation of power imbalances rather than "focus
their attention narrowly on the responsibility of the injured one to forgive"'6.
Discussion of the politics of forgiveness in relation to African Americans
goes back at least to Niebuhr who described their social attitudes as "compounded
of genuine religious virtues of forgiveness and forbearance and a certain social
inertia which derived not from religious virtue but from racial weakness"'1 (a
weakness he thought they ma)' have shared with "animals, children and primitive
nations (who) have short memories ... (while) only highly cultured nations like
France and Germany allow the accumulated resentments of the centuries to
determine their present policies"" !). He saw the failure of this forbearance to soften
the hearts of their oppressors as indicative of the failure of all attempts to practise
the Sennon on the Mount politically - "only a religion full of romantic illusions
could seek to persuade the Negro to gain justice from the while man merely by
forgiving him"'5'.
Shnver goes beyond the paternalism of Niebuhr's words, but also stresses the
readiness of black protesters (of the Martin Luther King tradition) to offer
forgiveness; he adds that "white defenders of racist institutions were less ready to
accept forgiveness for these long-standing sins"*>. He can claim real successes for
King's politics of forgiveness, but has listened more than Niebuhr to the victims'
voices, particularly of recent years when repentance and reparation have been higher
on the black agenda than forgiveness. He therefore says that "African Americans
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have even right and obligation to reserve a certain portion of forgiveness in
themselves for the day when that business (of reparation) has at last been tended to.
that debt at last paid"". (This debate about reparation is also, of course, a debate
about the different forms of justice discussed above, asking in particular how far
back we may go, and what questions may appropriately be asked, in challenging
such rights as title to land.) In his discussion of reparation, and in the recognition
that reconciliation and justice may be measured in terms of access to the consumer
capitalism from which the black poor are still excluded, he opens the economic
dimension in the discussion and in forgiveness. And he can still say that in all the
dimensions of social renewal "forgiveness has a powerful place ... in its judging,
empathising, revenge-refusing and reconciling work it makes new society
possible''^.
McClendon also discusses a politics of forgiveness in this context, agreeing
that forgiving is not forgetting. But he tells a story of a civil rights activist*5, enraged
at the murder of a colleague, being transformed by a fellow-Christian with the
insight that both murderer and victim were sinners and that neither was
irredeemably cut off from God's love. As noted above, the doctrine of original sin
does not commit Christians to neutrality in conflict situations, nor exclude the
preferential option for the poor: it should not therefore undermine the passion for
justice, though it may orient that passion towards inclusion rather than exclusion.
The activist did. as McClendon suggests, gain a deep insight, but not one that should
have diminished his concern for the victims of racism or any other injustice.
Shriver also reports a great deal of serious attention to the politics of
forgiveness in South Africa. At the time of writing, the Queen's visit to the "new"
South Africa greets that newness as a "miracle". Indeed there are many aspects of
what has happened in South Africa which can readily be seen as a miracle of
liberation in which the politics of forgiveness has played a large part, notably in
President Mandela's remarkable forbearance from retaliation, for the sake of a new
justice in South Africa. But that is not to deny that there has been a cost, and there is
still a risk in forgiveness there; the hope for the future may well depend on the depth
of the shift in power and on the completeness of the process of forgiveness.
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Conclusion : Towards An Economics of Forgiveness
Shriver's analysis of that process provides a helpful way of drawing together
some of the threads of this discussion. "Forgiveness in a political context", he says
"is an act that joins moral truth, forbearance, empathy and commitment to repair a
fractured human relation", with all four elements intertwined, none having
automatic priority and all coming up for repeated attention94. He describes a "long,
many-sided seldom-completed process"9*, in which the dimension of moral truth
demands not forgetting but remembering past injustice, studying pain-filled history
in detail in order to face the facts of wrong before they can be overcome. Within
these strands of forgiveness, there are tensions, such as that between facing moral
truth (judgment) and empathy, which often appears to require the suspension of
moral judgment in order to stand with the other*, but the four must remain
intertwined for forgiveness to be fully effective. That effectiveness is urgent,
because "the poisoning of the present and above all of the future by the past must be
interrupted"97. Therefore, forgiveness has to be more than a "tidying up" after all the
real political work is done, but must be there in the pursuit of justice from the start,
as it was for Zaccheus (whose forgiveness and the justice that emerged from it were
at the heart of the politics of their day)98.
Two of the most promising ways of approaching this whole area lie in the
exploration of the "healing of memories" being carried out not only in Ireland99 but
also in the USA100, and. lest that be too internal an approach. Sobrino's concept of
"forgiving reality"'9'. He speaks, intriguingly. of forgiving the sin and forgiving the
sinner; ultimately, forgiving reality means converting it, and this cannot happen
without cost - "unlike other ways of eradicating sin, Christian forgiveness of reality
also means taking on its weight"'92. Or, as Dag Hammarskjold put it "forgiveness
breaks the chain of causality because he who 'forgives' you - out of love - takes upon
himself the consequences of what you have done; forgiveness therefore always
entails a sacrifice"103. Although the past cannot be undone, and "the wheel of history
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cannot be turned back"i0% forgiveness in the political realm can break, the power of
past injustice, and we can speak of "forgiving the past" without degenerating into
sentiment or cheap grace. By recalling its reality we can (painfully) liberate the
present from its power. Hinchliff is therefore misleading when he suggests that
policies which increase the sense ofwrong must exacerbate the situation That sense
of wrong may be the beginning of facing the facts rather than papering over cracks;
only the latter is worthy of the name of forgiveness. Even resentment may be a spur
towards justice that overcomes cynicism, and, so long as it is not the last word, may
be part of the forgiveness dynamic, part of the honesty (both emotional and
political) with which the past must be confronted in order to be overcome..
To speak of "forgiveness of reality" may also help take us beyond situations
where suffering is caused by identified individuals to the realities of structural
sin injustice. However, if the conscientisation that sees beyond the individual
oppressor simply leads to "understanding" the person and condemning the system,
we are not yet at a social dimension of forgiveness. Most of the discussion of the
politics of forgiveness in the various books cited focuses on the (often symbolic)
actions of leaders with deep political significance. Such actions as Chancellor
Brandt kneeling at the memorial to victims of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, or
President Tmman at Chapultepec in Mexico are vitally important, but could there be
other political expressions of the forgiveness that seeks to remove the effect of
injustice on the present and future? Such might well include the undermining of
policies which claim to be the only way because they follow the unjust logic of the
past.
This might take us into the economics of forgiveness - a theme not by any
means alien to the Bible, conspicuously in the jubilee and its New Testament
echoes, as noted in chapter three above. "Whereas in Matthew the practice of
forgiveness is regarded more as a matter of the relationships of individuals, it has
become in Luke more a matter of social relationships where to forgive means to
release from a debt"105. And Rubio's citing here of Luke 6.37 may be a reminder that,
in terms of the Biblical language at least, it is not, as Daly suggests, that the social
dimension of forgiveness is deduced by analogy from the individual/personal, but
that the personal spiritual meaning is established by analogy from the economics of
debt. McClendon points a way forward here when he writes that "forgiveness, with
Bonhoeffer, 1964, pi 18
Rubio, in Floristan & Duquoc (eds), 1986, p88
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its legal analogue of a pardon, while not the righting of an unfair distribution by
making one pay his debt, is nevertheless a restoring of the equilibrium by cancelling
the debt"106. Biblically and pragmatically, debt forgiveness can be creative ofjustice.
Perhaps surprisingly in the light of his restrictions on a social dimension lor
forgiveness, Luther argues for Christians (though not society as a whole) to give
serious consideration to practising a jubilee107, and deals with a hypothetical
personal debt scenario by advocating forgiveness - "if the debtor is poor and cannot
afford to make restitution, and the other party is not poor, then you should let the
law of love prevail and acquit the debtor"10® (and this whether you are a Christian or
not).
Unfortunately, the forgiveness of debt plays only a small part in Frost's book
(he draws one reference from Solzhenitsyn to a Russian day of forgiveness
characterised by forgiveness of debts on a Biblical model10®, and another to the
cancellation of some German post-Versailles debt in the build up ofNazism110). This
would seem to cut off a great deal of exploration of that large part of politics that is
concerned with economics and in which the language of forgiveness has some of its
roots (though the language of offence and repentance may be difficult to translate
into the discussion of debt).
As noted above, Shriver makes more reference to the economic dimension of
justice for African Americans He also speaks of a tendency for commercial
interests to seek a policy of "forgiving and forgetting and getting on with the
business of making money"111: in a way that carries echoes of Hayek's great market
reconciliation, he sees economic market forces as part of the dynamic towards
forgiveness, ihough of a less than full kind because the facts are ignored rather than
being faced. Shriver also sees as part of the practical politics of forgiveness the need
tc wage "a new war against poverty in competition-beset, debt-ridden America"112.
But Christian reflection of a social forgiveness here has been fragmentary
until the Third World debt crisis provoked many back towards the jubilee in search
McClendon, 1988, p224
107 Luther, 1962, p308
108 Luther, 1962, pi27
^ Frost, 1991, p 14
110 Frost, 1991, p24
''' Shriver, 1995, p220
112 Shriver, 1995, p214
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of a theological response1". Some of this fruitful mining of Biblical material has
already been referred to above, and has informed the argument to this point.
In a situation where the idealised model of an agreement between two free
contracting parties seems implausible, some way out of the hardship inflicted on
those within the debtor nations, with no prospect of the debts ever being repaid,
seems to be demanded by all but the narrowest concepts of commutative
procedural justice. There are, then, strong arguments for debt cancellation, amnesty
or some other forms of forgiveness, in the name and for the sake of justice. When
the jubilee is taken seriously, "it is held unacceptable that debtors should be
radically dependent and intolerable that they should submit""*, and the drive for
continuing payment of interest (on debts the benefit of which those now paying the
cost have never seen) deepens dependency.
Yet the "structural salvation" not just offered but enforced as a condition for
rescheduling by the World Bank inflicts greater hardship by imposed cuts in
welfare, education etc. (There seems a striking parallel here with the sacrificial
system of the Temple of Jesus' day, a system of tribute undermined by Jesus' talk of
forgiveness.) The purpose of these programmes is that "the salvation of the people
and of the nations shall come about through binding them ever more tightly to the
international market, equated to the world community"1" - a market seen as all-
encompassing and beyond challenge. In this context, "forgiveness" or at least a more
creative rescheduling of debts, seems not only a demand of justice but a necessity;
as Gorringe puts it, remission of debts may sound to some like the stuff of fairy
tales, but the alternative is the stuff of apocalyptic116 It is therefore in this conlext, in
which the debt is the defining reality of life in Central America, that Ringe looks
towards developing an "illogical and impractical economy of grace and generosity
which turns out to be the model that sustains life for rich and poor alike"117; that will
mean working out the practicalities of forgiveness or creative rescheduling.
But there are difficulties too The question of the cost of forgiveness is raised
in the issue of who should stand the losses when debts are written off, particularly
when some argue that forgiveness subsidised by the World Bank would let
irresponsible lenders off the hook: many of the points made by both Hayek and
1 See Jones (ed), 1988 & 1989, and Vallely, 1990, passim
7 Assmann, in Jones (ed), 1988, p20
115 George & Sabelli, 1994. p72
' ^ Gorringe, 1994, p 141
117 Ringe, 1995, p211
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Marx are raised when debl cancellation is set in a wider context which prompts
questions about whether the fundamental economic issues are being addressed or
avoided by talk of forgiveness, and about what unforeseen consequences will
emerge from tinkering with the market. Perhaps a more fundamental objection is
raised by Assmann (among others) when he draws attention to the danger of a
shallow forgiveness that amounts to charity in place of justice and disputes the
validity of the language of forgiveness when the moral blame requires forgiveness
from the opposite side to those being asked to forgive debts"8. Thus, suggestions
other than the forgiveness which might perpetuate the mythology of indulging lazy
foreigners are made in terms which speak more clearly of justice (the repudiation of
debts, or the doctrine of "odious debt" - employed as an argument in international
law by the USA to avoid a colonial legacy of debt"'), or of financial dealing
(creative rescheduling or conciliatory default).
Yet the point of this chapter - that there are many practical expressions of the
social meaning of forgiveness - is not undermined by the number of complex issues
involved, nor the theological issues raised for reflection back into theological
discussion. As noted above, when Meeks speaks of Third World debts which cannot
be paid back, he says they should be "forgiven" but feels a need for quotation marks
around the term - as does Wilkins, who prefers to speak of cancellation of debts120 -
as if denoting a strange new usage of the word whose primary Biblical meaning this
is121. The use of forgiveness here probably does not come naturally in English today,
nor is its use straightforward, but there are clearly elements in how people try to do
justice in the field of international debt which echo the characteristics of forgiveness
discussed here. It is by no means impossible to talk constructively about forgiveness
of debts; indeed one of the creditors interviewed in chapter two spoke of having to
leam this language working in the international section of a large British bank The
practical urgency of debts which simply cannot be paid and may not even be
serviced, and the moral urgency of poverty entrenched by debt repayment, have
forced that issue.
Rather than pursue this further in relation to Third World and international
debt issues, the next step (and aim of the concluding chapter) will be to reflect this
discussion back into the context outlined in the first two chapters, attempting to tie
' Assmann, in Jones (ed), 1988, p21
' Adams, 1994, pi2
120 Wilkins, 1992, pi80
121 Meeks, 1989, p31
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together the disparate threads of economic, Biblical, political and theological
reflection which have been drawn out in the thesis.
<
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8. Towards A Contextual Social Theology
The task now must be to complete the circle. Having started by building a
picture of an economic context, and analysing some of the attitudes and values at
work within that context, the thesis then began to consider the issues which emerged
there in the light of Biblical approaches rooted in a very different economic context
That Biblical reflection led clearly (and more explicitly than the contemporary
discussion) to justice and forgiveness as themes of which the ways of dealing with
debt were seen as paradigms. The demand of justice, in which God is known, was
then explored, and found to be challenging to many of the accepted ideas which
reinforce the culture of contentment. A Biblical understanding of justice as
dynamic/creative, relational and embodying a "bias to the poor" emerged.
Challenges to this understanding, and to the viability of the concept of social justice,
from Marx and the neo-liberals. were reviewed, and some correctives to
understanding accepted, but the main thrust of these critiques was rejected. The
theme of forgiveness (which also emerged in the Biblical material on debt) was then
considered theologically, especially in relation to justice. An approach was
developed which saw forgiveness as opening the way towards justice (rather than as
an alternative to it), and began to see the possibility of a social dimension of
forgiveness, which was then explored in terms of a possible social reality of
forgiveness.
The discussion at the end of the previous chapter of how that reality might be
seen in tciins of the international debt crisis almost completed the henneneulic
circle by taking the discussion back to an economic context. This last chapter must
return to the specific context with which we started, seeking to reflect back into that
context the ethical and theological discussion, which has tried to retain a sense of
context throughout. In seeking to tie together some of the various strands of
argument, letting the disparate elements question and inform each other, the impact
of the context on the theological reflection will also be assessed. But the crucial
question remains whether there is good news to the poor in all of this.
Since medieval times, the key words in the debates over debt have been 'fair'
and 'just', "terms which (Barty-King says) the modern authors of surveys and
memoranda on debtors and creditors find themselves having to resort to in every
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other paragraph"1; he also notes a rearguard action by judges to preserve terms such
as "fair" and "honest" against the demands of bargaining "freedom", in the sixteenth
century! While the terms 'justice' and 'forgiveness' were not regularly used in the
discussion of debt reported in chapter two, a sense of what is fair was clearly not far
beneath the surface. Yet Hayekian theory- puts severe constraints on the use of such
terms in this discussion, and the justiciary of today have, as has been noted above,
been less enthusiastic than their predecessors about intervening in contractual
"freedom". Hayek's arguments have to be taken account of, especially in the
avoidance of loose and emotive language or what Galbraith has recently referred to
as a descent into theology" (or the Puritans might have referred to as the "intrusions
of an antiquated morality or misconceived arguments of public policy"3); as have the
aspects of Marxist theory which would see debt problems as symptomatic rather
than basic, and capable only of solution once deeper problems of the economy are
tackled, not by appeals to "justice".
But that is not to deny the importance of the issues ofjustice and forgiveness
raised here. "If current patterns of consumer debt are a reflection of culture and
values (and of economic policies), then any solutions that are proposed must take
them into account The Christian community must also be prepared to challenge
these values (and policies)"4. There is a great weight of Biblical and theological
basis for that challenge, in insights on the borrower / lender relationship, ethical
reflection on usury, the meaning of debt for individuals and communities, the
demand for justice and the dynamic of forgiveness; and there are challenges in the
above analysis to Biblical and theological understandings of both justice and
forgiveness. So there is scope for mutually helpful dialogue, rooted in the
experience of injustice by many debtors and the need for radical measures to prevent
problems spiralling
Debt in Christian Ethics
A thesis in Christian ethics must be cautious in advancing into any field
armed with moral judgments, not least because of the sense revealed in the
interviews in chapter two that matters of "right and wrong" have to do with judging
individuals (and most often with blaming the victim). That sense, allied to the
pluralism that finds no shared basis for making moral judgments, may render such
\ Barty-Kmg, 1991, p2
As reported in The Guardian. 25-11-92
3 Tawney, 1926, p236/7
^ Jubilee Policy Group, 1991, p27
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an ethical approach unfashionable. The authors of the recent Rowniree Report, for
example, eschew interest in morality, in favour of analysing the "social effects ...
accumulation of problems ... and economic costs"-'. That may well echo Marx's
claim to analyse exploitation without judging it an injustice, but the case of this
thesis is that such analysis is a major part of what Christian ethics is about. Indeed
that analysis may help save ethics from being as ineffectual as Marx deemed, or as
destructive as Hayek reckoned.
Yet moral judgments, however sharpened, are not enough. The force of those
who wish to concentrate on doing what the)- can with the situation that presents
itself, without wasting time on judging whose fault caused the problem, must be
accepted. Such "hospital" approaches to debt are particularly attractive to Christians,
for whom being "part of the process of doing something to alleviate the human
misery debt causes"* seems a clear response to the "go and do likewise" with which
the parable of the Good Samaritan ends. Thus Tondeur stresses at the outset of his
book that "if you are in debt it is probably not your fault !"~, and goes on to offer
analysis of the likely causes of debt in terms of unemployment, advertising
pressures, and lack of education in budgeting etc; but his solution is a "simple yet
infallible budgeting method"' Clearly what he, like most debt counsellors, offers is
of far more immediate relevance to many individual debtors than either structural
economic analysis or impressive moral sentiments about justice and forgiveness. But
there are two points of conflict with the "justice" approach taken here. The
suggestion that better budgeting is the answer can easily slide into an implication
that budgeting failure caused the problem (as well as leaving underlying problems of
chronic low income untouched), and the individualism of this approach (which fits
readily, as we have seen, with an individualist theology) restricts its value in dealing
with the structural economic problems within which debt arises.
It is indeed "how we deal with people" that matters, but that cannot be purely
with people as isolated individuals or consumers, but with persons in relation,
people in the variety of relationships that make up communities. That has been a
consistent and insistent theme of this thesis. It was people in relationships that got
into debt and dealt with their debts; the Bible dealt with debt as a relationship and a
community problem; Biblical justice was, crucially, relational, and forgiveness had
Rowntree, 1994, pS
6 Tondeur, 1994, pi 1
' Tondeur, 1994, pi 1
^ Tondeur, 1994, p26 7
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to do with renewing relationships and community. From Hayek, we learned not to be
sentimental or nostalgic about relationships, particularly about informal, face-to-
face relationships which, in the context of debt and the door-to-door moneylender,
can be even more exploitative and manipulative than the more formal contractual
relationships of the market, But a concern for justice in relationships must take
account of the realities of power and cannot assume contractual agreement to be the
sole substance of a relationship. Nor can it rest content with the contingent
relationship which excludes from the proper concern of the creditor, or "society" in
the form of the courts, the real situation of the debtor; again, an abstraction (such as
concentration solely on the terms of a contract) cannot tell the whole story.
The value of an individualist approach, however, may be seen as stressing
personal responsibility, again perhaps attractive to Christians who would see
personal responsibility to God as at the heart of ethics, and certainly a major factor
found operating in responses to credit and debt (especially among those not directly
involved in dealing with debt problems). Clearly this is (not only for Christians) an
important moral value, of particular relevance to this context; without some sense of
personal responsibility to reinforce legal constraints the market cannot work (if
every debt has to be enforced in court, the system breaks down). Some (like Hayek)
would go further, and argue that the tendency to blame "society" undermines this
sense of personal responsibility, providing excuses to avoid meeting one's
obligations and ultimately destroying individual self-respect by encouraging
dependency (as Weyer has argued1'). Similar concerns for personal responsibility
may underline the unpopularity of "social work" oriented solutions, although,
paradoxically, these approaches may also be individualist in seeing help (albeit of a
paternalistic nature) to the individual debtor as the key response.
But "blaming society" as a means of avoiding responsibility (which may
indeed be as pointless as we have found the opposite tendency, blaming the victim)
need not be the same as recognising that sin can be structural as well as personal.
The analysis of justice, starting from the experience of injustice, was not
fundamentally undermined by Hayek's refusal to recognise injustice without a
personal cause. There are economic policies and structures which can be foreseen to
result in debt problems for some; that many are effectively trapped in chronic low




the vicious circle of debt as Oakman found in first century Palestine10 cries out for
the remedy of a rectifying justice, and the provision of Social Fund loans with
repayments deducted from the benefits that are already designed to provide a bare
minimum seems more likely to encourage despair (and or resort to the loan-shark)
than to enhance self-respect. A recognition of structural (original9) sin must,
therefore, not stop at "blaming society".
Another common dimension of Christian approaches to credit and debt is a
distrust of, or hostility towards, "consumerism". This may stem from the tenth
commandment, recognising covetousness or greed as the basis ofWestern consumer
society, and was found in the "almost moral suggestion that credit is a "bad thing' in
its own right - at about the level of soft porn"11. Yet Cameron has noted the
integration of debt with modern consumer capitalism, viewing the encouragement of
debt as a by-product of the push for consumption-led growth in the economy12, and
there is a deeper critique of consumer society than Berthoud's slightly mocking
caricature might suggest. Christians cannot rest content with what Marcuse
strikingly called "one-dimensional man", and there are other values to be cherished
than market values, not only by Christians. What remains as a serious issue is the
extent to which reservations about consumer society might lead to restricting access
to it. especially for those most vulnerable to its pressures. Thus Shriver cites
Shockley, a black American pastor as arguing that, while exclusion from consumer
capitalism is the biggest problem facing African Americans today, access to
consumption must be balanced by a challenge to the ideology that life consists in
owning things13. That balancing is difficult. We may recoil from the opinion
brazenly -expressed (by a university professor) that "if you die in debt, you've made a
profit"1'1, but that may not justify denying access to the credit market for the single
mother to enable her to buy her children trainers with play ground credibility Nor
may the professor's remark be any more indicative of materialism than the thinking
of the elderly person who lives in hardship in order to be able to "leave something".
The contention of this thesis is that a justice perspective will help to sort out some
of these dilemmas".
Oakman, 1986, p80
'' Berthoud, 1989, p 16
' 3 Cameron, 1994, p217/8
13 Shriver, 1995, p212
1^ Reponed by Rowlingson & Kempson, 1991, p26
13 See further below, on participation exclusion/ access, and on freedom
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So, too, with money. Whether in cash form (ironically currently displaying
on £10 notes the face of Sir Walter Scott who spent a large part of his life in debt!),
or in plastic or other credit form, money may be seen as the root of all evil fuelling
greed, as morally neutral (ie simply as a means of exchange), or as positive evidence
of divine favour, reward for efficient hard work, and resource for meeting one's own
needs and those of others (eg the argument that the Samaritan could only ensure
continued care for the victim by having the money to pay the innkeeper). Too often
the first perspective has gone along with the idea that money was too dangerous to
be trusted to the poorest (whose poverty becomes evidence of inability to manage
money properly), while the rich can cope with its burdens Galbraith's comment
about the egalitarian function of credit enabling the man with no money to
participate in the economy almost on a par with the one who has. especially where
the granting of credit is relatively casual and unrestricted"*, is a powerful counter to
this, as to any view which sees the restriction of credit as the answer to debt
problems. Again, a justice perspective w ill help clarify thinking here.
Does faith, then, have any relevance to debt? There is a profound challenge
to the church in the finding above that faith (at least as reflected in church
involvement) does not appear to influence values here, yet the Biblical investigation
suggested that not only was personal help to the (poor) debtor demanded, but
structural changes on the Jubilee paradigm too. Spiritualising and individualising
tendencies in theology were found to distance faith from such material concerns,
and to comfort the contented, but the social theology developed here has profound
significance for debt and responses to it As is already clear, Christian ethical
concern naturally focuses on values and attitudes, and the investigation of values in
chapters one and two suggested that, although people were not consciously bringing
to bear a coherent ethicai standpoint so much as responding to particular people and
situations, values embodied in attitudes, perceptions and ultimately public policies
are important, whether explicit or not. Indeed, camouflaged values (based on
untested stereotypes) may be particularly dangerous; as noted above, it is who is
seen as the typical debtor that has influenced policy in such fields as bankruptcy in
both Scotland and the USA in recent years
Therefore, clear thinking about values may be seen as important. Yet the
view ofChristian ethics or engagement taken here is not simply a matter of arriving
at principles of conduct and then consistently applying them. As Krusche has
16 Gaibraith, 1975, p79/80
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argued, there is a sense in which "the church does not think, speak and act on
principles but judges much more by the Spirit"'' (the Spirit which speaks through
events as well as through the Bible and Christian tradition). Thus, as we found in
discussing Miranda, the fact that God is known in the demand of justice, which is
therefore transcendent, makes it difficult (perhaps impossible) to go on to "define"
justice without lapsing into idolatry. Precision of thinking may therefore be a two-
edged sword. But we do have to think hard (as this thesis has tried to do) about how
we respond to God in the demand of justice in particular contexts, while being
especially wary at this concluding stage of generalising towards a Christian
blueprint. A useful contribution to dialogue and to action may be a more
appropriate, if less ambitious sounding aim.
Debt and Poverty
Perceptions of the relationship between debt and poverty may well depend
on where one starts from. Analyses of mortgage default, as noted, showed a sudden
drop in income, or marriage breakdown, as "typical" causes, whereas fuel debt and
rent arrears were more closely linked to chronic low income: reviews of total credit
default showed many debtors (often with the biggest debts) who were not in any
recognised sense "poor": much-publicised credit card "junkies" or recidivist
bankrupts (whose stories may have more to them than meets the media's eye) were
unlikely to be in chronic poverty , particularly since the poorest are denied access to
such credit. Yet the research found not only a substantial proportion of those on
long-term benefit facing debt problems which, while in amount less than that of
many mortgage defaulters, nonetheless represented a vicious circle from which
escape seemed impossible, but also many others struggling to survive near the
borderlines - some praised tor self- (and family-) denial in order to avoid debt,
others condemned as poor managers for failing to juggle biiis successfully or to
make sufficient adjustments to "make ends meet". Even among credit card
defaulters, there was little evidence of either fecklessness or recklessness as major
causes18. Among those struggling to make ends meet, Kempson found four scenarios
- those just keeping their heads above water, those sinking into arrears, those
struggling back to the surface, and those drowning in debt with little prospect of
things changing1". It was here (in all four of Kempsoris scenarios) that credit - often
*7 Knische & Moltmann, 1987, p3 ]
1 ft0 Rowlingson & Kempson, 1994, p64
Kempson (and others), 1994, p264
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at high interest rates, "justified" by the high risks to the lender - operated as an
inadequate sticking plaster to the wounds of chronic low income.
Perspective also, of course, depends on who is talking. "Bystanders" may
easily be tempted to judge from the sidelines on what appears in the media; debt
may be a major "problem area" for many creditors, but it only rarely involves their
whole lives; even advisers with a deep concern for the plight of most of those they
encounter still speak from personal security; for many debtors, the problem is all-
consuming and infects every aspect of life and relationships. On that basis, with
Shriver and many liberation theologians, we may accord them the "epistemic
privilege" of the victim?0, paying special attention to what they say and feel, and
seeking to reflect a solidarity with them in what we say. Yet the interviews and
questionnaires did not produce as clearly different a perspective as might have been
expected, although the extent of "internalising" media criticism and the effect of
hopelessness on reducing expectations (eg of release from debts) may be seen as
playing a part in this. Clearly an understanding of the problems (and ingenuity) of
making ends meet is demanded, and is too often missing from the comments of
those who see consumer education and the effective communication of the meaning
ofAPR as a panacea
But what difference might a justice framework mean to this discussion?
Certainly many of the debtors had a strong sense of unfairness, not readily or
specifically articulated but deeply felt. Of course, not all theories of justice would
recognise poverty as injustice, but the vicious circles which trap people in debt seem
to argue as forcibly as in the Old Testament for a remedy in the name of justice.
Even if we have left "command" economies behind, the Hayekian terminology of
losers in the market game learning how to play more efficiently seems
inappropriate, as even does the language of "casualties" in the market, when the
effects are foreseeable and avoidable.
Crucially, credit and debt gave clear indications of how, in reality rather than
theory, markets work, with most restrictions removed. We found at least two credit
markets, with access to one denied in practice to many of those in most need; for
credit, as for other things, the poor pay more; the "prices", ie interest rates are
predominantly determined by the speculators (whose stake in the currency markets
has gone from 10% to 90% in twenty years?'); interest payments work
^ Shriver, 1995, pi02
Commission on Social Justice, 1994, p65
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internationally and nationally as a systematic transfer of wealth from poorest to
richest, entrenching dependency22; and all of these tendencies have become more
pronounced as markets have been freed. Efficiency, as ensured by these markets,
seems not so much, as Adam Smith claimed, ensuring that resources go to those
who can make best use of them, but ensuring that the rich get richer and the poor
poorer.
The autonomy claimed for, and largely awarded to, economics as a science
and markets as the achievement (or evolution) of that science is perhaps unique to
modern market societies, although Tawney traces this "separation of economic from
ethical interests" back to the Puritans") It is certainly, as we have seen, a dramatic
difference from the Biblical "embedded" economies. Churches and governments
mdeed have a lot to be humble about, in relation to failures of attempts at planning
for change in economies, and must not attempt to defy gravity in the form of
economic "laws". But markets are neither as natural nor as value-free as Hayek and
others claim - "markets (for labour, for finance, for goods and services) are not
created by natural or divine forces; they are the product of the values, institutions,
regulations and political decisions that govern them ... their structures govern their
outcome"", and, when that outcome is as we have found here, the structures can be
immune neither from scrutiny nor the demands of justice. In that sense, then,
markets may need to be embedded (or their embedding in ideology recognised)
again; it is not "inevitable that economics dominates politics ana that the financial
markets dominate economics"".
The use of the word "outcome" signals a conflict with Hayek, whose
argument, as we have seen, is that if we let the market mechanisms work freely, we
can safely leave outcomes to the operation of the mechanism; in parallel, we should
let the world of contracts work freely and leave their outcomes to the working out of
what parties have agreed, which is the only way of reflecting both their wishes. As
soon as outcomes of debt problems are considered, however, this seems an article of
(often misplaced) faith rather than a practical policy. That a desperate debtor agrees
to a "buy-out" loan at interest rates over 50% leads to an outcome that only
represents his wishes in a very circumscribed situation, exploited by the
moneylender. Only the state can redress the bargaining imbalance which the
^ Robertson, 1990, p 131
^ Tawney, 1926, p225, 237 and passim
Commission on Social Justice, 1994, p98
y c
Jenkins, 1994, pi 1 (posing this inevitability' as a starting point for theological reflection)
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contract perpetuates and exacerbates, by specific interventions or by adjusting the
rules ofmarket operation.
Yet Hayek is right to point to the problems of attempting to adjust the
workings of markets, not least because of the necessary limitations of knowledge.
And Marx is right to warn of the futility of dealing with symptoms (in the area of
distribution) rather than causes (in the area of production). Debt may well be seen as
symptomatic of deeper problems of poverty , when the "sticking plaster" of credit is
painfully removed, and dealing with symptoms (while having immediate value) may
leave causes untouched.
The Meaning of Justice in This Context
The Biblical understanding of justice, which began from the jubilee,
demands intervention when the outcome of the market is spiralling debt One
reading of the functioning of the jubilee was that its purpose was to re-establish the
autonomy of individuals or families, by giving them the wherewithal (land, etc) to
participate fully in the community again. For the neo-liberals, however, autonomy
(or freedom) has nothing to do with the "wherewithal", or with ability to do
anything; rather it has to do with absence of coercion, by individuals or by the state.
It was in the name of this freedom that restrictions on the credit market were
progressively removed, treating people as adults in the terms of the Crowther
Report?6. Yet we have seen that some (such as the Jubilee Group) view debt
problems as sufficiently serious (undoubtedly more so than Crowther ever
envisaged) to justify' reversing this trend and find ways of restricting credit
availability.
The National Consumer Council proposal that agreements not preceded by
credit checking should be unenforceable at law (a modified form of which in the
questionnaire received strong support, though some debtors had reservations about
intrusive questions) seeks to adjust the framework in winch the market operates,
assuming that some are being tempted beyond their means and therefore wishing to
restrict their freedom or access to credit. Others would argue that the market itself
will correct (and to some extent has corrected) unrealistic credit bargains without
adjustment to the legal framework. The latter approach, however, makes the remedy-
depend heavily on the supply side of the credit market, because encouragement of
borrowing is a result of supply exceeding demand Both seem to assume that
See chapter 1 above
257
temptation and ihe inability of some io handle eredit are the major eauses of debt,
and that freedom, both in terms of market aceess and of privacy regarding credit
checking, may be curtailed in order to prevent this. But it is hard to see why the
consumer denied credit by "market forces" should be deemed free while one denied
by government policy should be seen as subject to coercion.
Marx is surely right in his understanding of freedom as involving ability; in
this economic context, the key issues here are participation / access to the market
and whether some basic human needs must be met before we can talk meaningfully
of freedom. Both a justice-oriented and a freedom-oriented ethic seem to suggest a
presumption that access to the market should be available to all Indeed, Hayek's
case was found to assume greater ease of entry to and exit from the market than
exists in practice, largely because of the assumption that access is free if there are no
legal restrictions. But the value of this "freedom" seems undermined by its divorce
from ability. Justice, like Marxist freedom, demands a real possibility of
participation, and from this perspective the "balancing" referred to earlier in this
chapter between access and hostility to consumerism cannot become a denial of
access to the weaker brethren when those strong enough to withstand temptation (or
rich enough to pay the bill) remain free to choose Indeed the urgency rightly felt by
many commentators is to find ways of making cheap credit available to those who
need it most, when the market leads to greater and greater areas of exclusion where
"there is simply no economy - no banks, no shops, no work"".
It is here that credit unions (which have been a focus of Christian
involvement in this area) may be seen as having a role to play, contributing to the
participation that is an essential dimension of justice. Although the reservations
expressed above about their limited value for the poorest, who cannot afford to
contribute, mean that they may not be seen as a panacea, they may fill an important
gap vacated by the credit market.
Rectifying justice, we discovered, seeks to re-establish people as active
participants in a community21; it cannot seek to save them from themselves by-
denying access to what they might covet. And that re-establishing will, on the
jubilee model, involve meeting the basic needs for participation, as indeed the
questionnaire results found most people agreeing. Both these results and the practice
of money advice recognise that basic needs must lake priority over payment of
97 Commission on Social Justice, 1994, p81
28 Mott, 1993, p81
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uebls. Although precise definition of this is clearly problematic, ii does suggest a
serious deficiency in the neo-liberal visions of freedom and justice.
As well as providing a paradigm of how markets work, therefore, debt also
shows up the differences between different understandings of justice, and, we found,
the inadequacy of a purely procedural or commutative justice. For Hayek, the core
of justice is procedural; if a credit bargain is properly made, it is meaningless to
inquire about the "justice" of its result. Behind this, we found the concern that
extensions of "justice" to deal with, and rectify, outcomes involves breach of the
basic principle of treating like cases alike (which we found to be less
straightforward than might seem). Certainly, inconsistency was one of the
dimensions of unfairness recognised by debtors and others, but too much hangs on
defining "like cases" to make Hayek's argument conclusive. Even current consumer
law sufficiently recognises, we discovered, the discrepancies of bargaining power as
to accept the possibility that an agreement properly contracted may still be set aside
as "extortionate".
Yet Hayek invests such contracts with a mystique of "reconciliation", and
there is a real sense in which the mvriad transactions of the market achieve at least a
temporary reconciliation of the various interests. Strikingly, Shriver found the
pressure to get on with the business of trade a major factor in building the politics of
forgiveness - the market cannot afford a long "stand-off" between enemies. But he
recognises that there is more than the limited pact of a contract involved in
reconciliation. And, as crucially demonstrated by the success of loan sharks, this
"reconciliation" may simply mean that the powerless accept what the powerful offer,
in order simply to survive.
We also found Marx sceptical (to say the least) of the use of a concept of
justice as more than a test of the internal logic of a system. In that sense it may well
serve to make clearer the internal contradictions of the system, as, for example, we
found surfacing in the confusing signals sent to defaulting credit cardholders who
were offered new loans alongside notices of default29; consumer credit operates as a
major engine of the economy yet also produces in debt problems a major source of
concern for individuals and for the economy as a whole. But it is when we come to
the possibility of a concept of social justice furnishing an external demand thai
Marx allows less validity in the concept. If justice is defined by the same system
which sets the market framework, the market will inevitably be "just", except when
T> i:t, P. 1 r\C\ A
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self-contradictions emerge. As we found, the problem of justice as external demand
or critique is where that can come from. If from "another world" (whether a past
society such as that of the Biblical period, or a future, communist society, or the
kingdom of God), then Marx derides its effectiveness. Clearly there is some force in
this, but what we found in terms of credit and debt was a deep sense of injustice or
unfairness developed among those most closely involved and operating in fact as a
critique, at several points, of the way the market operates, albeit one which was
more reluctant than the Christian understanding of justice worked out here was to
identify structural causes of debt.
If the Biblical understanding was, as we discovered, developed as a response
to God in a context of debt and poverty, can such an understanding not be developed
in today's context, drawing on the insights of the Biblical and theological tradition?
A crucial insight here was the relational understanding of justice, ie not only is
justice concerned with people in relationship to each other but justice is concerned
with the quality' of these relationships. That is not to say that "the values of face-to-
faceness" are to be applied to the "extended order ... of complex large scale societies
and markets"10, or that Biblical justice is blind to the manipulative dimensions of
informal relationships we found in doorstep credit But justice attends to the
exploitative nature of relationships in the credit market as elsewhere, as well as
recognising that market relations are neither the only ones possible, nor the only
viable model for relationships. We have more to do with each other than to make
money from each other, and the concern of justice is with humanising all
relationships, not only those easily described as "personal".
The Biblical understanding of justice developed especially in chapter four
contrasted with the blind, balancing goddess of the traditional Western image of
justice, adjudicating after the event. Biblical justice was justice from below, rooted
in the experience ofGod in the lives of the poor, with a "bias to the poor" rather than
the even-handedness which was central to the procedural understanding and was
found to perpetuate injustice. That means that the problems of those trapped in the
vicious circle of debt and poverty must be the starting point, and are not to be
written off as the relatively small proportion of the credit market where problems
emerge.
Biblical justice was pro-active, interventionist, rectifying, creative, dynamic;
its purpose not to evaluate but to change. This is perhaps a crucial Christian
30 Jenkins, 1994, p4
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dimension, one way in which a Biblical understanding cannot rest content with
"justice as fairness". The parable of the labourers in the vineyard seemed to point in
another direction; as Oakman puts it, Jesus "undercuts the prevailing order based on
a strict quid-pro-quo and a self-sufficient household economy ... 'justice' preserves
these assumptions"'". However, it is not simply that a different standard of justice is
introduced which undermines the "ruthless accounting of debts"" (especially if this
is seen as a return to the values of a simpler, smaller-scale community). Justice is
the activity of God rectifying injustice, and demanding our involvement in the
divine "project"''.
It was in this creative understanding of justice that we found its disjunction
from love untenable, as reducing justice to the "quid-pro-quo" and love to sentiment.
Justice, like love, is partial, and justice, like love, seeks the welfare of others. In the
context of debt, then, it is not a matter of judging rights and wrongs but of
remedying injustice, recognising that an ultimate state of perfect justice will not be
achieved but dealing as the jubilee did with the injustices which emerge. And this
brings justice into close relationship with liberation and with forgiveness.
Justice. Liberation and Forgiveness of Debts
Just as "the debt" is characterised by Ringe as the basic fact of life in Central
America'4, so debt for many in Britain is the encompassing determinant of life, the
trap from which they desperately seek liberation For Christians, then, liberation
must be at least three-dimensional - socio-political, spiritual and "personal"'5. And
part of what liberation means is release from the sins and the sinful structures that
entrap us. Forgiveness, then, is a major dimension of the Christian response to sin
(or way to overcome sin), not by ignoring or excusing sin but by confronting it, as
the way toward justice or, rather, part of the dynamic of justice, preserving the
crucial dimension of hope.
We found Shriver's work along these lines toward an "ethic for enemies"
helpful in taking forgiveness beyond the individual, psychological dimension. He
suggested four elements of forgiveness - moral truth, forbearance, empathy and
commitment to repair fractured relations. How do these relate to debt? Moral truth -
the element which distances forgiving from forgetting and distinguishes forgiveness
^ Oakman, 1986, pi65
Oakman, 1986, p215
IT
- - Ringe, 1995, p201, using the term as an alternative to "the kingdom ofGod"
Ringe, 1995, p201
^ S Gutierrez cited in chapter 7 n67
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from tolerance - means facing the facts; that means avoiding sanctifying debtors or
creditors, examining the situation carefully without reconstructing it to fit a formula,
and accepting that what has been done has been done. Forbearance - the element
which seems to contradict justice - means rejecting the quid-pro-quo as the final
solution, rejecting the payment of contractual debts as conclusive of justice.
Empathy demands an understanding of the other's situation and perspective,
humanismg the scenario without sentimentalising it, and recognising the debtor as
person and part of the community. And commitment to repair fractured relations
takes us back toward the perspective of relational justice and justice as re-
establishment within the community; it therefore looks to the possibility of the
"rehabilitation" of the debtor as participant in market and community. Forgiveness,
along these lines, will be a process in which these elements interact, and a process
requiring more and better communication between creditor than we found
happening when problems arise; anything, legal or informal, which can develop that
negotiation will, as Shriver says in a different, political context, "facilitate the
discovery of genuine justice"3*.
But the discussion above of the social reality of forgiveness has pointed to
areas of difficulty here. Concerns about cheap grace translate into the problems of
forgiveness as a formula or a policy. McClendon may go too far in saying that "it is
just the belief that its frequent use will increase violations that disqualifies pardon as
the usual remedy for offences"37, but it is a profound theological as well as practical
concern that recognises that cheapened grace is literally devalued and will be
exploited. That certainly has been seen as the scenario of bankruptcy made
accessible - "it may well be socially desirable to provide easier ways for those
beyond hope of recover)' to walk away and start again, but the easier the system, the
more likely it is to be abused"3' - and any system which makes room for forgiveness
opens up a risk. But is that risk more serious than what is happening within the
vicious circle?
Along with the "risk" factor goes the possibility that forgiveness is a
papering-over of cracks, leaving exploitative relationships intact and power balances
undisturbed That has been the sad experience when calls to forgive in situations of
abuse have sent battered wives back to further violence. If repentance is neither a
condition for nor a guaranteed result of forgiveness, and forgiveness is kept distant
3° Shriver, 1995, p32
37 McClendon, 1988, p224
38 Weyer, 1994, plO
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from restorative justice, we seem to be back with cheap grace. Forgiveness which is
not oriented toward change is just that, but forgiveness which is part of the dynamic
of justice (seeking repentance without guaranteeing it. and challenging structures
and powers) is more. Debt forgiveness can therefore be more than a new "sticking
plaster" on poverty: it may be a "necessary first step toward God's project of justice
and peace"".
The cost of such forgiveness is not to be ignored either, but the real question
is who pays it. It is the individualism of our current thinking which "throws the
social and economic risks of credit on creditors and debtors rather than on society at
large"'" (although, as we have seen there are costs to society' in bad debt which may
be harder to measure, at least in economic terms). We may be content with the
burden of default falling on the irresponsible lender, or the loan shark, but less so if
the creditor may feel the pain of default as acutely as the debtor feels his problems.
The perspective adopted here pushes us towards some way in which the cost of
forgiveness, of releasing those without hope from the spiral of debt, may be shared
within the community (which, we have seen, may have a crucial role in forgiveness).
But there is a greater problem, already noted in the context of Third World
debt, with the appropriateness of the language of forgiveness when we may feel that
the debtor is free of blame (and even that the creditor / forgiver carries a greater
share of any blame). Not only may debt "forgiveness" carry connotations of
judgments that are inappropriate, but the language may be seen as belonging to and
indeed perpetuating a hierarchy in which the debtor's lower place is ensured more
completely by being "le1 off than if he sought equality by paying his debtsu
Although it might be argued that the theology of original sin in which forgiveness is
Biblically rooted may free it from some of the focus on individual blame, there is no
doubt that there is a real difficulty here, of language at least. One issue is whether
the language and realisation of forgiveness reinforce the low self-esteem of the
debtor, or whether debt forgiveness may in fact renew a sense of responsibility , as
Ringe has suggested as a possible interpretation of Matthew 18.21-354-.
While Shriver's "moral truth" may have, inescapably, a dimension of
judgment on injustice which must not be evaded or glossed over, the Biblically- and
theologically-rooted understanding of forgiveness has at its heart not individual guilt
Ringe, 1995, p209
4® Sullivan (and others), 1989, pt41
41 Heller, 1987, pl3
42 Ringe, 1995, p210
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and blame bui release from ihe tyranny of the past, its poisoning of the future by
means of the perpetuation of injustice, thus we can speak of "forgiving reality " or of
tackling sinful structures by forgiveness. For that, the analysis of spiralling debt has
set the urgency of an agenda that has to find a way to break out of the vicious circles
defined by these structures It is ironic that a culture which finds it easy to release
people from the commitment ofmarriage (or at least is increasingly reluctant to hold
people securely bound to that), finds it very much harder to release them from the
financial commitments which have become debt problems". Perhaps it says
something about which kind of commitments are at the heart of what that
community is about; it certainly reflects what Ilayek has to say about the centrality
of market transactions.
In economic terms, what does the social embodiment of forgiveness look
like'.' What might it mean to talk of forgiving economic realities and structures? To
talk in such terms may, as noted in other contexts, seem like evasion of the demand
for justice; indeed, it would be so if it merely means tolerating the economic
structures which produce paralysing debt, or declining to challenge the policies of
banks and other financial institutions. But forgiveness may be the most profound
challenge, and the most effective route towards justice. Especially where the
injustice is current, or currently controversial, forgiving a sinful reality and its
structures may shake the economic thinking that assures both the comfortable and
the suffering that there is no alternative.
An economics of grace is a profound challenge to the ideology of market
society. Forgiveness seen as determination to break the power of the sins of the past
on the present and future runs directly contrary to neo-liberal contract-centred
justice; as Oakman again puts it. "if God's justice and forgiveness disrupt human
standards of justice, so much more is this the case with human notions of
economics"". For that very reason, it sounds implausible, dangerously impractical
and disruptive of the market that we are told has served us well. Disruptive
certainly, and dangerous too if it does not face the facts, but Ringe is right to suggest
that "imaginations constrained by the institutions of the powerful may need to be set
free by the wisdom of the poor", posing theological and economic questions from a
context "invisible to those who presume on its benefits" and discovering "the
^ Aphesis, in the New Testament, describes both kinds of release
44 Oakman, 1986, p 166
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illogical and impractical economy of grace and generosity (which) turns out to be
the model that sustains life for rich and poor alike"4-'.
All of that seems some distance from the economic realities assessed early in
this thesis, and beyond the hopes or expectations of the debtors interviewed. So,
largely, was any mechanism of release from debt - the values of the system
apparently internalised in curtailed expectations. Are there any signs, within or at
the edges of the system, of debt-release accepted at least as a pragmatic necessity (in
a context in which we have found massive amounts of debt are annually wTitten off
without apparently creating an expectation of debt release, at least among the
poorest) ? Rankruptcv (a legal device with possible "moral and cultural" roots in the
Biblical jubilee4* and in the sanctuary offered by the Church to the debtors of past
generations) has been seen as offering a "way out", whose chief selling point is the
possibility of new life. It is a dramatic understatement to say that the Biblical
standard of mercy is not achieved by current bankruptcy law4' (and the recent
changes may be seen to have taken us further from that), but it is the element in the
system which looks through forgiveness to rehabilitation and justice (albeit very
conditionally)48.
Of course, there are problems in developing this. As already noted,
structured or routinised forgiveness can become a matter for calculated avoidance of
justice; bankruptcy is a highly conditional form of forgiveness (and, as we found
above, hedging forgiveness with conditions in order to squeeze it into the political or
economic sphere may rob it of its power); forgiveness always costs and bankruptcy
law places that financial cost almost wholly on the creditor, while inflicting pain
and restrictions on the debtor with a clear message that this is someone not to be
trusted; the practicalities of access to bankruptcy are subject to the market forces in
fees which encourage or deter professionals whose assistance is necessary; and the
language of forgiveness may not be appropriate where the debtor is not seen to be at
fault. Yet there is a recognition here that the market system needs some "give" in its
joints4', and that creditor, debtor and community all have an interest in restoring the
debtor to active participation in both market and community.
45 Ringe, 1995, p210f
Sullivan and others, 1989, p4
4^ Hartropp. 1987. p 123
48 Ashley, 1983, pl94
49 Sullivan and others, 1989, p334
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In bankruptcy, then, the glimpses of forgiveness mav be seen as pointing
towards creative justice The discussion of international debt and its impact on the
poor of the Third World showed that there were other options there, and other
language perhaps more appropriate - debt cancellation, conciliator) delault.
repudiation, rescheduling etc - some of which carry much of this force of
"forgiveness" without the moral overtone, while others serve as reminders that the
language ofjustice has a place here too, since debt problems are not all to be solved
by negotiation if the (legal) justice of the debt is disputed. The strucUiral adjustment
programmes imposed by the World Bank as conditions even of debt rescheduling
may have their parallels in the conditions attached to Social Fund loans, and in the
restrictions placed on bankrupts: these share a concern to bind people into the rules
of the market without offering the wherewithal to participate, in either sphere, the
gap between the "structural salvation"5® prescribed by the World Bank and Range's
economics of grace, or belween bankruptcy and the forgiveness thai opens the wa\
to justice, seems great. Yet it is in that gap that the dialogue must take place.
Concluding Theological Reflection
That does not mean accepting a devalued form of forgiveness, or of justice,
in order to lit a theological notion into a resistant reality. The economic context
considered here is a crucial venue for God's project, not simply for thinking but for
action too. The Christian tradition of centuries of resistance to usury, of attempts to
establish pawnshops to mitigate the effects of poverty, of sanctuary for debtors and.
more recently, of building up credit unions belongs within that project and its
horizons of social justice and forgiveness. What has been argued here may provide
resources for continuing that tradition, challenging the Church to find new forms of
jubilee or of sanctuary appropriate in a current context where many desperately need
renewal or respite. In that context, debt is not the "social dynamite"5' it might seem
because it is regarded as the unplanned outcome of the operation of a credit market
that is central to the economy, unfortunate but not "unjust" and therefore not
requiring more than first aid to the casualties. What may be more in the nature of
dynamite to the structure of a system that too often turns a blind eye to its own
outcomes (or a judgmental eye to its victims) would be new forms of the jubilee or
new embodiments of the jubilee justice that operates through debt forgiveness.
^ George & Sabelli, 1994, p58
S' Sullivan and others, 1989, p334
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That dynamite is not a theological bombshell dropped from on high into the
economy; it must be worked out within that context, in the dialogue to which this
thesis is a contribution. And that must also be reflected back into theological
thinking. Just as Tawney traced the failure of the Puritans to build an adequate
ethicai basis for economic activity, "like ail failures which are significant, (to) the
soul of Puritanism itself", ethical thinking in this context has asked questions of
theology; the "boundaries of our (theological) thinking" are indeed broken open in
this process53, particularly the boundaries set by individualism, by the spiritualising
tendency to escape from the material significance of the Biblical tradition, and by
the separation of divine from human forgiveness and justice. We have rediscovered
the full meaning of the justification that is as effective in the material, social world
as in the spiritual realm. We have had to renew acquaintance with Bonhoeffer's
"cheap grace", and found new significance in it; we may also have rediscovered a
distinctively Christian way of confronting anu overcoming evil54, translated not into
a completely new or foreign context, but back into an original one.
For once. Bonhoeffer's theology seems to stop too soon, at the cross, when he
savs that "the wheel of historv cannot be turned back"55; in the struggle to resist
injustice, that is only half the truth, and leaves the trapped debtor with little hope.
For the problems, mistakes and injustices of the past to be overcome demands
engagement with precisely the theological question with which Edwin Muir wrestles
"Then how do I stand0
How can 1 here remake what there made me
.And makes and remakes me still0
Set a new mark? Circumvent history?
Nothing comes of history but history,
The stationary siorm that cannot bare
Its neutral violence,
The transitory solution that cannot wait,
The indecisive victory
That is like loss read backwards and cannot bring
Relief to you and me,
The jangling
Of all the voices of plant and beast and man
That have not made a harmony
Since first the great controversy began.
Tawney, 1926, p225
53 Ringe, 1995, p211
McGregor, 1960, p52
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And cannot sink to silence
Unless a grace
Come of itself to wrap our souls in peace
Between the turning leaves of history and make
Ourselves ourselves, winnow the grudging grain.
And take
From that which made us that which will make us again"*
There may be no good news for the poor, or hope ofjustice, unless that grace
takes economic shape; this thesis is intended as part of that ongoing project.
^ E Muir, "The Wheel", in Collected Poems, Faber & Faber, London, 1979
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